Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (36 page)

153
. “Qatar Ready to Provide More Finance to Egypt,” 13 November 2011,
http://www.zawya.com
.

154
. “Qatar Deposits $2 Billion to Support Egyptian Economy,” 11 August 2012,
http://www.zawya.com
.

155
. “Qatari Investments in Libya Accounting for around USD 10 Billion.”

156
. Valentine Low, “Full Pomp and Pageantry as Qatari Royals Are Welcomed,”
Times
, 27 October 2010, p. 15.

157
. “Qatar Top Sovereign Europe Property Buyer with 6 Weeks Gas Cash.”

158
. Will Pavia et al., “Why the Wealth of Qatar Was No Match for Camilla’s Ear,”
Times
, 17 June 2010, p. 18.

159
. Seznec, “The Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Persian Gulf,” 75.

160
. Quoted in Pavia et al., “Why the Wealth of Qatar Was no Match for Camilla’s Ear,” 18.

161
. Una Galani, “Qatar Headed Down a Risky Path,”
Globe and Mail
(Toronto), 20 September 2011, p. B15.

162
. Perumal, “QIA Has $30bn to Invest This Year,” 1.

163
. Benjamin Shepherd,
GCC Land Purchases Abroad,
Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar,
Summary Report.
No. 5, 2012. pp. 3, 17.

164
. Matthew Cranston, “Hassad Fills Its Portfolio,”
Australian Financial Review
, 7 May 2012, p. 48.

165
. Bonnie James, “Hassad Food Plans to Invest $700mn in Global Projects,”
Gulf Time
, 1 June 2010, p. 4.

166
. For purposes of guaranteeing the country’s food security, in 2008 the government, under the Office of Heir Apparent, set up the Qatar National Food Security Program, more on which is available at
http://www.qnfsp.gov.qa
.

167
. Allen J. Fromherz,
Qatar
(London, 2012), 2.

168
. See, for example, “Yemen Shia Rebels Hail Qatar Offer,”
Gulf Times
, 21 July 2010, p. 7.

169
. Hugh Tomlinson, “Power Broker Never Loses Sight of Goals,”
Times
, 25 June 2011, p. 25.

4. The Stability of Royal Autocracy

1
. One of the most important example of this strategy was the creation of the Supreme Council of Education (SEC) in 2002, with its own separate and “modernizing agenda,” which for seven years operated alongside the Ministry of Education. Then in 2009–2010, the Ministry and its personnel were formally incorporated into the SEC.

2
. Jill Crystal,
Oil and Politics in the Gulf
(Cambridge, 1990), 28.

3
. Frederick F. Anscombe,
The Ottoman Gulf
(New York, 1997), 144.

4
. Ibid., 90.

5
. Ibid., 143.

6
. As one British observer commented at the time, “The ruler of Doha should at once be both a soldier and a statesman, able to beat out the tribes at to march long distances whenever necessary, and while in Doha to keep order in the town, to remain conciliatory with the different tribes and to keep himself out of playing in the hands of the Turks. The Turks according to Sheikh Jasim are powerless to do any harm when kept at a distance, but when close are difficult to manage.” Quoted in Habibur Rahman,
The Emergence of Qatar
(London, 2005), 178.

7
. Ibid., 20–21.

8
. Ibid., 15.

9
. Anscombe,
The Ottoman Gulf
, 33.

10
. Quoted in Rahman,
The Emergence of Qatar
, 8.

11
. Quoted in ibid., 78.

12
. Nazih N. Ayubi,
Over-Stating the Arab State
(London, 1999), 133.

13
. Rosemarie Said Zahlan,
The Creation of Qatar
(London, 1979), 60.

14
. Crystal,
Oil and Politics in the Gulf
, 169.

15
. Quoted in ibid., 128.

16
. Anscombe,
The Ottoman Gulf
, 56.

17
. Crystal,
Oil and Politics in the Gulf
, 140–141.

18
. Ibid., 122, 128–129.

19
. Ibid., 129.

