Listening In (32 page)

JFK:
About a dinner tonight. She’s invited somebody and I invited somebody.

RFK:
How does it look?

JFK:
Looks like hell. Looks real mean, doesn’t it? But on the other hand, there is no other choice. If they get this mean on this one, it’s just a question of where they go about it next. No choice. I don’t think there was a choice.

RFK:
Well, there isn’t any choice. I mean, you would have been, you would have been impeached.

JFK:
That’s what I think. I would have been impeached. I think they would have moved to impeach. I wouldn’t be surprised if they didn’t move to impeach right after this election, on the grounds that I said, and didn’t do it and let … I mean, I’d be …

RFK:
I don’t think that’s … you know, that’s a, if we’d gone in and done something else, or taken some other step that wasn’t necessary, and then you’d be …

JFK:
Yeah.

RFK:
Yeah. But now, the fact is that you couldn’t have done any less. The fact that you got all those South American countries and Central American countries to vote unanimously.
¹⁸
When they’ve been kicking us in the ass for two years, and they vote unanimously for this. And then to get the reaction from the rest of the allies, you, like David Ormsby-Gore
¹⁹
and everybody else. Saying that you had to do it. You calculate … I mean, if it’s going to come at you, it was going to come as something you couldn’t have avoided.

CALL TO BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN, OCTOBER 26, 1962

Despite a twenty-three-year difference in age, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan shared an easy camaraderie. Throughout the crisis, they talked often, usually at night; Kennedy reported from the epicenter of events, and Macmillan offered calm, resolve, and unstinting support. As this call indicates, he was also willing to offer strategic considerations of high value, including Britain’s willingness to give up its Thor missiles. When the crisis was finally resolved, Macmillan took an active part in planning ways to avert any repetition, including his strong recommendation that Kennedy pursue a nuclear test ban treaty with Nikita Khrushchev.

JFK:
Hello, Prime Minister.

MACMILLAN:
Hello, what’s the news now?

JFK:
Well, Governor Stevenson
²⁰
saw U Thant
²¹
this afternoon and made our proposals about the importation of arms ceasing and that work on these bases stopping and leading to eventual dismemberment. There are some reports around, some Russian conversations, but it’s rather unofficial and unreliable, about some thought that it’s possible they might do something about withdrawing the weapons if they could get a territorial guarantee of Cuba. But that is so unofficial that I’m not in a position now to know whether there’s anything to it or not. Khrushchev told U Thant that he would keep his ships out of there for the time being, but he couldn’t—he wouldn’t do it very long. He isn’t giving us very much because actually he’s got no ships in the area anyway. But at least he’s made that an announcement; he’s keeping his ships out of there for the time being. We are continuing the quarantine. The buildup of the sites continues, however. And I put a statement out this afternoon describing how the buildup is going on, so that unless in the next forty-eight hours we get some political suggestions as to dismantling the base we’re then going to be faced with a problem of what to do about this buildup.

PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY, APRIL 5, 1961

MACMILLAN:
There’s one idea that you’ve just mentioned is that Cuba might be made like Belgium was—an international guarantee—an inviolable country which now all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability. Is that a possibility?

JFK:
Well, that is a matter which seems to me we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next twenty-four hours as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. That would leave Castro in power, it would leave the Russians perhaps free to ship in a good deal more of defensive equipment and they have shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armored vehicles with very sophisticated conventional equipment and so on, but it may be a possibility, but I could probably give you more information about that by tomorrow night, but at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet.

MACMILLAN:
Yes, now I thought another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with a team and ensure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussions.

JFK:
Yes, that is correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations. That is correct.

MACMILLAN:
Yes, but do you think that U Thant mightn’t … I am quite sure that Hammarskjöld
²²
would have done such a thing. Mightn’t he suggest to the United Nations that he would do this? He would go and do it with a team and see that they were not operable during the period of the talks.

