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the voters expected them to represent their own interests more effectively.

This was exactly the outcome of the closed elections of the secretaries of

the lower Party cells and the union elections in 1937 (Getty 1991, 31;

Goldman 2005, 1433, 1440–52). The task that Stalin required of the local

officials, i.e. to fulfill his orders and simultaneously take into account the

contrasting interests of the people so as to win their trust and the trust of

the ruler was impossible to carry out.

In reaction to letters warning of the activities of former kulaks and

priests, and stating that these activities would influence the election results, Stalin signed order No. 00447 (cf. Goldman). In preparation of the election, he ordered to arrest only those people whom he had constitutionally

granted voting rights just before: priests, former
kulaks
, as well as beggars and prostitutes, according to quotas set by himself. Half of the arrested

people were to be shot, the others sentenced to forced labor. This order

was to be executed in a secret police action. The fate of these people was

kept secret until the very end of the Soviet Union. A total number of

386,798 people were shot under this order, most were executed prior to

the election in December 1937.11 Shot in secret, these people had to pay

for their voting rights, which they had just been granted, with their very

lives. Abused by a public propaganda campaign that called the Soviet Un-

ion the truest democracy in the world, they served as cynical examples of

Stalin’s envisioned “unity of the people”.

In October, a second important change of rules was ordered by Stalin,

kept secret from the people until the very eve of the elections. Instead of

giving the voters the promised choice of selection, it was only the name of

one candidate that was to appear on the ballots. This certainly saved a lot

of the officials from being defeated in the election. The real choice left to

the people on election day now was either to vote for the candidate or to

be shot. Even under these conditions, the Party decided to keep the results

under strict control (Getty 1991, 31–35). Instead of a choice, from now on

a block of Party and non-Party candidates was propagated. With the offi-

cially published result of 96.8 per cent of the registered voters taking part

——————

11 Danilov and Manning 2004, 33–38. For local NKVD reports during spring 1937 on increasing counter-revolutionary activities see ibid., 240–41, 247, 258; Binner and Junge (2001).The first order claimed the shooting of 75,950 persons and the conviction of an additional 193,000 to arrest in camps. “On request of local authorities” the quotas were raised several times. Until the fall of 1938, a total of 767,397 persons were repressed, nearly half of them shot. The order required there to be silence regarding the time and the place of shooting. For individual life stories of those shot, see Herzberg (2011).

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in the election and 98.6 per cent voting for the candidates on the ballots,

the result of this first election in 1937 was already similar to all following

elections (Vollweiler 1938, 126–29).

Soviet election results from 1937 onwards therefore were, first and

foremost, dangerous to officials at the local level. More than average ab-

senteeism from voting or votes against the candidates would be taken as

proof of their failure in organizing the election. This fear created the

chance of bargaining between officials and subjects, as I will argue in the

following. Putting both groups in a state of insecurity eventually robbed

the regime of the total control over the election process, leaving pieces of

actual power in the hands of the voters.12 Voting from 1937 onwards had

nothing to do with choosing candidates or political alternatives. On the

contrary, it had to prove the nearly universal and mutual harmony and trust

between subjects and ruler. The officials, under pressure to report nearly

100 per cent consent with the regime, were willing to negotiate with single

voters and thus fulfill part of the paternalistic promise to care for public

and individual welfare.

The candidates’ selection was strictly controlled by the Party. Thus, the

candidates were fully dependent on the Party. Formally, only societal or-

ganizations were allowed to make nominations.13 The Party ensured that

the deputies were eventually representative of the population, including all

professions and non-Party members as well. Among the candidates for the

Supreme Soviet, about one half consisted of senior officials in high state

positions, while within the other half milk-maids and herdsmen, blue collar

workers, directors of enterprises and academics had to be included. As

higher officials were typically men, with only few exceptions, female candi-

dates in general were younger and represented less qualified professions.

While about one half of those deputies holding senior positions in the state

——————

12 Zaslavsky and Brym (1978, 367–68) state that electors, especially workers, increasingly refused to register and asked their agitator to report dissatisfaction, for example, with unpaved roads or leaky roofs. Voters in this manner utilized their vote—or at least the threat of withholding it—to extract minor concessions from the regime.

