Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (46 page)

of popular opinion seemed too great for many fascists. Despite Mussolini’s

order that intimidation should not take place (he was convinced, probably

correctly, that he would win a majority under the new electoral law in any

case), fascist leaders in the provinces did not hesitate to use violence in

order to ensure victory. This was done—significantly—even in those prov-

inces, like Ferrara, where the fascists were in any case assured of a large

majority, indicating that the objective was less a majority than total confor-

mity and virtual unanimity.1

Ironically, many of the same provincial leaders would find their disre-

gard for the basic democratic principles of electoral choice used against

themselves two years later. Tired of perpetual indiscipline on the part of

provincial fascist leaders, who often based their challenges to Mussolini on

their popularity within their own provinces (that is, on a local legitimacy),

Mussolini determined in 1926 that such leaders should no longer be

elected by their supporters but appointed from the center—in effect, by

Mussolini himself.2 Provincial leaders—the
ras
, as they were called—were wrong-footed by this ruling, torn as they were between their long-standing

——————

1 Italo Balbo, the fascist leader in Ferrara, is alleged to have told his supporters to take the first elector to come out of the voting station and, “even if he has voted for us”, to break his head open, shouting “Bastard, you voted for the socialists”. After this, Balbo was sure that no one would dare to vote against the fascists (Corner 1975, 263).

2 A further reason for this was very probably the tendency for provincial fascist assemblies to degenerate into open battles between the factions that had formed within the movement. See letter of party secretary to federations, December 1, 1923, in which people attending assemblies are told to leave their guns at the door. (See Aquarone 1965, 343).

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P A U L C O R N E R

and subversive hatred of Rome and its politics, and the obligation to show

discipline within a paramilitary organization. In this conflict, Mussolini

held most of the cards and, almost inevitably, the call to discipline won

out. The message he sent to his followers was clear: hierarchy was to be

respected on all occasions and from that point onwards all appointments

would be made from the center. Within the Fascist Party itself, therefore,

elections were eliminated and
designation from above
became the rule. In no circumstances should the people—not even the fascist faithful—be given

the chance to choose.

The same principle was applied widely from 1926 onwards. Elected

municipal councils were replaced by nominated bodies; the town mayor

was replaced by the newly-created figure of the fascist
podestà
, nominated by the Prefect; and union organizations no longer elected their own representatives. Even the Italian Jewish community came under attack in the late

1920s because its inner councils were elected rather than appointed; it was

feared that this example might be followed by others and could prove an

embarrassment to fascism.

Popular Participation: Terms, Conditions and Objectives

Denial of the principle of elections solved certain problems for the re-

gime, but it did leave the government with the difficulty of establishing

some kind of channel of communication with the people—without allow-

ing the people any kind of say. The essential conundrum facing Mussolini

was that of seeking popular approval, while at the same time denying any

spontaneity to the expression of that approval. After all, the fascist regime

claimed to be “popular”; Giuseppe Bottai even asserted that the regime

was more democratic than the traditional democracies because it had

solved the problem of the tension between elite and masses by unifying

the two; and yet, very obviously, the regime could not trust the people to

express an opinion. The use of the plebiscite is one of the ways in which

the fascist movement attempted to solve this dilemma. It permitted mass

participation, but it conceded no power or responsibility. This was per-

fectly in line with fascist thinking.

As any student of fascism knows, if the people were denied any form

of real election and all appointments were made from above, it was far

P L E B I S C I T E S I N F A S C I S T I T A L Y

177

from true that, under fascism, the people were absent from the scene. The

populist element in fascism reserved a significant role for the people; in-

deed, in many ways the people were much more present than they had ever

been before. Before the First World War, no one had been able to stand in

Piazza Venezia in Rome and scream replies to the questions shouted from

the balcony by the national leader. Under fascism, the piazza—the central

focus of any Italian town or village—assumed a new importance as a place

where people gathered to hear speeches by local leaders or speeches re-

layed by radio by the
duce
himself in Rome. Moreover, if people were not invited to vote in free elections, they were still “encouraged” to participate

in a whole range of activities organized by the Fascist Party and by other

related fascist groups. The leisure organization—the
Opera Nazionale

Dopolavoro
—was the most obvious example. Indeed, the undoubted totali-

tarian pretensions of fascism produced situations of almost frenetic activi-

ty in many provinces as local leaders worked to involve as many people as

possible in some kind of fascist activity.

What characterized this kind of political participation was that it was

realized not by voting but by wearing a uniform, belonging to a fascist

organization, sending one’s children to a fascist youth group, giving a cer-

tain kind of salute, and so on. This represented a specific kind of political

participation, one no longer based on individual choice but on involvement

in collective activity and on behaving in a certain way. In these circum-

stances, political conviction took second place to
public
behavior. What was important was that the individual had
to be seen
to be part of the collective effort; inner thoughts were less important.

The intense activity of the fascist regime throughout its entire existence

in organizing mass rallies, huge party meetings, fascist festivals and so on

was determined by this imperative. It was not that the people were absent,

therefore; it was rather that the channels of communication between the

people and their government had been changed, as had the content and

the significance of that communication. It is, of course, true that popular

participation was always, in a sense, one-directional. People could reply to

Mussolini’s questions from his balcony in Rome—but their replies could

only be those indicating agreement; the people were essentially audience to,

and chorus in, a play in which the protagonists were always others. This

kind of popular participation was essentially about creating a sense of

being part of a common narrative. The constant invocation of History,

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P A U L C O R N E R

and of fascism’s major role in History, was a way of underlining the same

common belonging to a unique story.

The mass demonstration was the classic way of attempting to create a

sense of commonality, of unity of purpose, among the population. Even

those present against their will (non-attenders were identified and pun-

ished) were in some way involved in the process and could hardly fail to be

touched by the impression of unity. In this respect, what was important

was that people had to, like all the others, behave
as if
they believed. Again, it was collective
action
rather than internal conviction that was to be emphasized. Mussolini’s balcony questions to the crowd usually invited the an-

swer “To us!”—the collective and unifying “we” in its various forms being

the characteristic of the replies.

So Why the Plebiscite?

This brings us nearer to the question of why fascism—which rejected all

forms of election—decided to hold plebiscites in 1929 and 1934. The first

plebiscite generated a great deal of noise in Italy; it was clearly seen as an

important test. The second passed almost unnoticed.

It should be noted that the 1929 plebiscite was held to renew the 1924

parliament; at least formally, therefore, the procedure appeared to observe

the rules governing the end of the 1924 legislature. Similarly, the 1934

plebiscite marked the end of the 1929 legislature. Analogies with previous

elections ended there, however. The 1929 plebiscite asked a significant

proportion of the male population to reply “Yes” or “No” to the question,

“Do you approve the list of parliamentary deputies drawn up by the na-

tional Grand Council?” But, since it was readily apparent to everyone, fas-

cists included, that parliament had ceased to count for anything, the vote

was seen everywhere as a request for a generic approval of fascist govern-

ment.

It is evident that the plebiscites—particularly the first—were above all

exercises in international and internal legitimization. In reply to

international criticism coming from the democracies, the fascist regime

wished to demonstrate that the people, when asked, really did support the

regime and that the traditional Western democratic model, which reflected

class conflict, had been superseded by a system that managed to achieve