A History of China (17 page)

The First Emperor’s ambitious projects also imposed additional burdens on the peasantry. Under the leadership of the ubiquitous Meng Tian, Qin forces swept into Inner Mongolia, and other commanders occupied regions in the modern provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian. Not only were peasants recruited into the army but they were also, together with convicts and other malefactors, forcibly moved to become colonists in the newly conquered lands. Wrenched from their families and environments, many of these colonists could hardly have been pleased with the treatment the government accorded them. Thus, the dynasty created still another unhappy and potentially disloyal group.

The Qin’s efforts at standardization, however, did not generate animosity and indeed generally received enthusiastic responses. It mandated the use of the same weights and measures developed during the Lord of Shang’s era, which facilitated economic dealings. Despite its bias against merchants, it encouraged trade by instituting a standard metal currency, consisting principally of a circular coin with a square hole in the center, which eliminated the diverse and confusing knife and spade coins used previously. It abetted transport and, by extension, commerce by prescribing a standard gauge for vehicles, which made travel less cumbersome. Perhaps the most important standardization entailed the written script. The written language had developed somewhat helter-skelter during the Zhou dynasty, with quite a few regional variations. In a policy instigated by Li Si, Qin scholars simplified the script, converted it from so-called Large Seal to Small Seal characters, and promoted this uniform writing system throughout the domain, contributing immeasurably to cultural homogeneity and to feelings of shared identity.

The Qin’s other cultural ventures earned fewer plaudits and, in fact, alienated still another group of its subjects. Li Si’s policies and their apparent deviation from tradition, as well as the First Emperor’s edicts and laws, had stimulated objections from many intellectuals who often (and effectively) cited past events to criticize present developments. In 213
BCE
, Li Si responded by calling for the burning of such texts as the
Book of Odes
and the
Book of Documents
and the writings of Confucian and other non-Legalist philosophers. All copies of these works had to be turned over to the government within thirty days. Only copies in the state’s own library would be preserved; the rest would be destroyed. Li Si warned that obstreperous intellectuals who continued to cite these texts to vilify Qin rule would be severely punished. Contemporary sources hostile to the Qin accused the First Emperor of executing quite a number of scholars. Later historians perhaps exaggerated the number of texts destroyed and probably overstated the number of executions of intellectuals. However, Qin hostility toward the literati and its deliberate and systematic extirpation of books in a culture that reputedly valued the written word enraged scholars and bequeathed to history an image of the Qin as an authoritarian state opposed to learning and to the educated. However fair or unfair this essentially negative perception of the Qin may be, many scholars turned against the dynasty, which led to a critical loss of support for the First Emperor and his Legalist adherents.

The alienation of the literati is ironic in light of the flexibility with which the Qin approached the three leading philosophies of the time (Legalism, Confucianism, and Daoism). Although the Qin ministers, from the Lord of Shang to Lü Buwei to Li Si, adhered to Legalism, they applied its principles less dogmatically than implied in traditional Confucian sources. They believed in severe sanctions and in group responsibility, yet other contemporary states had similarly harsh punishments for those perceived to be deviants or lawbreakers. Qin’s aggressive efforts at centralization and its grandiose public-works projects may have alienated just as many of its newly subjugated subjects as its reputedly harsh laws. Qin leaders also did not dismiss Confucianism and on occasion cloaked themselves in Confucian garb and morality. Portraying himself at times as a wise Confucian ruler, the First Emperor proclaimed his devotion to righteousness, unity, and humaneness – virtues also associated with Confucianism.

In addition, the First Emperor was attracted to a vulgarized form of Daoism, which had been influenced by folk and popular religion. This type of Daoism, which Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi might not have recognized and would probably have repudiated, comprised an amalgamation of superstitions and a smattering of the original form of the philosophy. It appealed to Chinese rulers, particularly because it sought formulas for longevity. Popular Daoism would eventually, in part, transform the spiritual path (
dao
) of the philosophical Daoists in their search for physical immortality. As he reached middle age, the First Emperor expressed great interest in efforts to discover formulas for prolonging life. A number of mysterious masters, magicians, and adepts persuaded the emperor to dispatch a mission composed of several hundred boys and girls to find an island populated by immortals. This party never returned, giving rise to the curious legend that the children reached the shores of Japan, where they chose to remain. Despite repeated failures, the emperor persisted in his support for men who pledged to produce an elixir of immortality.

