The Muslim Brotherhood (35 page)

Yet foreign policy, or rather the Brotherhood’s relations with the Western world, presents a particular challenge for the Brotherhood. Like the nationalist regimes before it, the Brotherhood has always relied upon anti-Westernism as a rallying cry and as a means of securing popular support. This does not mean that the movement has been averse to engaging with the US government where possible.
Even prior to the revolution, while it was spouting anti-US rhetoric, some Egyptian Brotherhood parliamentarians proved willing to meet with US diplomats. After the revolution, the Egyptian Brotherhood was equally keen to meet with US officials, clearly calculating that the regional and international legitimacy it stood to gain from being recognised by Washington outweighed the populist kudos it might have won from a premature clash with the US.
²⁵

Now, however, the Brotherhood has to forge a new relationship with the West and with the US in particular. This is particularly pertinent for the Egyptian Brotherhood. Given that Egypt receives around $1.5 billion dollars in US aid plus other support each year, the Brotherhood can hardly afford to turn its back upon such an important donor. Yet the movement knows that its support base remains largely sceptical at best about US intentions in Egypt and in the region more widely. The strategy adopted by the movement therefore has been to take a middle course, to demonstrate that it is not hostile to the US, but to make it clear that the Brotherhood intends to establish a more balanced and equal relationship with Washington than the former regime. During his election campaign, President Mohamed Morsi pledged to rework Egypt’s relations with the US based upon ‘independence of decision’ and an end to ‘subordination’, asserting that he would ‘seek to replace all political economic, military and other forms of subordination in the longer term, with new forms of relationships based on balanced joint gains’.
²⁶
Indeed, Morsi has to prove to the Egyptian people that he can stand up to Washington when it counts. It is for this reason that in his first public speech following his election as President, Morsi vowed to free Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian sheikh, imprisoned in the US after having been convicted of helping plan an attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. Morsi knew that such a demand would be out of the question as far as the US was concerned, yet he knew he could get some popular mileage by raising it.

It is clear therefore that while the Brotherhood will continue to cooperate with Washington, it is not going to abandon its populist verbal assaults on the US. Likewise it will continue to use the Palestinian issue as a means of bolstering its popular support base. For all that it is bound by realpolitik to uphold Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel and for all that it might see advantage in positing itself as a new mediator in the region, the Brotherhood cannot abandon its support for the Palestinians or for Hamas. Indeed, Morsi’s first election campaign pledge in his list of foreign policy promises was to, ‘Support the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore their rights, establish their own State and liberate their land.’
²⁷
Given the mood on the streets, the movement has no real choice but to rely upon anti-Zionist and anti-Western rhetoric as a means of shoring up its popular support base. In fact, if the going gets tough, such rhetoric is likely to increase.

And things will get tough for the Brotherhood as it struggles to manage the needs and expectations of the populations who risked life and limb for their revolutions. This is particularly true in the Egyptian case. The Egyptian Ikhwan came to power on a ticket of Islam and poverty alleviation. It wasn’t for nothing that the movement mobilised its charitable and welfare networks in the run up to the parliamentary elections to offer free or discount food and goods in some of Cairo’s poorest neighbourhoods. Moreover, Morsi’s campaign platform promised a ‘Renaissance Project’ to save Egypt from decline across the education, health, science and technology sectors. As such, many Egyptians are looking to the Brotherhood to solve their day-to-day problems of poverty, lack of jobs and dismal services.

Yet fixing the nuts and bolts of a society in which two fifths of the population live around the poverty line and are dependent on state subsidies (which eat up one third of the state budget
²⁸
), and in which corruption is endemic and bureaucracy stifling, is not going to be easy. What makes it harder for the Brotherhood is that expectations are so high. As one Egyptian analyst explained, ‘The expectations that he
[Morsi] would deal with all injustices quickly created an atmosphere of hopes that are very high and unrealistic.’
²⁹
The Freedom and Justice Party’s failure to meet some of these expectations has already prompted a wave of strikes and industrial action across a range of sectors. There have also been criticisms that the new President has failed to meet many of his ambitious list of sixty-four pledges, ranging from rubbish collection to improving Egypt’s gridlocked traffic, that he vowed to achieve within his first 100 days of office.

