Death to Tyrants! (17 page)

After taking into consideration the three aforementioned factors, a typical, moderately risk-averse individual might reasonably conclude that a sufficient number of his fellow citizens will join the resistance movement and that, as a result, the movement would prevail. Thus, after he saw a few men “run to the hills,” he would decide to do likewise, believing that others would follow him. And others would, in turn, follow him for the same reason. Thus the resistance movement would enjoy more and more support and quite possibly overwhelm Eretria's nondemocratic regime.

The analysis presented above demonstrates that the Eretrian pro-democrats, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, utilized a strategy commonly referred to as “defense in depth.” The law, that is, did not simply establish a single line of defense for their democracy. Instead, it established multiple lines of defense, each of which became operational at particular “progression points” in a coup: one line sought to disrupt a coup even before the democracy was overthrown; another line sought to prevent the members of a successful coup from consolidating their control of the polis; another line sought to dislodge a consolidated anti-democratic regime; and another, the “general layer of defense,” sought to facilitate large-scale pro-democracy mobilization whenever anti-democrats threatened to overthrow, or succeeded in overthrowing the Eretrian democracy. The Eretrian tyrant-killing law is thus considerably more sophisticated than it might appear at first reading.

Considering how thoroughly the tyrant-killing law facilitated coordinated mass action in defense of the Eretrian democracy, one might reasonably suspect that anti-democrats would be deterred from staging a coup. One cannot know for certain, of course. But the pro-democrats greatly increased the probability that a coup would fail. And the degree to which they increased that probability is (roughly) the greater degree to which anti-democrats would begrudgingly choose to cooperate with the newly reinstated Eretrian democracy.

Stability

The comments presented in this short section demonstrate that the Eretrian democrats maintained secure control of their polis—in a very difficult environment—for several years after they promulgated their tyrant-killing law. The chronological terminus for the discussion is 323—i.e., the death of Alexander. Several points argue in favor of that terminus. First, it is reasonable to conclude that the law's impact decreased over time: it would thus become increasingly irrelevant to extend the period of time examined. In addition, the death of Alexander marks the beginning of a new era in Greek history—when Alexander's “successors” fought with and against each other for supremacy—wherein Eretria's internal dynamics might very well have been both qualitatively and quantitatively different than in the years prior. And finally, evidence that sheds light on the fortunes of Eretria's democracy in the years after Alexander's death is both sparse and ambiguous.

The first point in support of this section's argument is that Eretrian democrats were optimistic about the viability of their regime a couple of years
after
the Athenian-led liberation. Evidence in support of that point is found in an Eretrian decree (
RO
73) promulgated in circa 338.
⁵⁵
The decree, which establishes the basis for augmenting the city's festival for Artemis, reflects optimism and confidence. Effort is made, for example, to attract foreigners to compete in various musical competitions and participate in an elaborate procession and sacrifice. The final sentence of the decree (lines 41–45), however, is particularly telling: “write up the decree on a stone stele and stand it in the sanctuary of Artemis, in order that the sacrifice and the musical festival for Artemis shall happen in this way for all time, with the Eretrians being free, prospering and ruling themselves” (
ἐλευθέρων ὄντων Ἐρετριέων καὶ εὖ πρηττό̣ν̣|των καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων
). Eretrian democrats almost certainly would not have articulated such a sentiment during the years preceding their liberation.
⁵⁶

It is important to emphasize the fact that the decree does not simply reflect postliberation euphoria. The Eretrians, again, likely promulgated the decree a couple of years after the fall of Kleitarchos. Thus enough time had elapsed for the Eretrians to assess the viability of the new, postliberation status quo. And they certainly appear to have been quite positive.

