The Sword And The Olive (34 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The first major incident involving the demilitarized areas took place at Tel Dan north of the Sea of Galilee on November 3.
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An Israeli half-track was sent to patrol a disputed dirt road and, as had been planned, came under attack. Northern Command under its new commanding officer, Brig. Gen. David Elazar, returned fire, attempting to use the opportunity to knock out Syrian earth-moving equipment and tanks at long range but failing to register any hits.
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Ten days later a similar incident, also deliberately staged by the Israelis, took place. This time the Syrian tanks were hit but not their artillery positions, which from elevated positions on the Golan Heights shelled the Israeli settlements below. In the end it became necessary to call in the IAF for strafing and bombing operations. After three and a half hours of fighting a cease-fire was arranged, but not before four IDF soldiers had been killed and damage suffered by two Israeli settlements.
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An Israeli half-track was sent to patrol a disputed dirt road and, as had been planned, came under attack. Northern Command under its new commanding officer, Brig. Gen. David Elazar, returned fire, attempting to use the opportunity to knock out Syrian earth-moving equipment and tanks at long range but failing to register any hits.
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Ten days later a similar incident, also deliberately staged by the Israelis, took place. This time the Syrian tanks were hit but not their artillery positions, which from elevated positions on the Golan Heights shelled the Israeli settlements below. In the end it became necessary to call in the IAF for strafing and bombing operations. After three and a half hours of fighting a cease-fire was arranged, but not before four IDF soldiers had been killed and damage suffered by two Israeli settlements.
Additional incidents took place in December 1964 as well as the spring and summer of 1965. By the latter time the IDF’s armored corps was much better prepared. Tal’s men proved capable of hitting the Syrians despite the difference in altitude between the two sides and even though the Syrians had changed the course of the canal being constructed to increase the range to seven miles. Unable to match the Israeli Centurions’ accurate 105mm cannons, Syrian tanks responded by shelling the settlements in the upper Jordan Valley, holding them hostage. When the Syrians extended the range to as much as thirteen miles Israel called in the air force. In July 1966 it bombed the earth-moving equipment and also shot down its first Syrian aircraft (next month another one was destroyed as the Syrians tried to interfere with the IDF’s attempts to salvage a boat that had run aground). There were major incidents in January and April 1967.
By this time, by Rabin’s own subsequent admission, the Syrians had already given up their attempts to divert the sources of the River Jordan.
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Thus the last incidents were deliberately provoked by the Israelis, who, determined “to exercise their sovereignty,” continued to send tractors into the disputed plots even though they knew full well that the Syrians would respond.
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In retrospect, perhaps the most remarkable thing about these incidents was the fact that they could take place at all. To fight for a few small plots of land was entirely irrational; as a Northern Command officer pointed out at the time,
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it would have been much cheaper to airlift individual grains of corn from California—packing, insurance, and all. Yet possibly because of decades of efforts to create the new Jewish fighting man, possibly owing to the effect of always living under the gun, by and large this was not how things were regarded either in the IDF, or by the government, or indeed by the Israeli public. Almost without exception, the country backed Northern Command. It did so even at the price of taking casualties and even though Dayan, then an ordinary Knesset member, repeatedly warned his former subordinates in the army that they were “out of their minds” in leading the country to full-scale war.
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Thus the last incidents were deliberately provoked by the Israelis, who, determined “to exercise their sovereignty,” continued to send tractors into the disputed plots even though they knew full well that the Syrians would respond.
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In retrospect, perhaps the most remarkable thing about these incidents was the fact that they could take place at all. To fight for a few small plots of land was entirely irrational; as a Northern Command officer pointed out at the time,
66
it would have been much cheaper to airlift individual grains of corn from California—packing, insurance, and all. Yet possibly because of decades of efforts to create the new Jewish fighting man, possibly owing to the effect of always living under the gun, by and large this was not how things were regarded either in the IDF, or by the government, or indeed by the Israeli public. Almost without exception, the country backed Northern Command. It did so even at the price of taking casualties and even though Dayan, then an ordinary Knesset member, repeatedly warned his former subordinates in the army that they were “out of their minds” in leading the country to full-scale war.
