After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (34 page)

Interference and coups d’état

The bitter quarrels and differences between the Gulf monarchies have sometimes even led to attempts to alter the course of dynastic succession
in each other. When opportunities have arisen in one Gulf monarchy—perhaps following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute—it is now commonplace for the other Gulf monarchies to interfere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate or, in more extreme cases, even sponsoring a coup d’état. Moreover, with the six monarchies failing to present a united front and often being divided over their choice of candidate in these ‘succession contests’, the resulting vacuums have often allowed foreign, non-regional powers to get involved. In some ways this is nothing new, as during Britain’s period of influence in the Persian Gulf there were frequent cases of the political resident stepping in to shape the future of certain monarchies. As described, the colonial representative eased the transfer of power in Abu Dhabi in 1966 from one brother to another, while in 1970 Britain ensured that control of Oman passed from father to son. In most of these situations Britain was playing the role of facilitator rather than meddler, usually consulting members of the ruling family in question and helping the dynasty install its preferred successor at the expense of unpopular or overly cautious incumbents. The squabbles and coups of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, however, been quite different, as when neighbouring monarchies or foreign powers have been involved there has rarely been any effort to identify the most suitable or popular candidate, with most of the focus being on installing a ruler that will be the most amenable to their interests.

In the late 1980s, for example, the coup in the UAE’s Sharjah—where one brother
¹¹¹
ousted another
¹¹²
on the grounds of economic mismanagement and squandering—was only reversed following interference by neighbouring Dubai, which had provided accommodation for the ousted ruler and published newspaper stories supporting him.
¹¹³
Similarly in 1995 Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia tried to re-install the ousted ruler of Qatar
¹¹⁴
who, as discussed, was removed from power by his more popular, pro-reform, son.
¹¹⁵
Although the counter-coup was unsuccessful, fears of a repeat attempt continued to dog Qatar for several more years. Indeed, the following year some 6000 tribesmen were disenfranchised and several ruling family members were arrested after being linked to a Saudibacked coup plot.
¹¹⁶
And in 2009 it was reported by Stratfor that a major coup in the emirate had been attempted, involving members of the Qatari military and the ruling family. Most of the subsequent press coverage hinted that the coup had Saudi Arabia’s support.
¹¹⁷
Similarly, in February
2011 the Jordan and UAE-based
Al-Bawaba
news agency reported that another coup had been attempted in Qatar, with thirty military personnel being arrested. This had supposedly coincided with a statement signed by sixty-six opposition figures including sixteen members of the ruling family who were backing the ruler’s exiled brother in France
¹¹⁸
and which claimed that the ruler and his wife were involved in ‘cases of corruption and social injustice’.
¹¹⁹
Gaining traction, this time the story was even covered in bulletins issued to various UN agencies. Whether true or not, the foreign-sourced report proved damaging for the ruler and has kept the spectre of future coup attempts in the minds of most Qataris and resident expatriates. Indeed, in April 2012 Iran’s Fars News Agency and Saudi Arabia’s
Al-Arabiya
reported that yet another attempt had taken place, with high-ranking military officers being rounded up and placed under house arrest after clashes between Royal Guard troops and regular military personnel outside one of the ruler’s palaces. Perhaps works of fiction, the reports claimed that the ruler and his wife were transported by American helicopters to a safe location.
¹²⁰

By far the best example of a modern-day coup and resulting foreign interference has been in the UAE’s northernmost emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah. In 2003, after having allegedly burned an American flag at the head of an anti-Iraq war demonstration, the emirate’s long-serving crown prince
¹²¹
was replaced by one of his younger brothers.
¹²²
A decree was signed by their very elderly father in support of this change, but at the time many analysts questioned the ruler’s decision-making abilities given his advanced age and poor state of health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, as tanks belonging to the federal UAE Armed Forces were moved from Abu Dhabi to Ra’s al-Khaimah and positioned on street corners. The ousted crown prince’s supporters demonstrated, chanting his name and holding flags, and thus indicating he still enjoyed popular support—but they were fired on by water cannon and dispersed. He was duly exiled, first crossing the border to Oman, and then living in the US and Britain.

However, with the emirate’s Dubai-like development programme beginning to flounder in 2008, the new crown prince was becoming increasingly vulnerable to criticism. There were also widespread allegations of corruption in his administration, specifically relating to kickbacks in the construction industry. Still in exile, the deposed crown prince enlisted a US public relations company and a British solicitor to conduct
an international media campaign with the dual aims of persuading Abu Dhabi and then the international community that the incumbent crown prince was a liability. In particular the campaign claimed that the 2003 decree was never authenticated, and that a later 2004 decree had in fact been signed by the aging ruler, which overturned the 2003 decision. In an effort to appeal to Abu Dhabi’s stance on Iran, the campaign also focused on the new crown prince’s apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective deputy—a Shia Lebanese businessman—had major commercial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic. In 2009 the campaign even claimed that Ra’s al-Khaimah’s port was being visited by Iranian customs officers and that the emirate was being used as a conduit for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Connections were also highlighted in the media between Ra’s al-Khaimah and al-Qaeda, with claims being made that recent terror plots in the UAE, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai’s then incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had originated in Ra’s al-Khaimah.
¹²³
And at one point it seemed that the campaign team had even tried to enlist the support of Israel, with it being reported that the exiled crown prince had met Israel’s ambassador to Britain and, according to documents seen by
The Guardian
, that the ambassador had promised that he was ‘…working with certain people from his side’ and ‘promised that the matter will be solved in his [the former crown prince’s] favour’.
¹²⁴

