A History of China (19 page)

The Xiongnu, one of the first of these steppe nomadic confederations, arose in Mongolia at precisely the same time that the Han unified and consolidated China. Under the leadership of their leader, who was known by his Chinese name Maodun, the Xiongnu united many of the pastoral nomads of Mongolia and central Asia into one powerful unit. Maodun himself defeated the Donghu and Yuezhi confederations on his road to power. He then took a major step for a nomadic ruler by establishing a fixed site for an annual meeting of all his people, a site that could potentially become the capital for an empire. He also initiated religious ceremonies, as well as such basic elements in creating a government as conducting a census. Maodun’s new policy raised the possibility of the establishment of a sedentary government. With experience in operating a regular administration, the Xiongnu would clearly be a more serious threat because they could not only occupy but also rule Chinese territory.

Responding to this potential threat, Gaozu initially mounted a punitive expedition and led his army in person against the Xiongnu. Maodun employed the tactic of a feigned retreat to entice the Chinese army into a trap in the modern province of Shanxi. He besieged the Han forces for a week and withdrew his troops only because of turbulence caused by the disaffection and disloyalty of two of his allies. The lifting of the siege did not conclude the hostilities, for the Xiongnu invaded again in 200 and 196
BCE
. Smarting over his precarious position, Gaozu sought a peaceful accommodation. He did so through a so-called marital alliance. In 192, a young Chinese woman who was supposed to be a princess became one of Maodun’s consorts, and the Han dynasty also promised to provide annual gifts of silk, grain, and wine in return for a pledge of nonaggression. Later the court permitted the Xiongnu to trade for Chinese products in specially designated markets on the Chinese border. Marital alliances and trade led to peace for about fifty years.

The accession of Emperor Wu altered this period of stability. Wu was determined to pursue a less conciliatory and more aggressive policy toward the Xiongnu. In 138, he dispatched a palace official named Zhang Qian (d. 114
BCE
) to travel toward central Asia to seek allies among the Xiongnu’s vaunted enemies. The underlying assumption was that such an alliance would translate into a concerted military campaign on two fronts against the Xiongnu. A Chinese army could launch an expedition from the south while their allies could move from the west to pacify the Xiongnu. Knowing of the enmity between the Xiongnu and the Yuezhi, who had been forced to move westward by Maodun’s attacks, Zhang traveled to the so-called Western Regions to sign a pact with the Xiongnu’s enemies. After a harrowing voyage during which he was captured and detained in the Xiongnu encampment for about a decade, he finally reached the Yuezhi territories only to find that the Xiongnu’s adversaries were reluctant to imperil themselves with an attack against their former enemies. They rebuffed Zhang’s overtures. The dejected Chinese envoy headed back to China, but the Xiongnu captured him once again. After a year, Zhang managed to escape and returned to China. His mission appeared, on the surface, to be a fiasco. However, he offered an invaluable report on the states and regions through which he had traveled. He implied that some could be lured into accepting Chinese sovereignty while others offered products appealing to China. The Ferghana region in modern Uzbekistan had fine horses, which intrigued Wu and the court because China simply did not breed sufficient steeds for its military needs. Similarly, the region around Ferghana produced grape wine, and Zhang ought to be credited with making the Chinese aware of grapes and alfalfa. However, he failed to achieve the diplomatic objectives of his mission. Nonetheless, the emperor sent him with gold and silk and a Chinese princess to lure still another group in the Western Regions, the Wusun, into an alliance. Though commerce developed between China and the Wusun, they did not reach an agreement on a joint expedition against the Xiongnu. Thus, Zhang’s contribution lay in fostering trade, leading eventually to the renowned Silk Roads commerce, rather than in developing a solution for China’s problems with the Xiongnu.

