Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (36 page)

of under what name they exist, of course tend to develop not only a politi-

cal life of their own, but also institutional power, if such processes are not

carefully suppressed by political leaders or overlaid by other political proc-

esses (Patzelt 2005).

Representative Assemblies as Focal Points of Election Processes

Representative assemblies are much older than democracies. They evolved

wherever it seemed to be sensible to bring together the really powerful

actors for the purpose of joint consultation and decision-making (Patzelt

2007). Within history, five institutional roots of representative assemblies

can be identified, most of which may lead to viable, and even to a certain

extent powerful institutions, even under dictatorships. In the case of
Estate
Parliamentarianism, which was so important for the history of Europe,

those work together who hold interconnected authority and power within

either territories or corporations.
Federal
Parliamentarianism, which in the form of federal assemblies produced the oldest known representative assemblies, is characterized by periodic meetings of the real holders of

power, or of their ambassadors, from collaborating political systems.
Corpo-

rate
Parliamentarianism exists wherever a representative assembly is the board of an organization tasked with self-government or self-administration.
Liberal
Parliamentarianism opens the path towards democracy: under this form of parliamentarianism, the members of an assembly, as repre-

——————

5 In the following, the term parliament is used in a broad sense and does not simply refer to the type of representative assembly in which the members of parliament are elected by means of free elections and possess considerable political power. On the advantages of using the term in this way, see Patzelt (2007, 484-485).

E L E C T I O N S I N M O D E R N D I C T A T O R S H I P S

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sentatives of a large variety of groups, are provided with a free mandate by

those whom they are representing. At the end of this path we reach
Demo-

cratic
Parliamentarianism. This goes beyond Liberal Parliamentarianism in that the members of parliament are not simply holders of a free mandate,

but are in fact
delegates as well
who are permanently linked to the citizens by means of general, equal, direct, secret and free elections.

The institution of a representative assembly is, at least in some of its

various forms, highly compatible with dictatorial rule. In the form of rep-

resentative advisory boards it is even part of the basic institutional set-up

of many dictatorial regimes. Examples include the
Shura
in Islamic monarchies, formalized in the consultative institution of the
Majlis al Shura
, or the provincial and imperial estate assemblies in which European rulers convened their vassals for
consilium et auxilium
, that is, for advice and assistance.

Representative assemblies became a particular challenge for dictatorships

only when during the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe “houses of com-

mons” or “chambers of deputies” were elected under an increasingly de-

mocratic system of electoral law. This was consolidated when in political

language the word “parliament” became synonymous with
democratic repre-

sentation of the people
, and when the idea started to prevail that a state ought to be based on democratic legitimization and should have a representative

assembly directly elected by the people. Moreover, with the worldwide

spread of the Western legal system in which a large part of a government’s

actions requires a legal basis, which can only be created by a parliament,

legislative representative assemblies became essential for dictatorships for

technical legal reasons as well, even if only as formal rubber-stamping

machines for authoritarian decisions made elsewhere.

However, as soon as an
elected
representative assembly is established

within a dictatorial regime, two sets of measures become necessary in order

to secure the stability of the authoritarian regime.6 First of all, it is unavoidable to manipulate the elections so that on the whole only partisans of the

regime get into parliament. These will make sure that the “people’s repre-

sentation” restricts itself to a back-seat role in the dictatorial regime.

Second, in order to ensure that no unexpected momentum, or even veto

power, can develop in the parliament, all intra-parliamentary decision-mak-

ing processes should be watered down, monitored, or even overlaid, by the

disciplining effects of, for example, an authoritarian-led ruling party. All

——————

6 See Patzelt und Schirmer (2002) for a detailed analysis of how this happened in the GDR People’s Assembly.

138

W E R N E R J . P A T Z E L T

historical and recent experience shows that without such precursory and

concomitant controls being in place, at least some members of parliament

will work on establishing an independent power base of their own. They

will even be justified for such attempts because doing constituency work

and social networking is the typical and irrepressible business of all mem-

bers of parliament. Moreover, if the representative assembly meets often

enough, it can develop political life of its own, and if this is not countered,

it may even become a political co-actor. Such a parliament, especially if

based on personal power of its members within society, will gradually alter

the regime. It may be unavoidable these days that dictatorships establish

elected representative assemblies and hold periodic elections. But this leads

inevitably to the establishment of a potentially dangerous “foreign body” in

their institutional system, and this in turn forces the regime into the risky

act of electoral manipulation every few years.

