Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (114 page)

228 "Below it was this guy's
arm": Pageler oral history.

228 sold   for   scrap:  
details   of  
Liberty's  
end   are   drawn   from   NSA,   Top

Secret/Umbra, "Attack on a
Sigint Collector, the USS
Liberty"
(1981), p. 64. 228 $20,000 to
each of the wounded crewmen: Richard K. Smith, "The Violation

of the
Liberty," United
States Naval Proceedings
(June 1978), p. 70.

228  Ten months earlier:
Department of State, Press Release (May 13, 1969).

229  the U.S. government asked:
Bernard Gwertzman, "Israeli Payment to Close the Book on '67 Attack on
U.S. Navy Vessel,"
New York Times
(December 19, 1980).

229  Motor Torpedo Boat 203
display: photo and caption in A. Jay Cristol, "The
Liberty
Incident,"
a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of Miami in 1997, p. 331.

230  "I must have gone to the
White House": memorandum, Moorer to AMEU (June 8, 1997).

230  "The government is
pretty jumpy about Israel": Ennes,
Assault on the Liberty,
p. 194.

231  no U.S. naval vessel since
World War II had suffered a higher percentage: Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.,
"The U.S.S.
Liberty
1967-1989,"
NCVA Cryptolog
(Fall
1989), p. 1.

231 "Throughout the
contact": Israeli Defense Force, Confidential, Court of Inquiry Report,
Decision of Examining Judge, Lieutenant Colonel Yishaya Yerushalmi (July 21,
1967).

231  a small task force led by
Walter Deeley: NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "Attack on a Sigint Collector, the
USS
Liberty"
(1981), p. 58.

232  "There is no way that
they didn't know": Quoted in Cristol, "The
Liberty
Incident,"
pp. 161-162, n. 49.

232 "There was no other
answer": interview with Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter (July 17-18,
1980).

232  "Mr.  Mahon probed
several times": NSA,  Top  Secret/Umbra, Dr. Louis Tordella memorandum for
the record (June 20, 1967).

233  "A nice whitewash":
NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "Attack on a Sigint Collector, the USS
Liberty"
(1981), p. 41.

233 "Nobody believes that
explanation": interview with retired Major General John Morrison (July
2000).

233 many in NSA's G Group: NSA,
Top Secret/Umbra, "Attack on a Sigint Collector, the USS
Liberty"
(1981),
p. 63.

233 "The Israelis got
by": Letter, Tourney to Senator John McCain (May 11, 2000).

233 "After many years I
finally believe": oral history of William L. McGonagle (November 16,
1998).

233 McGonagle died: Michael E.
Ruane, "An Ambushed Crew Salutes Its Captain,"
Washington. Post
(April
10, 1999).

233  "Frankly, there was
considerable skepticism": letter, Christian to James M. Ennes, Jr.
(January 5, 1978).

234  "Exculpation of Israeli
nationals": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "Attack on a Sigint Collector, the
USS
Liberty"
(1981), p. 61.

234 "Though the pilots
testified to the contrary": ibid., p. 41.

234  "The fact that two
separate torpedo boat commanders": ibid.

235  "A persistent question
relating to the
Liberty":
ibid., pp. 63—64.

235 "I believed the
attack": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, Dr. Louis Tordella memorandum for the
record, June 20, 1967.

235 "It was not an official
policy": From "Israel Reportedly Killed POWs in
'67,"
Washington Post
(August 17, 1995).

235 "To speculate on the
motives of an attack group": Lieutenant Commander Walter L. Jacobsen,
JAGC, USN, "A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the U.S.S.
Liberty"
Naval Law Review
(Winter 1986), pp. 1-52. The quoted text appears on p. 51.

237 "I have to conclude that
it was Israel's intent to sink the
Liberty":
Memorandum, Moorer to
AMEU (June 8, 1997).

237 a CIA report: CIA, FOIA release
of documents and television transcript (January 28, 1985).