JFK:
Yes, there is some suggestion of that. Also they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida and Nicaragua, Guatemala and Swan Island. That came up in the conversation with the governor and I am looking into it. I don’t think we have got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect but this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the governor’s conversation. So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to which—and whether the Russians are interested in it or not. We will know a little more I think by tomorrow afternoon. In the meanwhile the quarantine stays, he doesn’t send ships in, we let a ship pass this afternoon, but there’s no other ships within forty-eight hours or so, so we don’t expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued buildup and I issued a statement on that today. I think I can probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals and U Thant’s conversation with Stevenson. I’ll send you a report on that tonight and then you will have it in the morning.

MACMILLAN:
There is just a third point that occurred to us. If we want to help the Russians to save face, would it be worthwhile our undertaking to immobilize our Thor missiles which are here in England during the same period—during the conference.

JFK:
Well, let me put that into the machinery and then I’ll be in touch with you on that.

MACMILLAN:
I think it is just an idea that it might help the Russians to accept.

JFK:
Good, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the Department. I think we don’t want to have too many dismantlings, but it is possible that that proposal might help; they might also insist on Greece—on Turkey and Italy—but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that, that may be advantageous.

MACMILLAN:
Yes, I don’t see why they should ask, because we have got sixty, so that missile for missile you see there wouldn’t be as many as that in Cuba.

JFK:
Yes that is correct. Let me—I’ll let Stevenson know that and he will have that in mind in the conversation.

MACMILLAN:
Well now, if there are any other suggestions that we can make, you will probably send me a message tonight and we can get in touch with you tomorrow.

JFK:
That is correct, Prime Minister. I think we just have to wait until we’ve analyzed this conversation. I haven’t seen the entire conversation, but I think that there may—and the prospect of a trade of these missiles for some guarantees of Cuba is still so vague that I am not really in a position to say that there is any possibility of it as yet. Maybe by tomorrow evening at this time we’ll know better.

MACMILLAN:
Yes, because of course at this stage any movement by yours, by you, may produce a result in Berlin which would be very bad for us all. That’s the danger now.

JFK:
Well, we’re not going to have any problem at sea because he is keeping his ships out of there, and as I say we let one ship pass today for the very reason that you’ve named. On the other hand, if in the end of forty-eight hours we are getting noplace and the missile sites continue to be constructed, then we are going to be faced with some hard decisions.

MACMILLAN:
And of course in making those decisions, one has to realize that they will have their effect on Berlin as well as on Cuba.

JFK:
That’s correct, and that is really why we have not done more than we have done up till now. But of course on the other hand if the missile sites continue and get constructed and we don’t do anything about it, then I would suppose that it would have quite an effect on Berlin anyway.

MACMILLAN:
Yes, I think that is the difficulty, but anyway there are these political plans which we have now got going, and if I may, I’ll send you a message concerning them and you will send me the result of U Thant’s conversation.

JFK:
Yes, I’ll send you a memorandum based on the copy of the conversation that Stevenson had with U Thant. I will also keep in touch with you tomorrow at this time if you’re—or otherwise I’ll send you a message tomorrow. Maybe I’ll send you a message unless we have got something immediate. And number three, we will not take any further action until I have talked to you in any case. I won’t bother to call you tomorrow, because I may be down—I may be away from here tomorrow evening and I assume you may be, too. But I will send you a message if there is anything new, and in any case I will talk to you on the phone before we do anything of a drastic nature.

MACMILLAN:
Well, thank you. I will be here all day so you can get me any time today, tomorrow, or Sunday.

JFK:
Prime Minister, I’m going to send you a note tonight or tomorrow morning about asking if it’s agreeable with you if General Norstad stay on until January 1, that there be an overlap with Lemnitzer’s
²³
tour of duty; that Lemnitzer go over there and take over the American forces and be there and have that sixty-day period to be sort of adjusted to his new responsibilities. You’ll be getting a formal letter, and I didn’t want to say anything about it because we haven’t been in touch with General de Gaulle as yet, who is very sensitive in these NATO matters. But I will be in touch with you and I would assume probably that the suggestion would be agreeable to you?

MACMILLAN:
It is indeed very sensible.

JFK:
Good. Well I’ll be in touch in a formal way with you tomorrow on that matter and I’ll send you tonight the memorandum on the U Thant conversation—over and I hope all goes well.

MACMILLAN:
Well thank you very much and of course Bundy can always ring up de Zulueta
²⁴
here. They can speak to each other so it is quite easy to have a talk.