Likewise, An-Nahda has struggled to respond to the needs and demands of a population that wants jobs and better services, as well as an end to corruption and to the stark regional inequalities that have dogged the country since independence. Like Egypt, Tunisia has seen a wave of public strikes and sit-ins and, despite its efforts, the government is proving unable to push economic reforms through quickly or forcefully enough. Whilst the Libyan Brotherhood, as a partner in the government is less in the firing line, it is still part of a ruling elite that is struggling to meet the everyday needs of the population, despite the country’s enormous oil wealth.

How long those who gave the Brotherhood their vote will continue to support the movement has yet to be seen. The more the demands of governing force the movement to compromise on its core principles, the more it risks alienating its core support base. Indeed, the Brotherhood is still a movement that is rooted in its own traditions and in the past. Whether this large and lumbering force will be able to rise to the challenge of the modern age has yet to be seen.

Yet for the time being, this is still the Brotherhood’s moment. For all that the movement has proved itself to be utterly self-serving, to have a questionable commitment to democracy in its wider sense, and to be unable to work economic miracles, for now, the Brotherhood and An-Nahda still seem to enjoy popular trust and support. While this is partly because the liberal and Salafist elements are in such disarray, meaning that there is still no credible alternative, it is also because
the Brotherhood is more than a political party. It is a
jama’a
. Even An-Nahda has a role that extends beyond the realm of most conventional political parties. The Brotherhood did not come to power on account of its political or economic agenda alone. The Brotherhood’s strength turned out to be what it had always been, its grass roots support base that sees in the movement a force that is morally untainted and that resonates with tradition and security. More importantly, perhaps, this grass roots continues to view the movement as synonymous with Islam.

Indeed, this is the real success of the Brotherhood. It has managed to posit itself as the authentic voice that can bring Islam to the core of every aspect of life, including politics. It is this ‘authenticity’ that enabled the movement to reach out beyond the revolutions and beyond the realm of elitist politics and to touch the masses. For the time being at least, the Brotherhood has proved itself more in tune with the people than either its political rivals or its predecessors could ever hope to be.

This book would not have been possible without the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation, who funded the research, and I would like to thank Nadia Schadlow in particular for backing this project. I would also like to give special thanks to all those Ikhwani and others from within the Islamist community and beyond who have been willing to be interviewed for this project. Particular thanks go to Dr Kamal Helbawy, who offered me great assistance and support throughout the project and whose frankness has been invaluable. I would also like to pay special tribute to the Syrian brother Sheikh Mohamed Hasnawi who sadly died during the course of this project. Sheikh Hasnawi demonstrated a particular generosity of spirit, openness and humility and made me feel particularly welcome during my stay in Amman. Thanks also go to Dr Issam al-Attar and to Adnan Saad Eddine for their kindness and support and for their particularly enlightening insights into the Ikhwan’s history. Finally, I would like to thank Ahmed for his invaluable help with Arabic sources, for his comments on various drafts of the text and most of all for his enduring patience.

1
   I use the term ‘Islamist’ here and throughout the text to mean those who engage in political activism articulated through an Islamic discourse. This does not necessarily mean those who espouse violence.

1
   ‘The Fruitful Tree, The MB Call’, on
Ikhwanweb.com
, 13 June 2007. See:
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=819&LevelID=1&SectionID=115

2
   Ibid.

3
   Mahmoud Abdelhalim,
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun. Ahdath Sunat Al-Tareeq. Ru’iah Min al-Dakhil
(
The Muslim Brotherhood. The Events that Made History. An Insider’s Vision
), Alexandria, 2004, Vol. 1, pp. 58–9.

