Out of the Mountains (57 page)

85.
John Hooper and Ian Black, “Libya Defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protestors Flee to Malta,”
Guardian
, February 21, 2011.

86.
Ibid.

87.
Martin Chulov, “Inside Libya's First Free City: Jubilation Fails to Hide Deep Wounds,”
Guardian
, February 23, 2011.

88.
Ibid.

89.
Beaumont, “The Truth About Twitter.”

90.
Pollock, “People Power.”

91.
Ibid.

92.
Ibid.

93.
See Pollock, “People Power” and Andy Carvin, “Munitions in Misrata: A Virtual Investigation by @acarvin's Twitter Followers,” Storify, online at http://storify.com/acarvin/munitions-in-misurata.

94.
See Pollock, “Streetbook” and the Anonymous #OpLibya IRC Channel, online at http://irc.lc/Anonops/OpLibya

95.
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Cyber-mobilization: The New Levee en Masse,”
Parameters
36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 77–87.

96.
Ibid., 77–78.

97.
Ibid., 79.

98.
Ibid., 81.

99.
Marshall McLuhan,
Culture Is Our Business
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 66.

100.
Chulov, “Inside Libya's First Free City.”

101.
Dorsey, “Pitched Battles.”

102.
Ibid.

103.
Ibid.

104.
Gaddafi's mercenaries were not all black—there were eastern Europeans, Pakistanis, and a few white South Africans among them—but many allegedly came from Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Sudan, and other black African countries. This led to protests by the African Union that the rebels were indiscriminately targeting black migrant workers and people from Libya's black ethnic groups.

105.
Ibid.

106.
Ibid.

107.
Ibid.

108.
Ian Black, “As Libya Uprising Reaches Tripoli Gaddafi Vows to ‘Open Up the Arsenals,'”
Guardian
, February 25, 2011.

109.
Ibid.

110.
“ICC to Probe Gaddafi over Violence,” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2011.

111.
United Nations News Centre, “Security Council Authorizes ‘All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians in Libya,” March 17, 2011.

112.
Author's interview with a member of the Libyan National Transitional Council, Oslo, Norway, June 29, 2011.

113.
See Portia Walker, “Q
 
atari Military Advisers on the Ground, Helping Libyan Rebels Get into Shape,”
Washington Post
, May 12, 2011.

114.
Pollock,
People Power 2.0
.

115.
Indeed, these problems are perhaps an inevitable downside of the light-footprint, limited-ground-presence approach, since with extremely few NATO boots on the ground, target identification and coordination with rebel forces were more difficult than they might otherwise have been.

116.
Martin Chulov, “Gaddafi's Last Moments: ‘I Saw the Hand Holding the Gun and I Saw It Fire,'”
Guardian
, October 20, 2011.

117.
Media analysis by Nathaniel Rosenblatt, Caerus Associates, Middle East North Africa Analysis team, March-April 2012.

118.
Andrei Netto, “Muammar Gaddafi's ‘Trophy' Body on Show in Misrata Meat Store,”
Guardian
, October 21, 2011.

119.
Butters, “Dispatch from Libya.”

120.
Ibid.

121.
Ibid.

122.
For a description of this enormous project, see MEED, “The Great Man-Made River Project,” December 2011, online at www.meed.com/Journals/1/Files/2011/12/11/Sample%20Chapter.pdf.

123.
Butters, “Dispatch from Libya.”

124.
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman,
Al Q
 
aeda's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records
(West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 11–12.

125.
Butters, “Dispatch from Libya.”

126.
Ibid.

127.
Amr Hamdy,
Survey of ICT and Education in Africa: Libya Country Report
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

128.
African Economic Outlook,
Libya Country Note
, African Development Bank, 2012, 11.

129.
Ibid.

130.
Ibid., 13.

131.
In part, the restraint shown by the army in Egypt was perhaps a result of attempts—by the United States, in particular—over several decades of military assistance and advisory effort, to professionalize the Egyptian army. This professionalization effort was aimed at helping the army become less politicized, more cognizant of human rights and international law, and more focused on external threats rather than internal repression. When the crisis hit, phone calls between senior U.S. military officers and their Egyptian counterparts (who, in some cases, had attended professional training courses in the United States) may have helped encourage Egyptian military leaders, at the moment of crisis, to refuse to attack their own people. Obviously, no such cooperation or professionalization effort existed for Libya.

132.
“Gaddafi Survival Means Weak Army, Co-opted Tribes,” Associated Press, February 23, 2011.

133.
“Libya—130 Soldiers Executed,” Agence-France Press, February 23, 2011.

134.
Nick Lockwood, personal communication via email from Benghazi, March 2011.

135.
Personal observation and interviews by a Caerus field team, Benghazi, February–May 2011.

136.
See “DIY Weapons of the Libyan Rebels,”
Atlantic
, June 14, 2011.

137.
Pollock, “Streetbook”.

138.
Stéphanie Plasse, “Libya: Gaddafi and his Mali-Chad Tuareg Mercenaries,”
Afrik News
, March 24, 2011.

139.
“Gaddafi Hires Separatist Militants from Niger, Mali, Algeria and Burkina Faso to Fight Rebels in Libya,” Agence-France Presse, March 4, 2011.

