(
c.
384–322 BC)
Greek philosopher. He was born into a wealthy family in northern Greece, where his father was physician to the King of Macedon. In 367 he came to Athens and associated himself with
Plato's
Academy, where he studied and taught until Plato's death in 347. After several years travelling and researching in the eastern Aegean, he was invited by Philip of Macedon to be tutor to the young Alexander the Great. In 335 he returned to Athens and established his own school of philosophy, the Lycaeum, where he worked until strong anti-Macedonian feeling prompted him to retire to Euboea; he died the following year.
His first independent researches were principally in biology, and the methods and concepts of the natural scientist permeated his thought throughout his life. His range of interests and learning was vast: apart from several fine biological works, he wrote treatises on physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, aesthetics, ethics, and politics. He divided the sciences into three main categories: the theoretical, the productive, and the practical. Ethics and politics are practical sciences, aimed not just at knowledge but also at action, at changing the way people conduct their lives. In a move away from Plato. Aristotle believed that these practical sciences should be based on empirical data and taxonomy, and together with a team of students he researched the political structure and history of 158 constitutions, though only the
Constitution of Athens
has survived. Some of the results of these researches, however, can be found in his most famous political work, the
Politics
, which, in its mixture of analysis, prescription, and description, gives accounts of a number of constitutions, including Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. Aristotle also describes and analyses the political theories (or his versions of them) of other philosophers, notably Plato.
The biological framework of his thought also shapes his analysis of the nature, origin, and purpose of the state. Whereas some of the sophists had claimed an antithesis between nature and culture, Aristotle seeks to demonstrate that ‘man is a political animal’, by which he means the kind of animal that naturally lives in a
polis
or city-state. First, he examines the way the city-state comes to be. There are, he believes, two basic forms of human association: the association of male with female for the purposes of procreation; and the association of master and ‘natural slave’ for the purposes of mutual preservation. From these associations the household is formed. Households group together to form villages and villages group together to form the
polis
which Aristotle perceives as a self-sufficient community bonded together by shared practices and values. Living in a
polis
therefore, is for humans the natural result of the two fundamental natural forms of association. There is no antithesis between nature and culture, and no artificial
‘social contract’
.
The second argument rests on an analysis of human nature and human flourishing which is referred to in the
Politics
but expounded in most detail in the
Nicomachean Ethics
. To flourish, we need to exercise the intellectual and moral capacities which we possess as members of the human species: such capacities, and in particular our capacity to act justly, cannot be exercised outside the context of the state. It is precisely because the state provides everything necessary for the good and flourishing life that it is said to be self-sufficient; and it is in the provision of this good life that its main purpose lies. Here again, therefore, the state accords with human nature. Indeed, Aristotle claims that the state itself is a natural entity: not only does it have its origins in the natural associations of male and female, and of master and slave, but it is the natural end of all the earlier associations, and ‘nature is itself an end’; it follows therefore ‘that the state belongs to the class of objects which exist by nature’ (
Politics
I. 2). This can lead Aristotle to talk of the state as a kind of supra-being of which individuals are merely the parts, of no independent worth. Such tendencies in his thought have led to charges of totalitarianism: at one point the citizen is actually said to belong to the state (
Politics
VIII. 1).
But who are to count as citizens? Aristotle distinguishes three basic elements in government, the deliberative, the executive, and the judicial, and he defines citizenship as active participation in at least the deliberative and judicial functions. Such active participation requires directive reasoning powers and a certain amount of leisure and education; he further holds that these requirements will mean that only freeborn, non-artisan males can be citizens. Some humans, Aristotle believes, have only sufficient reasoning powers to obey the directions of others; they cannot deliberate for themselves. Such humans are ‘natural slaves’ and are not capable of taking part in political decision-making: indeed they will be much happier if someone else directs their lives for them. This is why the master-slave relation is basic and natural. Women will also be happier if they are directed by someone else, for though they possess the ability to reason for themselves, this faculty is not authoritative in them, being at the mercy of their emotions. Artisans and manual labourers are to be excluded on the grounds that their occupation deprives them of the leisure required both for active political participation and for the intellectual development such participation demands. As resident aliens are also to be denied citizenship, the result will be that only a comparatively small number of those living in a state are to count as its citizens. Indeed, Aristotle sometimes writes as if these non-citizens are not even to count as members of the state, but simply as its
sine qua non
( cf.
Politics
III.3 and VII.8)—a view which, at least in the case of women and slaves, would appear to be at odds with the argument in Book I for the development of the state from the household.
