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Authors: Linda Lemoncheck

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Page 52
erosexual promiscuity as well as those against monogamy are the result of oppressive social conditions under which women's sexuality is currently constructed. To finger promiscuity as the culprit in women's sexual dissatisfaction is to ignore the sexual oppression that overlays men's subordination of women and to victimize women for their sexual choice. A sex radical feminist would remove women's sexual oppression, so that women were not punished for promiscuity; only then would individual women be in a position to decide for themselves whether or how promiscuity figured in their lives. Sex radicals would contend that from the "view from nowhere," it is easy to ignore Western sexual prejudices that both eschew and punish those who would stray from the prevailing sexual norms.
With regard to sexual violence against women, a sex radical feminist would argue that sexual liberation from the constraints of sexual exclusivity does not imply that any sex goes. As a radical feminist, she balks at any sex that subordinates women to the unwelcome demands of men. As a sex radical, she rejects any attempt to oppress sexual preferences solely because they fail to match the cultural norm; yet she disdains alternative sexualities that fail to meet minimum requirements of consent. Thus Gayle Rubin asserts both that "[a] radical theory of sex must identify, describe, explain, and denounce erotic injustice and sexual oppression" and that "[i]n the long run, feminism's critique of gender hierarchy must be incorporated into a radical theory of sex, and the critique of sexual oppression should enrich feminism."
65
Under such conditions, a sex radical feminist sees nothing wrong with promiscuous sex that is recreational or anonymous, nor with the frequent use of dominant/submissive roles in sex such as lesbian butch/femme sex or sadomasochistic sex. As long as each partners' sexual needs are accorded the kind of care respect (neither "forced [n]or fooled" to use Rubin's phrase) that appreciates the particular desires of one's partner and assures a context of mutual consent, sexual variety and experimentation are both permissible and encouraged.
66
Furthermore, according to sex radicals, sex liberated in this way would create new markets for erotica that would more than offset any commercial loss due to the release of sexual frustration. In short, promiscuous sex is part of sex radical feminism's positive program for women's sexual pleasure, agency, and self-definition.
Another kind of argument offered in favor of promiscuous sex has to do with the advantage in the
variety
of sexual partners. According to this line of reasoning, the sexual variety available through promiscuous sex increases the likelihood that a person will discover what kind of sex suits her individual needs. Sex never becomes boring or routine, since a person has the freedom not only to change partners but also to change his own sexual style. Adopting a sexual ethic of care respect, sexual partners can remain sensitive to the particular sexual needs of diverse others and encourage experimentation and change if desired. Frederick Elliston remarks that this variety gives us a "repertoire of gestures" that can "facilitate the mastery of one kind of body language." He suggests that such a repertoire can afford the promiscuous person a kind of sexual growth and creativity that sexually exclusive relationships cannot.
67
However, Elliston gives away the game by concluding that ultimately, "the good sex life cannot be achieved through physical gratification alone. . . . [H]aving talked with many, we may discover that our most meaningful dialogue can be carried on
 
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with one." His claim is that a "principled life represented by the traditional commitment 'to love, honor, and obey' signifies a higher mode of existence" than that of a promiscuous life, which ultimately succumbs to the aesthetic boredom of Kierkegaard's Don Juan complex.
68
I have argued, however, that promiscuous sex need not lack the principled ethical stage of love and commitment that Elliston requires. Furthermore, sex radicals challenge the notion that there is anything
wrong
with "physical gratification alone." Indeed, "having talked with so many," we may equally be assured that
one
would be boring. Elliston adopts the less radical alternative that promiscuous sex is justified as long as it is a means to the discovery of a person's most compatible, monogamous sexual partner.
69
Premarital sex is often justified in just this fashion: premarital sex increases the likelihood that an otherwise uncommitted person will find a partner
with whom she would wish to share the rest of her life
. When two people have had sex, they can better decide whether to pursue the relationship further, both physically and emotionally.
Implicit in such arguments, however, is the assumption that a sexually exclusive relationship, of a serial if not permanent sort, is the requisite sexual ideal. For many people, mastering their sexual body language may actually be easier and more efficient with just one person; and certainly there are lots of sexually creative, monogamous couples who do not need a promiscuous life for sexual satisfaction or growth. But Elliston's claim that promiscuity is somehow lower than monogamy on the moral totem pole only acknowledges his own adherence to a sexual norm that I claim is not more "principled" in its particular social context just because it is the norm. Only by deriving such principles from the "view from nowhere" can Elliston disguise socially situated sexual values as true ones.
Robert Solomon's virtues of romantic love also appear to suffer from a moral presumption of monogamy, since it could be argued that those same virtues may also be a part of promiscuous sex: Solomon states that romantic love promotes self-awareness, a healthy outlook on the world, inspiration and creativity, and excitement.
70
However, if such virtues are the result of sex with only
one
person, then sex with
more than one
person could be at least as virtuous, perhaps even more so. There is no fallacy of composition here. A variety of partners are often more capable of promoting self-awareness in one person than any one of them alone. Bruce shows Joan how much Joan likes to be stroked on her back. Hamilton reveals to her how many ways there are to be orgasmic. Ron reminds Joan of how hungry she is after really good sex. Furthermore, Joan's outlook on the world may be especially enhanced by the knowledge that she can satisfy and care for several men. Joan might easily be more inspired in her work or more creative in her sex play because of the variety of her sexual partners. Certainly the opportunity for new levels of sexual excitement are present that might be absent for Joan in a more exclusive relationship. My point is that Solomon invests in sexual exclusivity virtues that do not justify the value he places in romantic love. The "view from somewhere different" reveals that sexuality is much too contextual a feature of human relationships to exclude promiscuity from the sphere of the sexually valuable.
Moreover, Solomon says that "the aim of [romantic] love is to
make
a single person extraordinary and to reconceptualize oneself in his or her terms, to
create
an
 
