Out of the Mountains (53 page)

66.
For a useful review of the literature on this approach, see Elizabeth Rapoport, “Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Urban Metabolism: A Review of the Literature,” University College London Environmental Institute Working Paper, October 27, 2011, online at www.ucl.ac.uk/environment-institute/forthcoming-events/urbanlitreview.

67.
Joel Tarr, “The Metabolism of the Industrial City: The Case of Pittsburgh,”
Journal of Urban History
28, no. 5 (July 2002): 511.

68.
We should note that this is a contested approach that includes a range of perspectives. Some view biological systems as useful metaphors for the physical and sociopolitical dynamics of urban space, while others view the interdependent subsystems that overlap within this space as organic elements of a material flow system that is
truly
(not just metaphorically) biological.

69.
Tarr, “Metabolism of the Industrial City.”

70.
See John Bellamy Foster, “Marx's Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundation for Environmental Sociology,”
American Journal of Sociology
105, no. 2 (September 1999): 366–405.

71.
Ibid.; Abel Wolman, “The Metabolism of Cities,”
Scientific American
213 (July-December 1965): 179–93.

72.
Rapoport, “Urban Metabolism,” 5.

73.
I am grateful to officials of the Colombian government for insights into the concept of “territorial logic,” which I extend in this context to the notion of “systems logic.” Author's discussions with Colombian National Police and the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia, December 2011.

74.
David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” in
Small Wars Journal
, November 22, 2004, 22–23.

75.
See “Honduran City Is World Murder Capital; Juarez Drops for Second Year in a Row,” Fox News Latino, February 6, 2013.

76.
James Bargent, “Latin America Dominates World's Most Dangerous Cities List,”
Insight Crime
, February 8, 2013, online at www.insightcrime.org/newsbriefs/latin-america-dominates-worlds-most-dangerous-cities-list.

77.
See Mark Kukis, “Is Baghdad Now Safer than New Orleans?”
Time
, May 1, 2009; Citizens Report, “All London Murders, 2006–2013,” online at www.citizensreportuk.org/reports/london-murders.html.

78.
This section draws on original research produced by a Caerus Associates field team led by Stacia George and Dr. Christopher Johnson, which conducted fieldwork in 2012–13 in San Pedro Sula. See Caerus Associates, “The City as a System: Understanding Illicit and Licit Networks in San Pedro Sula, Honduras,” Washington, DC, February 6, 2013.

Chapter 2

1.
The following account draws on multiple sources, including contemporaneous media accounts, published analyses of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, and testimony at the trials of the sole surviving attacker, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, and of David Coleman Headley (a Pakistani American allegedly involved in the support network for the attack).

2.
Testimony by Willi Brigitte, quoted in Sebastian Rotella, “On the Trail of Pakistani Terror Group's Elusive Mastermind Behind the Mumbai Siege,”
Washington Post
, November 10, 2010.

3.
Saikat Datta, “Terror Colours, in Black and White: Outlook Accesses the Dossier India Has Sent to Pakistan and Its Unabridged Version That Proves the Pakistani Link,” in
Outlook
(India), January 19, 2009.

4.
Jedburgh Corporation, “Mumbai Attack Timeline and Order of Battle,” online at http://jedburgh-usa.com/wp-content/uploads/Mumbai%20Reconstruction.pdf.

5.
Sebastian Rotella, “Mumbai Case Offers Rare Picture of Ties Between Pakistan's Intelligence Service, Militants,” ProPublica.org, May 2, 2011.

6.
“Mumbai Attacks 2008: '40 Indians Involved in Terror Plot,'” One India News, July 2, 2012, online at http://news.oneindia.in/2012/07/02/mum-26–11–2008-attacks-40-indians-involved-terror-plot-1027835.html.

7.
“Serving Major Among 4 Pak Nationals Behind 2008 Mumbai Attacks: US Chargesheet,”
Times of India
, May 9, 2011.

8.
Gordon G. Chang, “India's China Problem,”
Forbes
, August 14, 2009.

9.
The inclusion of these items of escape-and-evasion gear have led some to speculate that the raiding team intended to survive the attack and exfiltrate by blending in with the city afterward.

10.
Damien McElroy, “Mumbai Attacks: Terrorists Took Cocaine to Stay Awake During Assault,”
Daily Telegraph
, February 9, 2009.

11.
S. Ahmed Ali, “26/11: Kuber Skipper Didn't Re[s]ist When Militants Used Ship,”
Times of India
, January 6, 2009, online at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009–01–06/mumbai/28005435_1_vinod-masani-kuber-amar-narayan.

12.
S. Ahmed Ali and Vijay V. Singh, “Terrorists Used Code Words to Evade Suspicion,”
Times of India
, December 6, 2008.

13.
In an uncharacteristic error, the LeT raiding party failed to sink the
Kuber
, which seems to have been their original intention. As a result the ship drifted, abandoned, until it was discovered along with Solanki's body several days after the attack. A GPS unit and satellite phone on board provided valuable intelligence to Indian investigators, showing the team's origin in Karachi, a fact later confirmed by Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving terrorist.

14.
Richard Watson, “Mumbai: What Really Happened,”
Telegraph
, June 28, 2009.

15.
A hard compromise occurs when a raiding team is detected and attacked by security forces; a situation (as in this case) where local civilians detect the team's presence but no security forces are engaged is usually defined as a soft compromise.

16.
Jedburgh Corp., “Mumbai Attack Timeline.”

17.
Onook Oh, Manish Agrawal, and H. Raghav Rao, “Information Control and Terrorism: Tracking the Mumbai Terrorist Attack Through Twitter,”
Information Systems Frontiers
13 (September 2011): 33–43.

