Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (25 page)

They actively tried to breach the boundaries set by the Number Four Document and attempted to spread the Anti-Liberalization Campaign into the areas of economic, agricultural, and science and technology policies. They tried to criticize and retaliate against reform on all fronts.

During the New Year and Spring Festival activities and during talks with foreign guests, I proposed the idea of the “two basic points” of the Third Plenum principles. It was not long before someone suggested that the “two basic points” could not be considered on the same level: the Four Cardinal Principles were principles; reform was only the means.

The person who proposed this was Lu Zhichao, the leftist bureau chief at the Theoretical Department of the Department of Propaganda. Deng Liqun approved of him and had on several occasions proposed making him Deputy Director of Propaganda. But since I always opposed it, he had never made it to this position. I later insisted on his leaving the Department of Propaganda. [Director of the Organization Department] Song Ping discussed it with Deng Liqun, and they had him placed in the post of deputy general secretary of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The leftists organized a conference for theoretical discussion through the education department head of the Central Party School, Jiang Liu. The agenda was to discuss the “principle versus means” issue concerning the Four Cardinal Principles and the Reform and Open-Door Policy. The discussion was meant to point out that I had made the two ideas parallel—or degraded the principle by overemphasizing the means. They hoped to downgrade reform in the name of upholding the Four Principles. When I heard about the event, I asked the president of the Central Party School to investigate. When the conference was held, Jiang Liu found an excuse to not participate. Nothing came of it.

Faced with such resistance from the left, I spoke at a national meeting of Propaganda Department leaders of provincial and local levels on March 13, 1987, and stated that we must further unify our views on the Central Committee’s Number Four Document and should completely, carefully, and accurately carry out its spirit. I criticized statements that had characterized the Number Four Document as restrictive, and spoke out against efforts to expand the Anti-Liberalization Campaign into the economic arena.

Since the timing was not yet right, my criticism of such incorrect thinking remained vague and lenient. I thought at the time that in order to turn things around, I would have to find the right opportunity to strike back forcefully. I needed to resist these forces to contain the Anti-Liberalization Campaign.

Another issue was how to deal with people implicated in all of this. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign was not just a theoretical issue. My biggest headaches came from the issues of whether to punish people, how to reduce the harm done to people, and how to contain the circle of people being harmed. From the beginning of the campaign, some Party elders were also very enthusiastic and wanted to punish a lot of people. Deng Xiaoping had always believed that those who proceeded with liberalization within the Party should be severely punished. Wang Zhen and other elders believed this as well. People like Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu were even more eager to take the opportunity to destroy certain people and take pleasure in the aftermath.

Under these circumstances, it was difficult to protect certain people, or limit the number being hurt or even to reduce the degree of harm that was done. Hence when it was drafted, the Number Four Document set strict limits on the punishment of those designated by the campaign as having made mistakes. The document defined this as: “Punishments that will be publicized and administrative punishments must first be approved by the Central Committee, and are to be meted out to those few Party members who openly promote bourgeois liberalism, refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions, and have extensive influence.” The document also stated, “For those who hold some mistaken views, criticisms by fellow Party members may be carried out in Party group administrative meetings. They should be allowed to hold to their own views and the method of carrying out the criticism must be calm.”

At the meeting of national Propaganda Department leaders and on other occasions, I also spoke on how to win over the vast majority of people in the theoretical and cultural domains. I suggested we cooperate even with people with biased or false ideas. I pointed out, “Among Party members working in the theoretical and cultural fields, there are those who clearly uphold the Four Cardinal Principles but are a bit conservative and rigid; some are enthusiastic about reform yet have made statements that are inappropriate. We cannot just label the former as dogmatic or the latter as pursuers of liberalization. We should educate and cooperate with them all.”

When proceeding with the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, I had intentionally emphasized that we should classify those who had taken faulty liberal actions as well as those who were too conservative and rigid into the same group of people who were too biased. The purpose was to avoid or reduce the harm being done to people.

Deng Xiaoping suggested making a list of liberals, and punishing them one by one. In addition to [liberal editor] Wang Ruowang and [dissident astrophysicist] Fang Lizhi, whom Deng had long wanted to expel from the Party, the first draft of this list—which included [prominent economist] Yu Guangyuan—was proposed by Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu. I suggested that according to the spirit of the Number Four Document, the criticism of Yu Guangyuan should be done at a Central Advisory Commission Party life meeting, with no administrative punishment. On March 2, 1987, Deng asked me at his house how the case of Zhang Guangnian [a prominent poet and literary critic] should proceed. I replied that I thought it would be best to employ the same method used with Yu Guangyuan. There were others on the list, but they did not pass through the approval process.

Some people in the Central Discipline Inspection Commission remained fervent about punishing people for liberalism, and Deng Liqun cooperated with them. He had help from the Research Office of the Central Committee Secretariat. They gathered materials and compiled a record of things people had said as evidence of their incorrect opinions. They then drew up a list of names that was sent to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission for comments and then forwarded it, in batches, to the Central Committee Secretariat.

If this were to continue, batch after batch, one could just imagine how many people would be punished. I had no option but to deal with this by stalling. Since these lists had to be discussed by the Secretariat, I would hold meetings infrequently and discuss only a few cases at each meeting. Differences of opinion inevitably arose during the discussions. If a discussion was inconclusive, the case would continue to be discussed at the next meeting. Not many people were punished, and the cases that were never discussed disappeared into oblivion.

During the campaign, the Secretariat decided to expel from the Party [influential journalist] Liu Binyan and [liberal intellectual] Zhang Xianyang. [Playwright] Wu Zuguang was originally marked to be expelled from the Party but ended up being “persuaded to quit.” [
People’s Daily
deputy chief editor] Wang Ruoshui was originally marked to be “persuaded to quit” but ended up being discharged. [Liberal intellectual] Su Shaozhi was originally marked for expulsion but I proposed removing him from his post as director of the Institute of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought but retaining his Party membership.

