Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (115 page)

288  "the current situation
in South Vietnam": Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3, quoted
in NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "In the Shadow of War" (June 1969),
pp. 30-31.

288  400th ASA Special Operations
Unit (Provisional): In September 1961 its name was changed to the 82nd Special
Operations Unit. By mid-1966 the organization had grown considerably; it was
thereafter named the 509th ASA Group.

289  "Cryptography must be
secret, swift, and accurate"; "During the decades past": NSA,
Essential
Matters: A History of the Cryptographic Branch of the People's Army of
Viet-Nam, 1945-1975
(translated and edited by David W. Gaddy, NSA, 1994),
pp. xiii-xiv.

289  "destroyed the entire
set of [cryptographic] materials": ibid, p. 106.

290  "As a civilian from
NSA": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "Deployment of the First ASA Unit to
Vietnam" (undated), p. 80.

290 James T. Davis: For this
account, I have relied on Army Intelligence and Security Command,
"Biographical Data on Specialist Four James T. Davis" (undated).

292 "Many of us who knew
about the 34A operations": Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark,
In
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
(New York: Vintage Books,
1996), p. 130.

292  "By midsummer of 1964
the curtain was going up": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra, "On Watch"
(September 1986), p. 41.

293  DeSoto patrols: ibid., p. 43.

293 another DeSoto mission was
scheduled: Unless otherwise noted, details of the Gulf of Tonkin incident come
from Edwin E. Morse's excellent study,
Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the
Vietnam War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and
NSA, Top
Secret/Umbra,
"On Watch" (September 1986), Chapter 6, "The Gulf of
Tonkin Incident, the DeSoto
Patrols and OPLAN 34A," pp. 43-50.

297 "It seems likely
that": Department of State, Top Secret memorandum, Forre-stal to Secretary
of State (August 3, 1964) (Department of State,
FRUS
1964-1968, vol. 1,
p. 599).

299  "Everybody was demanding
the Sigint": Morse,
Tonkin Gulf,
pp. 197, 199.

300  "I must address the
suggestion": U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, "The Gulf of
Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents," Hearings (February 20,1968), p. 19.

300 Operation Northwoods: JCS, Top
Secret/SpecialHandling/Noforn, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on Northwoods, Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A, "Pretexts to
Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (March 12, 1962), p. 8.
Details of the operation are covered in
more detail in chapter 4, "Fists."

300  to send the Sigint ship
Banner:
See
chapter 8, "Spine."

301  "At the time there's no
question": Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff,
Many Reasons Why:
The American Involvement in Vietnam
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), p.
108.

301  number of cryptologic
personnel: 1,322 were from ASA; 246 from the Air Force; and 179 from NSA and
the Navy. NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "In the Shadow of War" (June
1969), p. 118.

302  "U.S. personnel with the
ability to read Vietnamese": ibid., p. 55.

302  "We found that we had
adequate": interview with a former senior NSA B02 Group official.

303  "And of course there was
always": interview with another former senior NSA B Group official.

303 "There was no blotter
large enough": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the
Tide," part one (June 1970), p. 14.

303  "Through interrogation
of these men": NSA, Secret/Noforn, "Deadly Transmissions"
(December 1970), p. 4.

304  "The inescapable
conclusion from the captured documents": ibid., p. 5.

304 "The enemy might
disappear from a location": Lieutenant General Charles R. Myer, "Viet
Cong Sigint and U.S. Army Comsec in Vietnam,"
Cryptologia.
(April
1989), pp. 144-45.

305 "Even as late as the
spring of  1969": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn,

"Working Against the
Tide," part one (June 1970), p. 14. 305 "It was ... likely that they
could gain": ibid., p. 5.

305  "some tortuous
evolutions": Myer, "Viet Cong Sigint and U.S. Army Comsec in
Vietnam," p. 147.

306  "Signal security,
particularly in voice": ibid., p. 150.