18.
“Mumbai Attacks 2008: '40 Indians Involved in Terror Plot.'”

19.
Datta, “Terror Colours.”

20.
Watson, “Mumbai: What Really Happened.”

21.
“Saving the Patients and the Babies Was Our First Duty,” Rediff News, December 26, 2008, online at http://specials.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/26sld3-how-the-cama-nurses-saved-their-patient.htm.

22.
Vinay Dalvi, “Hemant Karkare Thanked for Exposing Saffron Terror,”
Mid-Day
(Mumbai), November 17, 2011.

23.
Amitav Ranjan, “Ashok Chakra for Only Two: Karkare and Omble,”
Indian Express
, January 21, 2009.

24.
Much of what we know about the internal workings of the raid comes from the interrogation and trial of Mohammed Ajmal Kasab. Kasab was tried on eighty-six terrorism-related offenses. He was found guilty and sentenced to death on May 6, 2010; he was hanged at Pune, Maharashtra State, on November 21, 2012. See Ashutosh Joshi, “India Hangs Gunman from Mumbai Attacks,”
Wall Street Journal
, November 21, 2012.

25.
Wilson John et al.,
Mumbai Attacks: Response and Lessons
, Observer Research Foundation, 23–24, online at www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/report/attachments/Mumbai%20attack_1230552332507.pdf.

26.
Damien McElroy, “Mumbai Attacks: Foreign Governments Criticize India's Response,”
Telegraph
, November 28, 2008.

27.
John et al.,
Mumbai Attacks
, 24.

28.
Ibid.

29.
Ibid., 25–27.

30.
Watson, “Mumbai: What Really Happened.”

31.
Ibid.

32.
“How Mumbai Attacks Unfolded,” BBC News, November 30, 2008.

33.
Author's discussion with a U.S. counterterrorism analyst, Washington, DC, November 29, 2008.

34.
John et al.,
Mumbai Attacks
.

35.
Nobhojit Roy, Vikas Kapil, Italo Subbarao, and Isaac Ashkenazi, “Mass Casualty Response in the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks,”
Disaster Management and Public Health Preparedness
5, no. 4 (April 2011): 273–79.

36.
Ibid., 275.

37.
Ibid.

38.
Fred de Sam Lazaro, “Karachi and Mumbai: A Tale of Two Megacities,”
PBS NewsHour
, July 15, 2011.

39.
See Port of Karachi official website, at www.kpt.gov.pk/pages/default.aspx?id=39, accessed October 27, 2012.

40.
Roy et al., “Mass Casualty Response,” 273.

41.
Watson, “Mumbai: What Really Happened.”

42.
Ibid., 275.

43.
John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,”
Small Wars Journal
, February 16, 2009.

44.
Richard Norton-Taylor and Owen Bowcott, “‘Mumbai-Style' Terror Attack on UK, France and Germany Foiled,”
Guardian
, September 28, 2010.

45.
Discussion with an officer from U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command, at U.S. Naval Amphibious Operations Base Coronado, November 14, 2012; discussion with officers and enlisted operators from Naval Special Warfare Development Group, September 9, 2010.

46.
Gwyn Prins's 1993 notion of “threats without enemies” was originally formulated to describe environmental challenges of exactly the type discussed in this book, although the concept has since been more widely appropriated by nontraditional security analysts. See Gwyn Prins,
Threats Without Enemies: Facing Environmental Insecurity
(London: Routledge, 2009 [1993]).

47.
Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,”
Naval War College Review
66, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 98.

48.
Ibid.

49.
M. V. Bhagavathiannan, “Crop Ferality: Implications for Novel Trait Confinement,”
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment
, 127, nos. 1–2 (August 2008): 1–6.

50.
Author's personal experience hunting wild pigs in northern Australia, and discussions with animal-culling experts, Townsville, Q
 
ueensland, 1998.

51.
Author's personal observation of feral dogs, pigs, cats, and horses during operations in the destroyed or conflict-affected cities of Nicosia (Cyprus), 1997; Arawa (Bougainville), 1998; Dili (East Timor), 1999–2000; Kabul, Khost, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Asadabad (Afghanistan), 2006–12; and Baghdad (Iraq), 2007.

52.
Central Intelligence Agency,
World Factbook 2012
, field entry for “Urbanization,” online at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html.

53.
As the anthropologist Graham St. John observes, “‘Feral' designates an Australian youth milieu connected with grassroots resistance. . . . Adherents express dissonance from ‘the parent culture' and, in acts of local defiance and identification, seek anarchist and ecological alternatives.” See Graham St. John, “Ferality: A Life of Grime,”
UTS Review
5, no. 2 (1999): 102.

54.
Richard Littlejohn, “The Politics of Envy Was Bound to End Up in Flames,”
Daily Mail
, August 12, 2011.

55.
See, among many examples, the discussion of urban exclusion in Susan Parnell and Owen Crankshaw, “Urban Exclusion and the (False) Assumptions of Spatial Policy Reform in South Africa,” in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds.,
Mega-Cities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South
(London: Zed Books, 2009), 161–67.

56.
See, for example, Charles Murray's discussion of super-zips and self-segregation (often also referred to as internal secession) in the United States, in Charles Murray,
Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010
(New York: Crown Forum, 2012).

57.
The same core/gap or core/periphery split that strategists such as Thomas P. M. Barnett (or theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein) have identified at the global level thus also arguably exists at lower fractal levels including cities, districts, blocks, or streets. What Barnett describes as “gap countries” and world-systems analysts call “semiperiphery” or “periphery” countries equate to marginalized or excluded populations and periurban settlements at the city level. See Thomas P. M. Barnett,
The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Berkley, 2005), and Immanuel Wallerstein,
The Modern World-System
(New York: Academic Books, 1974).