Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (44 page)

168

W E N D Y Z . G O L D M A N

The elections were not an unalloyed victory for any of these groups.

Party leaders were circumvented by lateral leapfrog from breaking up

“family circles” and rooting out oppositionists. The workers did not suc-

ceed in removing “Bureaucrats”. And regional and local leaders continued

to be arrested even after assuming new posts. More than ten members of

the new union central committees were arrested as “enemies of the

people” soon after the elections. In the Union of Railroad Workers alone,

19 newly elected officials were “unmasked” and arrested.49 Throughout

1937 and 1938, the NKVD continued to cull their ranks. These arrests

encouraged union officials to denounce each other, which prompted in

turn, ever widening circles of arrests.

The new elections opened a Pandora’s box of grudges, charges, and

grievances. In fact, the real struggle in the unions began
after
the elections.

Expulsions from the Party, VTsSPS investigations, and arrests kept union

officials in a state of churning uncertainty. Officials charged with “indiffer-

ence to the needs of the workers” lashed back with countercharges in an

attempt to discredit their accusers.
Everyone
cloaked their criticism or complaint in the language of democracy, using the same phrases to advance

differing interests. As the paired messages of democracy and repression

percolated down through the unions’ hierarchies, the meanings attributed

to the slogans multiplied along with the number of people using them.

Terror and union democracy mixed with charges of corruption and per-

sonal resentments to create a toxic brew. Daily workplace gossip turned

deadly, creating an ugly mess that the NKVD was all too eager to investi-

gate under the watchwords of democracy. There was no dearth of villains

or victims: officials in every union were soon caught up in the deadly game.

By 1938, thousands of union leaders had picked up the double-edged

sword of terror and democracy, and were slashing each other to ribbons.

The new leaders attacked the old, and everyone scrabbled frantically to

find someone to blame for problems in the factories. It became impossible

to disentangle the knot of charges and countercharges. Everyone portrayed

themselves as avatars of democracy and defenders of the working class. In

less than 18 months, the interests of top Party leaders had been subsumed

by those of mid-level union officials and workers, who were in turn en-

gulfed by chaotic mud slinging at the local level. In the end, the campaign

was used to serve a variety of interests. It spread rapidly through the un-

——————

49 GARF, f. 5451, o. 22, d. 64, l. 23.

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169

ions because it proved useful to so many ends. The campaign for union

democracy not only paralleled the mass repression of 1937–38, it became

the very means by which groups with different aims were transformed into

the willing, even enthusiastic proponents of purge and repression.

Although the campaign for democracy brought some limited attention

to working and living conditions, the newly elected leaders were neither

willing nor able to pursue substantive democratic reforms. Elections, even

with multiple candidates and secret ballots, meant little if the elected repre-

sentatives had no power to win tangible benefits for their constituencies.

Union representatives, no matter how honest and efficient, did not have

the power to challenge wage rates, investment policy, or production

norms. The only language available to workers, managers, and union offi-

cials for advancing their interests was that promulgated by Zhdanov at the

Central Committee plenum and popularized by Shvernik through the

VTsSPS: “wrecking”, “weakening ties with the masses”, “violation of de-

mocracy”, “arrogance”, “toadying”, “lack of vigilance”, and “suppression

of criticism from below”. This was the language of the terror and, as the

only sanctioned outlet for expression, it was widely employed. Yet these

phrases were of limited value in solving real problems, which were rooted

in rapid industrialization. Accidents, poor food distribution, housing

shortages, delayed construction, wage arrears, and low productivity were

not the result of “wrecking” and could not be solved by either elections or

arrests. Whether elections can alter deep structural inequalities is a question

relevant not only to the Soviet Union in 1937–38, but also to stable

capitalist democracies. In these countries, leaders pride themselves on their

political legitimacy and do not link elections to the purge of alleged

enemies. Yet their citizens, like Soviet workers, have also frequently found

voting to be a poor substitute for the power to effect genuine change.

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