Nelson: The Essential Hero (52 page)

Villeneuve, having found that the Spanish ships which were supposed to join him at Cartagena were unready, had wasted no time. On 8 April he had passed Gibraltar, his ships being sighted and immediately reported to Sir John Orde, who was stationed off Cadiz. Orde with his four sail-of-the-line accordingly withdrew, in accordance with normal strategy, to join the British fleet off Ushant. When the enemy’s intentions were unknown, it was always wisest to concentrate forces so as to guard the approaches to the Channel. Nelson toiled westward against light head winds — ‘Dead foul! Dead foul!’ - longing for the Levanter that might boost him out of the Mediterranean. Fortune favoured the French. In the saga of the Long Watch that turned into the Long Chase it must be seen that Nelson’s strategy of keeping a distant watch in order to lure the French out of Toulon had proved successful. But Villeneuve’s ability in escaping - principally by going west of the Balearics instead of east as had been expected -must not be underestimated. At the moment he was ahead of Nelson, not only in fact, but in the strategical game that had been played out in the Mediterranean over so many long months. It was not until 5 May that Nelson dropped anchor off Gibraltar, by which time Villeneuve was well on his way across the Atlantic, cramming on all sail to reach the West Indies and fulfil his mission.

Nelson, after debating the other options - Ireland or the Channel -had come to the conclusion that the French were bound for the West Indies. His judgement was based not so much on rumours or considered speculation as on a private visit from Rear-Admiral Donald Campbell, a British officer in the Portuguese Navy, who had assured him that this was indeed their destination. (Campbell by this action was contravening his neutrality and was later dismissed his command at the instigation of the French Ambassador in Lisbon.) ‘If they are not gone to the West Indies,’ Nelson told Dr Scott, ‘I shall be blamed. To be burnt in effigy or Westminster Abbey is my alternative.’ After so many months at sea it was hardly surprising that all officers and men who could be spared from the duties of watering and victualling the ships hastened ashore to enjoy such pleasures as the Rock afforded. The fleet’s linen had also been landed. Nelson, having come to his decision, was naturally all eagerness to be under way as soon as possible, but for the moment the wind was still foul. Scott provides the following anecdote about him at this salient moment in his life, just before the Atlantic chase that was the forerunner of the drama of Trafalgar:

Lord Nelson, however, observing and weatherwise as he was, perceived an indication of a probable change of wind. Off went a gun from the
Victory
, and up went the Blue Peter, whilst the Admiral paced the deck in a hurry, with anxious steps and impatient of a moment’s delay. The officers said, ‘Here is one of Nelson’s mad pranks.’ But he was nevertheless right, the wind did become favourable, the linen was left on shore, the fleet cleared the Gut, and way they steered for the West Indies.

Villeneuve’s passage across the Atlantic took thirty-four days in a fleet fresh out of Toulon; Nelson took twenty-four in a fleet that had been at sea for many months and which, without the benefit of a

Nelson's course to and from the West Indies in search of Villeneuve

friendly port, had been entirely self-maintained. Yet, at this very moment, Napoleon was of the opinion that Nelson ‘must have gone back to England to revictual, and to turn over his crews to other ships; for his vessels require docking, and his squadron may be supposed to be in a very bad condition’. These vessels, which were indeed in need of docking, were meanwhile running down the northeast trades with their studding-sails set and a bone between their teeth. Even so the French, with their long start on them, were at Martinique by mid-May, when Nelson was only off Madeira. Villeneuve had eighteen sail-of-the-line (six of them Spaniards under an able Spanish admiral, Don Federigo Gravina) and six frigates. Nelson in pursuit had only ten sail-of-the-line and three frigates. If Ganteaume had effected his escape from Brest and rendezvoused with Villeneuve the combination of their fleets would have been more than the British, even under Nelson and aided by the West Indies ships, could have withstood. But Ganteaume was still locked up in port by Cornwallis when Villeneuve’s ships were waiting in Martinique. The instructions were for him to stay there for forty days until Ganteaume arrived (he never did) and during that time to employ himself by seizing whatever British possessions he could. He started with Diamond Rock - determined not to make the mistake of Missiessy - and compelled its surrender. This relieved the situation at Port Royal but did little else, and his main achievement during this period was the capture of a British homeward-bound convoy. He had now been reinforced by Rear-Admiral Magon from Rochefort with two eighty-gun ships, and further orders for him to wait thirty days for Ganteaume. The Emperor’s numerous orders, orders of a type which might have been explicit on the chessboard of Europe, had a habit of confusing his admirals. As E. H. Jenkins points out in his
History of the French Navy
: ‘Villeneuve objected with justice, that he could not both sail in sufficient force to capture British islands and yet be ready at Martinique to weigh at once when Ganteaume arrived. . . .’

