From the Tree to the Labyrinth (22 page)

What remains Aristotelian in Quintilian is the notion that the metaphor, in addition to being an ornament (as it is when we speak of
lumen orationis
or of
generis claritas
), may also be an instrument of knowledge, when it finds a name, and therefore some semblance of a definition, for something that otherwise would not have one—when farmers, for instance, speak of the buds of the vine as gems or of crops as thirsty. But it cannot be said that Quintilian insists further on this function, which, more than cognitive, might be called “lexically substitutive,” since it serves to make up for
penuria nominum
or the scarcity of names for things.

Another suggestion came from Donatus (fourth century), in whom Quintilian’s scheme was taken up with a hint of semic analysis: in fact metaphor is spoken of as a
translatio
from animate to animate, inanimate to inanimate, animate to inanimate, inanimate to animate, with all the appropriate examples.
¹

There follows the definition of all of the other tropes, and it is interesting to point out that for allegory and enigma Donatus bases himself on an implicit criterion accepted throughout the Middle Ages and still valid for modern rhetoric. Taken at face value, a metaphor may appear to be absurd (semantically unacceptable), and we must therefore assume (today we would say
by implicature
) that we are dealing with a figurative usage. On the other hand, we have allegory when the letter of the text is meaningful but we must infer a secondary sense on the basis of certain contextual clues (as Augustine teaches, but we will get to that later). Donatus gives the example of Virgil’s “et iam tempus equum fumantia soluere colla” (“and now it is time to unyoke the necks of our smoking steeds” [
Georgics
II, 542]), to say that it is time to end the poem, and, though this may strike us as a valid metaphor, Donatus is right to point out that it does not seem unreasonable for someone to want to remove the horses’ harnesses (though odd in that particular context), and that therefore this is an example of allegory and not of metaphor. The same criterion holds true for enigma.
²

Nevertheless, in these definitions of Donatus it is not specified to what extent obscurity is a vehicle of knowledge. Finally, we find something in Donatus that recalls Aristotle’s
eikon,
that is, the simile
:
“Icon est personarum inter se vel eorum quae personis accidunt comparatio, ut ‘
os humerosque deo similis
” (“Icon [or simile] is the comparison between persons or between the properties that belong to them, such as ‘godlike in face and shoulders’ ”) (
Ars maior
III, 6, ed. Holtz, p. 673).
³

Among early medieval definitions, the following is taken from the
Etymologiae
of Isidore of Seville (I, 37. 2): “metaphora est verbi alicujus usurpata translatio, sicut dicimus ‘fluctuare segetes,’ ‘gemmare vites’ ” (“metaphor is an adopted transference of some word, as when we say ‘cornfields ripple’ or ‘the vines put forth gems’), which is clearly derived from Cicero and Quintilian, from the second of whom Isidore borrows the distinction of the passage from animate to animate, animate to inanimate, and so on. There is no hint that these substitutions have a cognitive function, indeed “things are transferred very elegantly from one kind to another for the sake of beauty, so that the speech may be greatly adorned” (I, 37, 5).

Isidore is among those, and there are some among the moderns, who—while they are prepared to accept a metaphor like
fluctuare segetes
—consider its opposite,
segetare fluctus
inacceptable,
⁴
as if its unprecedented boldness were an offence to metaphorical common sense, while they find the interchange of a bird’s wings and a ship’s oars reciprocal, precisely because both
are said
: “alae navium et alarum remigium
dicuntur
” (ibid., my emphasis). A good metaphor, then, is something that “is [already] said.” It appears, then, that there is little room left for uncodified daring, which evidently “non dicitur …”(“is not said”).

Donatus’s definitions are found almost verbatim in the
De schematibus et tropis
of the Venerable Bede, and from there they are handed on with minimal variations to a number of later medieval texts. Compared to Donatus, what changes, if anything, are the citations and the comments on them.
⁵

It is never made explicit whether the trope is witty because of its difficulty, though it is implied that it should be clarified by the reading of the text’s interpreter. The tradition will tend to privilege readily comprehensible tropes over obscure and ingenious ones.

