Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (26 page)

Even though there was no choice but to carry out the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, the above measures largely contained the attempts made by Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, and other elders to expand it. However, open disapproval of reforms continued in the name of the campaign. The campaign still had the loudest voice in the nation’s media, while the voice of reform was still extremely weak. The majority of cadres who were at the forefront of reform were in a difficult position. With the 13th Party Congress only several months away, I sensed it would be difficult in the existing political climate to make it a congress that supported reform. It was time to decisively change the situation.

On April 28, 1987, I had a long talk with Deng Xiaoping. I reported to him that after several months of the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, the prevailing climate had changed. The situation that existed before, in which the media had been taken over by supporters of liberalism, had been turned around. However, certain people were using the campaign to resist reform. This attitude was incompatible with the goals of making the 13th Party Congress a meeting that supported reform, so it was important, if we wanted the 13th Party Congress to be successful, for us to start right away to highlight reform in the media.

Deng supported my view. He asked me to carefully prepare and deliver a speech on this matter soon.

On May 13, 1987, I spoke at a meeting of cadres involved with propaganda, theory, and media, and from the Central Party School. At around that time, Deng Xiaoping told foreign guests that socialism did not just mean being poor, and that the mistakes of being too far to the left were the most important lessons learned in China’s pursuit of socialism. Because of his remarks, my speech had much more impact. In the meetings of the Secretariat and the Politburo, in addition to harshly criticizing the disturbances caused during the Anti-Liberalization Campaign by attempts to use the left against the right to ignore the limits set by the Number Four Document, I reiterated the following:

First, after several months of effort, the overall climate has changed. The spreading of liberalization has successfully been stopped. From this point on, we must emphasize reform. The 13th Party Congress must be a meeting that supports the Reform and Open-Door Policy. We must make preparations for a successful 13th Party Congress.

Second, this campaign was meant to resolve the problem of the spreading of liberalization. Spreading could have been avoided from the start; it was only a case of a failure in leadership. It is not a difficult matter to resolve.

But after we have resolved the problem of spreading, the next step is to look to long-term efforts. First, we must depend on education; and second, we must rely on continued efforts in reform. Only with the reform programs will productivity develop and people’s living standards rise, so people can see the advantages of socialism—and then the influence of liberalism will naturally wane. From this point of view, only reform can deliver the aims of upholding the Four Cardinal Principles. Failure to carry out reform will ultimately end in the overturning of the Four Cardinal Principles.

Therefore, we cannot rely on the repeated waging of campaigns to resolve the fundamental problems of liberalization. We cannot let the issue of spreading liberalization change our resolve to develop productivity through the reform programs. To resolve the problem of spreading liberalization, it was right to take time to root out the disturbances from the right, but from a long-term and fundamental viewpoint, the barriers against reform have come from the left.

Third, the Four Cardinal Principles are the basis of our political system. Reform is our general direction and policy for the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The characterization of the Four Cardinal Principles as the principle and the Reform and Open-Door Policy as only the means was an attempt to overturn reform in the name of upholding the Four Cardinal Principles, that is, to denounce the new policy set forth at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in the name of upholding the Four Cardinal Principles. If the reform is only a means and only a specific tactic, then what is socialism with Chinese characteristics? We should not treat reform as though it were liberalization, nor should we uphold the Four Cardinal Principles in a dogmatic manner. We must use the concept of reform to interpret the Four Cardinal Principles. Otherwise, the result will be the overturning of reform, and a falling into the trap of leftist dogma. If so, “upholding” would have only a utopian meaning and the resulting socialism would be Soviet-style, not one with Chinese characteristics.

Fourth, we must understand the importance of productivity. Gains in productivity are the standard for judging whether a society is progressing or in recession. Especially in our country, which is in the initial stage of socialism, increasing productivity is a must. The leftist viewpoint prolonged its existence for a long time with talk about production relations, without actually developing productivity.

As for what socialism is, there are many attributes that have been attached to it over the years. For example, the Soviet-style economic model was in fact an economic model for times of war, but we took it on as though it were economic planning intrinsic to socialism. In theoretical studies, some have branded the methods that are beneficial to the development of productivity and socialist modernization as capitalist, while labeling other methods that prevent the development of productivity as socialist. Even now these viewpoints that are disconnected from reality and rigid in their reasoning remain prevalent in the theoretical realm. We must further emancipate our minds and advocate bold explorations.

After my speech, most of the cadres showed support and the prevailing climate turned in favor of reform. This made for a successful drafting of the 13th Party Congress report.

E
ven before the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun’s situation was not good. Starting in 1986, Deng Xiaoping had distanced himself from Hu Qiaomu and had not met with him for a long time. Hu had made several attempts to arrange appointments but was turned down each time; this made him very worried. He had asked [China’s president] Yang Shangkun to speak to Deng on his behalf.

