On China (77 page)

37
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 268, 8–9.

38
“Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 14.

39
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s Meeting with the People’s Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 3:35–4:59 p.m.,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 270, 10–11.

40
“Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng, Subject: Vietnam: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40 p.m.,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 007, 2.

41
Ross,
The Indochina Tangle,
229.

42
“Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng, Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40 p.m.,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 007, 2.

43
Ibid., 5.

44
Brzezinski,
Power and Principle,
410.

45
“President Reporting on His Conversations with Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 009, 1.

46
Henry Scott-Stokes, “Teng Criticizes the U.S. for a Lack of Firmness in Iran,”
New York Times
(February 8, 1979), A12.

47
The lower figure appears in Bruce Elleman,
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989
(New York: Routledge, 2001), 285. The higher figure is the estimate of Edward O’Dowd in
Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War,
3, 45–55.

48
O’Dowd,
Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War,
45.

49
Deng Xiaoping to Jimmy Carter on January 30, 1979, as quoted in Brzezinski,
Power and Principle,
409–10.

50
“Text of Declaration by Moscow,”
New York Times
(February 19, 1979); Craig R. Whitney, “Security Pact Cited: Moscow Says It Will Honor Terms of Treaty—No Direct Threat Made,”
New York Times
(February 19, 1979), A1.

51
Edward Cowan, “Blumenthal Delivers Warning,”
New York Times
(February 28, 1979), A1.

52
Ibid.

53
One of the few scholars to challenge this conventional wisdom—and to emphasize the conflict’s anti-Soviet dimension—is Bruce Elleman, in his
Modern Chinese Warfare,
284–97.

54
For a review of various estimates of PLA casualties, see O’Dowd,
Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War,
45.

55
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 268, 8.

56
“Memorandum, President Reporting on His Conversations with Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/ 78–10/3/79, item no. 009, 2.

57
“Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File, 16.

58
“Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File, 15.

59
“President Carter’s Instructions to Zbigniew Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Brzezinski,
Power and Principle,
Annex I, 4.

60
By one estimate, as of 1986 Vietnam stationed “700,000 combat troops in the northern portion of the country.” Karl D. Jackson, “Indochina, 1982–1985: Peace Yields to War,” in Solomon and Kosaka, eds.,
The Soviet Far East Military Buildup,
as cited in Elleman,
Modern Chinese Warfare,
206.

61
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the Vice President’s Meeting with People’s Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, August 28th, 1979, 9:30 a.m.–12:00 noon,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 279, 9.

62
“Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and Premier Hua Guofeng of the People’s Republic of China: Tokyo, July 10th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Subj. File, Box No. 38, “Memcons: President, 7/80.”

63
As quoted in Chen Jian,
China’s Road to the Korean War
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 149.

64
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Conversation with Vice Premier Geng Biao of the People’s Republic of China: Washington, May 29th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 70, “Geng Biao Visit, 5/23–31/80,” Folder, 5.

65
Lee,
From Third World to First,
603.

1
George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,
A World Transformed
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 93–94.

2
Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, § 3.1.

3
Joint Communiqué Issued by the Governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (August 17, 1982), as printed in Alan D. Romberg,
Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations
(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 243.

4
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,
Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 151.

5
Ibid.

6
Ibid., 148–50.

7
John Lewis Gaddis,
The Cold War: A New History
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 213–14, note 43.

8
Hu Yaobang, “Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization—Report to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: September 1, 1982,”
Beijing Review
37 (September 13, 1982): 29.

9
Ibid., 30–31.

10
Ibid.

11
Ibid.

12
Charles Hill, “Shifts in China’s Foreign Policy: The US and USSR” (April 21, 1984), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL), 90946 (Asian Affairs Directorate, NSC).

13
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “China-USSR: Maneuvering in the Triangle” (December 20, 1985), RRPL, 007-R.

14
“Memorandum to President Reagan from Former President Nixon,” as appended to Memorandum for the President from William P. Clark, re: Former President Nixon’s Trip to China (September 25, 1982), RRPL, William Clark Files, 002.

15
George P. Shultz,
Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 382.

16
Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, April 30, 1984,”
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), book 1, 603–8; “Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, April 27, 1984,”
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
, book 1, 579–84.