237  "The Israelis have been
very successful": CIA, Secret/Noforn/Nocontract/ Orcon, "Israel:
Foreign Intelligence and Security Services" (March 1979), p. 32.

238  "The principal targets
of the Israeli intelligence": ibid., p. 9.

238 "Congress to this
day": Memorandum, Moorer to AMEU (June 8, 1997). 238 "I saw Abed
lurch out": Details of the killing were reported by William A.

Orme,  Jr.,   "BBC  Says 
Unprovoked  Israeli  Fire  Killed  an  Employee  in

Lebanon,"
New York Times
(June
22, 2000).

Page

240  "The Navy was very
interested in having a trawler program": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, oral
history of Eugene Sheck (December 16, 1982), p. 2.

241  "We talked once":
Oral History of Admiral David Lamar McDonald, USN (Ret.) (November 1976) (U.S.
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland).

242  "We were
operating": Sam Tooma, "USS Banner Anecdotes," USS
Pueblo
web
site (April
15, 2000).

242  The most serious incident
took place: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Reconnaissance Center, Top Secret,
"The Pueblo Index: Experience of Harassment" (January 24, 1968), pp.
1-2.

243  "There were some touchy
situations": Oral History of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper,  USN  (Ret.) 
(1978)  (U.S.  Naval  Institute,  Annapolis,  Maryland). Hooper was commander,
Service Force, Pacific Fleet, based in Hawaii.

243  "The
Liberty[-size]
ships
were owned by NSA": interview with Stephen R. Harris (February 2000).

244  "The location of the
first mission hadn't been decided upon": Trevor Arm-brister,
A Matter
of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair
(New York:
Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 154; NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, Oral History of Eugene
Sheck, December 16, 1982.

244  "would do one patrol in
response": Sheck oral history.

245  "I want to sell you top
secrets": Pete Early,
Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring
(New
York: Bantam, 1988), p. 63.

245 Starting in May: This account
of increasing North Korean activity draws on CIA, Secret, "North Korean
Intentions and Capabilities with Respect to South

Korea" (September 21, 1967),
p. 1. 246 "We were about": Details of the attack on the RB-47 are
from George V. Back,

"North Korean Attack on
RB-47," web posting at

55_back.html> (May 1, 2000).
248 "This young fellow": Sheck oral history.

248  "The following
information is provided to aid": U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S.
Pueblo,
Inquiry
into the U.S.S.
Pueblo
and EC-121 Plane Incidents, Hearings, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess, (1989).

249  "This was the first
voyage": ibid.

249  "NSA has a pretty strong
voice": Sheck oral history.

250  On January 2, 1968: Unless
otherwise noted, all details of the voyage of the USS
Pueblo,
as well as
the prior approval process, come from U.S. Navy, Top Secret/Limited
Distribution/Noforn, "Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations of a
Court of Inquiry Convened by Order of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet, to Inquire into the Circumstances Relating to the Seizure of USS
Pueblo
(AGER-2) by North Korean Naval Forces" (April 9, 1969). Details on
General Steakley and Captain Gladding: Trevor Armbrister,
A Matter of
Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair
(New York:
Coward-McCann, 1970), pp. 192-199.

251   "Determine the nature
and extent of naval activity": U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S.
Pueblo,
Inquiry into
the U.S.S.
Pueblo
and EC-121 Plane Incidents, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989), pp. 762-767.

251  "I was very upset when
we found out": Harris interview.

252 
"Out of Japan":
E.
M. Kisler, "Bucher's Bastards," written in North Korea in September
1968.

253  "It... infiltrated
scores of armed boats": FBIS Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA International
Service in English (November 27, 1967).

253 "Drawn into the spy
ring": FBIS Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA International

Service in English (November 10,
1967). 253 "As our side has declared time and again": FBIS
Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA

International Service in English
(December 1, 1967). 253 quoted in a Japanese newspaper:
New York Times,
January
27, 1968.

