Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (79 page)

distrust becomes evident from a letter protesting against being given only a

pencil to cancel the name of the candidate, as this potentially allowed the

commission to fake the ballot afterwards.51 While some voters felt uncom-

fortable voting for old-age deputies, it was at the same time and under the

influence of Brezhnev’s rule that non-working pensioners felt destined to

——————

155; opis’ 7, delo 23, ll. 3–5, 40–52; opis 6, delo’ 22, ll. 41–46, delo 28, 17–20. Article 76

of the election rules claimed to provide special rooms or booths to fill out the ballot.

No other person was allowed to enter this room. Only illiterate voters were allowed to ask another person to fill out the ballot (Roggemann 1973, 274–79; Carson 1955, 75).

49 Ibid., opis’ 2, delo 59, ll. 91–92, 113–15, 117, 123.

50 Ibid., opis’ 13, delo 72, ll. 34–35, 44–45 (1989), opis’ 11, delo 24, ll. 4, 49; opis’ 10

(1979), delo 23, l. 3.

51 Ibid., opis’ 13 (1989), delo 72, ll. 44–45. From the comment of the commission it becomes evident that such complaints had arrived after prior elections as well. L. 56 gives information on complaints on the violation of the election rules to be decided by the mandate commission: 26 complaints were about violating the balloting rules, 16 on wrong counting or falsification of the results, 19 on the lack of equal competition between candidates, spreading of slanderous rumors etc.

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be nominated as candidates, for the Supreme Soviet could benefit from

their experience.52 There were always complaints regarding deputies not

fulfilling their report obligations or failing to receive voters regularly.53

Some writers suggested signaling consent for or dissent of the candidate by

simply putting a “yes” or a “no” behind the respective name to avoid the

wrong interpretation of the vote by the commission.54

Taking into consideration the many concerns expressed by the popula-

tion, we have to conclude that the sentence calling for the cancellation of

candidates’ names on the ballot and the question of secret voting revealed

the contradictory nature of the voting process for each voter. The practice

of voting obviously differed vastly from its theory. To express it differ-

ently: the organization of the voting process rendered its illegitimacy strik-

ingly obvious to the people. Getting the vote out thus signified the subju-

gation of the people under a process of moral corruption. The voter was

essentially forced to give up his constitutionally given rights twice, on the

one hand by practically being unable to vote secretly, and on the other

hand by having no choice who to vote for. We may speak of a “performa-

tive self-contradiction” (Jessen and Richter in this volume). A positive in-

terpretation will hold against this that taking part in the election was under-

stood as praise of the wise ruler and as “bargaining”, i.e. to exchange one’s

vote for private consumption goods such as a sausage, a razor blade, or

even better housing. This way, one vote really did make a difference.

Were election results falsified? It is beyond doubt that there was dissat-

isfaction with the voting system.55 There is ample evidence that the results

were manipulated, but it is rather unlikely that they were generally falsified.

Reading the reports suggests that manipulating the results became more

widespread over time. Judging manipulation and falsification, we have to

take into account that elections aimed at controlling local officials, and that

they therefore, of course, took the opportunity to manipulate the results so

as to reduce control and pressure. The crazy outcome of this trend was

that the voter turnout in the 1984 elections amounted to 99.9 per cent. The

highest percentage of voters canceling the name of the deputy was re-

——————

52 Ibid., opis’ 10 (1979), delo 23, l. 2. For complaining about old-aged candidates cf. ibid., opis’ 11 (1984), delo 23, ll. 2, 26.

53 Ibid., opis’ 10, delo 23, ll. 2, 39.

54 Ibid., opis’ 10, 1979, l. 25; opis’ 8, delo 30, l. 7.

55 Zaslavsky and Brym (1978, 363) speak of 18 per cent of the workers of a big Moscow plant uttering dissatisfaction with the voting system in a sociological investigation.

E L E C T I O N S I N T H E S O V I E T U N I O N , 1 9 3 7 – 1 9 8 9

299

ported by the RSFSR with 93,320 voters, or 0.09 per cent. The Ukrainian

SSR celebrated the smallest percentage (0.01 per cent) of voting against the

candidates, only 5,184 voters in absolute numbers.56 Thus, in the end,

obviously nobody really cared about the results if they showed patriotic

unanimity. The actual turnout at the polling stations was very likely below

80 per cent, taking into account such aspects as voting for family members

and neighbors and absentee certificates.

On the absentee certificates, some information is available. Voters ab-

sent from their home district on election day had to apply for an absentee

certificate, allowing the holder to vote at any polling station wherever he

might be that day (Carson 1955, 57–58; Roggemann 1973, 254, 274–75).