13 (Cf. Roggemann 1973, 250–53). The election rules did not exclude the nomination of more than one candidate. The name of the candidates had to be published 30 days

ahead of the election. TsDNIY, Fond 272, opis’ 229, delo 320 and 321 give biographical data of the candidates of the 1967 elections to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR; GAYO, Fond R-2513, opis’ 1, delo 107 (1950), contains the protocols on the selection of the candidates. In general, the members of the local commissions first suggested nominating Stalin or Molotov for their
okrug
, and only then changed to another candidate.

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and Party apparatus served as deputies over long periods of time, others—

the majority of them women—were just elected for one election cycle.14

The annual compilation of the voting list had an important side effect

on registration of the population, as the police had to check who lived

where. Special problems appeared in Moscow, Moscow
oblast’
and Kiev, as

registration ration was strictly limited there. Many people lived in the city

without registration, and thus were not easy to sign up as voters.15

The Political Significance of the Elections: A View from Below

What was the role of the deputies under these conditions? In the self-con-

ception of the paternalistic political regime, the deputy had to act as the

personal representative of his voters and represent their interests. Although

the voters had no influence on the selection of the candidates, voting for

the candidate established a personal relationship between voter and deputy.

In communicating with the political system, the citizens were used to ad-

dressing the office-holder as a person and not as the head of an institution

(Merl 2010a, 250).16 Thus, the voter could address his deputy with all his

demands and request support if he wanted to get a car, a better apartment

or just firewood or a spare part for his television set. According to this

definition, it was the obligation of the deputy to represent the wishes of his

voters in front of state authorities, give support to them in the pursuit of

their wishes, and to report what he had achieved for his voters (Merl 2007,

531–32). This contributed to the “warm feeling” so important for Russian

people. Apart from a “democratic” legitimization, the stability of the Soviet

system until its very end was based on this paternalistic tradition. In theory,

the deputy even attained an imperative mandate. In case he did not fulfill

his duties, the voter had the right to vote him out of office. In practice, this rule could not materialize, as only social organizations were allowed to

——————

14 (Cf. Hill 1972, 47–67). While on average 51.0 per cent of all deputies were re-elected, this was the case for only 15.3 per cent of the women, 14.9 per cent of non-party members, and of 21 per cent of those below 39 years of age.

15 (Cf. Zaslavsky and Brym 1978, 367–69). Carson (1955, 81) mentions that the data on voters were used by Western observers to guess missing data on demographic trends.

16 For the law on the status and the obligations of deputies from September 20, 972 (see Roggemann 1973, 257, 281–94). The deputies were expected to keep in close and steady contact with the voters, offering receptions, giving reports, fulfilling instructions etc.

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initiate the process.17 During the 1920s and 1930s it had been quite com-

mon during all campaigns of repression that elected members of executive

organs, especially heads of rural soviets or
kolkhoz
chairmen were dis-

charged from office during production by state and Party plenipotentiaries

or the Secret Police (Merl 1990, 234–49).

In their almost desperate attempt to bring everybody to the ballot

boxes, the local officials could easily be blackmailed. The voters were puz-

zled to what extent the local officials were fighting for their votes, and

understood that they had won exchange value. We may speak of the bar-

gaining power of the voters. Thus, in practice voting had become a fasci-

nating story of political communication, overlooked by most of the previ-

ous research.

Occasions for bargaining arose, for instance, during meetings of voters

and candidates, in writing to state and Party organs during the election

campaign, and by making remarks on the ballot. As communication in

dictatorships in general and the election process in the Soviet Union in

particular was not free from fear, it was crucial for the voters to identify

those forms of behavior that were tolerated. Agitators had to look after

special groups of voters, making sure that they took part in pre-election

meetings, checking their names on registration lists, and making sure that

the voter actually showed up at the polling station on election day.18

As a general rule, vertical communication with the regime was much

less restricted than horizontal communication among voters. For example,

a voter telling his friend in early 1953 that he had successfully threatened