The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business (53 page)

6.18
hundreds of unwritten rules
Esbjoern Segelod, “The Content and Role of the Investment Manual: A Research Note,”
Management Accounting Research
8, no. 2 (1997): 221–31; Anne Marie Knott and Bill McKelvey, “Nirvana Efficiency: A Comparative Test of Residual Claims and Routines,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
38 (1999): 365–83; J. H. Gittell, “Coordinating Mechanisms in Care Provider Groups: Relational Coordination as a Mediator and Input Uncertainty as a Moderator of Performance Effects,”
Management Science
48 (2002): 1408–26; A. M. Knott and Hart Posen, “Firm
R&D Behavior and Evolving Technology in Established Industries,”
Organization Science
20 (2009): 352–67.

6.19
companies need to operate
G. M. Hodgson,
Economics and Evolution
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Richard N. Langlois, “Transaction-Cost Economics in Real Time,”
Industrial and Corporate Change
(1992): 99–127; R. R. Nelson, “Routines”; R. Coombs and J. S. Metcalfe, “Organizing for Innovation: Co-ordinating Distributed Innovation Capabilities,” in
Competence, Governance, and Entrepreneurship
, ed. J. N. Foss and V. Mahnke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); R. Amit and M. Belcourt, “HRM Processes: A Value-Creating Source of Competitive Advantage,”
European Management Journal
17 (1999): 174–81.

6.20
They provide a kind of “organizational memory
” G. Dosi, D. Teece, and S. G. Winter, “Toward a Theory of Corporate Coherence: Preliminary Remarks,” in
Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective
, ed. G. Dosi, R. Giannetti, and P. A. Toninelli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 185–211; S. G. Winter, Y. M. Kaniovski, and G. Dosi, “A Baseline Model of Industry Evolution,”
Journal of Evolutionary Economics
13, no. 4 (2003): 355–83; B. Levitt and J. G. March, “Organizational Learning,”
Annual Review of Sociology
14 (1988): 319–40; D. Teece and G. Pisano, “The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: An Introduction,”
Industrial and Corporate Change
3 (1994): 537–56; G. M. Hodgson, “The Approach of Institutional Economics,”
Journal of Economic Literature
36 (1998): 166–92; Phillips, “Genealogical Approach to Organizational Life Chances”; M. Zollo, J. Reuer, and H. Singh, “Interorganizational Routines and Performance in Strategic Alliances,”
Organization Science
13 (2002): 701–13; P. Lillrank, “The Quality of Standard, Routine, and Nonroutine Processes,”
Organization
Studies
24 (2003): 215–33.

6.21
Routines reduce uncertainty
M. C. Becker, “Organizational Routines: A Review of the Literature,”
Industrial and Corporate Change
13, no. 4 (2004): 643–78.

6.22
But among the most important benefits
B. Coriat and G. Dosi, “Learning How to Govern and Learning How to Solve Problems: On the Co-evolution of Competences, Conflicts, and Organisational Routines,” in
The Role of Technology, Strategy, Organisation, and Regions
, ed. A. D. J. Chandler, P. Hadstroem, and O. Soelvell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); C. I. Barnard,
The Functions of the Executive
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); P. A. Mangolte, “La dynamique des connaissances tacites et articulées: une approche socio-cognitive,”
Economie Appliquée
50, no. 2 (1997): 105–34; P. A. Mangolte, “Le concept de ‘routine organisationelle’ entre cognition et institution,” doctoral thesis, Université Paris-Nord, U.F.R. de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, Centre de Recherche en Economie Industrielle, 1997; P. A. Mangolte, “Organisational Learning and the Organisational Link: The Problem of
Conflict, Political Equilibrium and Truce,”
European Journal of Economic and Social Systems
14 (2000): 173–90; N. Lazaric and P. A. Mangolte, “Routines et mémoire organisationelle: un questionnement critique de la perspective cognitiviste,”
Revue Internationale de Systémique
12 (1998): 27–49; N. Lazaric and B. Denis, “How and Why Routines Change: Some Lessons from the Articulation of Knowledge with ISO 9002 Implementation in the Food Industry,”
Economies et Sociétés
6 (2001): 585–612; N. Lazaric, P. A. Mangolte, and M. L. Massué, “Articulation and Codification of Know-How in the Steel Industry: Some Evidence from Blast Furnace Control in France,”
Research Policy
32 (2003): 1829–47; J. Burns, “The Dynamics of Accounting Change: Interplay Between New Practices, Routines, Institutions, Power, and Politics,”
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
13 (2000): 566–86.

