The War of 1812 (4 page)

Still more men were needed and, as in the United States, the Canadian government could draw on the militia. By law all males aged 16 to 60 belonged to it and were supposed to attend a few days of training every year. Attendance was generally poor and, in any case, that amount of training was far too little to be of value. This was only the beginning of the militia's problems, for they lacked virtually
everything: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, tents, blankets, food, even boots and cooking pots.

At first, militia law made no provision for compensating the families of militiamen killed or wounded in action. Brock set out to change this situation by proposing that such families receive land as compensation; this was approved in 1812 by the British government. But while the men were away on militia duty, their families had to look after the farm or business, which meant the burden fell upon the women, children, and old people. During the busiest times — seeding and harvesting — no one could be spared from the farm even if there was a war on. It was essential that the farm work be done in Upper Canada or people would go hungry.

Not surprisingly, militia in both Canada and the United States were always more concerned about their homes and farms than about military duties. These farmers and townsmen could not be expected to fight with the discipline or courage of regulars. Sometimes they did fight stubbornly, usually when defending their homes (as the Canadians were) rather than when attacking another country (as the Americans were). Fighting in war was the responsibility of the soldiers. Militiamen were meant to perform other duties such as transporting supplies, building roads and fortifications, and guarding prisoners. But the British commanders knew that if the Americans invaded, the Canadian militia would have to fight along with the army and Indians. They therefore set about improving the military ability of the militia.

In Lower Canada, a new Militia Act was passed in April 1812 providing for a Select Embodied Militia that was to be paid. In Upper Canada, the Militia Act was revised to create unpaid militia flank companies. These changes meant that part of each militia battalion would receive extra training to make them better soldiers. The Select Embodied Militia was made up of men chosen by lot from the Sedentary Militia, whereas the flank companies were composed of volunteers. In 1813 the Volunteer Incorporated Militia was created. Men volunteered to serve in it until the end of the war, received pay, and were promised land grants when the force was disbanded. All these special companies of militia would fight strongly in several major battles.

The need to use militia who remained civilians created extra problems for Prevost and Brock, for they could not simply give orders to civilians as they could to soldiers. They faced the need to persuade the elected assemblies in Lower and Upper Canada to change the militia laws, to vote money, and to pass other laws to help the war effort.

Prevost had success with the Assembly of Lower Canada. Besides the new Militia Act, it voted to make a large sum of money available to him. After war broke out, he persuaded the assembly to vote more funds and to guarantee a paper currency called Army Bills. At that time, people believed coins were the only safe money because the gold or silver of the coins had intrinsic value whereas paper money was risky even if backed by the government. However, under the influence of their political and religious leaders, Lower Canadians soon accepted the bills as safe. Prevost used them to buy supplies and pay militia wages, and also sent them to Upper Canada to help its government cover expenses.

Brock's prospects were decidedly bleak compared to Prevost's. In early 1812 Brock proposed several laws which would have strengthened his control over the province. The assembly was not willing in peace time to give him the powers he wanted, but it did amend the Militia Act and vote some money for the militia. In July, even though war had been declared, the assembly was again unwilling to agree to Brock's demands for a further strengthening of the militia law and the imposition of martial law (law established and enforced by military officers instead of by civilians). Brock's despair is evident in his letter of 28 July to Prevost:

A more decent House has not been elected since the formation of the province — but I perceive at once that I shall get no good of them. They, like the magistrates and other in office, evidently mean to remain passive . . . if I have recourse to the law martial I am told the whole armed force will disperse. Never was an officer placed in a more awkward predicament.
³

In the North and West, and perhaps elsewhere, Indians might help in the defence of Canada. Even before the war, western Indians were gathering at Amherstburg. Robert Dickson, a British fur trader, was bringing others to St. Joseph. But the Six Nations, or Iroquois, on the Grand River did not want to get involved.

Both sides wanted to gain the support of native warriors and part of the reason was the number of fighting men they could provide. By 1812 there were some 3,800 Iroquois living on reserves in New York
and Pennsylvania and another 550 in Ohio just south of Lake Erie. At least 5,540 Iroquois lived on reserves in Upper and Lower Canada.
⁴
Altogether, there may have been 10,000 warriors in the Great Lakes region, most of them Western Indians.
⁵
Despite defeats, loss of lands, and outside pressures to adopt European culture, the Iroquois remembered their warrior traditions and many wanted to revive them.

Six Nations warrior, 1812.

[Courtesy of Parks Canada Service.]

Indian warriors were effective fighting men for several reasons. From childhood they learned warlike skills because they participated in hunting and in games, they accompanied war parties, and they practiced marksmanship and tomahawk-throwing. They acquired and developed both the physical and mental competence to operate in difficult or hostile conditions. In short, they were better trained for war than their American or European opponents. Part of this training involved developing martial attitudes and this was an important element in Iroquois tradition because warfare gave the Iroquois male the opportunity to prove his manhood, to gain recognition for his
warlike skills, and, perhaps, advance to a leadership position. But preparation for war was not limited to individual skills. Warriors were also adept at carrying out controlled co-operative movements such as advancing in loose-line formation or forming circles, semicircles, or squares as required in combat. Their leaders controlled these manoeuvres sometimes from the front of the line, sometimes from the extremities and used animal or bird sounds as signals. Warriors acted as scouts and as skirmishers (much like European light infantry), but their favoured tactic was the ambush. They hoped to confuse their enemy, making effective response unlikely and keeping their own casualties low. They favoured rapid, silent movement taking advantage of cover, but, on occasion, they used shouts or war songs to frighten their opponents. This tactic sometimes proved most effective during the war — in particular, at Detroit and Queenston Heights.

