Strategy (118 page)

19
. Oskar Morgenstern, “The Collaboration between Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann,”
Journal of Economic Literature
14, no. 3 (September 1976): 805–816. E. Roy Weintraub,
Toward a History of Game Theory
(London: Duke University Press, 1992); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa,
Games and Decisions; Introduction and Critical Survey
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

20
. Poundstone,
Prisoner's Dilemma
, 8.

21
. Philip Mirowski, “Mid-Century Cyborg Agonistes: Economics Meets Operations Research,”
Social Studies of Science
29 (1999): 694.

22
. John McDonald,
Strategy in Poker, Business & War
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 14, 69, 126.

23
. Jessie Bernard, “The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict,”
American Journal of Sociology
59 (1954): 411–424.

1
. This is discussed in Lawrence Freedman,
The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005).

2
. Colin Gray,
Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment
(New York: The Greenwood Press, 1982).

3
. R. J. Overy, “Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory Before 1939,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
15, no. 1 (March 1992): 73–101. See also George Quester,
Deterrence Before Hiroshima
(New York: Wiley, 1966).

4
. Stanley Hoffmann, “The Acceptability of Military Force,” in Francois Duchene, ed.,
Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), 6.

5
. Glenn Snyder,
Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

6
. Herman Kahn,
On Thermonuclear War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 126 ff. and 282 ff. It was originally going to be known as “Three Lectures on Thermonuclear War.”

7
. Barry Bruce-Briggs,
Supergenius: The Megaworlds of Herman Kahn
(North American Policy Press, 2000), 97.

8
. Ibid., 98. Noting the appalling style, Bruce-Briggs concludes that: “The artlessness imparts authenticity; were the author a hustler, he would have been slicker and ingratiating.”

9
. Jonathan Stevenson,
Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable
(New York: Viking, 2008), 76.

10
.
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/#
.

11
. Schelling's major books were
The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960);
Arms and Influence
(New York: Yale University Press, 1966);
Choice and Consequence
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); and, with Morton Halperin,
Strategy and Arms Control
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

12
. Robin Rider, “Operations Research and Game Theory,” in Roy Weintraub, ed.,
Toward a History of Game Theory
(see chap. 12, n. 19).

13
. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict
, 10.

14
. Jean-Paul Carvalho, “An Interview with Thomas Schelling,”
Oxonomics
2 (2007): 1–8.

15
. Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 479 (see chap. 12, n. 7). One possible reason was the skepticism of Jacob Viner, professor of economics at Chicago and Brodie's mentor. Viner's 1946 essay on the implications of nuclear weapons was one of the foundation texts of the theory of deterrence and clearly influenced Brodie.

16
. Bernard Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists,”
The Defense Technical Information Center
(October 1964): 294.

17
. Oskar Morgenstern,
The Question of National Defense
(New York: Random House, 1959).

18
. Bruce-Briggs,
Supergenius
, 120–122; Irving Louis Horowitz,
The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1963).

19
. Cited in Bruce-Biggs,
Supergenius
, 120.

20
. Schelling, in the
Journal of Conflict Resolution
, then edited by Kenneth Boulding, in 1957.

21
. Carvalho, “An Interview with Thomas Schelling.”

22
. Robert Ayson,
Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as a Social Science
(London: Frank Cass, 2004); Phil Williams, “Thomas Schelling,” in J. Baylis and J. Garnett, eds.,
Makers of Nuclear Strategy
(London: Pinter, 1991), 120–135; A. Dixit, “Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
108, no. 2 (2006): 213–229; Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Some Like It Cold: Thomas Schelling as a Cold Warrior,”
Journal of Economic Methodology
14, no. 4 (2007): 455–471.

23
. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict
, 15.

24
. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 1.

25
. Ibid., 2–3, 79–80, 82, 80.

26
. Ibid., 194.

27
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
, 188 (emphasis in the original).

28
. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 93.

29
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
, 193.

30
. Dixit, “Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory,” argues that many of Schelling's formulations anticipate later developments in more formal game theory.

31
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
, 57, 77.

32
. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 137.

33
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
, 100–101.

34
. Cited by Robert Ayson,
Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power
(London: Palgrave, 2012).

35
. Wohlstetter was one of the most influential RAND analysts. See Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski, eds.,
Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, 2009).

36
. Wohlstetter letter to Michael Howard, 1968, quoted in Stevenson,
Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable
, 71.

37
. Bernard Brodie,
The Reporter
, November 18, 1954.

38
. Schelling,
The Strategy of Conflict
, 233. This essay on “Surprise Attack and Disarmament” first appeared in Klaus Knorr, ed.,
NATO and American Security
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).

39
. Schelling,
Strategy and Conflict
, 236.

40
. Donald Brennan, ed.,
Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security
(New York: George Braziller, 1961); Hedley Bull,
The Control of the Arms Race
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).

41
. Schelling and Halperin,
Strategy and Arms Control
, 1–2.

