Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (74 page)

tion in implementing state politics (tax, arrests etc.), distribution of state

funds (apartments, jobs, pensions etc.), and in organizing public welfare.

Thus, the election of local deputies had much more immediate significance

for the people. The voters often knew precisely how these deputies did

their job. It was only at the grassroots levels that there existed a manifest

risk for the candidates in the countryside of being defeated in secret elec-

tions.6 The real places of political decision-making, however, the Central

——————

4 Also, candidates in these elections in general were designated by higher levels.

5 Cf. Ritterband (1978, 101–3).

6 Roggemann (1973, 256) indicates that the total number of such cases for the 1957

election to the local soviets was 134 candidates defeated for the RSFSR, and 16 for Ukraine. Especially the heads of rural soviets or
kolkhoz
chairmen ran the risk of being defeated, cf. TsDNIY, Fond 272, op. 226–29, diverse dela.; 227, delo 489, l. 209 states that there were more negative votes in the lower soviets; delo 464 (1959), l. 53: states that two chairmen of rural soviets failed.

280

S T E P H A N M E R L

Committees of the Party or the Party Committees, were not elected in

general or direct elections. Their leading personnel was installed from the

top by the ruler and the
nomenclatura system
(Merl 2010a, 264).

From 1937 onwards, elections of the Soviets were prescribed to be

general, direct, free and secret. This constituted a fundamental change in

the principles effective until the mid-1930s. Only the principle of equal

elections had existed since 1917, granting men and women the same voting

rights.7 Especially in the countryside, it had taken a long time for women

to make use of their new rights.8 The principle of general elections was

new. From 1937 onwards, every person “was granted” voting rights, in-

cluding the previously disenfranchised “former people” such as former

kulaks
, landowners, and “cult servants” (priests). While participation in the elections until the mid-1930s was under increasing political pressure, it still

remained voluntary. Now it became obligatory. The second novelty was

the introduction of direct elections to all levels of the soviets. This meant

that in 1937, for the first time, the election of the newly-founded highest

organ of state power, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was held. Until the

mid-1930s, only the rural and city soviets had been elected directly. Finally,

the principle of secret balloting was introduced. It played the core role in

Stalin’s understanding of “democracy” (Goldman 2005).

Was there a need to change the election system in the mid-1930s in the

first place? In comparing Stalinism to National Socialism, we realize that

the ideological foundation of Stalinism, making use of class struggle and

splitting up the population by class categories, was clearly inferior to the

German
Volksgemeinschaft
, providing a formal cover of
belonging together
.9

——————

7 (Cf. Roggemann 1973, 243–49). In contrast, the constitution of 1918 introduced a differentiated, indirect and unequal vote. Only rural and city soviets were elected directly. It could be classified as class right of voting. Cf. Carson (1955, 49–54). He gives an overview on pre-1935 election practices (ibid. 9–48).

8 For participation in pre-1935 elections see Carson (1955, 39–48) and Merl (1990, 241–

42). In 1922, total participation in rural soviets was only 28.9 per cent (men 47.8, women 10.0 per cent). In 1929, 61.5 per cent of the rural inhabitants took part (75.7 per cent of men and 48.5 of women), and in 1934 participation in the election to rural soviets reached 83.2 per cent (women: 80.3 per cent). This increase in the female voter turnout is partly to be seen as emancipation and partly due to the presence of industrial worker brigades, since 1929, during the rural elections. Roggemann (1973, 249) provides data on the percentage of disenfranchised voters: 1923 8.2 per cent in cities, 1927 in cities 6.6 per cent, in the countryside 3.0 per cent, 1934/35 3.0 and 2.3 per cent respectively.

