Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (31 page)

through this voluntariness, even if it remained dubious. The widely spread

readiness to vote very early in the day, which the authorities wished for,

highlights the elections ability to discipline. From the end of the fifties,

terror and external repression had declined during elections. Instead, inter-

nal discipline and therefore the horizontal aspect of power had increased in

importance. By participating in the elections, the citizens showed their

readiness to be a part of the socialist collective. In doing so, they also re-

ceived the right to be taken care of by the collective. Indeed, submission

was swiftly followed by the blessing of the collective: material and also

immaterial, by being unhindered in career paths and being granted a private

life in peace. This exchange between submission and reward was possible

because
communication
was a significant aspect of the election.

Communication is the second unofficial function that played a central

role in the elections. Election time intensified the interaction between

——————

26 Cf. Brief Weise, Staatssekretariat für Kirchenfragen, an W. Barth, Arbeitsgruppe Kirchenfragen, June 10, 1968, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv DY 30 / IV A 2/14/40; Informationen zu Pfarrern in DO 1/100 / 183/2; Information, Staatssekretariat für Kirchenfragen, December 12, 1977, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv DY 30/IV B 2/14/80; cf. Volks-

polizei Kreisamt Löbau an Landesbehörde der Volkspolizei Sachsen, September 26,

1951, BStU (Bundesbeauftragter für Stasi-Unterlagen) BV Dresden AGI 1198/52, S. 37; cf. BStU BV Drd. AOP 2163/62; Ermittlungsbericht, September 27, 1962, Dienststelle Löbau, BStU BV Drd. AIM 4977/81 I–I, S. 90; Beurteilung des IM Hickmann,

Abteilung XX/4, Dresden, October 17, 1976, BStU BV Drd. AIM 4977–81, S. 143.

118

H E D W I G R I C H T E R

above and below, which at other times was sorely lacking (Herz 2004;

Böckenförde 1967, 59; cf. also Mergel 2010, 11–14). Because the authori-

ties wanted something from the electorate that they could not achieve

through pure force—namely the seemingly voluntary vote of every single

citizen—they had to offer something in return. The submission of con-

crete requests from citizens to the authorities (for consumer goods or

apartments or a better infrastructure) rose steeply during election cam-

paigns and had good chances of being fulfilled at these times. The Soviet

Union was, here again, an obvious role model. In 1979, Brezhnev put it

bluntly during an election meeting that the aim of the elections is to “im-

prove the life of the workers” (Brezhnev 1979). Stephan Merl shows in his

contribution in this volume the close connection between elections, com-

munication and consumer gratification in the USSR. The voters there used

their ballots to note down their wishes and complaints (cf. also Merl 2007;

Bohn 2008). Voters displayed a pragmatic and instrumental grasp of elec-

tions, which correlated with their understanding of politics and rule: the

regime was supposed to look after them, and in return they owed it to the

regime to submit. If the good turns did not materialize, it could lead to an

election boycott.27

The intensified communication between above and below offered espe-

cially those citizens who were critical of the regime a chance to be heard.

The above-mentioned rebellious farmers, motivated to participate only by

“one-on-one conversations”, are a good example of this. The officials gave

members of the clergy their special attention. High-ranking candidates

were ordered to personally meet up with theologians.28 During these “one-

on-one conversations” the faithful, who as a rule were leading members of

the church, could negotiate a price for their vote. Nearly everything was

bargained over in the discussions, informally but very concretely: from

permits to travel to fuel for heating right up to building permission.29 The

——————

27 A Soviet voter wrote in 1962 on a ballot paper: “I don’t want to vote—I am living at rock bottom”, another wrote: “If you feed us, you will get our vote,” quoted in Merl 2007, 530.

28 Brief Stellv. des Vorsitzenden, RdK Löbau, an Stellv. des Vorsitzenden, RdB Dresden, April 25, 1966, HStA Drd. 11430, No. 10809, S. 5. Cf. files in HStA Drd. 11430, No.

10792 u. in SAPMO DY 30/ IV 2/14/16.

29 See Abschlussbericht über Mitarbeit bei Volkskammerwahlen, October 18, 1976, ACDP

II–209–030/1; Monatsbericht RdK Löbau, April 25, 1974, HStA Drd. 11430, No.

10926; Zentralsekretariat der SED an Landes-Provinzial- und Bezirksorganisationen, 7/1946, HStA Drd. 11377, No. 236; RdB an alle Stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden in den

M A S S O B E D I E N C E

119

negotiations interwove all parties into the intricate web of power relations.

