Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (24 page)

Yaobang was amiable and open-minded and was able to listen to different opinions. He was very generous to people and did not like giving people a hard time. People could argue with him and even quarrel with him. I have said many times, just because he was open-minded by nature did not mean that we did not still have to consider the issue of the system of leadership. Since he was already seventy years old, after the Party elders were gone, who knows how long he would be able to lead?

In my speech at the Party life meeting, I said that we must rely on a system, not on individuals, since people could change. Without a good system, even great leaders such as Stalin and Chairman Mao had problems. I mentioned my letter to Xiaoping without explaining the contents of the letter. Moreover, my criticisms of Yaobang also touched upon the obeying of the rules of democratic centralism and Party discipline. Therefore, it is possible that my comments about Yaobang were interpreted as having also been the contents of the letter. This is probably how the rumor spread.

There was another rumor, which was not as widespread. I heard it much later. Yaobang had often spoken about the issue of Party elders possibly retiring before the 13th Party Congress. So there was a rumor that Deng Xiaoping once said in front of Yaobang and me that he would retire at the 13th Party Congress. Hu Yaobang purportedly responded that he would “lift both hands to approve,” while I replied, “You cannot retire, absolutely not!” This incident supposedly made Deng feel that Yaobang was up to no good. This is an entirely fictitious story.

Before Yaobang stepped down, Deng had never expressed in front of me, let alone in front of Yaobang and me, whether he would retire. The first time I heard of Deng saying he would resign from the Politburo Standing Committee and as chairman of the Central Advisory Commission was after the summer of 1986, when Yaobang told me about his talk with Deng. There was no occasion where Deng asked both of us for our opinions.

I indeed asked Deng to retain his official position, asking him not to resign from the Politburo Standing Committee. That was in 1987, after Yaobang had stepped down and I was already Acting General Secretary. Since Deng was still going to be in charge, I preferred that he do so from within the Party Standing Committee.

There is one other event worth mentioning. At a Politburo Standing Committee meeting in March or April 1983, Comrade Chen Yun’s criticism of Yaobang caused a small disturbance. Even though this incident had nothing to do with Yaobang’s resignation in 1987, rumors about the incident spread, some of which involved me.

At that meeting, the main agenda was to report to Deng and the Politburo Standing Committee about work on the economy. Deng Xiaoping felt at that time that annual target levels had been set too low for two consecutive years. The result was a huge overshooting of the target, which Deng disapproved of. But the comrades on the Planning Commission and I all felt that there would be no benefit at all to setting the target too high. It was better to have room to maneuver. The report was meant to explain our reasons clearly.

Yao Yilin and Song Ping then reported on behalf of the Planning Commission. After they gave their report, I spoke. In addition to agreeing with their assessment, I talked about the fact that there had been a big drop in the ratio of financial revenue to gross national product. This was normal, since we were paying back debts. But it could not go on for a long period of time or else finances at the central level would run into trouble.

After I finished speaking, without a chance to discuss what I’d said, Comrade Chen Yun pulled out a prepared speech, specifically raising many points about some of Yaobang’s recent remarks on economic issues. The criticism was very harsh. For example, Yaobang had said that the Ministry of Finance exaggerated a deficit year after year just to frighten people. Chen Yun said that the reported size of the deficit claimed was in fact real. He also criticized Yaobang for saying that the first Five-Year Plan had managed big enterprises but neglected small and midsize firms.

Since Yaobang had not anticipated this, after Chen Yun’s speech he made no rebuttal and only responded that he had made many mistakes and would carefully reconsider them. It appeared that Chen Yun had vented anger with Yaobang that had been accumulating over a long period of time.

Comrade Xiaoping was not willing to criticize Yaobang in this kind of setting and did not want to debate the issue. He seemed displeased. He said that discussion of such things could be put off for some other time, and that we were primarily there to hear the report. Because of this, the discussion did not continue.

It was difficult for others to give their opinions after Comrade Chen Yun made his speech. Hu Qiaomu, however, stood up and spoke. He said that the remarks made by Yaobang and criticized by Comrade Chen Yun had been spread widely and had caused huge disruptions to economic policies. He suggested calling for a meeting at the provincial and municipal levels to inform them of Chen Yun’s criticism. At the time, Deng Xiaoping had no choice but to say, “Very well, why don’t you discuss this later.”

A day or two later, Hu Qili suddenly appeared at my home and told me what was happening. Without telling anyone, Deng Liqun had already disseminated the Chen Yun criticism of Yaobang at the Politburo Standing Committee in a national conference held by the Xinhua News Agency. Hu Qili and I felt that this action was really harmful. This could cause nationwide confusion.

