Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (32 page)

30
. Evan Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Security,”
Washington Quarterly
29, no. 1 (2005–06), 145.

31
. Evelyn Goh,
Meeting the China Challenge
(Washington, DC, 2005), viii.

32
. Balancing and bandwagoning need not be viewed as opposites. Walt sees both strategies as responses to threats as “states will ally with or against the most
threatening
power” (Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 8–9). Schweller agrees, to a point. “The aim of balancing,” he argues, “is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain.” He goes on to argue that “the presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon.” Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,”
International Security
19, no. 1 (1994), 74.

33
. Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging,” 164.

34
. Ibid., 164–165.

35
. Ibid., 171.

36
. Joseph S. Nye,
The Future of Power
(New York, 2011), 5.

37
. Robert A Dahl, “The Concept of Power,”
Behavioral Sciences
2, no. 3 (July 1957), 202–203.

38
. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics
, 194–195.

39
. Henry R. Nau,
Perspectives on International Relations
(Washington, DC, 2007), 22.

40
. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 42.

41
. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics
, 131.

42
. Tammen et al.,
Power Transitions
, 15, 44.

43
. Ibid., 18.

44
. Mearsheimer,
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
43, 61, 57, 21, 45, 67, 55, 56.

45
. Paul Kennedy,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(New York, 1989), xxiv.

46
. Keohane,
After Hegemony
, 18, 32, 33–34, 40.

47
. Nye,
The Future of Power
. 21.

48
. Joseph S. Nye,
Soft Power
(New York, 2004), 5.

49
. Ibid., 7, 15, 8.

50
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 8.

51
. Joseph S. Nye,
Bound to Lead
(New York, 1990), 27.

52
. Ibid., 198.

53
. Ibid., 27.

54
. Ibid., 7.

55
. Ibid., 179.

56
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, xiii.

57
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 187.

58
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 5.

59
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 32.

60
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 10.

61
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 31.

62
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 61.

63
. Nye,
Soft Power
, 16.

64
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 182.

65
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 114–115. The concept of soft power is not without its critics. Colin Gray, for example, maintains that there are “serious limitations” to the concept since “it utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners.” Colin S. Gray,
Hard Power and Soft Power
(Carlisle, PA, 2011), viii. Gray states that soft power is “a historically imprecise concept” and “potentially a dangerous idea” (28–29).

66
. Nye,
Soft Power
, 18–19.

67
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 30–31.

68
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, xiii.

69
. Ibid., 22–23. There is a complex relationship between soft and hard power, with some hard power resources increasing the effectiveness of soft power, and vice versa. See Gallarotti,
Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations
, 33. Also, as Nye points out, “no country likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. At the same time,…hard power can create myths of invincibility or inevitability that attract others.” Nye,
Soft Power
, 25.

70
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 208–209.

71
. Ibid., 210.

72
. Giulio M. Gallarotti.
Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations
(Cambridge, 2010), 35.

73
. Ibid.

74
. Nye.
The Future of Power.
80.

75
. Ibid., 55, 70, 60.

76
. Gallarotti,
Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations
, 5, 16–17, 268, 42–48.

77
. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,”
International Organizations
59, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 39–40.

78
. Gallarotti,
Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations
, 37.

79
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, xvii.

80
. Ibid., 119.

81
. Nye,
Bound to Lead
, 196.

82
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, 8.

83
. Keohane,
After Hegemony
, 26.

84
. Barkin defines agency as the “behaviors that individuals purposively choose to undertake…that are affected but not determined by the structures, social or biological, within which actors find themselves.” J. Samuel Barkin,
Realist Constructivism
(Cambridge, 2010), 102.

85
. Richard Ned Lebow,
A Cultural Theory of International Relations
(Cambridge, 2008), 18–19.

86
. Ibid., 28–29. Lebow argues that spirit and appetite lead to risk-taking while reason leads to caution and restraint. There are, according to Lebow, different patterns of risk acceptance by actors motivated by either fear or honor. An actor motivated by honor and standing tends to be especially risk-accepting with respect to both perceived losses and gains (31).

87
. Ibid., 470.

88
. Ibid., 492.

89
. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 48.

90
. van Ham calls this “social power,” which he defines “as the ability to set standards, and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment…. [It] involves discursive power, drawing attention to the impact of framing, norm-advocacy, agenda-setting, the impact of media and communications, as well as lesser-known practices like place branding and public diplomacy.” Peter van Ham,
Social Power in International Politics
(London, 2010), 8.

91
. Nye,
The Future of Power
, xvii.

92
. See Hanna Newcombe, Michael Ross, and Alan G. Newcombe, “United Nations Voting Patterns,”
International Organization
24, no. 1 (Winter 1970), 100–121, especially 102–110.

93
. After the US subtle participation in the NATO campaign to oust Moammar Qaddafi from power in 2011, through the organization’s imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace in support of rebel forces operating on the ground, the phrase “leading from behind” was used to describe an emerging “Obama doctrine.” “It’s a different definition of leadership than America is known for. Pursuing our interests and spreading our ideals…requires stealth and modesty as well as military strength.” Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist,”
The New Yorker
, May 2, 2011, 55.

94
. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics
, 102.

95
. Referring to two highly popular American TV shows, van Ham makes the following observation: “As long as America presents the world with its
Desperate Housewives
and
Mad Men
, it seems to get away with policy failures like Iraq.” van Ham,
Social Power in International Politics
, 164.

96
. Consumers are shown to form attitudes toward products based on perceptions about the products’ country of origin and vice versa. There are “structural interrelationships between country image, beliefs about product attitudes, and brand attitudes.” C. Min Han, “Country Image,”
Journal of Marketing Research
26 (May 1989), 228.

97
. See Mehran Kamrava. “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,”
Middle East Journal
65, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), 1–18.

98
. Peter Beaumont, “Qatar Accused of Interfering in Libyan Affairs,”
Guardian
, 4 October 2011, 22.

99
. Reuters, “Qatar’s Big Libya Adventure,” Arabianbusiness.com, 13 June 2011; Andrew Hammond and Regan Doherty, “Qatar Hopes for Returns after Backing Libyan Winners,”
http://af.reuters.com
, 24 August 2011.