The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (289 page)
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Authors: Iain McLean
BOOK: The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics
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war
Armed conflict between two or more parties, usually fought for political ends. Its everyday meaning is clear, and the main focus of the idea is on the use of force between large-scale political units such as states or empires, usually over control of territory. The boundaries of the idea are, however, difficult to pin down. Some of this difficulty is suggested by the numerous adjectives that can be placed in front of it: civil war, guerrilla war, limited war, total war, gang war, tribal war, cold war, phoney war, race war, trade war, liberation war, propaganda war, class war, and so forth. Some of these are metaphors exploiting the image of ruthless and violent conflict over political ends taken from
international relations
, and transferred to actors other than states.
But it is also true that the phenomenon of war does have rather blurred edges. In a legal sense, states can be at war without actually using force against each other, but merely by declaring themselves to be in a state of war (phoney war). Conversely, states can be using force against each other on quite a large scale without actually making formal declarations that they are in a state of war. The political element in wars blurs messily between the international system and civil wars, preventing any clear location of the phenomenon at the interstate level. At both levels, wars are often about disputes over
sovereignty
and territory.
There are many theories about the causes of war, but no unified view. Some argue that war is simply a large-scale expression of the selfish, violent, and power-seeking elements in human nature. Others, notably neorealists, argue that the regular recurrence of war throughout history is a consequence on the anarchic structure of the international system. Perhaps the most numerous source of theories is found amongst those who argue that war is caused by the political construction of states and the ideologies they express. During the nineteenth century, liberals argued that aristocratic states were aggressive because of the martial inclinations of their ruling class. Towards the middle of the twentieth century, almost everyone argued that fascist states were aggressive, including the fascists themselves. Marxists argue that capitalist states are driven to aggression by their ruthless competition for markets, while socialist states relate to each other peacefully. Liberals argue that communist states are inherently aggressive because of their totalitarian organization and their expansionist ideology, while liberal democracies relate peacefully because of their economic interdependence with each other, and the constraints of democracy on the state's use of force. Empirically the liberals so far have the better of this argument. There are no cases of democracies going to war with each other, whereas during the period of communist power, wars between communist-run states were quite frequent. The empirical evidence on states with military governments is mixed.
Until quite recently, war was held to be a legitimate practice of states in pursuit of their
national interest
. European states fought regularly amongst themselves in pursuit of territory, dynastic claims, and colonies, and resort to war was an accepted mechanism for maintaining the
balance of power
. After periods of exceptionally exhausting war, the European great powers would try to arrive at diplomatic settlements that would avoid major wars for an extended period. In the late nineteenth century laws of war began to develop to put some constraints on the use of some of the nastier technological possibilities for weapons. The shock of the unexpected cost and carnage of the First World War established war prevention firmly on the international agenda, but the overambitious and weak
collective security
mechanism of the
League of Nations
conspicuously failed to expunge war from the practice of states. After the Second World War, a stronger legal regime against war was constructed, making war illegal for nearly all purposes except self-defence and collective security. In and of itself, this legal regime has probably not prevented much war, but it coincided with both the onset of the
Cold War
and the impact of nuclear weapons. The lesson of the First, and even more so the Second, World War for the great powers was that their capacity to inflict destruction on each other had outrun the possible gains to be made from war amongst themselves except as a last resort of self-defence. This lesson was hugely reinforced by the arrival of nuclear weapons, whose obliterative powers were so great as to plausibly eliminate the distinction between total victory and total defeat. This development has not eliminated war amongst the lesser powers, or between great powers and lesser powers, a fact which raises interesting questions about whether
nuclear proliferation
should be encouraged or discouraged.
BB
international relations
, and transferred to actors other than states.
But it is also true that the phenomenon of war does have rather blurred edges. In a legal sense, states can be at war without actually using force against each other, but merely by declaring themselves to be in a state of war (phoney war). Conversely, states can be using force against each other on quite a large scale without actually making formal declarations that they are in a state of war. The political element in wars blurs messily between the international system and civil wars, preventing any clear location of the phenomenon at the interstate level. At both levels, wars are often about disputes over
sovereignty
and territory.
