Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life (32 page)

The Carthaginian army under Himilco then approached Syracuse (from his base at Agrigentum) with the intention of relieving the city. He realized ‘that his enemy, well fortified and numerically strong, was safely ensconced around Syracuse’ so he decided to move out into Sicily and encourage other cities to join the Carthaginian cause. Hannibal must have closely followed the events in Sicily and been instructing representatives, supporters and agents to ensure that there was upheaval in all the major centres on the island. At this moment Morgantina (a city approx. 100 km north-west from Syrcause) betrayed its Roman garrison and went over to Carthage (Livy 24.36.9–10). With the island itself now in the balance, Marcellus left Syracuse under blockade and moved with part of his army to prevent more defections from cities in Sicily.
⁷⁷

The war for Syracuse turned into a brutal struggle for the cities of the interior of Sicily. Morgantina’s defection ‘gave encouragement to other city-states,
and Roman garrisons now began to be expelled from the citadels, or crushed after being treacherously betrayed’. Details of events at the strategically crucial inland town of Henna (modern Enna) describe the gruesome slaughter of ‘an unarmed crowd’ trapped and massacred in the theatre by the Roman garrison (who were themselves threatened with massacre). This fuelled the rebellion of more cities, as ‘even those who had been vacillating earlier now went over to the Carthaginians’ (Livy 24.37–39).
⁷⁸
At Henna, Marcellus had employed the same deterrent he had employed previously in Campania, at Nola. He thought it would ensure the loyalty of other Sicilian towns but in this he seems to have been mistaken.

The winter of 213/212
BCE
saw Marcellus back at Syracuse camped near the northern entrance to Syracuse, called the Hexapylon gate. Carthaginian attempts to lift the siege and break the blockade continued. Some supplies did reach the city but there was essentially a stalemate. The first success for the Romans came in the early spring when a deserter from the city reported that ‘copious quantities of wine’ were being consumed inside the town during a festival celebrating the worship of Artemis (Livy 25.23–24). The witness reported that drinking was excessive because, due to the blockade, there was little else for the population to consume except wine. Marcellus took advantage of the distraction to seize the area of Epipolae, the plateau overlooking Syracuse to the north. He set his men to scale the walls by night while the population was distracted at the festival. Marcellus followed and looking down to Syracuse from his perspective high on the plateau he saw ‘probably at the time the world’s most beautiful city stretched out before his eyes’ (Livy 25.24.11).
⁷⁹
The fall of cities like Syracuse often provoked a poetic reaction from Hellenistic and Roman generals, and the Roman historians writing their history. Marcellus was reminded ‘of the Athenian fleets that had been sunk there, of the two mighty armies that had been destroyed along with their leaders and of all the critical wars fought with the Carthaginians’ (Livy 25.24.12–13).
⁸⁰
Marcellus wept, they say, both at the beauty and also at the glory of the city he was about to sack.
⁸¹

Yet events did not proceed quite as quickly or as smoothly as Marcellus had envisioned. As his troops advanced towards Achradina they encountered fierce resistance and had to pull back. Confusion reigned in the city, with the Romans in control of a significant part of the suburban area of Neapolis and Tycha and the Syracusans under Epicydes holding the centre of the city and the island of Ortygia. Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral at Syracuse took advantage of this (and a rough sea) to break the Roman blockade and with thirty-five ships made for Carthage. He reported the events at Syracuse to the
Carthaginians and then, within a few days, returned to Syracuse with a fleet of 100 ships and provisions (Livy 25.25.11–13).
⁸²

The Carthaginians attempted to break the siege by throwing everything they could into the endeavour. Another Carthaginian fleet arrived and landed on the shore between the city and the Roman camp. These events are reported in a paragraph or two in Livy but took place over months and resulted in a stalemate of sorts with the territory of Syracuse held piecemeal by both sides. In the autumn of 212 a plague ravaged the city after the long, hot summer months. It affected both armies but seems to have had a greater impact on the Carthaginians.
⁸³
Only when the plague finally killed both the Carthaginian general Himilco and the Syracusan/Carthaginian leader Hippocrates did the Romans take all of Syracuse under their control.