In 2010 there were signs that the campaign may have been gaining traction, as Abu Dhabi’s ruling family seemingly allowed the former crown prince to return from exile in order to visit his father, who was being treated in a hospital in Abu Dhabi. He was reportedly also allowed to stay in his wife’s palace in Kalba—a town controlled by Sharjah. Given Abu Dhabi’s increasingly hawkish position on Iran, some observers believed that Abu Dhabi was unwilling to allow Ra’s al-Khaimah to retain links to Tehran. However, when the ruler finally died in October 2010 several hours of confusion ensued. The former crown prince had reentered Ra’s al-Khaimah and installed himself in his pre-2003 palace with approximately 150 heavily armed guards and a larger number of loyal tribesmen. He believed he had Abu Dhabi’s blessing to attend his father’s funeral and had concluded that he would be installed as ruler later that day. By early evening, however, a brief announcement was made by the UAE’s Ministry for Presidential Affairs in Abu Dhabi that his younger brother was after all going to be the new ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah.
Tanks were again deployed on the outskirts of Ra’s al-Khaimah and all of the former crown prince’s retainers—including two of his cousins, several Omani citizens, and a Canadian military advisor—were arrested and detained for questioning.
¹²⁵
Two months later the emirate’s new ruler was invited to a banquet in Abu Dhabi held in his honour, where the ruler of Abu Dhabi congratulated him and his new crown prince—one of his sons—on their successes. The new ruler was then described as ‘… expressing happiness over meeting the president [the ruler of Abu Dhabi] and assuring that he would work with dedication and honesty in the shade of the directives of the president and his wise leadership’.
¹²⁶

The immediate future is likely to be marked by more such coup attempts in the region, as a number of the Gulf monarchies now have very aged rulers and—given the ever increasing size of the ruling families—powerful factions have coalesced around rival candidates. In each of these cases it is likely that internecine contests will develop and, given the high stakes involved, the discreet involvement of foreign powers is all but inevitable. In Oman, for example, the seventy-one year-old Qaboos bin Said Al-Said has no children or other natural heirs and has always shied away from appointing a crown prince. Moreover, given the exclusion of most ruling family members from senior government positions, no real candidate has emerged as a potential successor, as nobody has been able to accumulate the necessary administrative or military experience and expertise normally expected of an heir apparent in a Gulf monarchy. At present, much seems to hang on a clause in Oman’s constitution
¹²⁷
that permits the non-appointment of a crown prince, thereby allowing a ‘ruling family council’ to meet after the ruler’s death to decide upon the succession process. Indeed, Qaboos has stated his intention that such a council should meet after his death, but that if the council fails to reach a consensus then it should open a sealed envelope containing his two recommended candidates, in descending order. Two copies of these recommendations are believed to have been made, and are kept in safekeeping in two different places. Their contents are the subject of much speculation, with most Omanis believing them to name at least one of the sons of a popular uncle of Qaboos who died in 1980.
¹²⁸
The obvious concern in Oman—and currently the subject of great speculation—is that should the family council be divided over its decision and then pursue one of Qaboos’ posthumous recommendations, then the newly installed ruler would have little personal legitimacy and thus be vulnerable to rivals.

The situation in Abu Dhabi—and thus the UAE presidency—is also worthy of attention. In late 2010 the sixty-four year-old ruler, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, returned to the country after a lengthy period of medical treatment in Switzerland, having failed to return in time for the Eid Al-Fitr festival—the attendance of which is customary for a Gulf ruler. Moreover, he appeared to have suffered considerable weight loss, and the state-backed media published little or no information about his condition. Having been unable to appoint one of his own sons as crown prince, his heir apparent is instead one of his younger half brothers, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. Now fifty-one, and crown prince since 2004, Muhammad enjoys considerable clout in the emirate and is in de facto control of the UAE’s military in addition to the aforementioned Mubadala Development Company and several other state-backed entities. Moreover, Muhammad has the advantage of having five full brothers and a still influential mother
¹²⁹
who was always considered the favourite of the late ruler’s many wives and is now officially referred to as ‘Mother of the Nation’.
¹³⁰
Among them, these brothers control several further key portfolios in the Abu Dhabi and federal governments, and Muhammad’s eldest son is now seemingly in control of internal security. When Khalifa dies, however, all may not be smooth for Muhammad and his full brothers, as despite their strong influence they do not yet control all of the strings in Abu Dhabi. Notably the all-important Supreme Petroleum Council, the massive Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and several other key institutions still remain beyond their collective reach. Furthermore, although Muhammad and his brothers undoubtedly enjoy popularity within some circles in Abu Dhabi, it seems that in other emirates as many UAE nationals fear him as love him. Certainly, with the described hawkish stance on Iran, the relations with Israel, and—as discussed later in this book—a recent crackdown on opponents by the UAE’s security services—the fear factor is likely to keep building. Although critics and potential rivals within the extended ruling family have kept a low profile, they nevertheless exist, and there are some individuals who enjoy discreet support and—courtesy of their maternal ancestry and marriage links—are believed to be favourably viewed by some of the UAE’s largest and most influential tribes.

The most recent bout of speculation centres on succession in Saudi Arabia, as the main players are all very elderly and in some cases are perceived as having differing viewpoints on key issues such as relations with
the US, the influence of the religious establishment, and women’s rights. A spate of deaths at the top of the establishment, which already seems to have begun, could see an unpopular king being installed and will likely expose deep divisions within the ruling family. In turn, this could easily force a stalemate or prompt a coup d’état in the kingdom. The current king, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, is fairly well liked. However, he is now believed to be about eighty-eight, having outlived a number of his younger brothers and relatives. Notably, his crown prince since 2005, Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, died in 2011 aged eighty-three. Seemingly with little choice, Abdullah then appointed another of his younger brothers, Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud as his crown prince and successor.