Wu adopted a forceful policy even before learning of the results of Zhang’s first mission. He abandoned the policy of marital alliances and instead ordered several surprise attacks on Xiongnu positions. In 127, 121, and 119
BCE
, Han forces routed the “barbarians” of the north, compelling them to move ever farther north, but these reputed successes were costly. Moreover, the Han dynasty histories, which were often based on reports by commanders who sought to inflate their achievements, exaggerated the Xiongnu losses. Had the Xiongnu suffered as many casualties as described in the Chinese accounts, they would have needed decades to recover from the devastation. In fact, the Xiongnu repeatedly attempted to avoid direct confrontations with large Chinese forces, preferring to flee farther into the steppelands. A pursuing Chinese army would encounter serious logistical difficulties because it would have to carry, by oxen, its own supplies for men and animals for an extended period of time, while the Xiongnu would simply butcher a few of their animals and continue to flee. Such campaigns in the rugged terrain in the north led to great losses among the troops and animals, particularly the oxen, which had fragile constitutions and suffered under the heavy loads they had to transport in desolate areas where they could not adequately graze.

Thus, although Wu’s campaigns played a role, the real weakening of the Xiongnu confederation resulted from internal turbulence. Unity within this newly established confederation was always fragile, and each supreme leader’s authority over his various underlings had to be earned – a demanding task. About two decades after Wu’s accession, conflicts erupted in the Xiongnu leadership, weakening the confederation. One supreme leader after another succeeded to power over the next sixty years, culminating in greater regional power and a diminution of central authority. Facing such internal disunity and unrest, the supreme leaders were more willing to abide by the system of foreign relations devised by the Chinese. Assuming their civilization was the most advanced in the world, the Chinese created a system that demanded acknowledgment of their superiority. They pointed out that they had a sophisticated culture, a written language, a well-worked-out ethical code, and magnificent cities and palaces, all of which their nomadic neighbors to the north lacked. Thus they portrayed their neighbors as uncivilized, crude, intractable, and occasionally treacherous. The Chinese claimed that they had the responsibility, through their own example of creating an orderly society, of encouraging foreigners to “come and be transformed” – that is, to become increasingly sinicized. The Chinese emperor, who had a mandate from Heaven to rule his own people, was allegedly vital because his conduct inspired the foreigners to seek the benefits of Chinese culture. His benevolence, compassion, and generosity served as a model for foreign rulers and drew them and their people closer to China. Though the Xiongnu and other foreign peoples to the north and west of China did not necessarily subscribe to this ideological viewpoint, they recognized that China was the most important country in east Asia at that time and often abided by Chinese regulations in order to obtain diplomatic and commercial gains.

The tribute system governed foreigners’ relations with the Chinese. In order to deal with China, foreign rulers were required to send tribute embassies periodically to the Chinese emperor. When an embassy reached the Chinese border, Chinese officials immediately took charge and accompanied the envoys to the capital. The Chinese government bore all the expenses of the embassy during its stay in China. Its officials taught the envoys the proper etiquette for their appearance at court. After the envoys had been prepared, they had an audience with the emperor. They performed the rituals, including the kowtow, a symbolic recognition of their inferiority and, more important, of their acknowledgment of their status as envoys of a “vassal” state or group. Their conduct at court implied that their ruler was subordinate to the emperor. They then offered their tribute of rare and precious goods to him, and he, in turn, bestowed valuable gifts upon them and their ruler. The audience ended, and the envoys then had three to five days to trade with Chinese merchants. The Chinese court could, in theory, control this relationship. It determined the frequency with which embassies could be admitted into China, the number of men in each embassy, and the length of the embassy’s stay in the country. Court officials supervised the foreigners’ trade with Chinese merchants, regulating the prices and profits and ensuring that ­neither side exploited the other. The court asserted that it did not gain from such ­tribute and trade relations. China, it contended, was economically self-sufficient, and the gifts that the foreigners brought to the court were superfluous. On the other hand, the Chinese products granted to the foreigners were vital and valuable. Although the court appeared to be bribing the foreigners in order to secure peace, Chinese officials hesitated to describe the relationship in those terms. They could use the threat of a suspension of tribute and trade to pacify the foreigners, since they gained little from the relationship while the foreigners gained much.