The population, already decimated by the plague, was not spared and the Romans killed whomever they found and looted everything. In the ovation celebrated in Rome, Marcellus paraded ‘most of the statues and other offerings which the Syracusans had dedicated to the gods, including their finest works of art; for he intended that these should not only decorate his triumph but also adorn the capital’ (Plutarch,
Marc
. 21).
⁸⁴
Marcellus’ sack of Syracuse was a seminal event for the Romans when they looked back on their history. Syracuse was a sophisticated Hellenistic city adorned with statuary, paintings and temple offerings and votives. The Romans were awed by the wealth; there was ‘as much booty as there would scarcely have been had Carthage been captured then’ (Livy 25.31.11; see also Plutarch,
Marc
. 19.3, Polyb. 9.10.1–13). The ancient sources itemize the loot and speak of quantities of bronze, melted down and used in buildings, of silver and tapestries (Pliny,
NH
14.13). Livy records that ‘along with a model of Syracuse after its capture, catapults, ballistae, and a whole panoply of war engines were carried in the procession … there were heads of silver and bronze artefacts, furniture, precious clothing, and many famous statues, Syracuse having been one of the Greek cities most richly endowed in such things’ (26.21.6–9). These accounts of the wealth won and the great glory achieved at Syracuse illustrate the way in which the war with Hannibal was woven into the fabric of Roman society, both in a physical sense and through the legends of the fall of great cities.

CHAPTER 9

HANNIBAL’S DILEMMA, 212–209

Hannibal was not as determined to defend Capua as the Romans were to tighten their blockade.
(Livy 26.12.1)

H
ANNIBAL MUST HAVE DESPAIRED
at the loss of Syracuse in 212
BCE
, an event that would turn out to be a pivotal moment in the war. If Carthage could have held the city and again acquired the wealth of Sicily along with it, an overall victory might have been possible. The fight for Sicily was not over yet and the Carthaginians did not give up altogether. They still held Agrigentum and continued with a significant investment in men and resources there. It was a base from which to operate across the island. Hannibal sent a Libyphoenician cavalry commander named Muttines to Agrigentum to direct the opposition to Rome. Muttines made a reputation for himself as a brilliant soldier, schooled by Hannibal in tactics. In Sicily he worked hard to ‘keep the Carthaginian allies loyal by bringing them timely assistance’ when the Romans threatened (Livy 25.40.5). Despite a valiant effort by Muttines it would only be a matter of time before the whole island was controlled by Rome.
¹

For the Romans, the sack of Syracuse was a turning point and marked the beginning of almost a century of the looting of cities across the Hellenistic world. The art and treasures of the ancient world would find their way to the city of Rome where they were used as trophies of war – in some cases even fixed to the doors of houses, to adorn public spaces and private homes (Livy 38.43.9–10).
²
In the rhetoric of the Romans looking back on their history,
these trophies would effect a change in the traditional character of the Romans. The loot of the conquered would irrevocably influence life at Rome. Later Romans would criticize this wave of luxury that flooded into the city and some claimed this splendour caused a breakdown in the moral fibre of the Romans. The ‘Greek’ luxury was seen to have eroded the core values of the Roman Republic, the very values that had been so important in defeating Hannibal.
³

According to Cicero, the only object from Syracuse that Marcellus is reported to have kept for himself was ‘a globe of the heavens made by the great Archimedes’ (
De Rep.
1.21). But Archimedes himself did not survive the sack of the city; he fell victim to the enthusiastic looting that stripped Syracuse of all her wealth. ‘While many foul instances of anger, many of greed were being carried out’, the fate of Archimedes, the chief defender of the city and greatest thinker of the age, was sealed by a Roman soldier (Livy 25.31.9). Not knowing who he was, a soldier came across an old man intently drawing diagrams in the earth. Archimedes, the distracted genius, was too absorbed by his geometry to respond to the soldier’s questions and was killed despite Marcellus’ orders that he be spared (Valerius Maximus 9; Cicero,
De finibus
5.50).
⁴

Marcellus’ looting of Syracuse provoked a fair amount of contemporary criticism and later Roman commentators used the event to rationalize the subsequent decline of the Roman Republic. But this criticism may conceal a more concrete reason for the censure. Underlying Marcellus’ success was great public acclaim for his victory and this would have intensified the sharp personal rivalries at Rome. Marcellus’ willingness to engage with Hannibal and fight for glory won him much ‘popular support’ at Rome, which must have rankled with the Fabian supporters whose cautious approach had been official policy for almost half a decade. Marcellus may therefore have been denied an official triumph for his victory at Syracuse by rivals in the Senate at Rome opposed to his growing reputation, and was granted only an official ‘ovation’ instead.
⁵

Hannibal’s attention was now stretched thinly across the south of Italy. Without reinforcements he did not have the ability to protect his allies and expand his territory. Wherever Hannibal went one or two Roman armies tracked him. The other Roman armies would then focus their forces on where he was not. So when Hannibal went into Campania the Romans would move towards the cities of Apulia and Magna Graecia.
⁶
In this way Hannibal’s territorial gains and alliances were slowly but surely stripped away by superior Roman manpower.