The second point in support of this section's argument is that Eretrian democrats maintained control of their polis after the battle of Chaironeia and throughout the reign of Alexander. That they had such control during the reign of Alexander is adequately attested epigraphically—there is no doubt.
⁵⁷
It is true that the there is no evidence that surely sheds light on Eretrian politics immediately after Chaironeia. But there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the Eretrian democracy was overthrown after Chaironeia and reestablished early in the reign of Alexander.
⁵⁸

It is quite remarkable that anti-democrats did not reclaim control of Eretria after the battle of Chaironeia. There can be little doubt that they would have liked to stage a coup d'état. And one would think that they had the opportunity to do so. To begin with, the Eretrian pro-democrats were, at least during the previous generation, unable to defend their regime against attacks launched by their domestic adversaries. In addition, Eretrian pro-democrats likely would not have received support from an outside power (e.g., Athens or Chalkis); they would have had to defend their regime by themselves. And finally, Philip quite likely made it known that he was not at all averse to pro-Macedonian, anti-democratic coups in the wake of his victory at Chaironeia. Demosthenes, for example, wrote (18.65) that, after his victory, Philip destroyed, wherever he could, “the prestige, the authority, the independence, and even the regime of every city alike.” And there is reason to suspect that
many cities suffered pro-Macedonian, oligarchic coups in the wake of Philip's victory, likely with Philip's active support.
⁵⁹
One might reasonably conclude, therefore, that, if Eretrian anti-democrats did not assume control of their polis, they either tried and failed or did not try because they thought they would fail. In either case, their failure (actual or expected) would have been due to the Eretrian pro-democrats.

The evidence presented above demonstrates that the Athenian-led liberation of 341 marked a turning point in the history of Eretria's fourth-century democracy.
⁶⁰
As noted in the “Threats to Stability” section of this chapter, during the thirty years before 341, the Eretrians had three different democratic regimes covering (collectively) about twelve years (377–370, 357–353, 344–343) and four different “strongman” regimes covering about eighteen years (370–357, 353–349, 349–344, 343–341). The story after 341 is quite different: the democrats maintained control of the polis for eighteen years straight. And, at least during the first few of those years, one might reasonably conclude that the pro-democrats' ability to maintain that control was severely tested by their domestic opponents.

Conclusion

Philip II posed the most serious threat to democratic governance on the Greek mainland since—at least—Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War. On the one hand, he could threaten a democratically governed polis from the outside: he had accumulated sufficient military and economic resources to simply overpower a polis.
⁶¹
On the other hand, and perhaps most noteworthy,
he could threaten a democratically governed polis from the inside. He appears to have known that democracy's weak link was the difficulty its supporters had in mobilizing effectively in its defense. And he certainly knew that he could find reliable partners in the various cities to help him exploit that vulnerability. Indeed, such a partnership would be “win-win”: Philip would acquire loyal puppet regimes on the cheap; anti-democrats would be able to dominate their domestic opponents. It thus was with reason that Demosthenes feared for the future of democracy.
⁶²

Eretrian pro-democrats, however, demonstrated that it was possible to counter Philip's attempts to overthrow a democratic regime from the inside. Their main weapon, of course, was a thoroughly crafted tyrant-killing law—a tool that facilitated coordinated mass action by the (majority) pro-democrats in response to a coup attempt by the (minority) anti-democrats. Philip, despite the promulgation of that law, likely still could overthrow the Eretrian democracy. But he would have to do so from the outside. And that would be much more costly.

It is tempting to connect the success of the Eretrian democrats to the subsequent popularity of tyrant-killing legislation. Arguments from silence are problematic, of course. But it is quite striking to note, first, that all extant (i.e., on stone) tyrant-killing enactments were promulgated during the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods—that is, during a period wherein the nature and extent of a king's influence in the domestic affairs of the various Greek poleis was being worked out for the first time. Second, the law from Eretria is the earliest such enactment. Perhaps the Eretrians (and, of course, the Athenians) taught the wider Greek world that tyrant-killing law could facilitate pro-democrats' efforts to maintain control of their city—and not just in Athens.