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escape from the anonymity of the Kantian moral world and thrive in a world
à deux
of one's own" (Solomon's italics).
71
I have already argued that romantic love can be much less satisfying for women than Solomon makes out simply because he personalizes sexual exclusivity without gendering it. In addition, the obsessive (and possessive) implications of
making
someone extraordinary combined with Solomon's suggestion that lovers remain content in a self-contained moral universe would not appeal to many feminists interested in promoting loving sex within caring communities.
Feminists have often argued that women's freedom from their sexual subordination by men is directly proportional to the amount of control women have over our bodies. The exercise of such control is often interpreted in terms of a woman's right to make sexual and reproductive decisions for herself without undue interference from others. In the language of an ethic of care, such control can be interpreted as creating opportunities for individual women to choose sexual and reproductive lives that allow them to care for themselves and others. Marjorie Weinzweig has combined the language of individual autonomy with the language of care to develop the notion of "autonomous relating to others," by which a woman is able to choose her sexual and reproductive roles amid a community of others and out of a concern for others in a way that does not hinder her self-development.
72
Each interpretation describes a kind of empowerment that would enable individual women to direct the course of their own sexual and reproductive destinies. I have suggested that sexual liberation is women's liberation when women can define its terms and conditions. Is promiscuity consistent with women's sexual empowerment? Could a promiscuous lifestyle promote such empowerment?
The answer lies in a promiscuous woman's knowledge of her own social location. The "view from somewhere different" requires an appreciation of the dialectic between gender and sexuality. A woman who adopts this perspective understands that men who promise true love have little incentive to be faithful under a patriarchal system that rewards men for "scoring." When men do "settle down," they often do so only in exchange for the sexual and domestic subordination of their wives, a subordination with no guarantee of emotional or financial payoff.
73
A woman who adopts the "view from somewhere different'' is situated to recognize that her own casual or recreational promiscuity bears little resemblance to men's, when a promiscuous woman's score makes her a "slut" but her sexual reticence makes her "frigid." She recognizes that her own domestic and child-care responsibilities can make an adulterous affair look especially appealing, while those very responsibilities, often shouldered alone in addition to salaried work, make finding the time and energy for extramarital sex a near impossibility. In a society that makes women the keepers of monogamy and the family, her awareness of the dialectic between gender and sexuality reveals that promiscuous married women symbolize the breakdown of the very foundation of social life.
74
Such a society will be loath to free women from our domestic chores once we enter the workforce: with access to an array of new potential sexual partners while on the job, women must be dissuaded from promiscuous pursuits at all costs. Husbands, on the other hand, often have more social and domestic freedom to play the field. Furthermore, despite her lopsided domestic responsibili-
 
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ties, a woman is typically marked insensitive to her children's needs when her marriage falls apart due to her infidelity. From the recognition of her own social location, a woman can begin to understand how her economic and monogamous dependence on men has made it easy to be co-opted by a system that has made sexual liberation a synonym for women's derogation and sexual subordination.
If the "view from somewhere different" acknowledges difference without presuming superiority and without devolving into dislocation, then women who adopt such a perspective will (1) recognize their sexual partners as "the particular individuals they are" and not treat them solely in terms of some general capacity they share with other human beings; and (2) try to see the world from their point of view. Because such a perspective acknowledges that sexual partners have sexual needs of their own, the "view from somewhere different" encourages its adopters to (3) care about their sexual partners' well-being by helping them pursue their own wants and needs. This is precisely the ethic of care respect that both describes the intimate sex of cultural feminists and affords sex radical feminists the respectful regard between persons that is definitive of mutually consenting sex.
From such a perspective, promiscuity can empower those women who would choose it over monogamy by encouraging the sexual autonomy characterized by Weinzweig's "autonomous relating to others." With no illusions about the advantages of marriage, monogamous relationships, or romance, a woman who chooses promiscuity from the "view from somewhere different" knows that she is asserting her own sexual agenda in a world ready to denigrate her or dismiss her for failing to act in a sexually subordinate role. At the same time, by acknowledging her potential as a self-defining sexual subject acting contrary to monogamous norms, she can begin to forge a sexual identity of her own. Acting under an ethic of care respect, however, such a woman will not become so absorbed in the pursuit of her own sexual needs that she is blind to those of others. She will acknowledge that promiscuity may not be for everyone. She will recognize that some sexual partners prefer intimacy and others prefer anonymity. She will be less inclined to regard any promiscuous man's insensitive treatment of women as her model for promiscuous sex, since she will recognize that such a model is inconsistent with care respect and only reinforces the belief that monogamy is really better for women after all. When a woman chooses sexual exclusivity, she will have done so knowing that as with promiscuity, there are benefits as well as risks.
A woman whose sex life is understood from the "view from somewhere different" also recognizes that in many women's lives there is a place for celibacy, when freedom from an active sexual life is a source of comfort or relief. Women who would rather be sexually active than celibate may be frustrated by the "view from somewhere different" for encouraging them to perceive themselves as sexual agents when there is simply no safe or satisfying sex to be had. However, the "view from somewhere different" would recommend that such women see their celibacy dialectically as both misfortune and opportunity; as I will argue in the following section, in a culture where a woman's sexual assertiveness can make her a "good" girl, a ''bad" girl, or both, rejecting celibacy will mean embarking on a complex and often contradictory quest for sexual satisfaction. No one feminist sexual framework can
promise
sat-

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