Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (16 page)

Al Jazeera owed its genesis to a desire by the then heir apparent sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa in 1994 to modernize Qatari state television and to broadcast its programs via satellite.
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Soon after assuming power, he issued a decree in 1996 establishing Al Jazeera, whose broadcasts expanded quickly from six to twelve and eventually to twenty-four hours a day. Benefiting from the premature demise of the BBC’s Arabic news service due to editorial differences with the venture’s Saudi financiers, and an unexpected open slot in the Arabsat satellite, Al Jazeera’s popularity grew as rapidly as Arab audiences could tune in. The key was the station’s radical departure from what had been the norm across the Arab world by offering news that went beyond mere presentation of doctored government statistics and data and instead offered what were raw, often unvarnished, facts. Controversial guests and even Israelis speaking in Hebrew, once shocking for Arab audiences, became regular features of the network’s often piercing news stories. Soon the network began to rival, and in some areas even surpass, the BBC and CNN as a recognized international source of information.
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Far more popular were the many news talk shows, hosted by colorful personalities and tackling political, social, and even religious topics long considered taboo across the Arab world.
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The launching of Al Jazeera was inspired by the effort to brand Qatar as a pioneer on several fronts, ranging from dialogue and discussion to openness and debate, communication technology, and a news trailblazer. Equally important was the desire to project Qatar’s image as a serious regional and global player. In the process the network has managed to attract the ire of countless Arab and Western governments that have either harassed or altogether barred its correspondents from reporting from their territories, or, as is the case with the Saudis, have pressured advertisers to stay away from the network.
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Few inside Al Jazeera believe that the US military’s bombing of its facilities in Afghanistan in November 2001 and in Iraq in April 2003 were, as the Americans claim, accidental, pointing instead to the leaked 2004 memo between the Bush White House and former British prime minister Tony Blair concerning the bombing of its headquarters in Doha.
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While in the short run such incidents are likely to complicate the job of Qatari diplomats, who often find themselves addressing complaints from around the world about Al Jazeera broadcasts, in the long run the station serves Qatar’s diplomatic interests well.
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Al Jazeera has gone beyond simply giving “a big voice to a tiny country.” The network’s reach across the globe expanded dramatically in 2006 when it established Al Jazeera International, a twenty-four hour satellite channel delivering the news in English. Beginning in 2003 the network started adding a number of sports channels, complemented with additional channels devoted to public affairs (Al Jazeera Mubasher, in 2005), children’s programs (Al Jazeera Children’s Channel, also in 2005), and documentary shows (the Al Jazeera Documentary Channel, launched in 2007). By 2010, according to the annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, some 78 percent of individuals across the Arab world claimed to rely on Al Jazeera as their main source of international news.
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In 2011, the network announced planned expansions of broadcasts to Turkish, Swahili, and Balkan audiences. At the same time, with advertisers few and far in-between, and with mounting expenses as it expands the reach and variety of its offerings, the network continues to rely overwhelmingly on the Qatari government for its operating budget. As mentioned earlier, the ambiguous nature of the relationship between Al Jazeera’s editorial choices and Qatari diplomacy remains a subject of debate and controversy.
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Protestations regarding its uneven coverage of the Arab Spring notwithstanding, the rebellions engulfing the Middle East solidified the network’s indispensability to the region’s—and indeed the world’s—communication revolution. In the words of one of its chief officers, the network “experienced rebirth” through the Arab Spring,
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and, in the process, surpassed its original goal of helping put Qatar on the map.

A second, rather distinctive, branding strategy that Qatar employs is through proactive attempts at regional conflict resolution. Over the past decade, Qatar has become one of the world’s most active mediators in international conflicts across the Middle East and parts of Africa, and in the process it has actively cultivated an image of itself as an honest broker interested in peace and stability. These have included mediation efforts in Yemen, Palestine, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea, and, most notably, in Lebanon. Qatar has not had much success in its efforts to bring about peaceful resolutions to the conflicts between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine in 2008, and between the Huthis and the central government in Yemen in 2009–2010. But its successes in hosting substantive talks aimed at ending or at least curtailing the Sudanese civil war and the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, both in 2010, are quite notable. Even more significant was Qatar’s successful mediation of a serious political crisis in Lebanon in May 2008 that threatened to reignite the country’s civil war. In this particular instance, Qatari mediation succeeded where previous efforts by the Arab League, the United Nations, and France had all failed. Even in relation to cases where lasting peace has been elusive, successful mediation is often measured in terms of the reduction of hostilities rather than the effectiveness of a lasting agreement.
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As such, the value of Qatari efforts at mediation, regardless of their yield, should not be underestimated.