6.23
you’ll probably get taken care of over time
Winter, in a note in response to fact-checking questions, wrote: “The ‘routine as truce’ formulation has turned out to have particularly long legs, and I think that is because anybody with some experience in working inside an organization quickly recognizes it as a convenient label for the sorts of goings-on that they are very familiar with.… But some of your example about the salesperson evokes issues of trust, cooperation, and organizational culture that go beyond the scope of ‘routine as truce.’ Those are subtle issues, which can be illuminated from a variety of directions. The ‘routine as truce’ idea is a lot more specific than related ideas about ‘culture.’ It says, ‘If you, Mr. or Ms. Manager, VISIBLY DEFECT from a widely shared understanding of ‘how we do things around here,’ you are going to encounter strong resistance, fueled by levels of suspicion about your motives that are far beyond anything you might reasonably expect. And if these responses are not entirely independent of the quality of the arguments you advance, they will be so nearly independent that you will find it hard to see any difference.’ So, for example, suppose we take your ‘red this year’ example down the road a bit, into the implementation phase, where enormous effort has gone into making sure that the red on the sweater is the same on the catalog cover and on catalog p. 17 and both of those match what is in the CEO’s head, and that red is also the same one produced in response to contracts with suppliers in Malaysia, Thailand, and Guatemala. That stuff is at the other end of the routines spectrum from the decision on ‘red’; people are engaged in complex coordinated behavior—it is more like the semiconductor case. People in the organization think they know what they are doing (because they did more or less the same with the green pullovers featured last year), and they are working like hell to do it, more or less on time. This is guts management stuff, and it is very hard work, thanks partly, in this case, to the (alleged) fact that the human eye can distinguish 7 million different colors. Into that, YOU, Mr. or Ms. Manager, come in and say ‘Sorry, it’s a mistake,
it should be purple. I know we are well down the road with our commitment to red, but hear me out, because … ’ If you have lined up strong allies in the organization who also favor a belated switch to purple, you have just touched off another battle in the ‘civil war,’ with uncertain consequence. If you don’t have such allies, your espoused cause and you are both dead in the organization, in short order. And it doesn’t matter what logic and evidence you offer following your ‘because.’ ”

6.24
of throwing a rival overboard”
Nelson and Winter,
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change,
110.

6.25
But that’s not enough
Rik Wenting, “Spinoff Dynamics and the Spatial Formation of the Fashion Design Industry, 1858–2005,”
Journal of Economic Geography
8, no. 5 (2008): 593–614. Wenting, in a response to fact-checking questions, wrote: “Nelson and Winter speak of organisational routines as repetitive collective actions which determine firm behaviour and performance. Notably they argue that routines are hard to codify and part of company culture, and as such are hard to change. Also, routines are a major reason why firms differ in their performance and the continued difference over time between firms. The literature started by Steven Klepper interpreted this aspect of routines as part of the reason why spinoffs are in performance similar to their parents. I use this same reasoning in the fashion design industry: fashion design entrepreneurs form to a large extent their new firm’s blueprint based on the organisational routines learned at their former employer. In my PhD research, I found evidence that from the start of the haute couture industry (1858 Paris), spinoff designer firms (whether located in NY, Paris, Milan or London, etc.) do indeed have a similar performance as their motherfirms.”

6.26
and found the right alliances
Details regarding truces—as opposed to routines—within the fashion industry draw on interviews with designers themselves. Wenting, in a response to fact-checking questions, wrote: “Note that I do not speak of truces between entrepreneur and former employer. This is an extension of the organisational routines literature I did not specifically explore. However, in my research on the ‘inheritage’ effect between motherfirm and spinoff, the role of ‘reputation’ and ‘social network’ are often times mentioned by designers in how they experience advantages of their mother company.”