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The largest single incident took place in April 1967. As usual, the chain of events was started by an Israeli tractor attempting to work a disputed field (at one point the Syrians suggested that Israel work half of the field while they worked the rest, but this proposal was rejected). As usual, the Syrians responded by raining down artillery shells from their Golan positions, this time mainly on
kibbuts
Gaddot, which suffered considerable material destruction but no fatalities. Once again the range was too great and the topography too difficult for the Centurions, so the IAF was called in. Syria’s air force rose to the challenge and scrambled, six of its fighters being shot down in air-to-air combat. Having received permission to pursue their prey,
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Israeli Mirages flew over Damascus, which the pilots reported looked like “an overgrown Arab village.”
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Whether deliberately or not, the chain of events that led to the Six Day War had been set in motion.
kibbuts
Gaddot, which suffered considerable material destruction but no fatalities. Once again the range was too great and the topography too difficult for the Centurions, so the IAF was called in. Syria’s air force rose to the challenge and scrambled, six of its fighters being shot down in air-to-air combat. Having received permission to pursue their prey,
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Israeli Mirages flew over Damascus, which the pilots reported looked like “an overgrown Arab village.”
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Whether deliberately or not, the chain of events that led to the Six Day War had been set in motion.
In the absence of Arab documentation—not that Israeli material relating to the period has been released—the exact origins of the Six Day War will probably never be known. Clearly the IDF under Rabin, more cohesive and better trained than ever before, was spoiling for a fight and willing to go to considerable lengths to provoke it. Clearly there was talk of a full-scale Israeli attack on Syria, which the Soviets, ally to both Syria and Egypt, did nothing to discourage.
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Nasser’s decision to violate the agreements of 1957 by sending forces in May 1967 into the Sinai may have been a response to this threat. As self-appointed leader of the Arab world he could hardly be expected to sit by as the balance of power between Israel and its neighbors fundamentally changed; indeed for months he was attacked verbally for doing nothing while the Jordanians (at Samua) and the Syrians clashed with Israel. Yet he was provided with an excuse to disentangle himself from his commitment in Yemen, where his forces had been fighting to aid the Yemenite revolution for four years without achieving anything in particular. Yet another question—little written about, yet perhaps at least equally important—was Israel’s nuclear program during those years.
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Nasser’s decision to violate the agreements of 1957 by sending forces in May 1967 into the Sinai may have been a response to this threat. As self-appointed leader of the Arab world he could hardly be expected to sit by as the balance of power between Israel and its neighbors fundamentally changed; indeed for months he was attacked verbally for doing nothing while the Jordanians (at Samua) and the Syrians clashed with Israel. Yet he was provided with an excuse to disentangle himself from his commitment in Yemen, where his forces had been fighting to aid the Yemenite revolution for four years without achieving anything in particular. Yet another question—little written about, yet perhaps at least equally important—was Israel’s nuclear program during those years.
As far as can be reconstructed, things developed as follows: Frenchassisted Israeli efforts to build a reactor went into high gear during the late fifties. From the beginning, they had been overshadowed by the possibility they would lead the Arabs to launch a preventive war or try to obtain a weapon of their own. For this reason, but also in order to avoid irritating the Americans (who then as always opposed the attempt of any country to obtain nuclear arms), the Israeli project was kept secret as much as possible. When news of the reactor being built at Dimona leaked—as it was bound to—Pres. John F. Kennedy put pressure on Ben Gurion to desist. After Kennedy was succeeded by Lyndon B. Johnson and Ben Gurion by Eshkol, an informal deal was apparently worked out. It is claimed that the Americans, having been allowed to inspect Dimona, pretended not to notice what was going on (a hoax they did their best to foist upon their incredulous British allies).