1
The Macedonian supported invasions of Eretria: Dem. 9.57–8. The Macedonian invasion of Oreos: Dem. 9.59–62. It should be noted that Cawkwell (1978b: 131–32) doubts that Philip was behind the invasions of Euboia. His reasoning: (1) Philip does not appear to have supported those regimes subsequently; (2) Demosthenes did not emphasize the Macedonian invasion in Euboia in his speech
On the Chersonese
, a speech likely delivered only a few weeks before his
Third Philippic
and wherein reference to the invasion of Euboia would have strengthened the case that Diopeithes should not be recalled—the argument advanced in that speech. Denis Knoepfler (1995: 347n144) understandably rejects Cawkwell's position as being too dismissive of Demosthenes's repeated assertions. The date of the invasion of the Macedonian sponsored invasion of Euboia is also debated. The chronology accepted above is that of Ellis (1976: 162–66). Sealey (1993: 260), however, argues that the first invasion of Eretria (led by Hipponikos) took place in 343 and before the trial of Aischines, which took place in autumn of 343. This disagreement of date is largely due to different interpretations of Demosthenes's repeated references in
De Falsa Legatione
—a speech delivered at the trial of Aischines—to Philip's action in Euboia (87, 204, 326, 334). Sealey (1993: 260) concludes that Demosthenes referred to Hipponikos's mission in that speech. Ellis (1976: 279n109), however, argues that Demosthenes simply amplified Philip's diplomatic (as opposed to militaristic) moves in Euboia. Ellis rests his case on the fact that that Hegesippos, in chapter 32 of
On Halonnesus
(a speech perhaps dating to early 342 and wrongly attributed to Demosthenes), does not mention an invasion of Eretria as one of Philip's misdeeds.

2
On the importance of Skiathos, see Dem. 4.32. It is to be noted that the Athenians had troops there at least as late as 344/3 (
IG
II
²
1443, 106–8). Demosthenes often wrote that Philip intervened in Euboia in order to secure a “base of operations” against Athens and Athenian interests: Dem. 8.36, 66; 10.8, 68; 18.71; 19.326 (
hormētēria
).

3
Karystos was important for Athens's grain supply due to the proximity of Cape Geraistos: Strabo 10 C444; cf. Dem. 4.34. Twice, in his
De Corona
(230, 241), Demosthenes wrote that, if the Athenians had not controlled Euboia in the war with Philip, pirates (
lēstai
) would have harassed Attika and disrupted shipping routes.

4
This unfortunate period in fourth-century Athenian history began when the Athenians invaded Eretria in order to support Ploutarchos (the pro-Athenian “tyrant”) in his struggle against Kleitarchos (the man subsequently secured in power by the Macedonian-led invasions of 342). The Athenian invasion backfired in large part because Kallias and his brother Taurosthenes mobilized a pan-Euboian response. For this episode, see Parke (1929); Cawkwell (1962); Carter (1971); Picard (1979: 240–45). The primary ancient sources: Plut.
Phok
. 12–14; Aischin. 3.86–88.

5
The invasions were pursuant to a decree drafted by Demosthenes: Dem. 18.79. The date for the overthrow of the regime at Oreos: Philochoros, F 159 with Schol. Aischin. 3.85 (confirming the month Skirophorion, which must be restored in the Philochoros fragment). The date for the overthrow of the regime at Eretria cannot be pinpointed to a certain month within the year 341/0. But the entry in Philochoros (F 160) apparently cited the Athenian-led liberation of Eretria after the words
ἐπὶ τούτου
(“during that man's [sc., archonship]”—that man being Nikomachos, archon in 341/0). And it is widely held that citations immediately following that chronological marker (i.e.,
ἐπὶ τούτου
) occurred early in the year. Additional sources for the liberation of Eretria: Diod. Sic. 16.74.1; Schol. Aischin. 3.103 (where it is explicitly stated that the tyrant was killed).

6
That the Athenians mounted catapults on ships during the siege of Eretria is inferred from Athenian naval inventories (
IG
II
²
1627, B, lines 328–41 [year = 330/29]). Knoepfler (2002: 196n256) accepts the use of ship-mounted catapults during the siege. Marsden (1969: 57–58), however, does not; he suggests that the “frames of the catapults from Eretria” (
πλαίσια καταπαλτῶν ἐξ Ἐρετρίας
) were given to the Eretrians by Philip II in order to help defend Eretria against the Athenian-led invasion. According to that interpretation, the frames (
πλαίσια
) were subsequently brought home by the victorious Athenians as booty. It should be noted, however, that Alexander used ship-mounted machines during the siege of Tyre (Arr.
Anab
. 2.21.7). It is thus conceivable that the Athenians used ship-mounted catapults nine years earlier.