9 See my forthcoming study (2012) on “Political Communication in Dictatorships”.

E L E C T I O N S I N T H E S O V I E T U N I O N , 1 9 3 7 – 1 9 8 9

281

After forced collectivization and the Cultural Revolution made the af-

firmative-action policy towards the integration of non-Russian population

groups obsolete at the turn to the 1930s, the Soviet state was in urgent

need of an integrative ideology suitable for a multi-ethnic country. The

constitution of 1936 therefore created a new unity, becoming manifest in

the
Soviet
people, and granted each citizen equal voting rights. It is in con-junction with this new emphasis on the unity of the people that we can

understand the full scale of the altered voting principles. Equality now

meant that each Soviet citizen possessed equal voting rights regardless of

ethnicity. Direct voting meant that everybody would take part in the elec-

tion of the supreme organ of state power. From this point of view, it be-

comes evident that the principle of general voting was a threat rather than

a right to many citizens. It put the voter and the official under fear of re-

pression. Not taking part in the election from now on meant self-exclusion

and unmasking oneself as an enemy of the people, the consequences of

which were dire. As nobody could possibly be against the “good Tsar”, not

voting could only be attributed to the lack of the local officials’ persuasive

powers. Voting against the candidate signified dissent with the ruler on the

one hand, but expressed dissatisfaction with incompetent local officials on

the other hand, who did not provide the promised welfare to the voters.

Voting against the candidates thus caused repressions against both, the

officials for their failure to convince and mobilize the voters and the voters

themselves for being political enemies, subject to arrest or annihilation

(Kozlov and Mironenko 2005, 186–212). In 1937 this demonstration of

unity served foreign policy aims as well. In connections with Stalin’s mania

of a
fifth column
, it should demonstrate to enemy countries that in the case of attack any hope of finding collaborators in the Soviet Union was idle.

The fatal consequence of this interpretation was the criminalization of

any form of justified opposition as a result of the political role played by

the ruler. Being the representative of the objective truth, he could do no

wrong. An individual might have held a different view at the beginning, but

upon being informed by the officials, he/she had to recognize the objec-

tive truth. The duty of the officials was to make the people “voluntarily”

take part in the election. Pressure on the officials led to pressure on the

population. Nomination of the deputies by the state would have been a

much easier way, as the voters suggested several times.10

——————

10 GARF, Fond R-7522, opis’ 6, delo 22, ll. 16–20; delo 28, ll. 17–20.

282

S T E P H A N M E R L

The birth of Stalin’s electoral system was strongly connected to the si-

multaneous implementation of his conception of consumption. Both elec-

tions and consumption aimed at the stabilization of the regime on a seem-

ingly “democratic” basis. The system of allotting consumption goods was

replaced by the principle of free or open trade, allowing the people to de-

cide on their own which goods they preferred to consume (Merl 2007).

The electoral system was designed to be secret, allegedly allowing the voter

to make his own choice.

How could Stalin be convinced that general elections in 1937, granting

voting rights also to those class-alien and
anti-Soviet
elements, would not lead to a disaster for his rule by showing dissatisfaction with the Communist regime? The archives do not leave any doubt that this was Stalin’s own

decision, enforced even by personally interfering in the work of the com-

mission writing the constitution. Many people making proposals for the

constitution in the public discussion campaign in 1936 did not agree with

Stalin’s proposal to give voting rights to everyone. About 20 per cent of

those writing demanded the exclusion of priests and alien people, espe-

cially former
kulaks
(Getty 1991, 26). Getty states that the majority of people were concerned with questions of bread and butter and with putting

the local authorities under public control, but “they were not worried

about individual rights or civil protection” (ibid.).

The new election regulations were mostly a threat to the local officials,

who could now be blamed and repressed for any unpleasant result of the

vote. As Goldman argues, the campaign for “democracy” was closely con-

nected to terror. In the self-conception of the Party, there could be no

opposition to the regime. Everything depended solely on correct and com-

petent agitation. From the very beginning, the principles of general and

secret ballot caused a wave of letters from Party and NKVD officials to

leading Party organs. The local officials feared that the “former people”,

especially
kulaks
and priests, might negatively influence the result of the vote. They were especially frightened that somebody might misunderstand

the concept of the secret ballot as the right to vote against the regime.

They were also afraid of Stalin’s “democratic” claim that there should be

several candidates in order to give the voter a chance to unmask incompe-

tent officials. This would have led the voters to turn office-holders into

scapegoats, eliminating the names of officials who had previously executed

Stalin’s orders from the ballots. The dubious outcome of such a choice

would have been to elect unknown and inexperienced new candidates, as