20
. Alanound Alsharekh, “Introduction,” in Alanound Alsharekh, ed.,
The Gulf Family
(London, 2007), 9.

21
. Allen J. Fromherz,
Qatar
(London, 2012), 7.

22
. Ayubi,
Over-Stating the Arab State
, 241.

23
. Ibid., 245.

24
. Given the fact that nine years had elapsed before this punitive action, there were speculations at the time that perhaps the Al Murrah had again been implicated in some more recent political action. Rumors began circulating that in 2002 another undisclosed coup was attempted. As with many similar rumors, the veracity of this one is open to question.

25
. Joel Migdal,
State in Society
(Cambridge, 2001), 15.

26
. Ibid., 56, 92–93, 100.

27
. S. N. Sangmpan,
Comparing Apples and Mangoes
(Albany, NY, 2007), 197.

28
. Michael Herb,
All in the Family
(Albany, NY, 1999), 111–113.

29
. Fromherz,
Qatar
, 80.

30
. Crystal,
Oil and Politics in the Gulf
, 159.

31
. Herb,
All in the Family
, 114.

32
. Ayubi,
Over-Stating the Arab State
, 133.

33
. Crystal,
Oil and Politics in the Gulf
, 7.

34
. Gerd Nonneman, “Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies,” in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, eds.,
Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies
(Reading, UK, 2008), 8.

35
. Herb,
All in the Family
, 30.

36
. Hisham Sharabi,
Neopatriarchy
(Oxford, 1988), 8. Sharabi uses the concept of neopatriarchy to describe a social phenomenon, “a duality [that] manifests itself most clearly in the petty bourgeoisie.”

37
. Nonneman, “Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies,” 5.

38
. Raymond Hinnebusch, “Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East,”
Middle East Critique,
19, no. 3 (Fall 2010), 205–206.

39
. Fromherz,
Qatar
, 81.

40
. Ibid., 84–85.

41
. Herb,
All in the Family
, 119.

42
. Quoted in Patrick Cockburn, “Emir of Qatar Deposed by His Son,”
Independent
, 28 June 1995.

43
. Herb,
All in the Family
, 119.

44
. Wikileaks, “The Move toward an Interagency Synchronization,” n.d., 07DOHA677.

45
. Ayubi,
Over-Stating the Arab State,
230.

46
.
http://www.al3nabi.com/vb/f10/t126756.html
.

47
. Herb,
All in the Family
, 41. Held at all levels in society, the
majlis
is an informal social gathering of men, held usually on weekly basis in a special tent-like room built for the purpose.

48
. Ibid., 45.

49
. Much has been written on Sheikha Moza and all that she represents for Qatar in general and Qatari women in particular. See, for example, Louay Bahry and Phebe Marr, “Qatari Women,”
Middle East Policy
12, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 104–119.

50
.
http://www.mozahbintnasser.qa/output/page6.asp
.

51
. Others in this short list include Queen Rania of Jordan and the Syrian first lady Asma Al-Assad. Princess Haya bint Hussein, the junior wife of the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, also has a highly visible public profile, though she is known as much for controversies as she is for her charity works and her involvement in international sports, having served as the president of the International Equestrian Federation.

52
. Justin Dargin, “Qatar’s Natural Gas,”
Middle East Policy
14, no. 3 (Fall 2007), 140.

53
. Nathalie Thomas, “The Qatari That Got the Cream,”
Scotland on Sunday
, 29 June 2008, 5. For more on Qatar’s hyperactive diplomacy see chapters 3 and 4 in this volume.

54
. Conversely, the depth and efficacy of institutions are key to the success of so-called developmental states. See Ziya Öniş. “The Logic of the Developmental State,”
Comparative Politics
24, no. 1 (October 1991), 110.

55
. Abdullah Juma Alhaj, “The Political Elite and the Introduction of Political Participation in Oman.”
Middle East Policy
7, no. 3 (June 2000), 103–106.

56
. Thomas Fuller, “Rallies in Oman Steer Clear Of Criticism of Its Leader,”
New York Times
, 2 March 2011, p. 8.