But all was not lost and in 212
BCE
, even before Syracuse had fallen, Hannibal turned his focus to another important Greek city in Italy, the Spartan colony of
Tarentum (Taras, modern Taranto) (Polyb. 8.24–34; Livy. 25.7.–11, 13.1).
⁷
Hannibal would have known that the Tarentine–Roman alliance was an uneasy one for it was the Tarentines who had called on Pyrrhus for help against Roman incursions in southern Italy earlier in the century. After the Pyrrhic War Tarentum fell to Rome (
c.
270) and perforce became an ally. Given this recent history it was perhaps surprising to Hannibal that the ruling citizens of Tarentum had not immediately moved to his side in the aftermath of Cannae. In fact, Polybius expected Tarentum to abandon Rome and claimed erroneously that the city was among those that switched sides directly after Cannae.
⁸

However, Tarentum is exemplary of the difficult situation in which the cities of southern Italy found themselves. Many factors, including economic ties, may have preserved Tarentine loyalty to Rome but the Romans did not take any chances. The city sat on the Via Appia between the eastern port of Brundisium and Venusia (modern Venosa), both key Latin colonies that had been established earlier in the third century (see
Map 1
).
⁹
The Romans, eager to protect their colonies and transport links early in the war, had moved quickly to secure the area and occupied the town with a garrison: this made a quick transfer of allegiance to Hannibal difficult for the population.
¹⁰
The city elites were divided between pro-and anti-Roman factions but most importantly, at some point early in the war, members of the leading families had been taken as hostages to Rome. The Romans kept hostages from many cities of the south and this seems to have preserved an uncomfortable loyalty of the chief towns of Magna Graecia, and Tarentum especially.
¹¹

Two years after Cannae, in 214
BCE
, while Hannibal was in Campania near Lake Avernus he received a delegation made up of five men of the Tarentine elite. They told Hannibal that most of the younger men of the city would choose an alliance with him (Livy 24.13.1–2). It is revealing of Hannibal’s personal appeal that from across Italy people flocked to his side, especially younger men of fighting age.
¹²
These young men of the city had fought with the Romans against Hannibal, and had, like the other allies, been released and treated with the ‘usual courtesy that the Carthaginian had accorded all the allies of Rome’ (Livy 24.13.1–2). It may have been in response to this delegation and show of interest from the young men that Hannibal turned his mind to the port of Tarentum. Livy claims he was ‘overtaken by a keen desire to take possession of this rich and famous city’ (24.13.5). For Hannibal, Tarentum was especially appealing for its access to the east and his new ally, the Macedonian king across the Adriatic.
¹³
As Hannibal continued to be stifled in Campania, trying and failing to take Neapolis and Nola anew, he had looked elsewhere for a port.
¹⁴

In the autumn of 214
BCE
, at the same time as Marcellus went to Sicily, Hannibal marched an army up to the walls of Tarentum. He did not lay waste the countryside around the city, as he hoped for a peaceful surrender. There was no reaction and the city did not open its gates to the Carthaginian, its Roman garrison still firmly in control. Hannibal withdrew his army and spent another winter in Apulia. This year he chose the town of Salapia for quarters and from there built up his troop base. Reports of Hannibal’s liaison with a local woman that winter were still discussed centuries later, and Pliny records that the town was ‘famous as the place of Hannibal’s amour with a courtesan’ (
NH
3.103). The echoes of Hannibal’s time in Italy resound in this story, which illustrates that it was the most exciting thing to have happened in Salapia for centuries.
¹⁵
The liaison was perhaps somewhat more than a brief encounter for it to be remembered and identified so clearly with Hannibal. It could not have been his only encounter with a courtesan in his years in Italy. In fact Appian records a variation of the story that saw ‘Hannibal move his army to Lucania and into winter quarters, and here this fierce warrior gave himself up to unaccustomed luxury and the delights of love’ (
Hann
. 43).
¹⁶