The Muslim Brotherhood (31 page)

Setting up the Freedom and Justice Party was a bold and decisive move for a movement that had long been riven with internal debates over the rights and wrongs of establishing a political party. All the more so given that in the years prior to the revolution, the traditionalists, who advocated shying away from the political arena, had come to dominate. However, after some heated debates within the movement in which some brothers argued that the Brotherhood should remain as a
jama’a
, leaving its members free to join whichever political party they wanted, the objections to forming a political party, even among
the party traditionalists, seemed to dissipate as quickly as Mubarak himself. Now that the opportunity of getting to power had become a reality, ideological concerns were put quickly to one side.

Not that the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party was without its challenges. There was a great deal of discussion both inside and outside the movement about what the nature of the relationship between the party and the
jama’a
should be. The standard Brotherhood line on the subject was that the two entities would be completely separate.
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However, old habits died hard. Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie seemingly saw no contradiction in the fact that party leaders were appointed by the Guidance Office. He also prohibited Brotherhood members from joining any party other than the Freedom and Justice Party.
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The movement also wrote the party’s platform and approved its bylaws.
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For all its protestations to the contrary, it was clear that the party was going to be tightly controlled behind the scenes by the movement.

While this lack of separation was predictable enough, it still frustrated some more reformist-minded members who had hoped that the revolution would herald a newer, fresher and more open way of doing politics. Particularly aggrieved at the dominance of the old leadership over the new party were some Brotherhood youth elements. These young people tried to stand up to the Brotherhood machinery by holding public conferences at which they challenged the leadership’s way of doing things. At one such meeting in April 2011, they demanded that the Brotherhood become an official Islamic society in order for the Freedom and Justice Party to operate as a truly independent body. They also called for a raft of reforms, including that the Brotherhood separate itself from the international
tanzeem
, and, most boldly, that it select a general controller other than the Supreme Guide. Some of these youth elements became so frustrated that they broke away and formed their own political parties, such the Hizb al-Tayyar Al-Masri (the Egyptian Current Party).

Just as it did with those Brotherhood members who broke away in the 1990s to form the al-Wasat party, the movement’s leadership took a zero tolerance approach to these ‘errant youth’, expelling them from the movement making it clear that there was no room for disobedience within the ranks. Whilst much was made of these youth elements in the international media, where there were even suggestions that the Brotherhood might split apart, the movement proved as robust as ever. Indeed, a movement as large and solid as the Brotherhood could clearly withstand such shocks, which ultimately proved to be little more than an irritation. The message was clear: revolution or no revolution, the Brotherhood was not going to change its way of doing things.

Moreover, such matters were of trifling concern given what was at stake. The Brotherhood could see that after almost a century of semi-clandestine opposition, power was finally within its reach. Rather than get bogged down in soul searching about internal procedures and reform, something that risked weakening the movement, the Brotherhood focused all its energies on the more pressing task in hand. This was ensuring a victory in the upcoming elections that were scheduled for November 2011. This was the all-important moment for the Brotherhood that had to legitimise itself by turning its perceived popular support into tangible political gains.

However, as the elections approached, the Brotherhood found the SCAF to be a trickier partner than it had first anticipated. For all that the generals had been willing to work with the Ikhwan on the transition roadmap, as the elections approached the SCAF began to get increasingly alarmed at the prospect of a Brotherhood controlled parliament and a Brotherhood dominated constitution. The SCAF began to wonder whether it had made a mistake in rushing to work so quickly with the Brotherhood on the roadmap. Thus, the SCAF, that had already been frustrating both the Brotherhood and the revolutionaries by its repeated backtracking on agreed dates for its handing over of power, took a series of steps to try to ring-fence the
Ikhwan. Most notably, in July 2011, the SCAF issued a new parliament law which stipulated that 50 per cent of seats in the lower house of parliament be reserved for individual candidates, with the remaining 50 per cent to be elected under a party lists system. The law ruled too that in the Shura Council or upper house, 65 electoral constituencies would be reserved for individual candidates, while 28 would follow closed party lists. This was disastrous not only for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, but for the other political parties and groupings. Under intense public pressure, the SCAF were forced in September to increase the share of party lists from 50 per cent to two-thirds of seats, but this would still work to limit the Brotherhood’s presence and influence in the parliament.

The SCAF also upheld a constitutional provision introduced by President Nasser ruling that half of contested parliamentary seats be reserved for representatives of ‘labourers and farmers.’ What this had meant in practice in the last years of the regime was that these seats were taken by retired military officers and security personnel who turned themselves into farmers in order to enter government.
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Fearing that it was about to be denied its moment, the Brotherhood retaliated by playing it tactically, trying to outmanoeuvre the SCAF by finding other ways to dominate the political arena. In the early days after the fall of Mubarak, consistent with its cautious approach, the movement had insisted that it would only nominate candidates to 35 per cent of seats in the parliament.
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By April 2011, a more self-assured Brotherhood had notched this figure up to 50 per cent. But by October 2011 the movement changed its tune and went full out for power. It announced that, through the alliance it had teamed up with – the Democratic Alliance for Egypt – it would be nominating candidates for all available seats.
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There were ten other parties in this grouping, but the Freedom and Justice Party was the dominant player by far. It also supplied the vast majority of candidates nominated by the alliance for the elections.

At the end of September, the Brotherhood also upped the stakes by threatening to boycott the elections unless the SCAF amended the parliament law. However, it was careful not to push things too far. At the same time, it declined to give its backing to the mass protest that was held on 30 September to ‘reclaim the revolution’. However, the pressure coming from all sides was such that the SCAF agreed in October to amend the law and to allow all seats to be contested through the party list system.