In a region known for its cross-border crises and intra-national sectarian strife, Qatar has quickly emerged as an actor adept at diffusing and mediating conflicts. Doha’s “niche diplomacy” has led to its reputation as a reliable peace broker.
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An integral part of its foreign policy pursuits, Qatar’s insistence on playing a mediating role has at times provoked the ire of other regional actors hoping to assume such a role for themselves. For instance, Egypt, which has long viewed itself as Sudan’s primary patron, initially sought to take the initiative away from Qatar in solving the Darfur crisis. In the end, Qatar’s richer pockets and less of a history in relation to Sudan won.
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As far as international mediation efforts by state actors are concerned, several aspects of Qatari mediation efforts stand out. By and large mediation often takes place under the aegis of one of the major powers such as the United States (Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” designed to bring the Arab-Israeli 1973 War to a conclusion), the former Soviet Union (Moscow’s 1966 efforts to end the Indo-Pakistani conflict), France, or Britain. Sometimes “middle powers” also involve themselves in international mediation efforts, as was the case with Austria during the premiership of Bruno Kreisky (1970–1983), Algeria and its role in the freeing of American hostages in Iran in 1981, and, in 2010, Brazil and Turkey in relation to the Iranian nuclear program. Rarely do small states involve themselves in international mediations as a principal mediator, with Norway’s role in sponsoring the secret talks that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords being a major exception.
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In specific relation to the Middle East, the role of mediator has traditionally been played by the regional heavyweights, in particular Egypt and Saudi Arabia, each of whom views itself as the protector of the regional status quo.
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For their part, none of the other GCC states have ever engaged in mediation efforts. Qatar’s prolific mediation efforts are unique both regionally and, given its size, globally.

Qatar’s motivations for emerging as a serious mediator of international conflicts are not that different from those of other states wishing to shine on the world stage. As early as the seventeenth century, diplomats at the court of Louis XIV advised him of the prestige attached to mediating international conflicts, and, today, the spread of the global media has only added to the veracity of that advice.
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States may also engage in mediation because the potential costs of standing by as a conflict rages on are seen as greater than the risks involved in becoming a mediator. The dangers of spillover, particularly for conflicts that are nearby or may directly affect a state’s interests, often serve as powerful motivators for mediation efforts. Similarly important are calculations of regional or global power politics that are perceived as enhancing the mediator state’s position within the international system.
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Moreover, for many mediator states, mediation is not simply a response to emerging developments. Rather, mediation
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foreign policy; it is a “broader framework of strategic action within the international and domestic political systems.”
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In the case of Qatari diplomacy, mediation appears to be an integral part of its toolbox.

In addition to these broad objectives, for Qatar mediation efforts serve specific purposes related to branding. Qatar is seeking to carve out for itself the image of an experienced mediator with a proven track record, a regional diplomatic powerhouse, an honest broker, a wise and mature player interested in peace and stability. The fanfare with which Qatari mediation efforts are often accompanied bespeak of their importance to the country’s carefully crafted image. Secrecy is often considered to be one of the central elements of any mediation effort. “If elements of secret negotiations are leaked,” according to the diplomatic historian R. P. Barston, “difficulties occur in that possible concessions by one party are exposed, thus weakening its position; the credibility of the mediator may be called into question; or an incorrect or misinterpreted version of the ‘contract’ discussions or negotiations may be presented by the media.”
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Invariably, Qatar’s mediation effort have taken place in the limelight and often before the local and regional media outlets, with high-ranking Qatari diplomats frequently granting media interviews as the process is still underway and reflecting on the country’s role in positive, often glowing terms.
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Keenly aware of the advertising value of their mediation efforts, long after the mediation process is over Qatari leaders continue to refer to it as one of their major accomplishments and an important contribution to regional stability. They cannot, after all, be blamed for being proud of having successfully positioned their country as a peace broker in a region so rich with warriors.

Effective diplomacy of crisis management and conflict termination requires in-depth knowledge of other states and nonstate actors, especially those in alliance or in opposition, and their perceptions of the issues at hand and the world in general.
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Given the lack of depth in Qatar’s diplomatic bureaucracy—a structural condition arising from its demographic limitations—and the resulting dearth of skills and knowhow, as well as resources necessary for sustained, on-the-ground presence, it is far from clear how sustainable and lasting Qatar’s mediation efforts are in the long run. Take, for example, the crowning achievement of Qatar’s mediation efforts, namely its astounding success at bringing Lebanon’s contentious factions to the negotiating table in 2009.
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What came to be known as the Doha Accord, and was accompanied by the customary fanfare, nearly unraveled a year later once the Lebanese factions were faced with the difficult realities of translating signatures and handshakes into action on the ground. When in Beirut the rubber of the agreement hit the rocky road, it was not the Qataris who managed to salvage the agreement, but instead the Saudis and the Syrians, and, if rumors are to be believed, also the Iranians. Qatar’s mediation efforts, it seems, are at best only partially successful; at worst, they are expensive and glitzy media events. Their overriding objective of putting the country on the map and solidifying its brand image as a peacemaker is brilliantly successful. But, for now at least, their value in bringing meaningful peace and stability to the region is far from clear.

International Investments

Another means through which Qatar seeks to enhance its influence regionally and internationally is by international investments through its sovereign wealth fund (SWF). In this respect Qatar is by no means alone, and, with its SWF, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), established only in 2005, it actually entered the game relatively late. The earliest SWF dates back to 1953, with the pioneering work of the Kuwait Investment Authority, set up before Kuwait was even an independent country. Following precipitous rises in oil prices beginning in 2002, Russia and the Persian Gulf oil produces started accumulating massive reserves, which they invested through their SWFs. These funds are generally set up with aim of helping facilitate macroeconomic stabilization, seeking higher returns on investments, creating a pool of wealth for future generations, and helping the growth of domestic industries.
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It was only at that point, in the politically charged atmosphere of the post–9/11 era, that the size and operations of SWFs began garnering attention and, in many cases, suspicion.
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The negative attention directed at the secretive SWFs operating out of the Persian Gulf, especially the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and Mubadala, also of Abu Dhabi, was particularly intense.
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