306 During 1967, Comsec monitors
eavesdropped on: NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the
Tide," part one (June 1970), p. 35. 306 "it was shot at the whole
way": ibid., p. 19.

306  "capstone of the enemy's
Sigint operations": ibid., p. 9.

307  estimated to be around $15
million: ibid.

307 "All of our primary
operational communications": ibid., p. 16.

307 "Walker is not
responsible for your failures": Pete Early, "Interview with the

Spy Master,"
Washington
Post Magazine
(April 23, 1995). 307 "We certainly provided":
interview with Oleg Kalugin, unpublished CBS

News transcript (undated), pp.
15-16. 310 "compromising cipher-signal anomalies": Details on the
Izmeritel
and Guam:

NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn,
"Working Against the Tide," part two (June

1970), p. 202.

310  "The communications were
in plain language": ibid.

311  "Comsec   monitors  
and   analysts   had   an   advisory":   NSA,   Top   Secret/
Umbra/Noforn, "Working Against the Tide," part one (June 1970), p.
16.

311   "35 kilometers north of
here tomorrow;" "On landing, the assault force": ibid., p. 35.

312  "a veritable
flood": ibid., p. 38.

312  "Most U.S. commanders in
Vietnam": ibid., p. 50.

313  orders were transmitted to
the ship on May 26: USS
Oxford,
"Command History" (January 6,
1966), Enclosure 1.

313  "In Africa we were
looking at some of the local links": interview with George A. Cassidy
(January 2000).

314  "They tried to keep the
Oxford
movements very highly classified": interview with John De Chene
(February 5, 2000).

315  "I was on the back of a
flat pickup truck": interview with Ray Bronco (February 17, 2000).

315  "There was always a
rivalry between our sister ship": e-mail from Richard E. Kerr, Jr., to
author (January 26, 2000).

316  "a world of their
own": Bronco interview.

318 "The operators hung a
long wire out the back": This and other details of the RU-6A Beaver and
the RU-8D Seminole aircraft are drawn from NSA, "Army Security Agency
Aerial Reconnaissance: Mission and Sacrifice" (undated), pp. 2-6; NSA,
"National Vigilance Park RU-8 Aircraft Dedication Ceremony" (May 12,
1998).

318 "Whoever controlled the
shipping channel": This and Richard McCarthy's other comments come from
his e-mail to author (February 25, 2000). McCarthy served in Vietnam from
December 1965 to August 1967 and was awarded aircrew wings and the air medal
with twenty-seven oak-leaf clusters. 519 "Naturally, that particular
flight element": Major General Doyle Larson, "Direct Intelligence
Combat Support in Vietnam: Project Teaball,"
American Intelligence
Journal
(Spring/Summer 1994), pp. 56—58.

320  "MiG-21s would streak
out": This and Bruce Bailey's other remarks are from "The RB-47 &
RC-135 in Vietnam," his web posting at 55th Strategic Reconnaissance   
Wing    Association    web    site    55_vietnam.html> (May 1, 2000).

321   "They were designed to
intercept": Details on the drones are from Bruce Bailey, "Drones in
Southeast Asia," web posting at 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing
Association web site (May 1, 2000).

322  the planes were soon assigned
exclusively to Sigint: The CIA conducted a photo mission over North Vietnam on
August 15, 1961. Between 1962 and 1964, CIA U-2s staged a total of thirty-six
photographic missions over North and South Vietnam. By April 1964, however,
photographic requirements were changing from strategic reconnaissance to
tactical support as the Vietcong became more active. As a result of the
increasing level of combat in Indochina, the U.S. Intelligence Board gave
responsibility for aerial reconnaissance of the areas where fighting was taking
place to the Strategic Air Command. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
the Air Force assumed responsibility for all of Indochina (CIA, "The CIA
and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974" [1998], pp. 222-31).

322 "All I had to do was
throw a switch": Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos,
Skunk Works
(Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1994), p. 185.