253  "The U.S. imperialist
aggressor troops": FBIS Transcript, Pyongyang KCNA International Service
in English (January 11, 1968).

254  "Although the seas were
calm": Stu Russell's remarks are quoted from Stu Russell, "Cold and
Getting Colder," U.S.S.
Pueblo
web site,
(April 15,
2000).

255  "We had a crew meeting
and we were told": interview with member of ship's crew.

255 "In   the   New   Year,  
the   U.S.   imperialist   aggressors":   FBIS   Transcript, Pyongyang
KCNA International Service in English (January 10, 1968).

257  "We were close enough to
see the crew": Russell, "Cold and Getting Colder."

258  "Subchaser No. 35":
Secret, "Chronology of Events Concerning the Seizure of the USS
Pueblo"
(NSA, undated), pp. 1-4.

258 "A guy comes steaming
back": Sheet oral history, p. 30.

260  SC-35 then instructed all
North Korean vessels: Secret, "Chronology of Events Concerning the Seizure
of the USS
Pueblo"
(NSA, undated), pp. 1—4.

261  "The Koreans requested
from the United States": interview with former U.S. Air Force F-4 pilot
Bruce Charles (February 2000).

262  "in excess of that
necessary or desired": Department of Defense, Secret memorandum,
"What Reaction Forces Were Available and What Were Our Reaction
Options?" (January 24, 1968).

262 That left Okinawa: For the
F-105s on Okinawa, see Thomas C. Utts, "After North Korea Seized USS
Pueblo
on the Eve of Tet, It Looked Like the Communists Had Opened a Two-Front
War,"
Vietnam
magazine (date illegible on author's copy).

262  Bucher's actions during the
attack: See, generally, Lloyd M. Bucher with Mark Rascovich,
Bucher: My
Story
(New York: Doubleday, 1970).

263  "For ten days":
Henry Millington, quoted in Sheck oral history. 263 "That happened around
two o'clock": ibid.

267  "Each time the mike was
keyed": Russell, "Cold and Getting Colder."

268  "That's guys'
lives": "Betrayal: The Story of the USS
Pueblo,"
History
Channel (1997).

268  "They were on their
own": Sheck oral history.

269  "We were, it
seemed": Russell, "Arrival in Wonsan," USS
Pueblo
web
site,    
(April    15, 2000).

269  "General Carter read it,
and then he got up": Sheck oral history.

270  Within hours of the incident:
Details of McNamara's war council come from Department of Defense, Top Secret,
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (January 25, 1968).

271  "We had F-4s lined up
wingtip to wingtip": oral history of Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, III,
Volume 1 (1973), p. 348 (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania). Bonesteel was commanding general, 8th U.S. Army;
commander-in-chief, United Nations Command; and commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

271 "They wanted to
provoke": This and the subsequent quotations from Gene Sheck are from
Sheck oral history.

273 "My first pass started
off near Vladivostok": This and details on the A-12 come from Paul F.
Crickmore,
Lockheed SR- 71: The Secret Missions Exposed
(London: Osprey
Aerospace, 1993), pp. 31—33.

273 "Our mission was to
support the captain": Rakfeldt's comments and details concerning the USS
Volador
come from Harry O. Rakfeldt, letter to author (April 17,2000).

275 "The KGB did not plan to
capture": interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished CBS News transcript
(undated), p. 9.

276 "The Soviets had been
allowed to inspect": ibid., pp. 12—13. 276 "The ciphers and codes are
considered": ibid., pp. 8—9.

276  "perhaps the best
operative" ... "read your cables!": Pete Early, "Interview
with the Spy Master,"
Washington Post Magazine,
April 23, 1995.

277  Jerry Whitworth: Early,
Family
of Spies,
p. 137.

277 "Using the keylists
provided by John Walker": interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished CBS
News transcript (undated), pp. 13—14.