On 4 June 1805, Nelson stood into Carlisle Bay, the open anchorage off the capital of Barbados. The last time he had been in Caribbean waters was in 1787, but he had known them since he was a midshipman, and he could well recall all the vexation he had experienced in them as a young captain. He had also, but perhaps he deliberately discarded the memory, married Fanny in the Caribbean. His presence in the area was quickly learned by Villeneuve who, in the course of standing south to attack Antigua, had captured the British convoy and learned at the same time that Nelson was in Barbados. He was told that the British consisted of fourteen sail-of-the-line, not ten, but the very name of Nelson was enough to dissuade him from any further activity. The object of his coming to the West Indies in the first place had been to draw Nelson away from the Continent and the approaches to the Channel. It seemed that his purpose was fulfilled and, although he had only been waiting for Ganteaume for twenty-six days, he was confident that the latter had not managed to slip out of Brest. In this he was correct, for Cornwallis kept so tight a watch that the French Admiral, who had been ordered only to slip out if he could do so without a battle, had never been able to make a move. On 9 June, Villeneuve made sail for Europe. Nelson had been distracted from heading for Martinique by information from General Brereton, who commanded the troops at St Lucia, that the enemy had gone south to attack Trinidad and Tobago. He wasted several days running south to Trinidad in the expectation of a battle that would prove as annihilating as the Nile. On finding that no French had passed in that direction, he bitterly retraced his course. As he later wrote : ‘But for false information I should have been off Port Royal as they were putting to sea; and our battle, most probably, would have been fought on the spot where brave Rodney beat de Grasse.’ He was now convinced that the enemy had left for Europe and that no further purpose could be served by staying in the West Indies. ‘Nelson, Napoleon said, ‘when he learns that Villeneuve is not at the Windward Islands, will go to Jamaica, and during the time he is wasting there in getting provisions and waiting for news, the great blows will be struck. Of course Nelson was well aware of the grave threat to Jamaica and indeed all the West Indian colonies. If they were lost it would be a disaster for Britain, but the greatest disaster of all would be if, in his absence, the threatened invasion of Britain itself took place.

On 13 June, taking with him from the West Indies squadron the
Spartiate
of 74 guns, which brought his numbers up to eleven, he set sail in pursuit of Villeneuve to Europe. His mood was black. Though it seemed that no more than his presence in the area had been enough to save the British colonies and, with the exception of one convoy, to protect the rich lifeline of shipping upon which much of the country's wealth depended, yet he had once again failed to bring the French to battle. On 21 June he recorded in his diary : ‘Midnight, very nearly calm, saw three planks, which I think came from the French Fleet. Very miserable, which is very foolish. So far everything he had done seemed ineffectual. Villeneuve had got out of the Mediterranean scot-free; he had then escaped without being brought to battle in the West Indies; and now, elusive as ever, he was away into the Atlantic, miles ahead of his pursuer. Ireland was a possible destination, so equally was the Channel. But these areas were covered by Cornwallis, and Nelson's duty now was once more to protect the Mediterranean. He swung south to pass through the Azores and headed direct for the approaches to Gibraltar. On 17 July, Cape St Vincent loomed ahead, that formidable outrider of Europe where he had first been sealed with fame. Throughout all these long months of endless seatime his kindness and consideration for his officers and men had never faltered. The
Superb
was a slow sailor and had delayed the fleet's progress on the way out, but Nelson had written to her captain, Richard Keats, ‘. . . I know and feel that the
Superb
does all that which is possible for a ship to accomplish; and I desire that you will not fret upon the occasion. We know from a letter written by one of his captains what they thought about him: ‘We are all half-starved, and otherwise inconvenienced by being so long away from a port, but our full recompense is that we are with Nelson.'

On 20 July, at Gibraltar, he recorded in his private diary : ‘I went on shore for the first time since the 16th of June, 1803; and from having my foot out of the
Victory
, two years, wanting ten days.'

Two days after Nelson set foot ashore in Gibraltar, the battle which he had been seeking for so long was fought off Cape Finisterre. Captain Bettesworth, a veteran of twenty-five who had been wounded in action even more times than Nelson, had been despatched in the brig
Curieux
in advance of the fleet to tell the Admiralty that Nelson was returning to Europe, and to convey his assessment of the French fleet’s movements. Bettesworth, sailing fast and direct for England, had come up with Villeneuve in the Atlantic, had stayed in the vicinity of the French long enough to ascertain their numbers and course, and had then made course to get this all-important information home.

On 9 July, Lord Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was given the news by Bettesworth in person. Although he was nearly eighty, Barham showed that he had lost none of the activity which had made his career in the Navy so remarkable. He immediately sent orders for Cornwallis to despatch the five ships-of-the-line which were on watch off Rochefort to join the ten with which Sir Robert Calder was blockading Ferrol. Calder, with these fifteen under his command, was ordered to intercept Villeneuve one hundred miles west of Cape Finisterre. On 22 July the two fleets were in contact. The wind was very light, a fog came down, and an indecisive action was fought in which, although the French and Spanish ships outnumbered the British by five ships-of-the-line, the victory went to Calder - two Spaniards striking their colours. Unfortunately, when dawn broke the next day, the two fleets were about seventeen miles apart and Calder, rather than following up the attack, contented himself with securing his two prizes and attending to the damage among his own ships.