In short, the Qin, its ministers, and its emperor did not simplistically apply Legalist doctrine in their political, social, and cultural policies. Their deliberate destruction of Confucian texts notwithstanding, they portrayed themselves as embodiments of some of the Confucian virtues. Despite their authoritarianism and elitism, they were often patrons of popular religions, and the First Emperor was captivated by the claims of a variety of popular religions. Yet the image of the Qin as an inflexible regime and of the First Emperor as a tyrannical despot has lingered, with the later Confucian dynasties contributing to that perception. To be sure, the Qin had created many enemies via its aggressive, even ruthless, implementation of its policies and vision. However, it should be noted that other Chinese rulers have been brutal. They have recruited, exploited, and mistreated corvée laborers at public-works projects; they have censored and, on occasion, destroyed texts; and, every so often, they have severely punished elites and peasants alike. However, perhaps such practices were not carried out on as comprehensive a scale as during the Qin. Moreover, because Confucian rulers implemented these policies, the sources did not excoriate them as much as they did the Qin.

Nonetheless, the Qin generated hostility among its contemporary subjects. Its abolition of “feudal” titles and states stimulated considerable animosity toward the First Emperor. The Qin’s numerous enemies were given a golden opportunity to challenge the dynasty because of the irregularities in its last years. The First Emperor, one of whose favorite activities was making tours of inspection throughout his domains, partly for his own pleasure and partly for ceremonial and military purposes, died in 210
BCE
during one of these processions. His aging chief minister, Li Si, and a certain Zhao Gao (d. 207
BCE
), the first in a long line of powerful eunuchs at the Chinese courts, concealed news of his death until his caravan had returned to the capital while they hatched a (successful) plot to derail the succession of the First Emperor’s eldest son in favor of a younger son whom Zhao Gao had tutored and had influence over. Despite their success in hiding the emperor’s death until their return to the capital, they could not avert uprisings against the tottering dynasty. The usurpation of the throne made the second emperor appear to be lacking in legitimacy, which gave rise to opposition and then to outright rebellion. Having to face an increasingly more volatile situation shattered the fragile unity at the Qin court. These rifts led, in rapid succession, to the execution of Li Si, the suicide of the second emperor, and the murder of Zhao Gao. Disaffection was so pronounced that the dynasty collapsed without much resistance. In 206, one of the rebel armies marched into and devastated the capital at Xianyang, burning numerous buildings and destroying palaces, artifacts, and texts. The Qin had ruled for barely fifteen years – a striking contrast to the eight centuries of the Zhou, its predecessor, and the four centuries of its successor, the Han. Yet it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that it laid the foundations for the Han, considered by the Chinese to be one of their greatest dynasties.

The disparity in length of the Qin and the other dynasties was often attributed to the oppressiveness of the Legalist-inspired government, but that explanation is simplistic. A sounder interpretation is that the Qin displaced the Zhou nobility, creating a ready-made opposition that would pounce on any of its missteps. Another valid explanation is the Qin’s audaciousness and ambition. It undertook too many projects in too short a time, resulting in a straining of China’s capacities. Forced labor and forced exactions of taxes in order to perform these manifold endeavors fostered the real opposition to the court. These public-works projects were valuable and turned out to be essential for China’s political and economic development, but the Qin embarked upon them without considering the impact of such rapid and dramatic construction projects on the already stretched resources of the country. The burdens, both financial and labor related, fell inordinately on the most vulnerable segments of the population, principally the peasantry, creating a sizable reservoir of discontented and angry people. However, the Qin’s disastrous miscalculations and its authoritarian rule should not obscure its considerable achievements in unifying China. Its efforts led to the creation of a bureaucracy, standardization of important functions and agencies, and centralization of the country.

