Red Star Rogue (39 page)

199  
While the Nixon transition: Nixon and Ford: Uneven Access, CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates,
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., May 1996.

200  
It was the way:
Andrew and Gordievsky,
KGB: Inside Story,
p. 537.

201  
Haig insisted the photo:
Sontag et al.,
Blind Man’s Bluff,
pp. 116–17.

202  
“The discovery of a high probability”:
Craven,
Silent War,
p. 221.

203  
Reports that an unmarked packet:
Former U.S. intelligence analyst, interviewed by author.

204  
The KGB had covertly:
John Kenneth White, Department of Politics, Catholic University of America, introduction to “Seeing Red: The Cold War and American Public Opinion,” National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

205  
A high-ranking Soviet:
Ibid.

206  
“The Soviet Union cannot look”:
Henry A. Kissinger,
The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984 Reprint), p. 241.

207  
Long before Kissinger:
“Henry Kissinger—Biography,” Nobelprize.org (modified April 29, 2004, accessed January 31, 2005): http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1973/kissinger-bio.html

208  
A growing body of information:
William Burr, ed.,
The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow
(New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 50–51.

209  
Declassified transcripts:
Ibid.

210  
Agence France Presse revealed:
Agence France Presse, “Kissinger Offered China U.S. Intelligence,” Washington, D.C., January 11, 1999.

211  
“When one of three states”:
Wishnick,
Mending Fences,
p. 5.

212  
Dobrynin told his superiors:
A. Dobrynin, Memorandum to members of the Politburo and A. Gromyko, July 12, 1969, regarding back-channel meetings with Henry Kissinger (accessed October 12, 2003): http://www.turnerlearning.com/cnn/coldwar/detente/dete_rel.html

213  
The Soviet officers:
Retired Soviet submarine commander in the Kamchatka Flotilla at the time of the K-129 incident, interviewed by author’s Russia-based researcher, Eugene Soukharnikov.

214  
In no case had a nuclear:
Sagan,
Limits of Safety,
p. 45.

215  
At the end of the Cold War:
John Greenwald, “Spy vs. Spy,”
Time
, November 2, 1992.

216  
He frequently met: History of Russia’s Pacific Fleet After the War and Today
(Russian publication), translated by author’s Russia-based researcher, Eugene Soukharnikov. Kissinger provided Dobrynin the results of an American operation to raise the Soviet submarine K-129. The documents included the identification of the bodies of three of the sailors recovered in the salvaged wreckage.

217  
A likely purpose:
Kissinger,
Necessity for Choice,
p. 202.

218  
Something strange:
Petroff,
Red Eminence,
p. 169.

219  
General Grechko, along with:
“Mikhail Suslov,”
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia,
from Encyclopædia Britannica: http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/ article?eu=405253

220  
It ended with
Pravda: Petroff,
Red Eminence,
p. 169.

221  
Central Committee members:
Serge A. Mikoyan, “Western Winds Behind Kremlin Walls, Eroding the Soviet ‘Culture of Secrecy,’ ”: http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/fall_winter_2001/article05.html (2001)

222  
A significant new procedure:
Podvig,
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
p. 282.

223  
The KGB was stripped:
“Special Departments in the Armed Services,” May 1989, Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/irp/ world/russia/kgb/su0520.htm

224  
President Nixon did not rely:
Ron Kampeas, AP writer, “Nixon Used Madman Strategy,”
Dallas Morning News,
December 26, 2002, p. 29A (citing declassified documents, December 2002, National Security Archive).

225  
Upon returning to the agency:
Craven,
Silent War,
p. 249.

226  
The clandestine Forty:
Brent Scowcroft (national security advisor) affidavit, as referenced in Case Summary of
Military Audit Project
v.
Casey et al.,
United States Court of Appeals, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 135, May 4, 1981 (decided), p. 9.

227  
The project to raise:
Mark Riebling, “Blowback,” Chapter 16 of
Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA:
http://www.secretpolicy.com

228  
The first major Nixon:
Burr,
The Kissinger Transcripts,
p. 14.

229  
Kissinger used the border:
Ibid., pp. 5–6.

230  
At the very time:
L. Fletcher Prouty, “The Forty Committee,” Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, declassified 1977.

231  
The strategy of intrigue:
Kokoshin,
Soviet Strategic Thought,
p. 126.

232  
However, a large number:
Burr,
Kissinger Transcripts,
pp. 5–7, 12–15.

233  
Secret meetings between:
William Burr, ed., “Negotiating U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement,” National Security Archive, May 22, 2002.

