Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (29 page)

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H E D W I G R I C H T E R

Historical Excursus: The Secret and Free Ballot in Germany

In order to understand the paradox of state-socialist elections that lay be-

tween superficially mimicking democratic liberal standards on the one hand

and dictatorial communist electoral aims and policing on the other, it is

helpful to take a look at the communist understanding of elections before

1945.

The history of elections could have provided the communists with

plenty of examples for collective elections and public acclamations. The

standardized elections of the West, with the attempt to express the wishes

of the individual, are by no means the norm in the history of elections and

are a relatively late development. Furthermore, several political theories

offered a basis for the justification that an elite or cadre should dominate

an election, even if the majority were allowed to take part in it (Boberach

1959; O’Leary 1962; Kühne 1994). Why, for example, did the SED not

refer to Rousseau and his idea of “Volonté Générale”, so that the Party

could distance itself from the high esteemed position of the individual in

the West and the corresponding election techniques? Why did the Party

not call upon the various election modi that existed in the Soviet Union

before 1937, which didn’t meet the standards for a secret ballot (Goldman

2007)?

During the time of the German Empire, German socialists always

counted amongst those who campaigned for secret and fair elections. To

be sure, the 19th century socialists, like their competitors, manipulated the

elections as much as they could after the introduction of the universal and

equal male suffrage in the German Empire in 1871, and in doing so

circumvented the stipulated conditions of secrecy. They controlled workers

or small traders at the polling station or made it appear as if voters had

moved to hard-fought constituencies to increase the number of loyal sup-

porters. The “social democratic terrorism”, as their opponents polemically

denounced it, was notorious. However, the Social Democrats remained

convinced that fair, meaning secret, equal, direct, and universal elections

would benefit them, with the result that they virulently defended them on

the national level. After all, they had to campaign for a form of participa-

tion that would live up to their demands for equality. However, although

communists and social democrats had also protested against the dictatorial

election practices during the Nazi era, there was no evidence of this histori-

cal commitment to free elections to be found within the SED. The univer-

M A S S O B E D I E N C E

111

sal electoral tradition in Germany was probably much more decisive. In

general, the German electorate displayed a growing awareness for the im-

portance of universal and equal suffrage at a national level as early as the

19th Century (Anderson 2000). The turnout increased steadily, rising to

84.5 per cent in the final poll in 1912. Citizens of the empire registered

with pride the complexity of the election procedure, which for them was

inseparable from civility and modernity. In 1897, a liberal newspaper

noted: “We don’t believe that anything has ever existed on this earth, nei-

ther in its scope and scale nor in its refinement and technical accomplish-

ment which can compare to the election apparatus that exists in all civilized

countries” (“Bremen, 17. Oktober”, Weser Zeitung, October 17, 1897).14

The conservative parties soon saw the advanced election laws, which had

been installed by Bismarck, as a mistake, and argued against electoral equal-

ity.15 Despite this, they also recognized that suffrage was a political hot

potato, and to interfere with it would mean being punished in the elec-

tions.16 In the Weimar Republic, women received the right to vote—com-

pared internationally, this was quite early—meaning that the German suf-

frage became markedly progressive at a national level. The National Social-

ists did not dare to fundamentally change the political franchise and kept

the material setting with standardized ballots papers, ballot boxes or voting

booths (cf. the contributions by Frank Omland and Markus Urban in this

volume).

Not least because of this historical hypothec—the fight for free and

equal elections—the leadership of the KPD advocated a “parliamentary

democratic republic with all democratic rights and freedom for the peo-

ple”, at the end of the war (Aufruf des Zentralkomitees der KPD, in:

Deutsche Volkszeitung, June 13, 1945). This policy was embedded in the

Soviet Union’s general efforts to add a veneer of democracy to the state

restructuring taking place in the Soviet Occupation Zone in order to obtain

international legitimacy (Richter 2009b, 11–25). Because of this, the Soviet

Union refrained from implementing its dictatorial electoral practice, as they

——————

14 “Wir glauben nicht, dass es je zuvor auf Erden etwas gegeben hat, was mit den in allen civilisirten Ländern existierenden Wahlapparaten auch nur von ferne verglichen werden könnte, weder an Umfang und Massenhaftigkeit, noch an Raffinement und technischer Vollendung.”

15 “Die sächsischen Konservativen und das Reichstagswahlrecht”, Berliner Tagblatt, November 16, 1897; “Parteigenossen! Wähler!”, in: Vorwärts, April 10, 1898; cf. Lässig 1998, 139–145; Arsenschek 2003.