In Books III and IV of the
Politics
Aristotle undertakes a taxonomy and analysis of the different kinds of constitution. One way of roughly distinguishing constitutions is by asking two fundamental questions: who rules and on whose behalf? Rule may be exercised by one, few, or many, and it may be exercised well, on behalf of the population as a whole, or badly, on behalf of the rulers themselves. The three correct constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and ‘polity’, and the three corresponding deviations tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. In practice, however, the few will be rich and the majority poor; thus economic status will be at least as important a defining feature as number. In helping to shape the goals and values of those in power, economic conditions are also partly responsible for giving each constitution its own distinguishing mark: the goal of oligarchy, for instance, is more wealth; that of democracy, freedom. Later Aristotle qualifies this broad taxonomy. He stresses that there are several varieties of each of the six basic types and that all these varieties can be combined in a number of ways: indeed it is really more accurate to speak of a constitution as possessing, for instance, certain democratic features.
Aristotle's views on the relative merits of these constitutions are complex. He is clear that all constitutions which aim at the common good are preferable to those which look solely to sectional interests, and he is also clear that the common good must be firmly based on a notion of distributive justice, according to which the greater share of goods and honours is distributed to the citizens who contribute most to the state. The question of what form of constitution is best, however, depends on circumstances. Should a supremely wise and good person arise, who contributes supremely to the state, then according to the transactional principles of distributive justice such a man should be given supreme power, and be permitted to rule above the law; the same argument would apply to a supremely virtuous group. In the probable absence of such an ideal monarchy or aristocracy, however, the best constitution for the majority of states is ‘polity’, a mixture of democracy and oligarchy in which power is in the hands of those of moderate wealth. This middle class, Aristotle believes, will be the most likely to act in accordance with reason, and the least likely to suffer from faction and the extremes that both wealth and poverty encourage; he explicitly, if problematically, links it to the ‘mean’ which in the
Nicomachean Ethics
is said to constitute virtue. Their decisions are also most likely to win general acceptance. All these factors will make for stability.
Political stability is for Aristotle one of the greatest goods, and in Books V and VI of the
Politics
he devotes considerable space to examining the features which promote and undermine it. He considers it worthwhile to include measures for preserving even the ‘deviant’ constitutions, though in the case of tyranny he may regard an understanding of the tyrant's tactics as the best insurance against his emergence. The chief reason for constitutional instability and revolution is said to be discontent arising from perceived inequality. Everyone agrees that there should be justice, and that this is proportional equality, but there is no agreement on what the criterion for this should be: democrats will claim it is freedom and oligarchs that it is wealth.
The way to ensure stability, therefore, is to prevent such discontent by giving as many people as possible at least some share of honours, offices, and profit. Laws should be passed to guard against extremes of wealth and poverty, and to increase the numbers of the middle class; indeed, the support of this class in general will be critical for those in power. It is also vital to seek to incorporate opponents of the constitution into its structure. The most effective safeguard of all, however, is education: through education, the state can habituate its young to the ways of the constitution; without such habituation, the laws are powerless.
This pragmatic approach to political theory is also evident in the unfinished sketch of his ideal state in Books VII and VIII of the
Politics
: even an ideal, Aristotle stresses, should remain always within the bounds of possibility. Given that the purpose of the state is to provide the good life, and this is the life of virtue, the ideal state will be that which best facilitates the exercise of virtue in its citizens. For this, certain physical conditions are required, and advice is given on territory, food supply, defence, and size of the population (Aristotle would consider almost all modern ‘states’ far too large to count as states at all). Easily the most important factor, however, is again education, the principal aim of which is to create good citizens. Since the good life and good citizenship are for Aristotle matters of objective fact, education for citizenship must be based on objective principles and must be the same for all; this will also ensure homogeneity, and thus stability. The only way of guaranteeing that education is the same for all is if it is organized by the state. To what extent females are to be included in this ‘all’ is a vexed question: as they are excluded from citizenship, one would not expect them to require the same training as males; yet Aristotle makes it clear that they are to receive at least some education.
For all his emphasis on moderation and practicability, Aristotle is strongly authoritarian. His ideal state decides when an individual may produce children and have non-reproductive sex; it decides what works of art may be seen or heard, and even what musical instruments a child may learn. Like Plato , Aristotle not only believes that the good life is objective, but also that knowledge of this good is possible and entities its possessor to prescribe it for others. The possibility of a right to decline such prescriptions is never raised.
The
Politics
has influenced philosophers as diverse as
Aquinas
and
Hegel
, and is essential background to
Machiavelli
,
Bodin
, and
Hooker
. More recently, many of its notions have informed ‘communitarian’ thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel .
AH