An example of this is the case of a young pastor and his family in East

Berlin, who had been waiting years to be allocated an apartment. Just be-

fore elections were due in the 1960s, the family was told by the authorities

that something could be arranged if the couple would finally relent and

participate in the election. The pastor and his wife voted in the election

and were allocated a four-room apartment.30 At times, a more complex

approach was required in the case of church leaders. Before the 1967 elec-

tion, it came to the following prototypical conversation between the

chairman of a district council and the leading member of a Free Church: at

first, the members of the Free Church referred to their difficulties (building

permission, requests for upcoming celebrations etc.). The state official

expressed his “total sympathy” for them. Afterwards, the men chatted

about the imminent elections. In the protocol, the head of the district

council reported that the leaders of the Free Church had given their assur-

ance “that they would vote and that they would put their confidence in

those persons who are standing as candidates”.31 A member of the Free

Church spoke openly about a sore point: his notorious use of the voting

booth. According to the theologian, he did not use the voting booth “to

spoil his ballot, but to document that he was making use of his right to cast

a secret vote, which is bound by law.” Finally, according to the protocol,

everyone mocked the allegedly democratic elections of the West during the

election discussion.32

However, the election discussions are not only witness to corruptibility

and lip service, but also to resistance. Time and again, pastors used the

opportunity to demand free elections or also a fair educational policy to-

——————

RdK, November 5, 1971, HStA Drd. 11430, No. 10994; Telegramm Probst Grüber an

Staatssekretär J. Hegen, September 25, 1954, Bundesarchiv DO 4/342; Goerner,

Behandlung der Kirchenpolitik, S. 155 f.; Wahlanalyse, o.A., [1958], HStA Drd. 11430, No. 10701; Nationale Front an Kreisrat Löbau, September 19, 1950, HStA Drd. 11420, No. 57.

30 Letter D. Schiewe to Brüdergemeine Berlin II, September 24, 2006, S. 5, UA files H.

Richter.

31 The incumbent chairman RdK Löbau for distribution, September 9, 1965, HStA Drd.

11430, No. 10872.

32 CDU, KV Löbau, an 1. Stellv. Vorsitzenden des RdK, September 13, 1965, HStA Drd.

11430, No. 10849; Dreßler, amtierender Vorsitzender des RdK Löbau, an Verteiler, September 4, 1965, HStA Drd. 11430, No. 10872.

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H E D W I G R I C H T E R

wards Christian pupils.33 In the run-up to the local election of 1970, a state

church official had to pass on the bad news: “It is official that the regional

bishop, Noth, by his own admission, will not be voting.”34 Many other

priests also proved to be stubborn and declared that there were no demo-

cratic elections in the GDR, no credible opposition, no freedom of

speech.35 After the wall was erected, many pastors demanded in the run up

to the 1963 election of the Peoples’ Parliament that travel restrictions

should be lifted.36 In later elections, the priests brought up the subject of

travel restrictions again and again. In these cases, however, the authorities

were not “sympathetic”.37 Political horse-trading flanked the elections right

up to the demise of the GDR. The negotiation process was so closely con-

nected to elections, that during the peaceful revolution in 1989 there were

demands for “immediate talks to be had with the people, when it is known

that there is a grievance or problem, and that it should not be left until the

day of the election or shortly before”.38

However, the performative dimension of the elections and the rewards

from the state cannot alone explain the nearly 100 per cent electoral turn-

out and consent. The other side of the coin were the sanctions for refusing

to vote. Because voting was not officially compulsory, a boycott could not

be punished directly. However, the wide legal gray areas and arbitrary

practice of the SED authorities now came into force. Whether it was edu-

cation for children, business trips abroad, holiday plans or a license to

——————

33 Informationsbericht Februar, RdB Drd., Referat Kirchenfragen, March 6, 1970,

Bundesarchiv DO 4/2967/68; records in SED, Kreis Löbau, HStA Drd. 11864, No.

IV/4/09.085; Informationsbericht von H. Dohle, RdB Drd., March 6, 1970,

Bundesarchiv DO 4 / 2968.

34 Informationsbericht von H. Dohle, RdB Drd., March 6, 1970, Bundesarchiv DO 4 /

2968; see Interview with Ehepaar K., ostdt. Gemeinhelferpaar, August 28, 2007, S. 24, files H. Richter.

35 Informationsbericht von H. Dohle, RdB Drd., March 6, 1970, Bundesarchiv DO 4 /

2968; see also Interview with Ehepaar K., ostdt. Gemeinhelferpaar, August 28, 2007, S.

24, files H. Richter.

36 26 Pastor to the State Council of the GDR, October 1, 1963, HStA Dr. 11430, No.

10847.

37 CDU, KV Löbau, an 1. Stellv. Vorsitzenden des RdK, September 13, 1965, HStA

Drd.11430, No. 10849.

38 Protokoll über Stadtverordnetenversammlung Herrnhut, February 16, 1989, Stadtarchiv Herrnhut, Stadtverordneten und Ratssitzungen 1969–72, 1974.