The Muslim Brotherhood (27 page)

Yet given the prevailing political and social climate in the Islamic world and the ideology that has underpinned the movement for so many decades, it would be extremely difficult for the Ikhwan to take any other stance. Firstly, as explained above jihad is considered a core religious duty not just by the Ikhwan but by the entire reformist Islamist trend that has come to dominate political Islam in the contemporary context. As part of this trend the Brotherhood cannot refute such concepts and holds them very close to its heart. It is true that jihad can be interpreted in various ways and can be a means of struggling through peaceful means, yet the Brotherhood has always interpreted jihad in its range of meanings and the concept of violent struggle has always been part of its religious teachings. As the former leader of the Jordanian Ikhwan, Abd al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, has expressed:

Martyrdom operations are legitimate as long as the enemy targets civilians. Our ulema gave their religious opinion: They said these operations are religiously acceptable because they represent a reciprocal treatment. The Zionist enemy consists of people who are either in the military or preparing to join the military. Martyrdom-seekers offer the noblest forms of martyrdom. They sacrifice themselves knowing that they would meet God moments after their operations, and they realize that they wound the enemy in defence of their people and creed. Islamic history provides many examples of things similar to the martyrdom operations.
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Similarly Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh, once at the vanguard of the Egyptian Ikhwan’s more progressive wing, said in April 2004 of jihad in Palestine and Iraq: ‘This is a matter of religion, not politics. When a Muslim land is occupied, jihad becomes an individual duty for every
man and woman, boy and girl. A woman goes out to jihad without her husband’s permission and a child without his father’s permission. In this matter there is no place for discussion or games.’
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Aboul Fotouh’s assertion is of course highly questionable, in that the Ikhwan has used the jihad in both Palestine and Iraq as a means of rallying its supporters and bolstering its political standing. These two arenas of conflict have become key elements in its political agenda. In the Egyptian Ikhwan’s reform initiative of March 2004, the section titled ‘Most Important National Causes (Palestine and Iraq)’ notably takes up three and a half pages, whilst the section titled ‘In the Field of Combating Poverty’ is only half a page long! The opening lines of the section on Palestine and Iraq read: ‘Resistance against the Anglo-American and Zionist occupiers of Arab and Muslim lands is a legal right and duty imposed (on people under occupation) by Islam and guaranteed by Islam and guaranteed by international laws and treaties.’
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As such the repeated assertion by the Ikhwan that jihad is simply a religious duty is arguably a means whereby the Brotherhood has sought to hide politics behind the mask of religion.

Moreover, fighting jihad has been core to the Ikhwan’s political ideology since its very inception. Palestine was one of the first international causes to unite the Ikhwan and many brothers rushed to join the battle. Three battalions of Egyptian brothers went to fight in 1948 including Said Ramadan, who led a group of Ikhwani from Egypt to take part in the struggle. The Jordanian Ikhwan also sent its own battalion, as did the Syrians. Considering the difficulties of travelling at that time and the Ikhwan’s limited membership it was remarkable that according to Hassan al-Banna, the Ikhwan had 1,500 volunteers inside Palestine at one time during the war.
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However, the Ikhwan’s interest in Palestine pre-dates 1948; the Egyptian Ikhwan carried out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians during the Palestinian revolt of 1936 and the Mufti of Jerusalem was in regular contact with al-Banna. The Ikhwan also
formed a special committee headed by al-Banna to protest against Britain and defend the Palestinian cause, and a handful of Ikhwani took part in armed attacks against Jewish installations in Palestine during the revolt.
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The cause of Palestine was also taken up by the first Syrian Ikhwani leader, Mustafa al-Sibai, who invested a great deal of effort into raising awareness of the plight of the Palestinians within Syria and beyond. Since that time, the cause has been central to the Ikhwan’s political agenda and the call for Palestine’s liberation is a key tenet of its public discourse. Moreover, the Ikhwan has been forthright in its support for Hamas, which itself grew out of the Brotherhood.