The Dual Structural Compatibility of Elections

Moreover, elections in dictatorships also occur because there is no clear

dividing line between dictatorships, which can essentially function without

elections, and democracies, which require periodic elections (Schedler

2002, 37–39). That there are usually overlaps between regimes that are
still
dictatorships
and
rudimentary democracies, is reflected in the current

practice within political science to label many dictatorships simply as “de-

fective democracies”, or to talk of “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002).

Elections and plebiscites can in fact assume very different roles despite

apparent external similarities, depending on the type of regime in which

they are embedded.7 On the one hand they can be instruments of

manipulation in the hands of a dictatorial elite. But on the other hand, and

in the best case even free of any manipulation, they can be instruments of

power in the hands of pluralist competing elites, of civil society groups, or

of the citizenry as such.

Attempts to understand the role of elections in dictatorships must,

therefore, not simply contrast
dictatorship
with
democracy
, but rather look at the
continuum
that exists between the two (Schedler 2002, 46–48; Diamond 2002, 27–33). At one end of the continuum we find liberal constitutional

——————

7 On the important distinction between homologous and analogous similarity in parliamentary research see Patzelt (2007, 511-517).

E L E C T I O N S I N M O D E R N D I C T A T O R S H I P S

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democracy in all its various forms, which is not only based on free elec-

tions as the necessary requirement of democracy, but also exhibits the

other necessary features of democracy, that is, the rule of law, the separa-

tion of powers, the accountability of the government, the absence of cor-

ruption, the existence of political pluralism, and free mass media. In the

transition area between fully-fledged democracy and dictatorship there are

various “electoral democracies” in which we find non-manipulated free

elections, but which lack the reliable institutionalization of the additional

features of a liberal democratic constitutional state. Near the other end of

the continuum there are the many forms of “electoral authoritarianism”.

This type of regime not only lacks the important prerequisites of liberal

constitutionality, but it also falls short with respect to free and fair elec-

tions. These electoral autocracies, as has been shown, can be differentiated

between those regimes that have
competitive
authoritarian elections and

those with
closed
authoritarian elections. And beyond the electoral autocracies, at the extreme end of this political spectrum, there are totalitarian

dictatorships, which usually do not hold elections at all.

From this perspective, elections are clearly
not
the decisive distinguishing feature between democracy and dictatorship. The reason is that under

the normative, even if not de facto, dominance of the democratic principle,

and all the more so because of the ubiquitous existence of representative

assemblies, elections have become a “necessary” element of virtually all

non-totalitarian regimes. As a result, their actual organizational form varies

greatly. At one end of the continuum there are truly free and fair elections,

and at the other end there are manipulated or falsified elections.

It is important to understand that elections, just like representative as-

semblies, tend to develop a life of their own. First,
power
develops around them: on the one hand because the outcome of the election will at least

formally bestow or withdraw power, and on the other hand because the

manipulation of a desired election result requires significant resources of

power. Both features prompt the ruling power clique
and
the opposition to
really take elections seriously.
In this way, however, electoral campaigns and elections
will
become real and visible power struggles even if they only concern small victories of a still powerless opposition, or small defeats of a

still overly powerful ruling party. Inevitably facing these power struggles,

all those who participate in them are
sensitized
to the instruments of manipulation employed within the election context. This occurs in an even

more sustained manner when it is apparent to all that manipulation is