The War of 1812 (5 page)

Upper Canada's principal weakness was dependence on that route with its disadvantages of rapids, winter freeze-up, and proximity to the American border.

From Spain to the Russian border, Napoleon straddled Europe. By spring Europeans could see that he was preparing to attack Russia, for he was gathering troops from the countries he controlled directly as well as from his allies. Napoleon's Grand Army began the invasion in June and the Russians retreated. Even though the British knew that the Americans were making preparations for war, they were forced to give almost full attention to the spreading conflict on the continent.

The British commander, the Duke of Wellington, had been fighting the French in the Iberian Peninsula since 1809. In the spring of 1812, he began to win important victories, but it was clear that the French would not be driven out without a great deal more hard fighting. The British government would have to continue sending Wellington many soldiers and large amounts of supplies and money. There would be little to spare for war in North America.

Sensibly, the British government tried to avoid war with the Americans. Unfortunately, its move to repeal the Orders in Council, the major source of disagreement, was delayed by the assassination in May of Prime Minister Spencer Perceval. A new
government could not be formed for some weeks because the major political leaders disagreed so strongly over policies. Eventually, Lord Liverpool formed a government and moved quickly to repeal the orders on June 23.

But it was too late in North America. Still, the British avoided acting aggressively and delayed their declaration of war until January 1813, in the hope that the Americans would rescind theirs. Thus, for more than six months, the British struggled with the problem of having to help British North America fight a war they wanted no part of while at the same time trying not to anger the United States so that fighting could soon be ended. President Madison, however, had no intention of changing his mind.

Napoleon's empire.

[Adapted from R.A. Preston, S.F. Wise, and H.O. Werner
, Men
in Arms: A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with
Western Society,
revised edition (New York, 1956), p. 185.]

Governor Prevost, General Brock in Upper Canada, and Sir John Sherbrooke, commanding officer in the Maritimes, had realized early in 1811 that the threat of war was serious. They knew that Britain could spare them little aid and that they would have to defend the colonies with the forces and means they had available.

Sherbrooke had about 4,300 regulars, mostly in Nova Scotia. That colony had some eleven thousand men in the militia, but only half of them were armed and trained. The New Brunswick militia was too scattered and untrained and the Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton militias were too small to count as military forces. Halifax, a major British naval base, was the only town in the Maritimes with fortifications that troops could use to defend it. Clearly, the primary defence of the Atlantic colonies in case of war would be the Royal Navy.

In the Canadas, Prevost and Brock considered their 5,600 troops too few. In addition to organizing training for militia units, they set about strengthening defences in several ways. Prevost asked Britain to send help, specifically requesting, for example, ten thousand muskets, two hundred sabres, and saddles and bridles to equip cavalry. The two main regiments he had, the 49th and the 41st, were due to return to England. The government told Prevost that in the event of war, he could keep these regiments as well as those (the 103rd and the 1st, or Royal Scots) being sent as replacements.

During the spring and summer of 1812, Prevost sent what men and supplies he could spare to Upper Canada along with guns, money, and clothing. He asked Sherbrooke to send money and weapons from Halifax, and the first shipment of these arrived at Quebec in September. He also decided to keep the 100th Regiment, which was to have gone to Nova Scotia.

All this was good planning and is evidence of the professionalism of these British generals. On the American side, there was little of this kind of careful, detailed preparation. As a result, the President's authority to call out thousands of men would not be very effective in practice. Even when these forces were raised, they were not trained or properly supplied. Of course, the serious flaws of the American military structure were not evident to Canada's defenders and so they expected an early invasion by numerous and powerful forces.

The Canadas, the Maritime colonies,
and the northeastern United States.

(Courtesy of Loris Gasparotto.)

The Americans had the advantage of knowing when they intended to begin the war and, therefore, could choose where to gather forces and when to launch an invasion. For example, they could easily invade Canada from northern New York State and cut the St. Lawrence Route or even attack Montreal. Or if their objective was limited to Upper Canada, they could threaten it from their bases at Michilimackinac, Detroit, and Fort Niagara.

Clearly, it was vital to Prevost and Brock to know about American intentions and timing, and so they had informants gathering details. Canada's defenders had no desire to conquer American territory; they wished simply to repel any invasion. If they were beaten back, it was accepted British strategic doctrine that their troops would retreat to Quebec City and at all costs, hold on to that fortress until succour could come from Great Britain.