Whilst this was a triumph for the Brotherhood, the movement was soon to be disappointed again when, in November, the SCAF proposed a series of supra-constitutional principles. These principles, that had been circulating since August, included that the military budget remain confidential, that the military be granted the right to object to certain articles of the new constitution, and that if the parliament failed to draw up a new constitution within six months, the SCAF would be permitted to draw up a new assembly. Equally contentious for the Brotherhood was the proposal that the SCAF be granted the authority to hand pick 80 out of 100 members of the constitution writing committee.

Such an audacious attempt to deny the Brotherhood the power it craved was too much for the movement. With its interests threatened so directly, the Ikhwan once again took on the mantle of revolutionary and returned to the streets. The movement joined with other groups in Tahrir Square to demand the supra-constitutional principles be retracted. Demonstrating its seriousness, the Brotherhood set up its own stage in the square and mobilised its members to come out in force. The demonstrations were so large that there was talk of a second revolution. But it wasn’t a second revolution that the Brotherhood was after. Rather, the movement wanted to demonstrate to the generals that without it on board, the SCAF was at the mercy of the masses.

In the face of such a mass outpouring of public anger, the SCAF had little choice but to announce that the supra-constitutional principles
would no longer be binding, but would only be advisory. The SCAF also amended the principles so that the military would be placed directly under civilian government, asserting that it should ‘abide by the constitutional and legislative regulations.’
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Having got what it wanted, the Brotherhood agreed to pull its supporters from the streets and to enter into dialogue once again with the military. Indeed, sure of its own constituency, that did not include those who were still protesting in the square, the Brotherhood was determined to ensure that the all-important parliamentary elections would go ahead as scheduled.

Its judgement on the timing of the elections turned out to be correct. In the polls, which lasted from 28 November to 11 January 2012, the Freedom and Justice Party powered to victory with its coalition taking 235 seats, representing 47.2 per cent of the total. This made the Brotherhood the largest bloc by far. It turned out to be a disastrous election for the revolutionary and youth groups, and for the secular parties, who were left with almost nothing. The surprise result was that of the Salafist bloc, led by the al-Nour party, which came second with 120 seats. Indeed, despite the revolution’s having starting out from a largely non-ideological base, it was the Islamists who were to reap the final rewards. But it was the Brotherhood specifically that played the whole post-Mubarak period with extreme skill and dexterity and that, despite its earlier protestations that it was not seeking a majority in parliament, had succeeded in manoeuvring itself into power.

However, the game was not over yet. There was still the presidency to play for. The Brotherhood had always insisted that it had no intention whatsoever of nominating a candidate for the presidency, but as the situation on the ground changed, once again it moved the goalposts and announced it was entering the race. In March 2012, the Freedom and Justice Party stunned Egypt when it declared that it was nominating its powerful Deputy, Khairet al-Shater, for the upcoming presidential elections. Some of this shock was a direct result of the fact that in June 2011, the Brotherhood had expelled
prominent Brotherhood leader, Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, after he had disobeyed orders and announced his intention to run for the presidency on an independent ticket. Issam al-Ariyan declared in June 2011, ‘He has nothing to do with us now … We cannot support anyone violating our decisions.’
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While losing such a prominent figure was clearly a blow to the movement, the Brotherhood had always risen above personalities, proving that it had no time for those who promoted themselves or their ideas above the
jama’a
machinery. Moreover, Aboul Fotouh had always been somewhat of a loose cannon, whose more liberal views stretched the boundaries of what was acceptable to the Brotherhood’s hierarchy. Yet Aboul Fotouh’s expulsion was taken as a clear indication that the Brotherhood was serious about its promises not to field a presidential candidate.

But by March 2012 the Brotherhood was finding itself increasingly squeezed by the SCAF. It may have won the elections but it was frustrated at its inability to really exercise power. Most challenging was the SCAF’s refusal to dissolve the government of Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri and allow the Freedom and Justice Party to appoint a government of its own. The SCAF’s intransigence made the Brotherhood feel as though it had been backed into a corner.

The SCAF had also begun issuing veiled threats to dissolve parliament, making the Brotherhood feel as though its hold on power was built on very fragile foundations. Thus al-Shater’s nomination to the presidential race was a means for the Brotherhood to challenge the SCAF and to try to wrestle power away from it. As Mohamed Morsi explained, ‘We have chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfil its duties.’
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The decision to field a presidential candidate was not supported by all Brotherhood members. Some brothers were horrified at the move. Freedom and Justice Party MP, Mohamed al-Beltagi, wrote on his Facebook page, ‘I oppose the Brotherhood’s nomination of one of its
own for the presidency … It harms the Brotherhood and the nation, to have one faction assume all the responsibility under these conditions’.
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According to Kamal Helbawy, who resigned from the movement on account of its nominating a presidential candidate, 52 members of the Shura Council had opposed al-Shater’s nomination and the 56 who voted in favour only did so after significant pressure had been brought to bear upon them.
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The decision also prompted a group of young IkhwanI, calling themselves, Sayha Ikhwania (Brotherhood Shout) to stage a sit-in in front of the Brotherhood’s headquarters.

But fearing that the SCAF was moving to undermine the gains it had made, the Brotherhood’s leadership felt it had no choice but to up its game. It wasn’t long, however, before winning the presidential race became all the more pressing for the Brotherhood. On 5 April 2012 the Administrative Court suspended the constituent assembly that had been established to draft the new constitution. Its decision to do so was a direct response to the way in which the Brotherhood had handled the appointments to the assembly. With the parliamentary election victory under its belt, the Brotherhood had abandoned its ultra-cautious approach and the gloves came off.