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In return, Israel was to continue its confidence trick.
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As part of the deal Eshkol may also have promised not to conduct a test.
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In return, Israel was to continue its confidence trick.
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As part of the deal Eshkol may also have promised not to conduct a test.
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The Arabs, however, were not misled. Even if their intelligence services had not been able to warn them, they could have, along with everybody else, got the news from the
New York Times
. Already during the first half of the sixties various Lebanese, Jordanian, and Iraqi commentators had referred to the matter, expressing fear that an Israeli bomb would lead to the “freezing” of the conflict—and thus the end of any hope for defeating the Zionist entity and liberating Palestine.
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From 1965 on, scarcely a week passed without some Arab commentator or other raising the issue. Among those who took note of the developing “Jewish threat” and discussed possible reactions to it were some of the highest-ranking personalities in the Arab world. They included Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Sabri; the president of Egypt’s national assembly, Anwar Sadat; King Hussein of Jordan; Syrian President Zain; and Syrian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Machus.
New York Times
. Already during the first half of the sixties various Lebanese, Jordanian, and Iraqi commentators had referred to the matter, expressing fear that an Israeli bomb would lead to the “freezing” of the conflict—and thus the end of any hope for defeating the Zionist entity and liberating Palestine.
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From 1965 on, scarcely a week passed without some Arab commentator or other raising the issue. Among those who took note of the developing “Jewish threat” and discussed possible reactions to it were some of the highest-ranking personalities in the Arab world. They included Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Sabri; the president of Egypt’s national assembly, Anwar Sadat; King Hussein of Jordan; Syrian President Zain; and Syrian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Machus.
But whereas the weaker and peripheral countries could afford to acquiesce—if only against their will—to the eventual existence of an Israeli bomb, Nasser, the self-styled leader of the Arab world, could not. He referred to the question in several public speeches, stating that Egypt would not resign itself to the existence of an Israeli bomb but would launch “a preventive war” against it—a pronouncement that reflected a resolution passed by the third Arab summit in Casablanca in September 1965 and confirmed by the Palestinian national council a few months later. Apparently he asked the USSR to provide him with nuclear arms but was rebuffed.
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Equally unsuccessful was the attempt by his top aides to persuade Washington, London, and Paris to put pressure on Israel to stop their program. Just how these issues meshed with the origins of the June 1967 Six Day War we do not know, but the closer one looks the stronger the suspicion that they did in fact play a role.
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Equally unsuccessful was the attempt by his top aides to persuade Washington, London, and Paris to put pressure on Israel to stop their program. Just how these issues meshed with the origins of the June 1967 Six Day War we do not know, but the closer one looks the stronger the suspicion that they did in fact play a role.
During the first half of 1966, Nasser had apparently reached the conclusion that the Americans were not only going to do nothing to stop Israel from developing the bomb but also sell A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft capable, if suitably modified, of delivering it. By this time the term
preventive war
was common throughout the Arab world; everybody, including the U.S. State Department,
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knew just what it stood for.
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Expecting the bomb to be ready in 1968,
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the Egyptians knew it was now or never. When, in May 1967, the Soviets informed them that a dozen or so Israeli brigades were concentrated on the Syrian border they probably took the situation as a pretext for action and stuck to it even though a week or so later they knew that the Soviet reports were unfounded.
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While Israel was celebrating its nineteenth Independence Day on May 15, Egyptian forces began crossing the Suez Canal into the Sinai, not secretly as they had in 1960 but in paradelike manner and with the greatest possible fanfare. On the next day Egypt asked for the UN forces stationed in the Peninsula to be withdrawn; a day later (May 17) its forces reoccupied Sharm al-Sheikh. On the same day, Dimona became the target of an Egyptian reconnaissance flight. On May 23 the Straits of Tyran were blockaded, and again an Egyptian aircraft flew over Dimona.
preventive war
was common throughout the Arab world; everybody, including the U.S. State Department,
76
knew just what it stood for.