234  
Later, the U.S. Congress:
Colonel Daniel Smith, (Retired), Chief of Research, Center for Defense Information, “A Brief History of ‘Missiles’ and Ballistic Missile Defense,” (accessed December 3, 2003): http://www.cdi.org

235  
A flurry of other agreements:
SALT I, Interim Agreement between the U.S. and USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972.

236  
Some items may have:
Broad,
Universe Below,
p. 74.

237  
There is a well-established:
Ibid., pp. 78–79.

238  
If the Soviets learned:
Burleson,
Jennifer Project,
p. 55.

239  
Détente did nothing:
“The Brezhnev Era,” Learning Network: http://www.infoplease.com

240  
But when the CIA was given:
“Project Jennifer, Hughes
Glomar Explorer,”
Federation of American Scientists, March 8, 1999 (accessed July 1, 2003): http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/jennifer.htm

241  
The recovery operations:
Roy Varner and Wayne Collier,
A Matter of Risk: The Incredible Inside Story of the CIA’s Hughes
Glomar Explorer
Mission to Raise a Russian Submarine
(New York: Random House, 1978), p. 125.

242  
The
Hughes Glomar: Broad,
Universe Below,
pp. 79–80.

243  
Hughes Tool Company:
Varner and Collier,
Matter of Risk,
pp. 34–35.

244  
To some in the know:
Interview, John P. Craven, retired director, Navy’s Deep Submergence Systems Project.

245  
Their arguments against:
Burleson,
Jennifer Project,
p. 43.

246  
Contracts were let:
Richard A. Sampson, “The Hughes Glomar Explorer Project,”
OPSEC Journal,
2d edition 1995, OPSEC Professionals Society.

247  
Years later, even after:
Broad,
Universe Below,
p. 248.

248  
Secret subcontracts:
Varner and Collier,
Matter of Risk,
pp. 40–49.

249  
The Nixon assignment:
Broad,
Universe Below,
p. 78.

250  
The deep-sea mining:
David Helvarg,
Blue Frontier: Saving America’s Living Seas
(New York: W. H. Freeman & Co, 2001), Chapter 1.

251  
While the cover story:
Seymour Hersh, “Participant Tells of CIA Ruses to Hide Glomar Project,”
New York Times,
December 10, 1976, p. 1.

252  
The career CIA agents:
Sampson, “Glomar Explorer.”

253  
One of the roughnecks:
“Behind the Great Submarine Snatch,”
Time
, December 6, 1976, p. 23.

254  
The mineral-laden nuggets:
Sampson, “Glomar Explorer.”

255  
In total, Project Jennifer:
Burleson,
Jennifer Project,
p. 77.

256  
The job could be done only:
Former submariner aboard USS
Seawolf,
which participated in later phases of the K-129 recovery operation, interviewed by author, July 2003.

257  
Relocating and marking:
“Submarine Development Squadron Five,” Global Security.org (accessed April 16, 2004): http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/subdevrons.htm

258  
Ironically, the USS
Halibut: USS
Halibut
(SSGN587): http://www.home.earthlink.net/geflynn/halibut.htm

259  
Specialized vessels could then return:
“Exploring the Oceans: The Scientist at Sea,”
Oceans Alive!
(Boston: Museum of Science, 1998): http://www.mos.org/oceans/scientist

260  
The special CIA ship:
William Cole, “Recovery of Ehime Maru Tests Navy Skill,”
Honolulu Advertiser,
October 22, 2001.

261  
One by one, each section:
Varner and Collier,
Matter of Risk,
pp. 143–48.

262  
Each trip to the bottom:
Ibid., pp. 149–50.

263  
Once the retrieval:
Broad,
Universe Below,
p. 78.

264  
The CIA circulated:
Burleson,
Jennifer Project,
p. 51.

265  
The radioactive wreckage:
The author has extensive training and experience in handling and characteristics of nuclear materials. He served as a Navy crewman aboard a nuclear-powered submarine and worked more than twenty years as a civilian contractor in many of the major nuclear labs and facilities involved in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors.

266  
After the initial section:
Seymour Hersh, “Human Error is Cited in ’74 Glomar Failure,”
New York Times,
December 9, 1976, p. 1.

267  
On several occasions:
Burleson,
Jennifer Project,
p. 111.

268  
That location would have placed:
Sontag et al.,
Blind Man’s Bluff,
p. 112.

269  
A number of other reports:
“Selected Accidents Involving Nuclear Weapons 1950–1993,” Greenpeace archives, March 1996.

270  
Another rumored site:
Podvig,
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
p. 290.

271  
The
Challenger
was conducting:
Ships of the World: An Historical Encyclopedia, Houghton Mifflin: http://www.college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/ships/html/sh_000106_ships ofthewo.htm