Since it was difficult for Yaobang to say anything, I had to intervene. I called Deng Liqun, criticized him for doing the wrong thing, and asked him to have Xinhua News Agency retrieve his speech and not distribute or disseminate it. That is what happened.

I then went to Tianjin. After I returned, Yaobang came to my home and said Deng Xiaoping had reconsidered the proposal for provincial and municipal level meetings and had decided they would not be held after all. I surmise that Xiaoping believed if the meetings were to take place, the impact would be even greater.

At the same time, Yaobang said that there were rumors of changes in the central leadership. I wondered whether Yaobang was being oversensitive. I told him, “You shouldn’t listen to those rumors. As far as I can see, Comrade Chen Yun only wanted to vent some of the anger he had accumulated all these years over some of the things you’d said. After the outburst, it will be over. Also, you should not read too much into it. Now that we are in the same boat, we should cross the river together. I don’t believe Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun have any other ambitions.”

That’s what I thought at the time. I said, “They are intellectuals. As for Chen Yun, he’s even less likely to have ambitions. We must stick together and not worry too much.”

Yaobang agreed with what I said. Later, I met Hu Qili, who immediately told me that after having spoken with me, Yaobang was in good spirits, and told him, “What Ziyang said was very good. What we must do now is cross the river together on the same boat.”

That is what happened. Perhaps there were rumors in public that people had criticized Yaobang at the Politburo Standing Committee meeting. In fact it was not like that. Chen Yun was the only one to give a speech, and because it was directed at Yaobang, no one was able to comment one way or the other. Originally, I too had some reservations about Yaobang on economic efforts and also had critical views about the way he went around making careless remarks. However, I did not think it was appropriate to raise such issues under the circumstances, so I didn’t say anything.

A few days later, Deng Xiaoping asked Yao Yilin and me over for a talk. Deng said that initially there was to be a meeting about Yaobang. But after considering the impact that would have, the meeting was canceled. He said that Yaobang had a lot of personal shortcomings but still needed to be supported.

I immediately voiced my agreement. Xiaoping then criticized Yao Yilin, because before this incident, Yao Yilin and Song Ping had written a letter addressed to the Politburo Standing Committee and Deng Xiaoping in which they accused Yaobang of making careless remarks that were not in line with the spirit of the 12th Party Congress. As a result, the Planning Commission was having difficulty carrying out its work.

Deng accused Yao Yilin, “You were venting your anger in the letter!”

Yao Yilin immediately replied, “Yes, I was.”

I
n the 1980s, our reform was in the difficult stage of laying its basic foundations. The events of that period had a significant impact on the modernization and development process and are worth remembering. Here I will recount some of those events, in bits and pieces. If I ever get the chance, I would like to recount more.

First, I will talk about the Anti-Liberalization Campaign
*
that occurred after Yaobang stepped down in 1987.

On January 4, 1987, Deng Xiaoping called a meeting at his house and the decision was made to accept Yaobang’s resignation. From January 10 to 15, a Party life meeting, carried out by the Central Advisory Commission and chaired by Bo Yibo, was held for the purpose of criticizing Hu Yaobang. On January 16, an expanded Politburo meeting was held to announce the acceptance of Yaobang’s resignation. Subsequently, a nationwide Anti-Liberalization Campaign was launched.

The broadly sweeping campaign began with a reemphasis on the Four Cardinal Principles and evolved into an Anti-Liberalization and Anti-Rightist Tendencies movement. It ended with the 13th Party Congress [in late 1987], which emphasized reform and opposed “ossification” and leftist tendencies. Over the year, the political climate made a complete 180-degree turnaround. Of course, the route actually taken was a tortuously winding one.

My activities in 1987 can roughly be divided into two major phases. From January to April, when I had just succeeded Yaobang as [acting] General Secretary, I took on the designated task of waging a nationwide Anti-Liberalization Campaign. Most of my energy and concentration was focused on figuring out how to prevent the campaign from overreaching, to control and limit the “left wing” who were hoping to use the campaign to oppose reform. This “left wing” struggle was in essence opposed to the principles set forth at the Third Plenum [in 1978].

The second phase ran from May until the beginning of the 13th Party Congress [in October]. During this period, I reemphasized reform, tried to prevent a swing to the left, and opposed ossified thinking—all with the preparation for the 13th Party Congress in mind.