277  In some instances, classified
information was passed on: The Court of Inquiry reported that one crew member
"cooperated with the North Koreans during detention in that he amplified
classified information which the North Koreans had captured and provided
additional information which was not otherwise  available."  Other  crew 
members,  said  the  Court,   "may  also  have disclosed significant
classified information to a lesser degree, but the actual

. degree of such disclosure, over
and above what was already available to the North Koreans, could not be
determined from the evidence." U.S. Navy, Top Secret/Limited Distribution/Noforn,
"Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations of a Court of Inquiry
Convened by Order of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to
Inquire into the Circumstances Relating to the Seizure of USS Pueblo (AGER-2)
by North Korean Naval Forces" (April 9, 1969), p. 94.

278  "Americans were
shocked": William J. Taylor, Jr., "Remembering Seizure of the
Pueblo,"
Washington Times
(December 27, 1994).

278 "When a
fourth-rate": "Betrayal," History Channel (1998).

278 "I will sign the
document":
New York Times
(December 23, 1968), p. 3.

278  "A 
determination":  U.S.  Navy,  Top  Secret/Limited  Distribution/Noforn,
"Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations of a Court of Inquiry
Convened by Order of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to
Inquire into the Circumstances Relating to the Seizure of USS
Pueblo
(AGER-2)
by North Korean Naval Forces" (April 9, 1969), p. 84.

279  "He should have
persisted": ibid., p. 88.

279 "failed completely in the
execution": ibid., p. 89.

279  "With few exceptions":
ibid.

280  "You're
surrounded": Sheck oral history.

280 Naval Security Group officers
at Pacific Fleet Headquarters: The court of inquiry recommended that Captain
Everett B. Gladding, Director, Naval Security Group Pacific, be given a letter
of reprimand for allegedly "failing to ensure the readiness of
Pueblo's
research detachment" and "[failing] to provide intelligence
support to
Pueblo
during the mission." But Gladding's boss, Admiral
Hyland, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, vetoed the recommendation.

280 "Folks out there
said": Sheck oral history.

280  "They had total
incapacity": Bonesteel oral history.

281  "They have
suffered": U.S. Navy, press release (May 6, 1969).

281  "The
Pueblo
incident":
interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished CBS News

transcript (undated), pp. 32-33,
24-25. 281 moved to a pier: AP World News (October 26, 1999).

281 Led by a former NSA
contractor; "The sooner, the better": "North Korea Moves
Pueblo,"
The Lonely Bull
(newsletter of the crew of the
Pueblo)
(November
1999), p. 1.

Page

284  "I believe that the
enemy will attempt": Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  (MACV),  Secret
message, Westmoreland to General Earle Wheeler, January 22, 1968. (LBJL,
National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 68-69.)

285  "Japanese reports back
to Tokyo": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On Watch" (September 1986),
pp. 33-41.

286  "Thus began the
Indochina War": ibid.

286 "true autonomous
self-government": Stanley Karnow,
Vietnam: A History,
rev. ed. (New
York: Penguin, 1997), p. 148.

286 "would mean extremely
adverse reactions": CIA, Secret memorandum, "Intelligence Memorandum
No. 231: Consequences of Communist Control of French Indochina" (October
7, 1949), pp. 1-3. (HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence File, Box
250.)

286 aid, weapons, and U.S. forces:
On August 2, 1950, the first ten U.S. officers arrived in Saigon. Sixty others
soon followed, and before Truman left office in January 1953, 200 more would be
sent in to help the French fight off Vietnamese opponents.

286  witless CIA officer: Sedgwick
Tourison,
Secret Army Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North
Vietnam
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 7.

287  The operation began on March
13, 1954: CIA, William M. Leary, "Supporting the 'Secret War': CIA Air
Operations in Laos, 1955-1974,"
Studies in Intelligence
(Winter
1999-2000).

287 "I recall very
dramatically": interview with David W. Gaddy (May 2000).

287  "couldn't find any hard
evidence": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On Watch" (September 1986),
p. 39.