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Expecting the bomb to be ready in 1968,
78
the Egyptians knew it was now or never. When, in May 1967, the Soviets informed them that a dozen or so Israeli brigades were concentrated on the Syrian border they probably took the situation as a pretext for action and stuck to it even though a week or so later they knew that the Soviet reports were unfounded.
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While Israel was celebrating its nineteenth Independence Day on May 15, Egyptian forces began crossing the Suez Canal into the Sinai, not secretly as they had in 1960 but in paradelike manner and with the greatest possible fanfare. On the next day Egypt asked for the UN forces stationed in the Peninsula to be withdrawn; a day later (May 17) its forces reoccupied Sharm al-Sheikh. On the same day, Dimona became the target of an Egyptian reconnaissance flight. On May 23 the Straits of Tyran were blockaded, and again an Egyptian aircraft flew over Dimona.
For obvious reasons, historically no country has ever admitted to surrendering to nuclear blackmail. Hence, even if the Egyptian archives should one day be opened, it is not to be expected that the Egyptian train of thought will ever be made clear. The flights over Dimona may have been intended as preparation for a military strike, as some have claimed.
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However, and given the way they coincided with the moves at Sharm al-Sheikh, they may also have been meant as a signal to Israel. The latter interpretation is perhaps more likely, because attack aircraft would have come up against the IAF as well as Hawk antiaircraft batteries already positioned to protect the reactor.
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However, and given the way they coincided with the moves at Sharm al-Sheikh, they may also have been meant as a signal to Israel. The latter interpretation is perhaps more likely, because attack aircraft would have come up against the IAF as well as Hawk antiaircraft batteries already positioned to protect the reactor.
Thus much points to the possibility that Nasser’s real intent was to press Israel into halting the bomb’s development—just as Pres. John F. Kennedy, five years earlier, had blockaded Cuba to put pressure on the Soviets. Whether Israel did in fact possess the bomb at the time is unknown, though at least one source suggests that such was in fact the case and that two devices were available.
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This question has recently been put in an entirely new light when Shimon Peres wrote in his memoirs that if Israel had only adopted “a certain proposal” of his “that I cannot write about for reasons of state security” then the Arabs would have been “deterred” and the war “prevented.”
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This question has recently been put in an entirely new light when Shimon Peres wrote in his memoirs that if Israel had only adopted “a certain proposal” of his “that I cannot write about for reasons of state security” then the Arabs would have been “deterred” and the war “prevented.”
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Thus Israel appears to have fallen into a trap of its own making when, bowing to U.S. pressure, it declined to tell the world how advanced its nuclear program really was. However, there is another possibility Peres also hints at,
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namely, that Rabin, with Eshkol’s backing, had wanted war against Syria all along and was doing his best to bring it about. Thus, on May 11 Eshkol said that Israeli action “larger than that of April 7” might be necessary. Three days later Rabin chimed in, giving four different interviews to four different newspapers in which he said that more IDF operations might be necessary to change the regime in Damascus and make Syria stop supporting the PLO.
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namely, that Rabin, with Eshkol’s backing, had wanted war against Syria all along and was doing his best to bring it about. Thus, on May 11 Eshkol said that Israeli action “larger than that of April 7” might be necessary. Three days later Rabin chimed in, giving four different interviews to four different newspapers in which he said that more IDF operations might be necessary to change the regime in Damascus and make Syria stop supporting the PLO.
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By this interpretation Rabin, acting on the advice of his chief of intelligence, Aharon Yariv, had trusted in the fact that the Egyptian was busy in Yemen.
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When Nasser, contrary to expectations, used the opportunity to extricate himself from that country, his action “struck Israel like a thunderbolt” (Moshe Dayan’s words).