The Cleansing Spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983 had taught us that people like [conservative ideologues] Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu must be prevented from seizing opportunities to launch overzealous campaigns. From the beginning, I made strict stipulations on the nature, scope, key points, policies, and methods of the campaign. In the drafting of the document “The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Notice Regarding Several Issues in the Current Anti-Liberalization Campaign,” which I supervised, I defined the campaign as focused on resolving issues of basic political principles and policy direction. This campaign was to be applied only within the Party and within the realms of metaphysics and politics. It was not to touch rural policies, or science and technology. Nor was it to have any bearing on issues of literary or artistic style. This campaign would not be conducted in the countryside, and only positive educational activities were to be carried out in enterprises and government organizations. And even within the metaphysical and political arenas, the campaign was to be limited to educational activities about political direction and principles. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign was to be conducted in accordance with the principles of the Third Plenum, and none of the old leftist methods were permitted.

Because the Spring Festival of 1987 fell on January 29, the notice issued by the Central Committee would have had to have been approved by the Politburo meeting scheduled for the afternoon of January 28. Hence it was impossible to disseminate before the Spring Festival. Yet the custom of visiting friends and relatives during the Spring Festival would make for the most effective way to spread the news.

To let people know about the rules regarding the campaign, I delivered a speech at a January 28 meeting in Beijing of senior cadres from the Central Committee, various organs of Party administration, government, and the military. The speech identified the scope, policy, key issues, and methods for the campaign, outlining the Central Committee’s approach so that the news could spread through the Spring Festival activities.

I specifically stated that “The Third Plenum resolved that there would be no more mass campaigns. However, people are accustomed to the old ways, so whenever we oppose anything, these methods are still being used. Now, in our approach to defeating liberalism, to avoid these mass campaign methods it is very important from the beginning to be alert to possible biased tendencies, especially ‘leftist’ ones. We cannot do what we did in the past, placing emphasis only on proceeding boldly and firmly while ignoring all policies and limits. The result of that would be mistakes being made from the start and an overreaching that in the end will only require correction. This time we will take a distinctly different approach from the past mass campaigns. From the beginning we will clearly define what can and cannot be done and declare specifically what the limits are. That’s how to avoid another mass campaign.” (At the time, the momentum had already begun, and we couldn’t halt the campaign altogether.)

My speech and the Central Committee’s “Notice Regarding the Anti-Liberalization Campaign” were derided as chains by those who had hoped for a full-blown campaign, such as Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, and Wang Renzhi. They felt that this notice [popularly known as the Number Four Document] had bound them hand and foot and protected bourgeois liberals. They opposed the document, but because it defined the scope, key points, and policy from the start, the campaign ended up hurting few people. There was no nationwide shock, no disruptions to the economy, and no great harm to reform. The overall result was quite good.

During this period of time, whenever I received foreign guests or spoke in public, I repeatedly confirmed that the principles set forth at the Third Plenum would not be changed. (There were doubts both at home and abroad, because when people heard “anti-liberalization” they thought it meant retrenchment in reform.) I emphasized that reforms would not backtrack, but rather would only improve. I reiterated that current urban and rural policies would not change; the overall approach to reform would not change; the policy of opening up to the outside world would not change; the drive to reenergize the domestic economy would not change; and the policy of rewarding individual knowledge and merit would not change. Moreover, we would attempt to build on these efforts.

In response to those who were worried about the campaign spreading to Hong Kong, I told some Hong Kong visitors that while the mainland was compelled to uphold the Four Cardinal Principles and to oppose liberalism in its pursuit of socialism, the meaning of “One Country, Two Systems”
*
was to allow the capitalist system to continue in Hong Kong and Macau, and to allow liberalism there. How could we possibly carry out the Anti-Liberalization Campaign in Hong Kong or Macau?

The main idea I put forward was this: “There are two basic points to the principles of the Third Plenum. One is the upholding of the Four Cardinal Principles, and the other is the Reform and Open-Door Policy. We cannot neglect either one. Omitting either one would result in the failure of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ In an earlier period, we neglected the Four Cardinal Principles, so now we are reemphasizing them. However, if we give up the Reform and Open-Door Policy, we will veer in another wrong direction.”

I hoped first to relieve the doubts people were having, and second to prevent anyone from accentuating the Four Cardinal Principles while resisting reform. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign caused great misunderstanding because people did not grasp the true meaning of the Third Plenum principles. Some believed that they only stood for reform, so when the Anti-Liberalization Campaign was proposed, it seemed to constitute a change in policy. I made clear that the Third Plenum principles included the two basic points. These talks had the effect of calming the public and greatly reduced the range of activities that pitted left against right and set anti-liberalization against reform. The forces behind ossified thinking and dogmatism, led by Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, and Wang Renzhi, were highly displeased by my strategy. They attempted to sway public opinion and assert pressure in every way possible to disrupt and change the Central Committee’s way of deploying the Anti-Liberalization Campaign.