But beyond that point, Brock and Prevost disagreed about strategy. Both before and after war was declared, Prevost opposed striking across the border at the enemy. He argued that a British attack would unite Americans in support of the war and would thereby increase the
danger to Canada rather than eliminate it. Brock asserted that Upper Canada could be defended and insisted that vigorous efforts ought to be made to retain it. The most effective strategy, he argued, would be to attack the Americans in the West right at the outset of the war. Throw the Americans off balance rather than wait passively for them to strike first was his advice to Prevost.

Brock proposed to strengthen British forces at St. Joseph and Amherstburg and be ready to seize Michilimackinac and Detroit as soon as war broke out. He thought that victories early in the war were the only way to win the support of the Indians, and hoped that early defeats might discourage the Americans, who expected an easy victory. A setback might make them less willing to face the continued expense and difficulties of warfare. Moreover, if the British won battles in the West, the Americans would be forced to concentrate their efforts there rather than against the vital St. Lawrence route. The defenders would thus gain time — time to organize and train militia, and time for Britain to send aid across the ocean. It was the Americans who had to hurry before more British troops reached Canada and before the Royal Navy could attack the American coast.

The Detroit frontier.

[Reprinted from
The War of 1812: The War for Canada,
by W.B.
Turner (Toronto, Grolier Limited, 1982), p. 26.]

Compared to battles in Europe, those in North America were short and fought by tiny armies. Yet these first clashes were important because Britain could not quickly reinforce her colonies. Canada's fate really did hang on the battles of 1812.

Others, besides British army commanding officers, were anxious to know when war was declared. One group vitally interested in this news was the fur traders of Montreal whose valuable cargoes moved along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence. War would interrupt their trade and the Americans might seize their trade goods and furs. To avoid this danger, the Montreal merchants could use other routes that would be safer, even if longer and more expensive.

The merchants had business partners in New York City who sent word to Canada as soon as they heard of Madison's declaration of war. The message reached Montreal on June 24 and was taken the next day to Prevost at Quebec. Brock received the news at York on June 25 and immediately sent messages to the western forts. They reached Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas St. George, the commander at Fort Malden, on June 28 and Captain Charles Roberts at St. Joseph on July 8. These British officers acted on the declaration of war before their American opponents even knew about it.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General William Hull was leading a force of over two thousand American regulars and militia towards Detroit. The men struggled through pathless, thick forests in pouring rain. At last, on June 29, they emerged from the dark woods onto the shore of Lake Erie 130 kilometres from Detroit. By this time, many were too sick to continue the march and so Hull hired a ship, the
Cayahoga
, to transport them the rest of the way. He also put his papers containing his instructions and the list of his men on the ship. He did not know that war had been declared and that the British were waiting.

On July 3, the
General Hunter
captured the
Cayahoga
. Hull's papers were immediately sent to Brock who thus learned Hull's orders and the size of his army. The British general skillfully used that knowledge to his advantage.

Two days after the capture, Hull reached Detroit, which was a village of eight hundred people surrounded by stout wooden walls
four metres high. Behind it stood a fort with strong walls, cannons, and a garrison of about one hundred. Every day more and more Michigan militiamen arrived. There could be no doubt that Hull's force and position were much stronger than those of the British who had about three hundred regulars, eight hundred militia from Kent and Essex counties, and perhaps three hundred Indians.

The war truly began on July 12 when Hull crossed the river and occupied Sandwich, thus launching the first invasion of Canada. The men camped on Colonel Jean Baptiste Baby's farm and Hull moved into the Colonel's “beautiful mansion.”
¹

Hull planned to capture Fort Malden before advancing further east. He did not move against the fort immediately, however, for two reasons: he expected he would have to use cannons and was waiting until wheeled carriages were made; and he was hoping that the Canadian militia would return home or come over to his side. To discourage them from fighting he sent out a proclamation:

Inhabitants of Canadas! . . . The army under my command has invaded your country. . . . To the peaceable, unoffending inhabitants, it brings neither danger nor difficulty. . . . I come to protect, not to injure you. . . . In the name of my country, and by the authority of my government, I promise protection to your persons, property, and rights. Remain at your homes . . . raise not your hands against your brethren. . . . The United States offer you peace, liberty and security. Your choice lies between these and war, slavery and destruction.
²