[Intellectual] Sun Changjiang was marked to be expelled, but because Marshal Nie [Rongzhen] spoke up for him, he was not punished. Marshal Nie did a good thing. When he learned that Sun Changjiang’s case was being discussed at the Secretariat, he wrote a note to Chen Yun praising Sun’s work at the
Science and Technology Daily
and suggesting he not be punished. Chen Yun, who was at the time the secretary of the Party Discipline Inspection Commission, agreed with Marshal Nie. I took the opportunity to comment on the document along these lines: “The treatment of other cases shall be dealt with in the spirit of Marshal Nie and Chen Yun’s directive,” meaning they would be dealt with as Sun Changjiang had been. After that, the punishments practically came to an end.

On the issue of whether or not to publicize the names of people being criticized, the Number Four Document set limits and preferences: articles containing personal attacks or abusive language were not to be allowed, and inundating the media with meaningless assertions must be avoided. Inappropriate use of the Cultural Revolution–style language of past mass campaigns was prohibited. If those who were being criticized provided concrete and reasonable rebuttals, they should be published as well. Any publications unrelated to the campaign should avoid publishing articles of this kind.

However, as soon as the campaign started, Deng Liqun organized a group to employ the methods used in the mass criticisms of the Cultural Revolution: collecting articles and speeches of those they deemed as having made the mistake of liberalization; compiling digests of their so-called “incorrect opinions,” which were printed into booklets; making attacks on remarks taken out of context; distributing this material to staff writers of relevant organizations, inviting them to write their own criticisms according to the compiled digest. They published article after article, taking on the form of mass criticisms by quoting out of context and exaggerating a person’s offenses—all in an arbitrary and tyrannical manner.

At a Secretariat meeting, I criticized Deng Liqun and asked this group to stop this behavior. In a later meeting of provincial and municipal propaganda heads, I praised only articles by [Heilongjiang Party secretary] Chen Junsheng and [political reform think tank head] Bao Tong. I believed their articles were carefully reasoned and had a positive effect, unlike others that failed to lay out reasons, were simplistic and rough, and attempted to pressure people by labeling them.

I said that in the future, when publishing any critical article, the effect needed to be considered; that is, whether it had the power of persuasion and whether people could bear reading it. The articles written by Deng Liqun’s group were in general not welcomed, as they were infused with methods of Cultural Revolution mass criticisms. As a result, articles criticizing liberalism appeared less and less often.

After the resignation of Yaobang, another issue emerged in the Anti-Liberalization Campaign: “guilt by association.” Many people, including Party elders, had long objected to the promotion decisions Yaobang had made. They accused him of promoting people based on their skills without regard for their [political] virtue. In addition to preferring smooth talkers, he had also promoted people in the “Youth League Faction” to important positions. In the Party life meeting to criticize Hu, some elders raised the issue of the so-called “Youth League Faction,” accusing Yaobang of favoring this group.

I thought that if this issue were allowed to stay on the agenda, the effect could be excessive. So I recommended that no matter what, they should not raise the issue of a “Youth League Faction,” of Yaobang attempting to build a faction. I explained that the case was very difficult to judge, given that the Communist Youth League was the organization responsible for training and supplying cadres for the Party.

However, the issue never dissipated. In March 1987, even Deng Xiaoping remarked that Yaobang seemed to have promoted cadres from a certain faction. In the Number Four Document and in many of my speeches, I stated that we would absolutely not find people guilty by association; we would not do as was done during the Cultural Revolution, labeling people because of their connection to someone else. I raised the issue with Deng Xiaoping and suggested that we minimize the changing of personnel in this campaign. In any case in which the existing situation was tolerable, we would avoid reshuffling. Even if reshuffling were found to be necessary, we would do everything possible to delay the change and proceed slowly, so as to reduce the shock. Deng agreed.

It was Hu Yaobang who had proposed Wang Meng for the position of Minister of Culture. Deng Liqun and his associates had always seen him as a representative of liberalism. Naturally, they wanted to force him out. As soon as Yaobang resigned and the Anti-Liberalization Campaign was started, this change was proposed. I was firmly opposed. I told Deng Liqun and Wang Renzhi that Wang Meng would not be removed. The president of the
People’s Daily
, Qian Liren, who himself had been promoted from the “Youth League,” was relatively progressive, so Deng Liqun wanted to take the opportunity to remove him as well; I also objected to this. Bo Yibo told me that Shandong Party Committee secretary Liang Buting was a member of Yaobang’s faction and maintained a close relationship with Yaobang; since Shandong was a major province, he needed to be replaced. I found an excuse to object to this change.

It was impossible to prevent all the personnel changes. Zhu Houze, the Director of Propaganda, was in a very sensitive position, so his removal was unavoidable, as was that of Wei Jianxing, the Director of Organization, and Ruan Chongwu, the Minister of Public Security. For these sensitive bodies, the elders were extremely intent on having people in charge with whom they were familiar. In these situations, there was no choice but to make the changes. I did my best under the circumstances to arrange other positions for them. A female party secretary in Jiangxi was also removed, mainly for incompetence unrelated to the campaign. Also, Zhang Shuguang, Party secretary of Inner Mongolia, was removed because he had made some inappropriate remarks and, after Yaobang resigned, had exhibited attitude problems that triggered a lot of criticism. All of these terminations were handled with caution and new positions were arranged for all of them.

In general, throughout the campaign, excessive harm and major reshuffles were averted. The old habit of implicating or labeling people solely because of their associations was not repeated.