Indian fighters used the same weapons as the British and Americans. The British supplied muskets of smaller calibre but of the same quality as used by their own infantry, decorated muskets for chiefs, pistols, and rifles. They also provided swords, knives, tomahawks, and spears. The Americans gave more rifles than muskets, but these weapons were of poorer quality than those the Iroquois obtained privately or from the British.

Native fighting forces displayed certain weaknesses when compared with European or American armies. An Indian warrior fought as an individual and when he had met his own goals, he might decide to leave the battle. Chiefs frequently did not exercise enough authority to prevent these departures. Sometimes as many as half or more of an Indian force might desert, as happened just before the battles of Queenston Heights and Fort George. Iroquois society could not survive heavy losses of manpower and when casualties were high — as at Chippawa — the warriors might decide to withdraw from fighting altogether.

The Iroquois on the Grand River were not being threatened by the Americans, as were the western Indians. Before and after the outbreak of war, the Six Nations on the Grand were divided among pro-British supporters, pro-American supporters, and those who wanted to remain neutral. Delegates from the Six Nations Indians living in the United States came to the Grand to urge their fellow natives to take no part in an Anglo-American war. After the outbreak of war, Erastus Granger, the American agent to the Six Nations in New York State, told them to remain at home because their help was not needed. Surrounded by American settlements, these natives could not make an independent
choice of which side to support. On the Grand River, probably the majority wanted to remain neutral. John Norton (Teyoninhokarawen), a prominent war chief, tried to muster support for the British but he could not be certain how many warriors would follow him. Brock and Prevost knew about the divisions among the Six Nations and could only wait and see what support they would receive when fighting broke out.

There was another force that was important to the defence of the Canadas, although we often forget about it. This was the Provincial Marine, consisting of warships on lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie. When war broke out, the British had naval control of these waters. On Lake Champlain they had a schooner, while the Americans had only two grounded gunboats. On Lake Ontario the British had four vessels, although only three were seaworthy — including the large twenty-gun
Royal George
; the Americans had only the sixteen-gun
Oneida
, though they soon bought six merchant schooners to convert to warships. On Lake Erie the British had the
Queen Charlotte
(sixteen guns), the
General Hunter
(six guns) described as “falling fast into decay,”
⁶
and during the summer launched the
Lady Prevost
(twelve guns). The Americans had no armed vessels.

Naval control of the lakes was important for several reasons. For one thing, ships were the fastest way to move supplies and troops. For another, British control of the lakes would force the Americans to attack along land routes into Upper Canada instead of anywhere they pleased. This simplified planning for Canada's defence. Moreover, if the Americans advanced far into Upper Canada, naval forces could cut their armies' lines of supply and communication. The British faced great problems of maintaining naval forces so far inland. Canada had few trained or experienced sailors and, in effect, depended for almost all of them on the overstretched Royal Navy. It would also have to supply the numerous items necessary to build and supply ships. But how could the British navy spare men and supplies when it had the more important roles of blockading Europe and, after June 1812, the coast of the United States? By contrast, the United States had plenty of sailors and supplies to send to their naval bases of Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain, Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario, and Presque Isle on Lake Erie.

On June 1, Madison gave Congress five reasons for his war message. The first was the impressment of American citizens into the British navy. Second, he complained of British ships off the coast stopping and searching American vessels. The third, was the British blockade by which, he said, “our commerce has been plundered in every sea.” Fourth came the Orders in Council. The major reasons, it would appear, were maritime rights. Finally, Madison stated, “In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States our
attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers
-”
⁷
In other words, Madison blamed the British, not the Americans, for starting Indian warfare in the West!

On June 18 Congress passed a bill approving the President's call for war and Madison signed it. This officially began the War of 1812, although Britain did not declare war until January 9, 1813, almost seven months later. Meanwhile, as soon as the American decision was taken, messengers rode hastily north to Montreal and Newark.

While there were undoubted weaknesses in British North America's defences, there were also significant strengths at the outset of war. There was British naval control of the lakes, regulars commanded by good officers, and the western Indians, many led by the valiant Tecumseh. The militia was the weakest part of Canada's defences, but steps were being taken to improve it.

Disagreements among Americans over the war were an enormous benefit to Canada. The defence was also helped by the poor leadership of the American army — which was not well trained at the beginning of the conflict — and by the reliance on often-unpredictable state militias. President Madison did not provide firm direction for the political and military leaders who decided how the war was to be fought. As a result, the Americans time after time made the mistake of attacking west of Kingston instead of cutting the St. Lawrence route.