However, the call to liberate Palestine through violence is not unique to the Ikhwan or even to the Islamist camp. Given the deep resonance that the Palestinian issue has among Arab populations, Middle Eastern regimes have also railed against the occupation of Palestine and have sought to act as defenders of the Palestinian cause to bolster their legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab world. Defending Palestine went hand in hand with Arab nationalism. Yet it was also used by the conservative monarchies of the Gulf that sought to amplify the Palestinian issue for their own benefit. As such Palestine has become part of the discourse and rhetoric of the Arab world, with regimes and their opponents alike competing to make themselves appear as the legitimate and authentic defenders not only of Palestinians, but also of Muslims and Islam itself. Therefore in spite of the fact that Palestinians have been notoriously badly treated as individuals within the Arab world, the Palestinian cause has long been a means of tapping into popular sentiment and rallying support by those on all sides of the political spectrum.

As a result, the Ikhwan has sought to appeal to its grass roots support base with emotive calls demonstrating that it is fully behind the fight against Israel and that it is in some way ‘its struggle’. Abd al-Majid al-Dhunaybat proudly declared:

We want the jihad action to escalate and to involve the whole Muslim nation, not only the Palestinians. The enemy is a threat to the nation, not only to Palestine. Resistance against the enemy should not remain confined to the Palestinians; the entire nation must be involved. Resistance and the intifadah need the support of peoples to be able to continue.
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Similarly, during an appearance on Hizbullah’s Al-Manar television channel, the former Deputy of the Egyptian Ikhwan Mohamed Habib announced:

The truth is that the resistance, whether in Iraq or in Palestine, defends not only the holy places, the land, and the honour but also defends the nation’s honour. They represent the first line of defence for the entire Arab and Islamic society and world. Therefore, the issue of martyrdom and of the martyrdom operations carried out by boys and girls, and also the operations carried out by the Iraqi resistance, these redeem self-confidence and hope, because a nation that does not excel at the industry of death does not deserve life.
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Among the Jordanian Ikhwani the cause of Palestine is even more fundamental and the need to be seen to be resisting Israel is perhaps most crucial. This is because of the huge number of Palestinian refugees who reside in Jordan and the fact that the Kingdom has been more directly affected by the fall-out of Israel’s actions than any other state in the region. In addition, the ranks of the Jordanian Ikhwan have been swollen over the years by those of Palestinian origin. Whilst the Jordanian Ikhwan has long been divided into two currents – one that is more moderate, comprising those who
are originally Jordanian, and the other the more hawkish Palestinian wing, which tends to be more representative of the grass roots of the organisation – it goes without saying that both currents share a complete aversion to any rapprochement with Israel. Their 1989 election platform stated: ‘The Islamic movement believes that the liberation of all of Palestine is the most important and sacred duty … The soil of Palestine is Islamic and belongs to the Muslims for eternity.’
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When the Madrid peace conference on the Middle East opened in October 1991, the Jordanian Ikhwan termed the opening session as a ‘day of mourning’ and subsequently made clear its objection to all further peace deals with Israel, especially those that involved Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy. The presence of so many Palestinians in the ranks of the Jordanian brotherhood has only increased the imperative for populist rhetoric.

Yet such grass roots appeals are not confined to those Ikhwan in the Middle East. Azzam Tamimi, who caused controversy in 2004 when he told the BBC that he would be willing to sacrifice himself for Palestine, is reported to have told a crowd at the ExpoIslamia convention in Manchester in 2006: ‘Hamas is making sacrifices for you. We tell this government Hamas is not a terrorist group. It is elected by the people of Palestine. We are not terrorists. We are defenders of the truth. Fighting those who invade Muslims is a just cause.’
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It was in the context of this bid to be seen as defenders of Islam against Zionist forces that Mehdi Akef declared in 2006 that he was ready to send 10,000 fighters to Lebanon to fight alongside Hizbullah against Israel. Clearly such a proposition was totally preposterous; there was no way that Akef would have the intention or the capacity to muster such a force, yet alone send it to fight. Yet the pronouncement was aimed at capturing the mood of the street, which was firmly behind Hizbullah. In this case, too, the Ikhwan could do nothing other than back such a cause, despite the fact that Hizbullah are Shi’ite, because it had such enormous public support. One member of the Ikhwan told
the US media: ‘Of course we are supporting the resistance. We have no choice.’
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Yet, as with the jihad in Palestine, the movement’s action appears not to extend beyond making pronouncements that are aimed primarily at raising its own public profile.