An invitation to moderation could already be found in the
Rhetorica ad Herennium
(IV, 45): Translationem pudentem dicunt esse oportere, ut cum ratione in consimilem rem transeat, ne sine dilectu temere et cupide videatur in dissimilem transcurrisse” (“They say that a metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate, reckless and precipitate leap to an unlike thing”).
⁶
Alcuin (
De rhet.,
in Halm 1863: 37) reminds us that we must learn the good things that past authors have done, and when one has become accustomed to their manner of speaking, one will inevitably speak in an ornate style.

Alcuin affirms that the function of good metaphors is to make clearer something that could not be said in any other words, though exaggerations are to be avoided. Literary education, at least as organized from the
Schola Palatina
on, is based on imitation of the ancients, and the metaphorical arsenal too must stick to tried and true models. The examples given are the canonical ones
(gemmare vites, luxuriari messem, fluctuare segetes),
and the question of how far one may experiment with overbold metaphors is answered with an appeal to moderation, and a provocative metaphor such as the term of abuse
stercus curiae
(“the droppings of the curia or court”) is consequently rejected.
⁷

Centuries later, a refined proto-humanist like John of Salisbury in his
Metalogicon
will inform us that grammar provides the tropes, but “solis eruditissimis patet usus eorum: unde et lex eorum arctior est, qua non permittuntur longius evagari. Regulariter enim proditum est, quia figures extendere non licet” (I, 19) (“The employment of tropes, just as the use of schemata, is the exclusive privilege of the very learned. The rules governing tropes are also very strict, so that the latitude in which they may be used is definitely limited. For the rules teach that we may not extend figures”) (I, 19).
⁸

He will cite Quintilian reminding us that “virtus enim sermonis optima est perspicuitas et facilitas intelligendi” (“what is desirable first and foremost in language is lucid clarity and easy comprehensibility”) and he will say that tropes are motivated by necessity or ornament.

Again, it is John (
Metalogicon
III, 8) who, while he praises metaphors which highlight what we would call the physical resemblance between two things, condemns expressions like “the law is the measure (or image) of things that are just by their very nature” because in the concept of law there is nothing that resembles either measure or image (in point of fact he takes the example from
Topics
VI, 2, 140, 7 et seq.).

Does this perhaps mean that medieval poets were incapable of inventing unprecedented metaphors? Naturally, the whole history of medieval poetry is there to affirm the opposite, and we still find Dante’s “aiuola che ci fa tanto feroci” (“the garden plot that makes us so aggressive,”
Pd
22, 151) or “Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse” (“Galahad was the book and whoever wrote it,”
Inf
5, 137) admirable in their boldness. And that is not all: much of medieval poetry and prose frequently succumbed to the fascination of enigmatic expression. We have only to think of the so-called
Hisperica Famina
(cf. De Bruyne 1946: 1:4, and Herren 1974), or of the
Epitomae
of that bizarre seventh-century rhetorician Virgil of Bigorre (cf. Polara 1979), not to mention the hermetic
trobar clus
of the Provençal poets.

Nevertheless, it seems that the very authors who show their appreciation for enigmas and obscurity by composing such texts or quoting them admiringly are far more circumspect when it comes to theory. Virgil of Bigorre, for instance, says that there are poetic compositions which aspire to wit and whimsy, which he calls
leporia
(calling to mind Aristotle’s
asteia
), but he reminds us that in so doing poetry is distinct from rhetoric because it is cramped and obscure (“angusta atque oscura,”
Epitomae
IV, 6). The word-polishers (“tornores logi,” IV, 7), are therefore to be condemned; the
leporia
displays a certain
mordacitas
but does not always escape mendacity. Can we say “sol in occasu metitur maria,” when no created thing, not even the setting sun, can plumb
(metiri)
the depths of the seas? Better to say “sol in occasu tinguit mare.” Can we say “ventus e terra roborum radices evellit altas” (IV, 8), when we know that the wind only makes oaks quake and does not tear them up by their roots? We might say that for Virgil inventing neologisms, coming up with outlandish etymologies, and composing riddles in cipher was all in a day’s work, but when it came to metaphors you had to watch where you were headed.