Deng Xiaoping treated Deng Liqun a little better, but had noted that he liked being involved in left-wing type activities. Deng once commented on how Deng Liqun had proposed a revision to the draft of the “Resolution to Build a Spiritual Civilization” at the Beidaihe discussion. He had quoted Deng Xiaoping extensively but had actually been attempting to effect a major turn to the left. Deng was still referring to this in a talk with me as late as March 1987. Deng said Deng Liqun was very stubborn, like a Hunan mule.

At the time, amid the general climate of reform under the advocacy of [Hu] Yaobang, Zhu Houze headed the Department of Propaganda and consistently promoted a tolerant and relaxed environment for intellectuals. People in the intellectual realm dared to voice their opinions and ignored the leftists. For a period of time, the forces of conservatism, rigidity, and dogmatism represented by Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun were marginalized.

However, after Yaobang resigned and the Anti-Liberalization Campaign began in earnest, they [Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun] were suddenly anti-liberalization heroes and posed as victors. They hoped to take advantage of the situation by venting their suppressed fury. While Yaobang was in charge of the work of the Central Committee, I was busy dealing with economic and foreign affairs, and had very little involvement in the theoretical and metaphysical arena.

Frankly, I had no interest in it. I felt Yaobang was wrong to ignore Deng Xiaoping’s directions. I believed he had not considered the big picture, and that his actions had not helped the overall situation. And it had not been good for Yaobang himself. Therefore, I was in a relatively neutral position in the struggle between Yaobang and Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun.

Nor did Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun regard me as a rival, even though I had opposed their attempts to spread the Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign into the economic arena. In the economic arena, I had always advocated emancipating minds, being bold in exploration, and eliminating restrictions. But I was rarely involved in the cultural realm, so did not have any direct confrontations with the two.

After Yaobang resigned, however, I was in charge of the Central Committee’s work. The situation soon changed, as I tried to cool down the Anti-Liberalization Campaign and proceed moderately. I tried to ensure that the fewest possible people were harmed and actively protected reform. Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun wanted to go all out, making direct confrontation difficult to avoid. They soon came to regard me as their principal rival.

In March, I suggested to Comrade Xiaoping that Li Ruihuan be moved from Tianjin [where he was Party secretary] to the Department of Propaganda to assist Deng Liqun in theoretical work; Deng Xiaoping approved. With two people in charge, different opinions could be heard. Issues from the lower levels could be reported, unlike when one person was in charge. However, Chen Yun opposed the idea, so it was not carried out.

Later, I felt that a resolution of this matter was necessary because reforms urgently needed new theories and guidelines. Theoretical studies needed to proceed alongside the actual practice of reform. However, with Deng Liqun in charge, nothing would get done in this area; on the contrary, he was a counterproductive force. I expressed my view that if Deng Liqun were to continue to head theoretical studies, not only would there be no progress in the development of theories, but there could be extra barriers to their development. Therefore, I proposed at the 13th Party Congress that Deng Liqun be made a member of the Politburo to give him a position from which he could speak out and voice his opinions—but also to remove him from the Secretariat so he would no longer head theoretical and metaphysical work.

While this matter was in planning stages, Comrade Li Rui [a pro-reform elder] wrote a letter to me to report that while in Yan’an,
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Deng Liqun had exhibited disreputable and immoral behavior and was therefore unfit to lead work in ideology and propaganda. I forwarded the letter to Deng Xiaoping, who responded by issuing a decree that Deng Liqun should no longer be in charge of propaganda. Both were forwarded to Chen Yun and Li Xiannian to read. They both wrote comments praising Deng Liqun but were unable to directly object to Deng Xiaoping’s decree that Deng Liqun be removed from his post in charge of propaganda. So the decision was finalized.

On July 7, 1987, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting in his house of the Five-Person Group [set up to exercise the power of the Politburo Standing Committee until the 13th Party Congress] and formally announced his decision. I suggested Hu Qili take over this work, and everyone agreed. A decision also was made to dissolve the Research Office of the Secretariat, of which Deng Liqun was chief, since it had been producing public commentaries casting doubt on reform. Deng said that Deng Liqun should continue to be a member of the Politburo in the 13th Central Committee. The changes took effect immediately. [Party elder] Bo Yibo was assigned the task of talking to Deng Liqun. All of the arrangements proceeded according to Deng Xiaoping’s wishes.