Locations included long-distance trains, airports, or places close to the

dacha. Until 1962, it was necessary to procure confirmation from one’s

place of employment, attesting to a service leave or a vacation on election

day. From 1966 on, however, the certificates could be obtained without

such confirmation. During the elections taking place in June between 1966

and 1974, even more than 20 per cent of the Moscow voters might have

applied for and eventually obtained such an absentee certificate. The exact

number reported for the city of Moscow was 986,100 for the local soviet

election in June 1973 and, after intense campaigning to vote at the place of

residence, 592,500 for the election to the Supreme Soviet in June 1974.57

Outside the big cities, such certificates were much less widespread. How

many of these persons on election day really went to a polling station is

unknown. Obviously, however, nobody cared about it, either. The pressure

to drive voters to the polls was on the local officials of the respective dis-

trict. Registering the absentee certificate, they had done their duty. The

effort to apply for the absentee certificate was certainly bigger than just to

show up on election day, and it satisfied everybody: the local authorities,

the person applying, and even the ruler. I am therefore reluctant to catego-

rize a person applying for an absentee certificate as a dissenter or non-

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56 GARF, Fond R-7522, opis’ 11 (1984), delo 8, ll. 6–7. The Estonian republic reported 454 votes against the candidate, Kirgiziya 1,333 (0.07 per cent). The reports of the republics to the Central Committee highlight that the number of those voting nay strongly decreased in comparison to 1979, in the Estonian republic from 9,411 to 1,025

(RGANI, Fond 5, opis 90 (1984), delo 59, here l. 83). The figures between both reports differ slightly.

57 RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 67, delo 97, l. 6: Report of the secretary of the Moscow City Council Grekov to the Central Committee. Cf. also Zaslavsky and Brym (1978, 370).

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voter. The majority obviously only wanted to spend election day at their

dacha. A public sign of dissent towards the regime looked different.

Also the practice of bargaining and the most effective threat to refuse

the vote provides further evidence that falsifications were probably not as

widespread as some would believe them to be. The reports above were

obliged to list the amount of non-voters, and to provide information on

each of them including the reason for their not voting.58 Most of the re-

ports to the Central Committee subdivide the number of non-voters into

two groups: deliberate non-voters (giving name and address of these indi-

viduals to the district committees of the Party), and other non-voters, who

did not vote for more “respectable” reasons, for example as they were

drunk or outside of the district limit without having applied for an absen-

tee certificate.59 Among the reasons for the refusal to vote, and looking at

the entire period under consideration, housing conditions, as mentioned

above, ranked first at more than 50 per cent. Non-voting for religious con-

viction came in second. Among the other important motives were unjust

court sentences, and staying unemployed. Political reasons were named

very rarely, but some voters did not take part in the election in protest

against the voting system. This should not come as a surprise, as arrest was

the only reaction to this.60 Eventually, then, even a refusal to vote embod-

——————

58 Cf. TsDNIY, Fond 7386, opis’ 5, delo 4, ll. 157–68. In the election of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1958 in Yaroslavl’
oblast’
99.92 per cent of the 925,000 voters took part. Only 784 persons did not show up. All were interrogated about their reasons (TsDNIY, Fond 272, opis’ 227, delo 328, ll. 35–42; delo 355 ll. 268–69). In the 1957 local election in the city of Yaroslavl’ 99.83 per cent of the voters participated. Only 423

voters deliberately did not take part. The report states: “There were cases of deliberately not voting.” It gives the names of six persons living in barrack No. 22, who did not vote due to their housing. Also, most of the other non-voters did not vote because of housing (Ibid., opis’ 227, delo 222). Cf. also: ibid., opis’ 227, delo 489 (1959), ll. 133, 289; opis’ 229, delo 317–19 (1967).

59 RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 76 (1979), delo 137 and 138. TsDNIY, Fond 272, opis’ 229, delo 183 (1966), ll. 142–57, speaks of 703 voters, not taking part in the election, only 58 of them deliberately. Among the rest, 604 were outside the borders of Yaroslavl’
oblast’
on the election day, 31 were unable to move due to drunkenness, 8 were sentenced as hooligans on election day, and two died.

60 RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 66 (1973), ll. 120–22; opis’ 67 (1974), delo 97; opis’ 77 (1980), delo 102 and 103; TsDNIY, Fond 272, opis’ 229, delo 317–19 (1967). Delo 317, ll. 96–

100, lists 21 deliberate non-voters, 8 of them due to housing. Two said they disliked the candidate. In addition, there were 16 who did not vote without deliberation, including one drunk person; 168–74 lists 113 deliberate non-voters, 91 of them due to housing;