Among the Provençal poets (cf. De Bruyne 1946: 2:332), Allégret warns us that his verse will seem incomprehensible to fools, and Bernart de Venzac promises veridical words that will be a source of perturbation for the wise and scandal for the foolish, unless they accept a double reading. Guiraut de Borneill, however, while defending on the one hand the obscure style (“I will seek and lead by the reins fair words burdened with a meaning at once strange and natural that not everyone will discover”), on the other hand opts for the
trobar plan
or
leu chanso
over the
trobar clus,
and recognizes that it makes more sense to write intelligibly than to tangle up the words (“Qu’eu cut c’atretan grans sens / es, qui sap razo gardar, / com los motz entrebeschar” [“I think that it’s just as much good sense / if one can keep to the point, / as to twist my words around each other”]).

It is true that, in the various discussions of the lofty style, the perplexity that must be aroused in the mind of the reader, in such a way that the diversity of the examples may dispel boredom, is often praised and “tamquam cibum aurium, invitet auditorem” (“like food for the ears, invite your listeners”) (Geoffrey of Vinsauf,
Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi
Faral: 272);
⁹
usually, however, the examples do not concern difficult metaphors, but amplifications and descriptions that produce hypotyposis, as when, to say that travelers go on board ship and prepare for the voyage, the writer is advised to compose eight lines describing the action and making it vivid.

In other words, we seem to be witnessing a gap between poetic practice and rhetorical theorization. It appears, from the theoretical point of view, that straightforward, immediately comprehensible metaphors, preferably already codified, are to be preferred.

Geoffrey of Vinsauf (
Poetria nova,
1705–1708) will affirm that there are three ways to develop one’s style: through the art whose rules one follows, through custom to which one conforms, and through the imitation of models. John of Salisbury (
Metalogicon
I, 24) tells us how Bernard of Chartres conducted his classes: he pointed out what was simple and in conformity with the rules, he demonstrated the grammatical figures, the rhetorical colors and the subtleties of argumentation and, to teach the
splendor orationis
(“splendor of discourse”), he demonstrated the marvels of
translatio
(in other words, metaphor)
“
ubi sermo ex causa probabili ad alienum traducitur significationem” (“whereby speech is transferred to some alien meaning for a most likely cause”). The student who did not observe his strictures was educated “flagellis et poenis.” (“with whipping and punishments”). But he did not punish plagiary, though he pointed it out—as if to say that theft was preferable to having an overbold metaphor betray the
causa probabilis,
or the affinities acceptable between metaphorizer and metaphorized.

Be that as it may, in the classical rules for distinguishing the lofty style, the mediocre and temperate, the vicious or extenuated, the bucolic or pastoral and humble, the georgic and mediocre, and the epic or sublime or grand styles—from the
Rhetorica ad Herennium
to the
Schola Vindobonensia ad Horatii Artem poeticam
(probably dating from the eleventh century) to the
De ornamentis verborum
of Marbode of Rennes, down to the
artes poeticae
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Matthew of Vendôme, Geoffrey of Vinsauf, and John of Garland)—the examples of the words to be preferred are always canonical:
lychnos
is preferable to
lucerna;
in referring to Karolus, it belongs to the lofty style to say that he is “Ecclesiae clypeus et pacis columna” (“the shield of the Church and a column of peace”), but vicious to say he is “clava pacis” (“the cudgel of peace”); it is temperate or mediocre to say he is “Ecclesiae custos” (“the guardian of the Church”) and vicious that he is “militiae baculus” (“the staff of the military”); it is humble to say “In tergo clavem pastor portat, ferit inde—presbyterum, cum quo ludere sponsa solet” (“the shepherd carries a club on his shoulder, then he strikes the priest with it, who is wont to sport with his wife”), but it is vicious to say “Rusticus a tergo clavem trahit et ter tonse (or pertonso)—testiculos aufert, prandia laeta facit” (“the peasant takes the club from his back and tears off the priest’s testicles, of which he makes a good meal”). And even the metaphorical terms defining the styles are themselves defined by the tradition, “fluctuans et dissolutum, turgidum et inflatum, aridum et exsangue” (Matthew of Vendôme,
Ars versificatoria
I, 30).