322  "The pilot did not
operate the receivers": Bailey's comments and details of  the  U-2  come 
from  Bruce  Bailey,  "The  View  from  the  Top,"  web posting  
at   55th   Strategic   Reconnaissance   Wing   Association   web   site
(May 1, 2000).

323  "Throttles to Max
A/B"; details on March 21, 1968, SR-71 flight: Paul F. Crickmore,
Lockheed
SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed
(London: Osprey Aerospace, 1995), pp.
1-8.

324  "The SR-71 was excellent
for 'stimulating' ": Richard H. Graham,
SR-71 Revealed: The Inside
Story
(Osceola, Wise.: Motorbooks International, 1996), pp. 83-84.

325  "As a member of the Army
Security Agency": This and David L. Parks's other remarks are from his
e-mail to author (February 15, 2000).

326  the 199th Light Infantry
Brigade: This was composed of a headquarters company and three battalions
(three thousand men, more or less) of infantry troops.

330  "If SD and SSD are included":
CIA report, Harold P. Ford, "CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three
Episodes 1962-1968" (1998), p. 85.

531  "MACV used mainly
Confidential-level documents": ibid., p. 93.

331   "frustratingly
unproductive": ibid.

332 "I was frequently and
sometimes tendentiously interrupted": ibid.

332 NSA began reporting that two
North Vietnamese Army divisions: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New
York,
General William C. Westmoreland
v.
CBS, Inc., et al
(82
Civ. 7913), Stipulation of Facts, p. 2; hereinafter,
Westmoreland v. CBS.

332 "also told MACV
headquarters personnel": William E. Rowe, "Defending Long Binh,"
Vietnam
(February 1995), pp. 47-52.

332  NSA issued the first in a
series:
Westmoreland v. CBS,
exhibit 518, "Treatment of Indications
in Finished Intelligence: NSA."

333  "A 'we are winning'
consensus pretty much": CIA report, Harold P. Ford, "CIA and the
Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968" (1998), p. 108.

333 "It would seem to us that
there is a relationship": James J. Wirtz,
The Tet Offensive:
Intelligence Failure in War
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1991), p. 213. 333 the
Oxford
sailed
to Bangkok: USS
Oxford,
Confidential, 1968 "Command

History" (March 19, 1969), p.
2. 333 "Coordinated Vietnamese Communist Offensive Evidenced":
Westmoreland
v.

CBS,
exhibit
64, p. 26.

333  "Evening missions were
usually very quiet": McCarthy e-mail to author (February 25, 2000).

334  Westmoreland finally saw: The
following account is from CIA, Harold P. Ford, "CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers: Three Episodes  1962-1968" (1998), p. 115.

334 "At twelve
midnight": e-mail from David L. Parks to author (February 18, 2000).

334  "They had been hiding in
tunnels and foxholes": Rowe, "Defending Long Binh."

335  "They've hit the embassy
and palace": NSA, account by Gary Bright, NSA Cryptologic Museum.

336  the 
Oxford's
crew:
USS 
Oxford,
Confidential,   1968  "Command  History" (March
19, 1969), p. 2.

336  "The National Security
Agency stood alone": CIA, Harold P. Ford, "CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968" (1998), pp. 116, 141.

337  "The National Security
Agency extends its heartiest": NSA, telegram, Carter to Truman (May 8,
1968) (Carter Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Box 40, Folder 36).

337 Lyndon Johnson was being
compared in the press to General George Custer:

Art Buchwald,
Washington Post
(February
6, 1968). 337 "Nothing had been done to attend to their wounds":
e-mail from David L.

Parks to author (February 12,
2000).

339 "My opinion of 1969 on
Oxford":
Kerr e-mail to author (January 26, 2000). 339 95,000 people: testimony of
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, U.S.

House of Representatives,
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on

Department of Defense, Department
of Defense Appropriations for 1975, Part

1, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 598.