Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (41 page)

1931. Voronina argued that VTsSPS leaders passed and recorded endless

resolutions, but were disconnected from the real problems of workers.24

——————

21 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 126–9.

22 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 58–9.

23 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 187–92.

24 Ibid. See also comments of Diachenko, the chairman of the factory committee of “Serp i Molot” in Ukraine, l. 224.

T H E G R E A T S O V I E T P A R A D O X

157

Voronina’s deepest concern, however, was not the useless paper gener-

ated by the VTsSPS, but the 23,000 workers in her plant. If VTsSPS lead-

ers genuinely cared about workers, they would address stoppages, low

wages, and living conditions. “The factory is a scandalous mess!” she said

with disgust. In three years, the factory committee had five different chair-

men, and not a single one was elected. She contrasted conditions in the

lamp department, which was 90 per cent female, with the promises of the

state.

We know that according to the Stalin Constitution, everyone has the right to work, to education, and to rest. But what do we have in the lamp department? As a result of stoppages, women workers with two or three kids, and no husbands, earn 150

rubles a month. They swear at the Party and the government, but the Party and

government are not to blame. The unions and managers who don’t struggle with

these stoppages are guilty. And as a result, women receive miserable pay!

Voronina complained that conditions were deplorable. After the 1936

decree prohibiting abortion, the factory director had promised to build a

crèche for 180 infants. “Due to the decree, we have 500 women on mater-

nity leave, 300 more ready to take maternity leave, and 200 women bring-

ing their babies to the factory committee. Did we build crèches? No.”25

Housing had not kept pace with the massive influx of new workers from

the countryside. People slept in the factory or in makeshift huts. Older

workers, who had lost the strength and energy to work, were afraid to

retire on pensions of 75 rubles a month. They deserved better. Sick work-

ers were deprived of rightful insurance awards in an attempt to “econo-

mize” on funds. And working mothers received little help. “On this you

should not economize”, Voronina declared angrily. Her words rushed out,

building to a crescendo of criticism. There were no ventilators in many

shops, and temperatures reached over 130 degrees Fahrenheit. When

Voronina exclaimed in frustration, “We have already talked about this for

five years and we still have no ventilators”, the entire plenum burst into

spontaneous applause.26

The response to Voronina’s speech showed that an auditorium of un-

ion officials could still be moved by a heartfelt appeal to workers’ interests.

Yet their applause was also strangely displaced. For who, if not union and

——————

25 After a tightly scripted national debate and much opposition from women, the Soviet state prohibited abortion in 1936. The decree led to considerable hardship particularly among working mothers (Goldman 1993, 254–95).

26 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 195–202.

158

W E N D Y Z . G O L D M A N

VTsSPS leaders were responsible for the lack of ventilation in the shops?

Voronina’s critique of VTsSPS leaders revealed the dangerous dilemma

Shvernik’s speech posed. If union leaders recognized that conditions were

bad why had they not done anything to rectify them? Many officials at the

plenum struggled to escape this trap by shrugging off responsibility and

casting themselves as victims of
other “Bureau
crats”. Several repeated

Voronina’s excuse that “no one told us what to do”. At times, it appeared

that every delegate was looking for someone a little higher in the union

hierarchy to blame.

S. L. Bregman, a member of the VTsSPS presidium and head of the

Union of Shoe Workers, cast himself as a powerless victim: “We have no

help, we have no check-up, we have no controls.” He complained so much

about the VTsSPS leaders that one exasperated voice in the audience fi-

nally burst out, “But you’re a member of the VTsSPS presidium!” Yet

Bregman refused to take any responsibility, retorting quickly that it was all

Shvernik’s fault: “The secretariat and presidium of the VTsSPS are in the

position of an orchestra without a conductor.” He followed the oft-used

strategy of penitently admitting failure while shifting blame to his bosses.

Critiquing the leaders of the VTsSPS, he righteously declared, “It is much

better to sit in an office, to give orders, to defend the paper barricades.”