As it turned out, because Deng Liqun’s opposition to reform made him unpopular, he lost in the election for members of the Central Committee of the 13th Party Congress. When Deng Xiaoping learned about this, he said he would respect the outcome of the election. As such, it was impossible for Deng Liqun to be a member of the Politburo. I suggested to the presidium of the 13th Party Congress that Deng Liqun be listed as a candidate for the Central Advisory Commission, so he could be a member of the Standing Committee of the Commission. The result was that he was elected into the Central Advisory Commission, but lost again in elections for its Standing Committee.

For the 13th Party Congress, we had slightly reformed the way in which elections were held, giving some democratic rights to the representatives. Representatives consequently used their rights to make this choice.

Removing Deng Liqun from his position as the head of propaganda, dissolving the Research Office of the Secretariat, and halting the publication of
Red Flag
magazine—all of this made some elder comrades, including Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, and Li Xiannian, displeased with me. It seemed to them that the things Hu Yaobang had wanted to do but couldn’t had finally been carried out by me. I had done what Yaobang had not been able to do. Therefore, they directed their antagonism toward me.

At the time I did not realize that these circumstances would have such profound ramifications. But when problems emerged with consumer prices in 1988, with the buying frenzy, bank runs, and inflation, they carried out a campaign against me, with the Party elders accusing me of wrongdoings and even calling for my impeachment, all of which was very much related to the above incident.

Deng Liqun was extremely close to Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen. He was highly regarded by them and won their positive recognition. In 1980, Deng Liqun actively promoted Chen Yun’s thinking and proposals in economics through the Research Office of the Secretariat under his control. Deng Liqun promoted Chen Yun’s economic ideas in an obvious attempt to use them to resist Deng Xiaoping’s ideas of reform.

As I mentioned above, in 1987, I suggested that Li Ruihuan be brought in to assist Deng Liqun in managing ideological studies. Chen Yun did not immediately comment, but after a day’s consideration, he told me through his secretary that it was better that the work be managed by Deng Liqun alone. He [Chen Yun] had turned down my suggestion.

On July 3, he [Chen Yun] spoke with Bo Yibo and published a speech titled “Those with significant responsibilities had better study some philosophy.” It was intended for my ears. Bo Yibo took notes and forwarded it to me. On the face of it, it was a suggestion for me to learn dialecticism; in fact, it was a criticism of me. He believed that I was unable to tolerate opposing opinions.

The main cause of this was my forcing Deng Liqun from the propaganda front as soon as I had taken power. Another issue was criticism I had made of the left. In particular was my May 13 speech, in which I had criticized Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun’s remarks. When the minutes were printed and sent to Chen Yun, he disagreed with my remark: “In the 1950s, the economic model copied was in fact a temporary economic model intended for times of war.”

After Deng Liqun lost in the 13th Party Congress elections, Comrade Chen Yun gave special instructions to ensure that all of Deng Liqun’s political privileges and living arrangements remained unchanged.

Deng Liqun was also an important associate of [Party elder] Li Xiannian. Li Xiannian had been in charge of the Fifth Office of the State Council, where Deng Liqun also worked. He participated in decision making and the drafting of Li Xiannian’s documents. In 1987, Deng Liqun was personally in charge of the group set up to edit and publish Li Xiannian’s selected works. When Deng Xiaoping’s decree to remove Deng Liqun from his position in charge of propaganda was circulated, Li Xiannian wrote, “Deng Liqun is a good comrade. We still need to fully utilize his skills.”

The relationship between Deng Liqun and Wang Zhen went even deeper. As far back as the establishment of the People’s Republic, Deng Liqun was the Propaganda Division head of the Xinjiang Bureau under the Central Committee that Wang Zhen headed. Wang Zhen later was criticized by the Central Committee for recklessly forcing the husbandry industry into collectives. Deng Liqun stood by him then and tried to defend him. Since then, Wang Zhen always trusted him, and they were very close. After the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, when Deng Liqun needed something to be said that he found difficult to say publicly, he often called on Wang Zhen to voice his ideas for him.

It was around the summer of 1987 when [son of Marshal Ye Jianying] Ye Xuanning called me to say that Wang Zhen wanted to have a talk with me, so I went to Wang Zhen’s home. Wang Zhen advised me, “You shouldn’t accept the position of General Secretary. There is a great deal of work to be done by the State Council that cannot be done without you, while there is not a lot to do at the Secretariat. We could ask Yao Yilin to take charge instead.” Ye Xuanning was in attendance when we had this talk.

At the moment, I was not really interested in the post of General Secretary, either, so I asked Wang Zhen to persuade Deng Xiaoping. Later, I learned that, in fact, Wang Zhen was actively promoting a motion to nominate Deng Liqun for the position of General Secretary. The move caused concerns among many people, who all warned me that no matter what, I should not yield the position to Deng Liqun, thus arousing my own sense of vigilance. These events are why it was not at all surprising that the Party elders deepened their disapproval of me after Deng Liqun lost in the elections.