16 Bundesarchiv, Reichlandbunds R8034, II, No. 5072–5080; Bönker 2010, 68–93.

112

H E D W I G R I C H T E R

had in Poland in 1939. In actual fact, the municipal, county council and

Länder
elections of the Soviet Occupation Zone in 1946 proved to be relatively open despite some repression. However, the authorities were

shocked that the elections didn’t result in the desired resounding endorse-

ment (Bienert 2008). This blow altered the German communists’ under-

standing of elections fundamentally. Up to this point, they had assumed

that free elections would benefit them. Now they had to recognize that

even after the Nazi dictatorship, the people did not show willing for social-

ism. Before the “Workers’ and Peasants’ State” was founded, an official

stated in an internal meeting, “once we establish a government we will

never give it up, be it through elections or any other methods” (cited by

Mählert 2007, 54).17

In the elections of 1950—one year after the German Democratic Re-

public has been founded—the authorities turned to the electoral experi-

ences of the Soviet Union and installed the single list. This not only meant

the end of competition and electoral freedom, but also led to an open

voting procedure
de facto
. In a complicated fashion, the communists also made use of the same reasoning as their former adversaries in the German

empire, taking the position that only a vote cast openly was worthy of an

upright citizen: moreover, the welfare of the people would be at stake, and

whoever wished to vote against it, should admit to this disgraceful deed.

These were the arguments of those in total control and who, in spite of

elections, wanted to hold onto it. Also the Leninist viewpoint, that only the

advanced cadre should play a decisive role in the election, corresponded

with conservative ideas of the dominant role of an elite that knew better

than the people.18

The people, however, rebelled. Decades of a relatively free election tra-

dition and a political mentality, formed by around 150 years of fighting for

universal suffrage, could not be obliterated, even during the Nazi era.

Many GDR citizens protested against the dictatorial election practice far

into the 1950s. They felt that the electoral procedure and the alleged 99.7

per cent of votes in favor were a travesty and deeply humiliating, particu-

——————

17 “Wenn wir eine Regierung gründen, geben wir sie niemals wieder auf, weder durch Wahlen noch andere Methoden”.

18 “Parteigenossen! Wähler!”, in
Vorwärts
, April 10, 1898; “Die Sozialdemokratie und die Landtagswahlen”, in
Die Post,
October 10, 1897; “Zur Revision des Reichstagswahlrechts”, in BZ, November 4, 1897, Bundesarchiv Reichslandbund R8034, II, 5075, S. 31;

“Die Conservativen und das Reichstags-Wahlrecht”, in Mecklenburgische Nachrichten, January 29, 1898.

M A S S O B E D I E N C E

113

larly as massive vote rigging was necessary to achieve these results right

into the 1950s. Thomas Kühne has pointed out that changes to electoral

suffrage are very difficult to put through. This is not only because the

existing constitutional rights normally support those in power, as Kühne

suggests, but also due to the popularity and meaning of elections in the

society’s political culture, when the society has a long tradition of electoral

practice (Kühne 1998, 59). In an anonymous letter addressed to the

authorities it was stated, “Even Adolf Hitler didn’t manage to pull off such

brazen debasement”, and went on: “There has already been a result of 99

per cent! Do you remember? Something like this is only possible in totali-

tarian states.”19 Bishop Ludolf Müller complained that the elections were

“one of the most difficult and burdensome decisions of conscience” for

the clergy to make.20 In an SED report from 1956 it was stated: “The

opponent” repeatedly attempts “to spread his argument about ‘free elec-

tions’ amongst the population”, and amongst the population the opinion

was still prevalent that: “‘People can vote everywhere in the world, except

for in the GDR’”.21 Also, in the following year, the complaints did not

diminish.22

However, the people slowly got used to the new procedure. The pres-

sure of the Stalinist years bore its fruit. An East German university chap-

lain described the mental development from the first election of 1950 to

later elections: “Obviously, the majority of the population did not recog-

nize as strongly in October [1950] the shame of such a caricature of politi-

cal decision for which it was being used. Then, there had been reserved

and bitter faces, now there was a resigned light-heartedness. One had got

used to it […]”.23 By the end of the 1950s, the elections functioned without

a hitch.

——————

19 “Eine solche schamlose Erniedrigung […] hat nicht einmal Adolf Hitler zuwege ge-bracht [...] Es gab bereits einmal ein Ergebnis 99%! Entsinnen Sie sich? So etwas ist nur in totalitären Staaten möglich”, anonymous letter, o.D., HStA Drd. 11420, No.54.