Why would the Xiongnu, who were often China’s military equals, accept, even in theory, an inferior status in dealings with the Chinese court? One likely explanation is that they profited enormously from tribute and trade with China. The lavish goods they received from the emperors (e.g. silk) and the essential products they obtained in trade with Chinese merchants compensated for the less than exalted position they occupied in their relations with China. They would acquiesce to the Chinese system as long as they secured the products they needed. Only when China sought to limit or eliminate tribute and trade did they renounce the system and use their forces to challenge Chinese hegemony. Another explanation for the acquiescence of foreign rulers is that investiture by the Chinese emperor enhanced the prestige of the foreign ruler among his own and neighboring groups. Such Chinese support could be extremely useful to a new ruler, particularly one who faced rivals or opposition within his own land.

Thus the tribute system enabled China to devise its own world order. The Chinese court dealt with foreigners on its own terms. Equality with China was ruled out, and the court could not conceive of equitable international relations. It could not accept other states or tribes as equals. The court would not tolerate rulers who did not abide by this world order and would not permit entry to those who rejected this system of foreign relations. The Chinese emperor was the Son of Heaven, the undisputed leader of the east Asian ­peoples, if not the world.

Because Emperor Wu’s reign came at the apogee of the Han dynasty’s power, he could enforce the regulations of the tribute system, particularly when he faced a Xiongnu leadership that was in disarray. Nonetheless, his earlier military campaigns had been expensive. In addition, his expansionist policies in other regions were similarly costly, although some merchants profited. Following up on Zhang Qian’s mission, in 108
BCE
, Wu’s troops attacked and then occupied Turfan, a vital gateway to central Asia. From there, they made forays farther to the west to ensure passage for travel. The resulting development of the so-called Silk Roads trade enriched some merchants and brought China in touch with a wider world, offering opportunities for cultural and commercial exchanges. Naturally, many regions in central Asia, India, Persia, and west Asia (and, eventually, the Roman Empire) benefited from this trade because it gave them ready access to the silk they coveted. China became increasingly attractive to many foreign merchants. Nonetheless, the maintenance of troops in Turfan and other oases and towns along the Silk Roads contributed to the court’s financial burdens.

Wu’s adventurist foreign policies stretched from the southwest to the northeast and included the southern coast as well. Some of his expeditions were prompted by reports of the great wealth accruing to some areas due to trade; others resulted from turbulence that he feared might spill over into China; and still others entailed attempts to establish buffer zones for China’s territories. In 111
BCE
, his troops set up garrisons and commanderies in the kingdom of Dian in the modern province of Yunnan and in the kingdom of Yelang in modern Guizhou. A few years later, other military expeditions affirmed Chinese control and established commanderies in the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi and in northern Vietnam, as well as on the island of Hainan. Simultaneously, Han forces occupied the kingdoms of Dongyue and Minyue (in the modern province of Fujian) in reprisal for the killing of Chinese officials. In the northeast, the various inhabitants of Korea had been in touch with China for several centuries, and Chinese settlers had probably introduced features of Chinese civilization into the Korean peninsula. However, Wu was now determined to gain control. In 109, claiming that Koreans harbored Chinese defectors, he dispatched an army that created several commanderies, the most important of which were Lelang (near modern P’yongyang), Lintun, Zhenfan, and Xuantu. Archeological evidence, including numerous Chinese goods found at tomb sites and tombs of prominent Chinese, confirms the Chinese presence in Korea over the next century.

Despite the impetus to commercial and cultural contacts, Wu’s expansionism did not necessarily result in permanent territorial gains. Many commanderies were eventually abandoned. The extent of their control beyond the immediate region occupied by Chinese troops is unclear. These forays, nonetheless, fostered trade. In sum, Wu’s expansion had immediate benefits, but some of the long-term consequences may not have been salubrious, and the expenditures for the campaigns were staggering.