6.27
Philip Brickell, a forty-three-year-old
Rodney Cowton and Tony Dawe, “Inquiry Praises PC Who Helped to Fight King’s Cross Blaze,”
The Times,
February 5, 1988.

6.28
at the bottom of a nearby escalator
Details on this incident come from a variety of sources, including interviews, as well as D. Fennell,
Investigation into the King’s Cross Underground Fire
(Norwich, U.K.: Stationery Office Books,
1988); P. Chambers,
Body 115: The Story of the Last Victim of the King’s Cross Fire
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2006); K. Moodie, “The King’s Cross Fire: Damage Assessment and Overview of the Technical Investigation,”
Fire Safety Journal
18 (1992): 13–33; A. F. Roberts, “The King’s Cross Fire: A Correlation of the Eyewitness Accounts and Results of the Scientific Investigation,”
Fire Safety Journal,
1992; “Insight: Kings Cross,”
The Sunday Times,
November 22, 1987; “Relatives Angry Over Tube Inquest; King’s Cross Fire,”
The Times,
October 5, 1988.

6.29
if they aren’t designed just right
In the Fennell report, the investigator was ambiguous about how much of the tragedy could have been averted if the burning tissue had been reported. The Fennell report is deliberately agnostic about this point: “It will remain a matter of conjecture what would have happened if the London Fire Brigade had been summoned to deal with the burning tissue.… It is a matter of speculation what course things would have taken if he had followed the new procedure and called the London Fire Brigade immediately.”

6.30
“Why didn’t someone take charge?”
“Answers That Must Surface—The King’s Cross Fire Is Over but the Controversy Continues,”
The Times,
December 2, 1987; “Businessman Praised for Rescuing Two from Blazing Station Stairwell; King’s Cross Fire Inquest,”
The Times,
October 6, 1998.

6.31
responsibility for passengers’ safety
In a statement in response to fact-checking questions, a spokesman for London Underground and Rail wrote: “London Underground has given this careful consideration and will not, on this occasion, be able to provide further comment or assistance on this. LU’s response to the King’s Cross fire and the organisational changes made to address the issues are well-documented, and the sequence of events leading to the fire is covered in great detail in Mr Fennell’s report, so LU does not consider it necessary to add more comment to the already large body of work on the matter. I appreciate this is not the response you were hoping for.”

6.32
the hospital was fined another $450,000
Felice Freyer, “Another Wrong-Site Surgery at R.I. Hospital,”
The Providence Journal,
October 28, 2009; “Investigators Probing 5th Wrong-Site Surgery at Rhode Island Hospital Since 2007,” Associated Press, October 23, 2009; “R.I. Hospital Fined $150,000 in 5th Wrong-Site Surgery Since 2007, Video Cameras to Be Installed,” Associated Press, November 2, 2009; Letter to Rhode Island Hospital from Rhode Island Department of Health, November 2, 2009; Letter to Rhode Island Hospital from Rhode Island Department of Health, October 26, 2010; Letter to Rhode Island Hospital from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, October 25, 2010.

6.33
“The problem’s not going away,”
“ ‘The Problem’s Not Going Away’: Mistakes
Lead to Wrong-Side Brain Surgeries at R.I. Hospital,” Associated Press, December 15, 2007.

6.34
“everything was out of control.”
In a statement, a Rhode Island Hospital spokeswoman wrote: “I never heard of any reporter ‘ambushing’ a doctor—and never saw any such incident on any of the news stations. While I can’t comment on individual perceptions, the quote implies a media frenzy, which did not happen. While the incidents received national attention, none of the national media came to Rhode Island.”

6.35
a sense of crisis emerged
In a statement, a Rhode Island Hospital spokeswoman wrote: “I would not describe the atmosphere as being one of crisis—it was more accurately one of demoralization among many. Many people felt beleaguered.”

6.36
to make sure time-outs occurred
The cameras were installed as part of a consent order with the state’s department of health.

6.37
A computerized system
Rhode Island Hospital Surgical Safety Backgrounder, provided by hospital administrators. More information on Rhode Island Hospital’s safety initiatives is available at
http://rhodeislandhospital.org
.