140.
Michael Gunning, “Background to a Revolution,”
N Plus One Magazine
, August 26, 2011.

141.
Author's interview with Nathaniel Rosenblatt, Caerus senior analyst, Washington, DC, March 11, 2013.

142.
Suzanne Saleeby, “Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract's Unraveling,”
Jadiliyya
, February 16, 2012.

143.
Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, “A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria's War,”
New York Times
, February 8, 2013.

144.
Katherine Marsh, Matthew Taylor and Haroon Siddique, “Syria's Crackdown on Protesters Becomes Dramatically More Brutal,”
Guardian
, April 25, 2011.

145.
See Yassin al-Haj Salih,
The Syrian Shabiha and Their State
(Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2012).

146.
Ibid.

147.
Helmi Noman, “The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber Attacks in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army,”
Information Warfare Monitor
, May 30, 2011.

148.
Rosenblatt, interview, March 11, 2013

149.
Marcus F. Franda,
Launching into Cyberspace: Internet Development and Politics in Five World Regions
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 70.

150.
Ibid.

151.
See “Asad's Wife,” uploaded by XxHAMSHOURExX, April 3, 2007, www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRfs1qJQ
 
_ J8.

152.
Nathaniel Rosenblatt, personal communication via email to the author, March 11, 2013.

153.
Ibid.

154.
Ibid.

155.
Interview with researcher studying Libyan and Syrian anti-regime networks, Washington, DC, March 11, 2013.

156.
Ibid.

157.
“Rebels in Syria's Largest City of Aleppo Mostly Poor, Pious and from Rural Backgrounds,” Associated Press, October 16, 2012.

158.
For a discussion on youth unemployment and social exclusion in Syria's cities, see Nader Kabbani and Noura Kamel,
Youth Exclusion in Syria: Social, Economic, and Institutional Dimensions
(Dubai: Wolfensohn Center for Development, 2007).

159.
Nour Ali, “Assad's Forces Pound Syrian Port City of Latakia,”
Guardian
, August 14, 2011.

160.
See “DIY Weapons of the Syrian Rebels,”
Atlantic
, February 20, 2013.

161.
Ibid.

162.
Ibid.

163.
David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller, and Melissa Fuller,
The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998), 7.

164.
Author's field notes, Baghdad, January–March 2006.

165.
Peter Harling,
Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime's Slow-Motion Suicide
(Damascus: International Crisis Group, 2011), 9.

166.
“BART Officials Blocked Cell Phones During Transit Protest,” Associated Press, August 12, 2011.

167.
Ibid.

168.
Michael Cabanatuan, “BART Admits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests. Move to Disrupt Protesters' Plans Blasted as Violation of Free Speech,”
San Francisco Chronicle
, August 12, 2011.

169.
Paul Elias and John S. Marshall, “‘Anonymous' Hackers Protest San Francisco's BART Cellphone Blocking,” Associated Press, August 15, 2011.

170.
Zusha Ellison, “After Cellphone Action, BART Faces Escalating Protests,”
New York Times
, August 20, 2011.

171.
Ibid.

172.
Pollock,
People Power 2.0
.

Chapter 5

1.
“DIY Weapons of the Syrian Rebels,”
Atlantic
, June 14, 2011.

2.
See Caitlin Dewey, “Are Syria's Pro-Assad Hackers Up to Something More Nefarious?”
Washington Post
, March 1, 2013; Max Fisher, “Syria's Pro-Assad Hackers Infiltrate Human Rights Watch Web Site and Twitter Feed,”
Washington Post
, March 17, 2013.

3.
Abigail Fielding-Smith, “Alawite Heartland on Syria's Coast Remains Loyal to Assad Regime,”
Washington Post
, March 15, 2013.

4.
See Spencer Ackerman, “Syria Fires Scud Missiles, Burning Bombs and Even Sea Mines at Rebels,”
Wired
, December 12, 2012; Joby Warrick, “Intelligence on Syrian Troops Readying Chemical Weapons for Use Prompted Obama's Warning,”
Washington Post
, December 13, 2012.

5.
See Ken Dilanian and Brian Bennet, “CIA Begins Sizing Up Islamic Extremists in Syria for Drone Strikes,”
Los Angeles Times
, March 15, 2013; Press TV (Iran), “US Drone Strikes in Syria ‘Dangerous Escalation,'” online at http://www.presstv.ir/usdetail/293911.html

6.
Author's interview with Nathaniel Rosenblatt, Washington, DC, March 19, 2013.

7.
Associated Press, “Opposition Activists Set Off Small Bombs During General Strike in Bangladesh's Capital,”
Washington Post
, March 18, 2013.

8.
For a discussion of groundwater arsenic poisoning and fecal contamination of surface water in Bangladesh, see Andrew Zolli and Ann Marie Healy,
Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back
(New York: Free Press, 2012), 110ff.

9.
Sirajul Haq Talukder, “Managing Megacities: A Case Study of Metropolitan Regional Governance for Dhaka,” Ph.D. dissertation, Murdoch University, Perth, 2006, iii.

10.
Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Liveability Ranking and Overview,” August 2012, online at https://www.eiu.com//files/09/49/93/f094993/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Liveability2012.

11.
“Dhaka Reels Under High Population Growth,” New York
Daily News
, January 1, 2013.