The Qin also attempted to develop a system of imperial succession. However, the Han, the successor dynasty, truly implemented it. An emperor’s transfer of power to a son became entrenched during the Han. Nonetheless, the Qin had conceived of such a transfer, but its brevity prevented it from carrying out a proper succession. The Han adopted the system, which lent stability to the dynasty. To be sure, the new system did not always prevail. After the death of Emperor Wu, the most renowned of the Han rulers, the succession was messy, partly due to the length of the emperor’s reign and partly due to the death of his alleged chosen successor. Also, toward the end of the first century
BCE
, infants and young boys were enthroned, necessitating the appointment of regents. Yet the conception of a regular and orderly system of succession was frequently accepted and implemented.

The Qin and Han were the first imperial dynasties. Yet “dynasty” has to be understood in its Chinese context. Like the Western conception of the term, “dynasty” mandated governance by a specific family and hereditary succession, with the ruler perceived as part of a collective entity and not merely as an individual. The reigning emperor would choose his own successor, usually a son. To be sure, figures other than the emperor may have, in some eras, wielded power with the reigning emperor serving as a figurehead. A significant number of emperors were either uninterested in governance or dominated by others – for example, an official, a mother, a wife, or a eunuch. Yet the idea of dynasty persisted, with the most significant of them lasting for three centuries or more. Symbolism and rituals contributed to their survival. A dynasty constructed temples for its ancestors; its rulers conducted rituals associated with assurance of a bountiful harvest; its founder selected earth, fire, wood, metal, or water as its primary element, allegedly giving it strength for its future; and its family name could no longer be used as a surname by anyone in the country. Performance of the rituals lent considerable legitimacy, strength, and stability to the dynasty, even if a specific emperor was inadequate or had scant authority. The power of this model prompted usurpers to seek to found their own dynasties. Wang Mang (ca. 45
BCE
–23
CE
), who overthrew the Former Han dynasty in 9
CE
, and the Empress Wu (624–705
CE
), empress of the Tang dynasty in the seventh century
CE
and the only woman to seek to govern on her own, were perhaps the two most prominent examples of powerful but ignominious failures in those who sought to establish their own dynasties. Their efforts reveal the attractiveness and significance of the concept of “dynasty.”

The stability of the Chinese dynastic model contrasted sharply with the problems of succession of many of the nomadic pastoral peoples on China’s borders and with the foreign and often originally nomadic peoples who conquered and imposed their own dynasties on China. These foreigners devised a variety of different forms of succession to the throne, although a few adopted the Chinese pattern. Those who retained their own systems were often unstable. For example, the Mongol nobility traditionally convened to choose one of the descendants of Chinggis Khan (or Genghis Khan) as their new khan (or emperor). Conflicts often arose, and on occasion they resulted in chaos. This system was inherently unstable, and, after the Mongol conquest of China, successions to the throne led, at times, to assassinations and even battles bet­ween contending forces. The Chinese generally had a more regular and orderly system of succession.

The Han (206
BCE
–220
CE
), the next dynasty, which was split into the Former Han (206
BCE
–9
CE
) and the Later Han (25–220
CE
), proved to be not only enduring but also pivotal for Chinese history. Chinese prize the dynasty so highly that they often refer to themselves even today as “men of Han.” The dynasty devised institutions and policies that remained in place for much of Chinese history, and it witnessed the triumph of Confucianism as the dominant philosophy, the underlying ethical system, and the means of legitimizing the dynasty through rituals and the reputed blessing of Heaven. The Han pursued the Qin aim of unifying China and was determined to avert a reversion to the Zhou-era profusion of bitterly hostile states, whose conflicts had resulted in a descent into chaos. To ensure such unification, the Han needed to establish a government and to persuade the populace that it was sanctioned by Heaven.