42
. Ibid., 5.

43
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
, 239–240.

44
. Henry Kissinger,
The Necessity for Choice
(New York: Harper & Row, 1961). This particular essay first appeared in
Daedalus
89, no. 4 (1960). The first reference that I (and the OED) can find is an article by the English writer Wayland Young, an active proponent of disarmament, who referred to “the danger of what strategists call escalation, the danger that the size of the weapons used would mount up and up in retaliation until civilization is destroyed as surely as it would have been by an initial exchange of thermonuclear weapons.” In his glossary, we find the following: “Escalation-Escalator: The uncontrolled exchange of ever larger weapons in war, leading to the destruction of civilization.” Wayland Young,
Strategy for Survival: First Steps in Nuclear Disarmament
(London: Penguin Books, 1959).

45
. Schelling,
Strategy of Conflict
.

46
. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
, 182.

47
. Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in the Berlin Crisis,”
Foreign Relations of the United States
XIV, 170–172; Marc Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 224.

48
. I deal with this in my
Kennedy's Wars
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

49
. Fred Kaplan,
Wizards of Armageddon
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 302.

50
. Kaysen to Kennedy, September 22, 1961,
Foreign Relations in the United States
XIV-VI, supplement, Document 182.

51
. Robert Kennedy,
Thirteen Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962
(London: Macmillan, 1969), 69–71, 80, 89, 182.

52
. Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,
The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

53
. Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter,
Controlling the Risks in Cuba
, Adelphi Paper No. 17 (London ISS, February 1965).

54
. Kahn,
On Thermonuclear War
, 226, 139.

55
. Herman Kahn,
On Escalation
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).

56
. Cited in Fred Iklé, “When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation,”
World Politics
19, no. 4 (July 1967): 693.

57
. McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,”
Foreign Affairs
1 (October 1969): 1–20. See also McGeorge Bundy,
Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years
(New York: Random House, 1988).

58
. McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the Bomb,”
The New York Review
, June 16, 1983. For a discussion of “existentialist” literature, see Lawrence Freedman, “I Exist; Therefore I Deter,”
International Security
13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 177–195.

1
. Werner Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
9, nos. 2–3 (1986): 127–133; Sebastian Kaempf, “Lost Through Non-Translation: Bringing Clausewitz's Writings on ‘New Wars' Back In,”
Small Wars & Insurgencies
22, no. 4 (October 2011): 548–573.

2
. Jomini,
The Art of War
, 34–35 (see chap. 7, n. 5).

3
. Karl Marx, “Revolutionary Spain,” 1854, available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1854/revolutionary-spain/ch05.htm
.

4
. Vladimir Lenin, “Guerrilla Warfare,” originally published in proletary, No. 5, September 30, 1906,
Lenin Collected Works
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), Vol. II, 213–223, available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/gw/index.htm
.

5
. Leon Trotsky, “Guerrilaism and the Regular Army,”
The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky
, Vol. 2, 1919, available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch08.htm
.

6
. Leon Trotsky, “Do We Need Guerrillas?”
The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky
, Vol. 2, 1919, available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/military/ch95.htm
.

7
. C. E. Callwell,
Small Wars: Their Theory and Practice
, reprint of the 1906 3rd edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).

8
. T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” in Malcolm Brown, ed.,
T. E. Lawrence in War & Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia
(London: Greenhill Books, 2005), 260–273. It was first published in the
Army Quarterly
, October 1920. It forms the basis of Chapter 35 of
The Seven Pillars of Wisdom
(London: Castle Hill Press, 1997).

9
. Basil Liddell Hart,
Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934).

10
. “T. E. Lawrence and Liddell Hart,” in Brian Holden Reid,
Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller & Liddell Hart
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 150–167.

11
. Brantly Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary: Mao from the 1920s to 1937,” in Timothy Cheek, ed.,
A Critical Introduction to Mao
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61–86.

12
. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,
Mao: The Unknown Story
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).

13
. Andrew Bingham Kennedy, “Can the Weak Defeat the Strong? Mao's Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare in Yan'an,”
China Quarterly
196 (December 2008): 884–899.

14
. Most of the key texts—“Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War” (December 1936), “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), and “On Protracted War” (May 1938)—are found in
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung
, Vol. II. “On Guerrilla War” is in Vol. VI. They can be found at
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/index.htm
.

15
. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War.”

16
. Beatrice Heuser,
Reading Clausewitz
(London: Pimlico, 2002), 138–139.

17
. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Paret, ed.,
Makers of Modern Strategy
, p. 844 (see chap. 6, n. 2). On Maoist strategy, see also Edward L. Katzenback, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung,”
Political Science Quarterly
70, no. 3 (September 1955): 321–340. In “On Protracted War” he made the classic distinction between strategies of attrition and annihilation, which began with Delbrück, but Mao probably got it through Lenin (see below pp. 289).