4
   ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq
’ (A Witness in Time, the Muslim Brotherhood as Seen by Farid Abdel Khaliq), on Al-Jazeera, Episode 1, 7 December 2003. Available in Arabic on
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BF012F78-FC05-4E7B-839C-67E94CF195BA.htm

5
   Ibid.

6
   Richard P. Mitchell,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers
, Oxford 1993, p. 297.

7
   François Burgat and William Dowell,
The Islamic Movement in North Africa
, Austin 1993, pp. 34–5.

8
   Ibid.

9
   T. Ramadan,
Aux Sources du Renouveau Musulman
, Lyon 2002, p. 362.

10
  N. Ayoubi,
Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World
, London 1991, p. 90.

11
  Brynjar Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942
, Reading, 1998, p. 213.

12
  ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq’
. Episode 1, 7 December 2003.

13
  Ibid.

14
  Abdelhalim,
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun. Ahdath Sunat Al-Tareeq. Ru’iah Min al-Dakhil
, Vol. 2, p. 360.

15
  
Muthakarat Dr Abdelaziz Kamel, Uthou fi al-Nizam al-Khass
(The Memoirs of Dr Abdelaziz Kamel. Member of the Nizam al-Khass), July 2007. Available in Arabic on
http://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=120458

16
  ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq’
. Episode 1, 7 December 2003.

17
  Ibid.

18
  Quoted in Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
, p. 203.

19
  According to Farid Abdel Khaliq, al-Banna went ahead and consulted with the party about the possibility of joining and subsequently decided to put the idea to the Ikhwan’s Guidance Office. However, not wanting to influence the decision unduly he asked Abdel Khaliq to put forward the suggestion, which was ultimately rejected, as if it were his idea. See ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq
’.

20
  See for example, Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
.

21
  ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq
’.

22
  See, for example Lia’s description of how al-Banna bypassed his own Administrative Council when he disagreed with a decision they had made to set the wages of an imam and a handyman in the movement’s mosque at a rate that al-Banna disapproved of and how he insisted upon the appointment of a Deputy of his choice. Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
, pp. 61–2.

23
  Abdelhalim,
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun. Ahdath Sunat Al-Tareeq. Ru’iah Min al-Dakhil
, Vol. 1, p. 225.

24
  Ibid.

25
  Ibid.

26
  Ibid.

27
  Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
, p. 251.

28
  This group included a number of senior members of the Ikhwan including Mohamed Ali al-Mughlawi, who had been the Ikhwan’s Secretary of the General Committee of Students and Workers, Mahmoud Abu Zayed Othman, who was the editor of the Brotherhood’s weekly newspaper, and Mohamed Izzat Hasan.

29
  See Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
, p. 249.

30
  Other members of the Nizam al-Khass included Ahmed Hassanein, Mahmoud al-Sabah, Mustafa Mashour, Ibrahim Al-Tayib, Yousef Talat,
Abdelrahman al-Sindi, Helmi Abdelhamid, Hosni Abdelbaqi, Said Sadeq, Ahmed Hijiazi and Mahmoud Asaf.

31
  Abdelhalim,
Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun. Ahdath Sunat Al-Tareeq. Ru’iah Min al-Dakhil
, Vol. 1, pp. 178–9.

32
  Lia,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt
, p. 178.

33
  Interview with Mehdi Akef, Cairo, May 2007.

34
  Dr Mahmoud A’asaf,
Ma’ Imam Shaheed Hasan al-Banna
(
With the martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna
), Cairo, 1993, p. 154.

35
  ‘
Shahid Alla Aser, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun Kama Yrahm Farid Abdel Khaliq
’.

36
  For example: in December 1945 a young nationalist, Huain Tawfiq, assassinated the Minister of Finance, Amin Othman Pashsa, who was widely accused of being a British agent.