There are many theories about the causes of war, but no unified view. Some argue that war is simply a large-scale expression of the selfish, violent, and power-seeking elements in human nature. Others, notably neorealists, argue that the regular recurrence of war throughout history is a consequence on the anarchic structure of the international system. Perhaps the most numerous source of theories is found amongst those who argue that war is caused by the political construction of states and the ideologies they express. During the nineteenth century, liberals argued that aristocratic states were aggressive because of the martial inclinations of their ruling class. Towards the middle of the twentieth century, almost everyone argued that fascist states were aggressive, including the fascists themselves. Marxists argue that capitalist states are driven to aggression by their ruthless competition for markets, while socialist states relate to each other peacefully. Liberals argue that communist states are inherently aggressive because of their totalitarian organization and their expansionist ideology, while liberal democracies relate peacefully because of their economic interdependence with each other, and the constraints of democracy on the state's use of force. Empirically the liberals so far have the better of this argument. There are no cases of democracies going to war with each other, whereas during the period of communist power, wars between communist-run states were quite frequent. The empirical evidence on states with military governments is mixed.
Until quite recently, war was held to be a legitimate practice of states in pursuit of their
national interest
. European states fought regularly amongst themselves in pursuit of territory, dynastic claims, and colonies, and resort to war was an accepted mechanism for maintaining the
balance of power
. After periods of exceptionally exhausting war, the European great powers would try to arrive at diplomatic settlements that would avoid major wars for an extended period. In the late nineteenth century laws of war began to develop to put some constraints on the use of some of the nastier technological possibilities for weapons. The shock of the unexpected cost and carnage of the First World War established war prevention firmly on the international agenda, but the overambitious and weak
collective security
mechanism of the
League of Nations
conspicuously failed to expunge war from the practice of states. After the Second World War, a stronger legal regime against war was constructed, making war illegal for nearly all purposes except self-defence and collective security. In and of itself, this legal regime has probably not prevented much war, but it coincided with both the onset of the
Cold War
and the impact of nuclear weapons. The lesson of the First, and even more so the Second, World War for the great powers was that their capacity to inflict destruction on each other had outrun the possible gains to be made from war amongst themselves except as a last resort of self-defence. This lesson was hugely reinforced by the arrival of nuclear weapons, whose obliterative powers were so great as to plausibly eliminate the distinction between total victory and total defeat. This development has not eliminated war amongst the lesser powers, or between great powers and lesser powers, a fact which raises interesting questions about whether
nuclear proliferation
should be encouraged or discouraged.
BB
Warsaw Pact
The Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization was formed in May 1955 in response to the Federal Republic of Germany's rearmament and membership of NATO. The alliance was regarded by most commentators in the West as little more than an organization to legitimize the Soviet military presence in its members (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, plus the Soviet Union). The pact possessed no multinational institutions or command structures and its military structures were merely an extension of Soviet structures. Most of the pact's members were not in fact heavily armed. The front-line troops of the pact were the Soviet forces in Germany, eighteen armoured divisions in peacetime, backed by Soviet airforces and reinforcement forces.
In 1968 the pact was involved in the military occupation of Czechoslovakia, but in the late 1970s it tended to disintegrate. Polish governments displayed increasing independence and the Romanian government of Nicolae Ceausescu, which had denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia, effectively withdrew from the pact. As Soviet power in Eastern Europe crumbled in 1989 the pact crumbled with it. At the Paris conference in November 1990 the East European members declared the military aspects of the pact to be dead and in 1991 the pact itself was abandoned. From 1991 to 1994 the Soviet troops gradually withdrew from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, eastern Germany, and Poland.
PBy
In 1968 the pact was involved in the military occupation of Czechoslovakia, but in the late 1970s it tended to disintegrate. Polish governments displayed increasing independence and the Romanian government of Nicolae Ceausescu, which had denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia, effectively withdrew from the pact. As Soviet power in Eastern Europe crumbled in 1989 the pact crumbled with it. At the Paris conference in November 1990 the East European members declared the military aspects of the pact to be dead and in 1991 the pact itself was abandoned. From 1991 to 1994 the Soviet troops gradually withdrew from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, eastern Germany, and Poland.
PBy
Watergate
Office block in Washington, DC, occupied in 1972 by the Democratic National Committee. A bungled burglary here, by agents of President Richard Nixon trying to disrupt the Democratic campaign, led eventually to the resignation of Nixon in August 1973. The suffix -gate is now widely applied to the name of people or places involved in alleged political scandal.
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