Bregman especially targeted Evreinov, a VTsSPS secretary and editor of its

journal. “It’s a great event when the secretary goes to a factory”, Bregman

sneered. “In two years, Evreinov went to the Urals once. What kind of

leadership is this?”27 While Bregman cast himself as a bold and outspoken

fighter against the “Bureaucrats”, his own position on the VTsSPS presid-

ium and as head of the Shoe Workers undercut his blameless, heroic pose.

The delegates’ eagerness to shift blame was also prompted by fear.

Party expulsions and arrests were occurring all around them, and even

casual contact with an enemy of the people was grounds for investigation.

The head of the Union of State Beet Farm Workers, Radianskii, noted that

the secretary of his union turned out to be a “Trotskyist”, who had been

excluded from the Party several years before for participating in the left

opposition. Radianskii anxiously explained that the union presidium had

been unaware of its secretary’s past, but once it realized the Party had ex-

pelled him, it fired him immediately, transferred his case to the Party Con-

trol Commission, and asked the VTsSPS to affirm its decision. The secre-

——————

27 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 203–6.

T H E G R E A T S O V I E T P A R A D O X

159

tary was thus placed in an untenable position shared by thousands: ex-

cluded from the Party, he also lost his job. The Party Control Commission

investigated, overturned the expulsion, reinstated him in the Party, and

ordered the Union of State Farm Beet Workers to rehire him. Radianskii,

eager to prove his own “vigilance”, pressed for further investigation, but

Evreinov refused, and hired him onto the staff of the VTsSPS. He was

arrested soon thereafter “within the walls of the VTsSPS”.28

This story of expulsion, appeal, reversal, reinstatement, and arrest was

common, as thousands of desperate people attempted to save their Party

standing, jobs, and very lives by pushing for review of their cases at higher

levels. Radianskii, terrified that he would be associated with his arrested

colleague, painted himself as a scorned crusader who tried repeatedly to

bring an “enemy” to the attention of the VTsSPS. Yet Radianskii also re-

vealed the problems union officials faced when last week’s colleague be-

came yesterday’s enemy, today’s exonerated victim, and tomorrow’s enemy

again. Radianskii’s behavior was typical, if not honorable. Fearing guilt by

association, he severed contact with his former colleague and shifted blame

to the VTsSPS. “I was vigilant, comrades”, he implied. “The problem is

yours now.” Shvernik’s speech forced the delegates to explain why they

had ignored conditions and failed to encourage union democracy. Some

spoke out on behalf of the workers, seizing on “union democracy” as a

long-awaited opportunity to alleviate real problems. Yet in an attempt to

escape blame, the delegates also searched for scapegoats. The small winds

of recrimination and denunciation were kicking up. They would gain

greater power and speed as the delegates brought Shvernik’s message back

to their own unions.

The Charter for Union Democracy

The resolutions adopted by the VI VTsSPS plenum added up to nothing

short of a bold new charter for union democracy. The unions were to be

recast by a newly activated membership in secret-ballot elections from the

central to the factory committees. Voting by lists was to be replaced by

individual candidates, and union members would have the “unlimited

——————

28 GARF, f. 5451, o. 21, d. 1, ll. 218–9.

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W E N D Y Z . G O L D M A N

right” to reject and criticize candidates. These were not vague principles

for some unspecified future. Elections for factory and shop committees

were to be held in June and July, immediately followed by regional confe-

rences, union congresses, and elections for higher-level union organiza-

tions in July, August, and September. The VTsSPS would hold its own

capstone congress composed of newly elected officials on October 1, 1937.

Moreover, voting was to be accompanied by accountability. Before the

elections, the members of each union’s central and factory committees

were to submit reports on their activities to the rank and file, initiate the

process of “criticism and self criticism”, and actively solicit suggestions,

which would serve as “commands” for the newly elected leadership.

The VTsSPS plenum instructed
Trud
, its daily newspaper, to investigate

various unions to ensure compliance. Control of funds was to be decen-

tralized and democratized. The factory committees in the larger enterprises

(300 workers or more) were instructed to organize soviets of social insur-

ance (
sotsstrakha
) of 15 to 30 people to oversee disbursement of money,