In light of public sentiment within the Arab world towards the Palestinian issue, it would clearly be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Ikhwan to officially recognise Israel’s right to exist; to do so would be tantamount to acknowledging the legitimacy of conquering Muslim land.
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It would also shatter one of the core tents of the Brotherhood’s ideology. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke state that ‘Every Muslim Brotherhood leader with whom we spoke claimed a willingness to follow suit should Hamas – the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood – recognize the Jewish state.’
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However, as they concede, ‘Such earnest professions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas recalcitrance.’
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Even the most reform-minded Ikhwani maintain a degree of ambiguity about their stance on this issue when talking to Western commentators. During one interview, Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh declared: ‘We as the Muslim Brotherhood know that the Jews in Israel are human beings … and we know they should live, and should not be killed. Just the same as the Palestinians who are the original owners of the country should live and should not be killed.’
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Later in the same interview he reportedly responded to a question about Hamas by saying: ‘No, no, no! What they do is resistance, not violence. And what about Nelson Mandela? His movement had a military wing, too. We differentiate between resistance and violence.’
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Clearly such ambiguity does little to assist the Ikhwan in its bid to prove to the world that it has fully renounced violence and can be trusted.

The issue of Iraq has similarly inflamed passions within the Ikhwan. Just as with Palestine, the Brotherhood has sought to demonstrate that it is defending the cause of Islam against the external aggressor. Although less symbolic than Palestine, not least because Saddam Hussein’s
Ba’athist regime was of a secular orientation and also repressed its own Muslim Brothers, the invasion of Muslim Iraq by Western powers was something that the Ikhwan could not fail to oppose in the strongest terms. Moreover, the issue of Iraq goes beyond Islam and is also related to Arab nationalism, something that the Brotherhood has been unable to shake off. For all that Saddam Hussein was secular, he was considered as a hero for attacking Israel in 1991 and he was also deemed to be the defender of the eastern flank of the Arab world against Persian domination. The Ikhwan may have launched some publicity stunts such as condemning the kidnapping of British hostage Norman Kember, who was abducted in Iraq in 2005, and calling for his immediate release (a fairly useless gesture given that the Ikhwan has no clout whatsoever with militants operating inside Iraq), it has in general supported the military struggle against US and British forces. Abdul Moneim Aboul Fotouh has said:

We, as the Muslim Brotherhood and as the world leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, support the armed resistance in Iraq against the American occupier, one hundred percent … I personally, as all members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and around the world, wish to carry weapons against the American occupation in Iraq, just as we wish to carry weapons against the Zionist enemy in Palestine.
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It is easy to see why such statements are derided by those of a more militant bent, for in spite of his pronouncements, there is clearly no way that a figure such as the urbane Aboul Fotouh would ever dream of actually engaging in battle. Yet these kinds of statements are direct attempts to rally public support.

Although more measured in his response than Aboul Fotouh, Syrian leader Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni has also made clear his belief that armed resistance is justified:

We believe that Iraq is an occupied country. The Americans invaded to serve their own interests, not to liberate the Iraqi people. The chaos prevailing in Iraq today is a direct consequence of the occupation. Resistance against occupation is the legal and moral right of all people. The Iraqi Islamic Party has adopted peaceful resistance, but others are fighting through different means.
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Of course the Syrian Ikhwan may also be driven in their fervour by the fact that Saddam Hussein provided shelter and refuge to various parts of the Syrian Brotherhood when they fled from the al-Assad regime.