17
Donald Zagoria, “China’s Quiet Revolution,”
Foreign Affairs
62, no. 4 (April 1984): 881.

18
Jonathan Spence,
The Search for Modern China
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 654–55.

19
Nicholas Kristof, “Hu Yaobang, Ex-Party Chief in China, Dies at 73,”
New York Times
(April 16, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/16/obituaries/hu-yaobang-ex-party-chief-in-chinadies-at-73
. html?pagewanted=1.

20
Christopher Marsh,
Unparalleled Reforms
(New York: Lexington, 2005), 41.

21
Richard Baum,
Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 231–32.

1
Jonathan Spence notes that 1989 represented a convergence of several politically charged anniversaries: it was “the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, the fortieth birthday of the People’s Republic itself, and the passage of ten years since formal diplomatic relations with the United States had been reinstituted.” Spence,
The Search for Modern China
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 696.

2
Andrew J. Nathan, “Preface to the Paperback Edition: The Tiananmen Papers—An Editor’s Reflections,” in Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Perry Link, eds.,
The Tiananmen Papers
(New York: Public Affairs, 2001), viii.

3
Richard Baum,
Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 254.

4
Nathan, Introduction to
The Tiananmen Papers
, “The Documents and Their Significance,” lv.

5
An example of one such attempt to implement conditionality was the Clinton administration’s policy of conditioning China’s Most Favored Nation trade status on changes in its human rights record, to be discussed more fully in Chapter 17, “A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era.”

6
David M. Lampton,
Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 305.

7
George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,
A World Transformed
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 89–90.

8
Ibid., 97–98.

9
Congress and the White House shared a concern that visiting students who had publicly protested in the United States would be subject to punishment on their return to China. The President had signaled that applications for visa extensions would be treated favorably, while Congress sought to grant the extensions without requiring an application.

10
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
100.

11
Ibid., 101.

12
Ibid.

13
Ibid., 102.

14
Ibid.

15
Lampton,
Same Bed, Different Dreams,
302.

16
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
105–6. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen disputes this account in his memoirs, averring that the plane was never in any danger. Qian Qichen,
Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy
(New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 133.

17
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
106.

18
Ibid.

19
Qian,
Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy,
134.

20
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
109.

21
Ibid., 107.

22
Ibid.

23
Ibid., 107–8.

24
Ibid., 107–9.

25
Ibid., 110.

26
Deng had made clear that he intended to retire very shortly. He did, in fact, do so in 1992, though he continued to be regarded as an influential arbiter of policy.

27
The five principles of peaceful coexistence were negotiated by India and China in 1954. They concerned coexistence and mutual noninterference between countries with different ideological orientations.

28
Deng made a similar point to Richard Nixon during the latter’s October 1989 private visit to Beijing: “Please tell President Bush let’s end the past, the United States ought to take the initiative, and only the United States can take the initiative. The United States is able to take the initiative. . . . China is unable to initiate. This is because the stronger is America, the weaker is China, the injured is China. If you want China to beg, it cannot be done. If it drags on a hundred years, the Chinese people can’t beg [you] to end sanctions [against China]. . . . Whatever Chinese leader makes a mistake in this respect would surely fall, the Chinese people will not forgive him.” As quoted in Lampton,
Same Bed, Different Dreams,
29.

29
Some in the White House maintained that it was unnecessarily provocative to invite Fang Lizhi to attend a presidential banquet with the same Chinese authorities he was criticizing. They blamed the American Embassy in Beijing for failing to forewarn them of the impending controversy. In including Fang on the list of potential invitees, the American ambassador in Beijing, Winston Lord, had in fact flagged him as an outspoken dissident whose inclusion might provoke Chinese government consternation, but who nonetheless merited an invitation.

30
“Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, June 12, 0500 Local (June 11, 1989),” in Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans, eds.,
Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History
, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 16 (June 1, 1999), Document 26.

31
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
99.

32
U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, “China and the U.S.—A Protracted Engagement,” July 11, 1989, SECRET, in Michael L. Evans, ed.,
The U.S. Tiananmen Papers: New Documents Reveal U.S. Perceptions of 1989 Chinese Political Crisis,
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (June 4, 2001), Document 11.

33
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
101–2.

34
Deng’s reference was to Winston Lord.

35
Qian,
Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy,
140.

36
Bush and Scowcroft,
A World Transformed,
174.

37
Ibid., 176–77.