From the start, when Wang Renzhi succeeded Zhu Houze as Director of the Propaganda Department, I told him to remember that there were two basic points and not to neglect the other when carrying out the Anti-Liberalization Campaign. I also told him that when carrying out his work, he should think for himself—meaning that he shouldn’t just obey [former Director of the Propaganda Department] Deng Liqun—and should respect the policies of the Central Committee.

However, in a meeting of provincial and municipal level department heads of propaganda, Wang Renzhi said, “The Anti-Liberalization Campaign marks the second ‘restoring of order from chaos’ since the fall of the Gang of Four.” His meaning was obvious, that the first case involved restoring order after the leftist chaos brought on by the Gang of Four; this time, order was being restored from the Third Plenum and reform. When this was reported to me, I reproached Wang Renzhi and asked him if Deng Liqun had asked him to say such a thing, but he refused to answer directly, conceding only that he’d expressed “undeveloped thoughts.” I had never had a bad impression of Wang before. When he was at the State Planning Commission, he was decent and honest in his economic research, so I had hopes that he might keep some distance from Deng Liqun. Therefore, I only criticized him orally and did not pursue it further. Nor did I reveal to the public what he had said or how I had criticized him, hoping to give him another chance.

Around the summer of 1987, Wang Ruilin [Deng Xiaoping’s secretary] forwarded me a letter from Wang Daming [a former Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department]. It claimed that some bureau chiefs in the Department of Propaganda, upon hearing Deng Xiaoping’s statement that the main agenda in the immediate future was to oppose the left, reacted with inappropriate emotional remarks, such as “We must hold out and resist!” and “There is still no telling who will win!”

On July 11, after Hu Qili had taken over the propaganda front, I called comrades from the front to a policy briefing that was also a work transition meeting. At the meeting, I harshly criticized Wang Renzhi and Wang Weicheng [a Deputy Director of Propaganda], according to what had been reported in this letter.

I said that the Department of Propaganda was in a bad state. “As soon as you heard that Deng Xiaoping was opposing the left, you all reacted as though the sky had fallen, and appeared grief-stricken as though your parents had just died. How can you possibly implement the policies of the Third Plenum correctly with this kind of attitude?” I demanded that they make real changes to the Department of Propaganda’s position, but they expressed no remorse, and only evaded the issue by disclaiming any knowledge of it.

In March 1987, a conference was held in Zhou County, Hebei Province, for a discussion of theory. Attending were the three organizations under the control of the left wing, led by Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu:
Red Flag
and
Literary and Art Theory and Criticism
magazines and the paper
Guangming Daily
. [Xinhua News Agency director] Xiong Fu and others took a stand to “restore order” from the “chaos” of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, complaining that the eight years since the Third Plenum had been a nightmare. During those years, Marxists had been under pressure and a fierce struggle was being waged between anti-liberals and liberals.

Everyone knew Xiong Fu had been the main drafter of the “Two Whatevers.”
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He portrayed people like himself as heroes of anti-liberalism and denied that anything positive had occurred in the eight years since the Third Plenum. Xiong Fu had been criticized by some cadres at the Third Plenum. Although Deng Liqun had opposed the “Two Whatevers,” his way of thinking had much in common with Xiong’s, so Deng Liqun befriended him and entrusted him with important responsibilities.

At that time, Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, Wang Renzhi, and others who were influenced by them criticized the Central Committee’s Number Four Document, which they said “bound the hands and feet of the Anti-Liberalization Campaign and strangled the activists’ fighting spirit while increasing the worries of those who opposed liberalism.” They also said the restrictions outlined in the Number Four Document emboldened those who were involved in liberalization. Some even complained that the Number Four Document had “poured cold water” on the Anti-Liberalization Campaign. The earlier Anti–Spiritual Pollution Campaign had lasted only twenty-seven days; this campaign, these people said, would not even last that long.

Their goal was to pressure me to revise the approach and let them proceed without the restrictions. They also complained that “criticizing those who speak of liberalization is allowed; criticizing those who actually
do
liberalization is not allowed.” They labeled liberals in the ideological and theoretical arena as “speaking liberalism” and those carrying out economic reform as “doing liberalism.” They said, “Liberalism in ideology and theory involves the superstructure, and liberalization in the economic area involves the base that is its source. If we cannot touch liberalization in the economic arena, then the basic problem cannot be resolved.”