In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (50 page)

20.
George W. Bush, Speech at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia (Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 17, 2002).

21.
Author interview with Ambassador Said Jawad, October 5, 2007. In early 2002, Jawad had returned to Afghanistan to serve as President Karzai’s press secretary, chief of staff, and director of the Office of International Relations before becoming the ambassador to the United States.

22.
Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, September 21, 2004; Richard Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror
(New York: Free Press, 2004); Afghanistan Stabilization and Reconstruction: A Status Report, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 108–460, January 27, 2004, pp. 14, 17–18; Seymour M. Hersh, “The Other War: Why Bush’s Afghanistan Problem Won’t Go Away,”
The New Yorker,
April 12, 2004;
Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,
UN doc A/56/875-S/2002/278, para. 98.

23.
General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell,
American Soldier
(New York: Regan Books, 2004), p. 324.

24.
Ibid.

25.
Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

26.
United Nations,
Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General
(New York: United Nations, February 6, 2002).

27.
Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed.,
Ethnic Conflict and International Security
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,”
International Security,
vol. 22, no. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 5–53; Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict,” in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, eds.,
Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–302; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,”
American Political Science Review,
vol. 94, no. 4, December 2000, p. 780.

28.
Robert M. Perito,
Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004); Perito,
The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations
(Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002); Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg,
Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998).

29.
James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Security Operations,”
Parameters,
vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; James Dobbins,
America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Dobbins,
The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).

30.
James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones et al.,
Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

31.
Dobbins,
America’s Role in Nation-Building;
Dobbins,
The UN’s Role in Nation-Building.

32.
Vincenzo Coppola, “Briefing on the Multinational Specialized Unit,” Paper presented at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 16, 1999; Paolo Valpolini, “The Role of Police-Military Units in Peacekeeping,”
Jane’s Europe News,
July/August 1999.

33.
Author interview with Colonel Domenico Libertini, commander of the Multinational Specialized Unit, Pristina, Kosovo, April 2007. Also see Multinational Specialized Unit,
MSU Concept
(Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007).

34.
These numbers include local police, sheriff, primary state, special jurisdiction, constable/marshal, and federal. Department of Justice,
Law Enforcement Statistics
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004).

35.
The CIA comes with significant historical baggage in working with foreign police. By the early 1970s, the U.S. Congress became deeply concerned that U.S. assistance to police abroad frequently strengthened the recipient government’s capacity for repression. Congress was particularly concerned
about the role of the CIA, which trained foreign police in countersubversion, counterguerrilla, and intelligence-gathering techniques. Consequently, Congress in 1974 adopted Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibited the United States from providing internal-security assistance to foreign governments. In addition, the CIA does not have a viable policing arm. The CIA’s Special Activities Division is primarily a paramilitary organization—not a policing one. See, for example, Seth G. Jones et al.,
Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), pp. 9–22.

36.
Dobbins,
Europe’s Role in Nation-Building.

37.
William I. Zartman, Collapsed States:
The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267–73; Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding.”

38.
Seth G. Jones, Jeremy Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and Jack Riley,
Establishing Law and Order After Conflict
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005);
Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building; Dobbins, The UN’s Role in Nation-Building.

39.
Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, September 21, 2004; Hersh, “The Other War.”

40.
Dobbins,
Europe’s Role in Nation-Building.

41.
Author interview with Dov Zakheim, January 30, 2008.

42.
Ibid.

43.
Author interview with senior White House official, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008.

44.
Letter from Rangin Dadfar Spanta to Adamantios Vassilakis, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, September 20, 2006.

45.
Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,”
Foreign Affairs,
vol. 72, no. 5, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32–45. On the Weinberger Doctrine, see Caspar W. Weinberger,
Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon
(New York: Warner Books, 1990); Thomas R. Dubois, “The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait,”
Parameters,
vol. XXI, no. 4 (Winter 1991–1992), pp. 24–38. The Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine are named after Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense, and Colin Powell, most recently George W. Bush’s first secretary of state.

46.
Powell, “U.S. Forces,” p. 40.

47.
Speech by Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” November 28, 1984, Reprinted in
Defense Issues,
January 1985, p. 35.

48.
Seth G. Jones, “Averting Failure in Afghanistan,”
Survival,
vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 111–28.

49.
Interview with Major General Craig P. Weston, Chief, Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, June 23, 2004, Kabul, Afghanistan.

50.
Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.

51.
Feith,
War and Decision,
pp. 14–15.

52.
Ibid., pp. 51–52.

53.
Author interview with senior U.S. official present at the September 2001 Camp David meetings, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008. Also see, for example, Bob Woodward,
Bush at War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 74–92.

54.
Author interview with senior U.S. official present at the September 2001 Camp David meetings, Washington, DC, January 15, 2008.

55.
See, for example, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor,
Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), pp. 21–23.

56.
Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward O’Connell (ret.), October 4, 2007.

57.
Author interview with Richard Armitage, October 17, 2007.

58.
Gary C. Schroen,
First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), p. 360.

59.
See, for example, Seymour Hersh,
Chain of Command
(New York: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 188; George Packer,
The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), p. 45.

60.
Author interview with Robert Grenier, November 6, 2007.

61.
Author interview with Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, October 27, 2007.

62.
Author interview with Dov Zakheim, January 30, 2008.

63.
Sarah Chayes,
The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban
(New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 155.

64.
Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan: Progress Since the Taliban,”
Asian Affairs,
vol. 37, no. I, March 2006, p. 33.

65.
L. Paul Bremer III,
My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 143.

66.
Letter from Jeb Mason to Ambassador Bremer, Talking Points: Progress in the War on Terror, September 17, 2003.

67.
Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,”
Parameters
, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 5.

68.
Andrew M. Roe, “To Create a Stable Afghanistan,”
Military Review,
November-December 2005, p. 21.

69.
David L. Buffaloe,
Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82d Airborne in Firebase Shkin,
Landpower Essay 04–2 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2004), p. 12.

70.
On a firsthand account of the Battle for Deh Chopan, see Michael McInerney, “The Battle for Deh Chopan, Part 1,”
Soldier of Fortune,
August 2004; McInerney, “The Battle for Deh Chopan, Part 2,”
Soldier of Fortune,
September 2004.

71.
Anne Evans et al.,
A Guide to Government in Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2004), p. 14.

72.
On warlords and Afghanistan, see Roe, “To Create a Stable Afghanistan,” pp. 20–26; Government of Afghanistan,
Security Sector Reform: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Programme (DIAG) and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme (DDR)
(Kabul: Government of Afghanistan, October 2005); Mark Sedra,
Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
(Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002).

73.
Several warlords were reassigned as provincial governors, including Sher Muhammad Akhundzada of Helmand (2005), Ismail Khan of Herat (2004), Gul Agha of Kandahar (2004), Haji Din Muhammad of Nangarhar, Muhammad Ibrahim of Ghor (2004), Gul Ahmad of Badghis (2003), and Syed Amin of Badakshan (2003).

74.
Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan and Altai Consulting,
Afghan National Development Poll
(Kabul: Combined Forces Command, 2005).

75.
Afghanistan National Security Council,
National Threat Assessment
(Kabul: Afghanistan National Security Council, 2005), p. 4. Also see Afghanistan Ministry of Defense,
The National Military Strategy
(Kabul: Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, October 2005).

76.
Evans et al.,
A Guide to Government in Afghanistan,
p. 14.

77.
Feith,
War and Decision,
p. 123.

78.
Lester Grau, ed.,
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 201.

79.
Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 131, 167, 202.