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Not only that, but when the crisis materialized the Egyptians were able to carry with them both Jordan and Iraq. Although the former had been negotiating with Israel for years,
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now suddenly it concluded an alliance and put its forces under an Egyptian general; the latter mobilized and prepared to send an expeditionary force to Jordan’s aid. Taken aback by the consequences of his own actions, Rabin, recalling the events of 1960, at first hoped that things would calm down.
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When that failed to happen he went to see Ben Gurion in the hope of finding encouragement but instead was castigated for playing with Israel’s future and provoking an unnecessary war. Thereupon the chief of staff either panicked and offered to resign (as his detractors claim)
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or suffered from exhaustion and nicotine poisoning (says he, seconded by his wife).
90
At any rate on May 24 he was under sedation and was hors de combat. Then he collected himself and went on to win the war.
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When Nasser, contrary to expectations, used the opportunity to extricate himself from that country, his action “struck Israel like a thunderbolt” (Moshe Dayan’s words).
86
Not only that, but when the crisis materialized the Egyptians were able to carry with them both Jordan and Iraq. Although the former had been negotiating with Israel for years,
87
now suddenly it concluded an alliance and put its forces under an Egyptian general; the latter mobilized and prepared to send an expeditionary force to Jordan’s aid. Taken aback by the consequences of his own actions, Rabin, recalling the events of 1960, at first hoped that things would calm down.
88
When that failed to happen he went to see Ben Gurion in the hope of finding encouragement but instead was castigated for playing with Israel’s future and provoking an unnecessary war. Thereupon the chief of staff either panicked and offered to resign (as his detractors claim)
89
or suffered from exhaustion and nicotine poisoning (says he, seconded by his wife).
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At any rate on May 24 he was under sedation and was hors de combat. Then he collected himself and went on to win the war.
Note, too, that nuclear weapons were never even mentioned in the public exchange of inflammatory messages between Israel and its neighbors during the crisis that preceded the war. On the Arab side this was probably because, had they been mentioned, any major military undertaking against Israel would at once have been seen to be impossible; on the Israeli side, they would have made it unnecessary. In the event it was precisely the fact that both sides—each for its own reasons—kept the nuclear genie in its bottle, which enabled the various military moves and countermoves to take place.
When the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai became known, the IDF’s first response was to put some units on alert and send others into the Negev. Next, on May 19, the decision to mobilize the reserves was made. Once Nasser had committed himself by getting rid of the UN forces and blocking the Straits of Tyran, war was inevitable. As it happened, the crisis found the IDF at the peak of preparedness. Mobilization brought its strength to approximately 250,000 men, some 180,000 being reservists.
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The three-week waiting period that followed proved fortunate: Whereas in 1956 parts of 38th
Ugda
in particular had been far from ready, now the IDF was given time to hone its edge. Having spent years preparing for exactly this eventuality, the air force, its two hundred modern combat aircraft at the ready, was eager to put its plans into practice. Since 1956, the ground forces too had been heavily reinforced until they numbered perhaps twenty-one brigades. According to a recently published account by Gen. Yisrael Tal, ten were armored and organized in four division-sized task forces. Between them they had 746 artillery barrels plus 1,300 tanks
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—far above the figures mentioned in contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of the war.
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Much later, Rabin explained that people at the time did not understand how powerful the IDF had become and “really believed” that Israel had been in danger.
94
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The three-week waiting period that followed proved fortunate: Whereas in 1956 parts of 38th
Ugda
in particular had been far from ready, now the IDF was given time to hone its edge. Having spent years preparing for exactly this eventuality, the air force, its two hundred modern combat aircraft at the ready, was eager to put its plans into practice. Since 1956, the ground forces too had been heavily reinforced until they numbered perhaps twenty-one brigades. According to a recently published account by Gen. Yisrael Tal, ten were armored and organized in four division-sized task forces. Between them they had 746 artillery barrels plus 1,300 tanks
92
—far above the figures mentioned in contemporary or near-contemporary accounts of the war.
93
Much later, Rabin explained that people at the time did not understand how powerful the IDF had become and “really believed” that Israel had been in danger.
94
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