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Authors: Walter Laqueur

The Israel-Arab Reader (43 page)

BOOK: The Israel-Arab Reader
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He added:
“Autonomy, as the Israelis understand it, means withdrawing army patrols and leaving [military] camps and settlements all over the West Bank. Furthermore, Begin has threatened to open the doors of his jails if any of the autonomy officials think about establishing their own state. So what is this autonomy which is nothing more than another version of the occupation? What it is is the deception and misleading of world public opinion and the other people of the world.”
Mr. al-Tawil asserted that there are no people—and that there never will be people—who will participate in carrying out this step. He said that if there were any such mercenaries, they would not represent anybody and would not number even 1 person out of 10,000. He said that all [Palestinian] citizens reject this plan.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak: Egypt and Israel (October 14, 1981)
22
Egypt, the state and the people, is continuing along the road to a lasting and comprehensive peace based upon the framework that has been agreed upon at Camp David and that is based on the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in letter and in spirit. Egypt, the state and the people, will spare no effort or time in continuing the autonomy talks until we put the Palestinian people along the beginning of the correct course for achieving their legitimate rights.
We, as the late leader repeatedly declared, do not speak on behalf of the Palestinian people. We do not claim that we are achieving the final solution of the question. The Palestinian people are the owners of the right and owners of the first and last responsibility for solving their problem. However, we are continuing in our role, dictated by our historical responsibility. We will make all efforts and pave the way for a transitional period during which the Palestinian people will determine their fate.
Egypt, the state and the people, is implementing the peace treaty. Egypt's position before the complete Israeli withdrawal in April 1982 is the same as Egypt's position after the complete withdrawal.
It pleases me to announce to you that we have received categorical assurances that the final Israeli withdrawal will take place on schedule, without delay and without slowing down. This coming 25th of April will, God willing, not pass without Egypt's flag waving high over Rafah, Sharm ash-Shaykh and every foot of the sacred land of the Sinai. The martyr of justice will have thus given his country and nation the greatest fulfillment by liberating the territory, restoring dignity and opening the road to a great future.With this historic event, the glorious Egyptian people and their valiant armed forces will have completed their most tremendous achievement in their contemporary history, lighting an eternal flame on the sands of Sinai that time cannot extinguish. Brothers, the historic peace initiative undertaken by our departed leader was the initiative of 42 million Egyptians. In fact, today that initiative does not belong only to the Egyptian people but also to all the peoples of the world.
Since President Reagan assumed power, the United States has announced the continuation of the U.S. commitment as a full partner in all the peace steps that are now taking their normal course.
I take this opportunity to declare to all the peoples of the world that the Egyptian people, who have faith in the peace miracle achieved by the hero of peace, today believe even more strongly in the continuation of the peace process, today they are more determined to protect all the fruits of peace.
The result of the referendum on my assumption of the responsibility on Sadat's road is the best evidence of the will and decision of the Egyptian people. It is a will for peace and it is a decision for peace.
U.S. and Israel: Memorandum of Understanding (November 30, 1981)
PREAMBLE
This Memorandum of Understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The Parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union in the region. Noting the long-standing and fruitful cooperation for mutual security that has developed between the two countries, the Parties have decided to establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security by deterring such threats in the whole region.
The Parties have reached the following agreements in order to achieve the above aims:
ARTICLE I
United States-Israeli strategic cooperation, as set forth in this Memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region. It has the following broad purposes:
a. To enable the Parties to act cooperatively and in a timely manner to deal with the above mentioned threat;
b. To provide each other with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area that may be required to cope with this threat;
c. The strategic cooperation between the Parties is not directed at any State or group of States within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above mentioned threat.
ARTICLE II
1. The fields in which strategic cooperation will be carried out to prevent the above mentioned threat from endangering the security of the region include:
a. Military cooperation between the Parties, as may be agreed by the Parties;
b. Joint military exercises, including naval and air exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, as agreed upon by the Parties;
c. Cooperation for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities, as agreed upon by the Parties;
d. Other areas within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly agreed.
Israeli Law on the Golan Heights (December 14, 1981)
1. The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State shall apply to the Golan Heights. . . .
2. This law shall become valid on the day of its passage in the Knesset.
3. The Minister of the Interior shall be charged with the implementation of this law, and he is entitled, in consultation with the Minister of Justice, to enact regulations for its implementation and to formulate in regulations transitional provisions and provisions concerning the continued application of regulations, orders, administrative orders, rights and duties which were in force on the Golan Heights prior to the application of this law.
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon: Israel's Security (December 15, 1981)
23
As I see them, our main security problems during the 1980's will stem from external threats to Israel, her integrity and her sovereign rights. . . .
One—The Arab confrontation.
Second—The Soviet expansion which both builds on the Arab confrontation and at the same time provides it with its main political and military tools.
Later on, I will comment on the implications in terms of political and military requirements in order to cope with the threat and to ensure Israel's national security in the 1980's.
Starting with the Arab challenge, I must touch upon the three major factors which, in my mind, contribute the most to sustain Arab enmity and confrontation at a level that presents an actual danger to our security and which, I believe, will continue to sustain it in the foreseeable future—at a level which might confront us with a potential threat to the existence and integrity of Israel.
Those factors are:
A. First, the national ideology of radical Arab regimes (such as in Syria, Libya, Iraq and South Yemen) and their political and strategic ambitions which motivate them to invest, on a first-priority basis, in the creation of a political-military setting designed to serve a strategy of political and military stages for the liquidation of the State of Israel.
The main elements of this strategy of stages can be summed up as follows:
1. A combined effort of sustained political pressure and, when needed, limited military action aimed at the harassment and weakening of Israel.
2. The build-up of a military power, conventional and eventually non-conventional, to be used in appropriate conditions in the future, for a decisive onslaught against Israel.
3. The third element of the strategy is the political and military reliance on the Soviet Union, to ensure the Arab capability to initiate and carry out the confrontation.
4. The fourth element is to maximize the political strategic impact of the oil weapon.
5. And the fifth is the political and military backing to the PLO as an instrument to carry out terrorist activities. This constitutes a central element in the strategy of stages, so long as Israel's deterrent posture and other political considerations prevent the formation of an Arab coalition, ready to wage war.
That brings me to the second major factor, which is the PLO. On the challenge presented by the PLO, I will say only this: The PLO poses a political threat to the very existence of the State of Israel and remains one of the main obstacles to the resolution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the Camp David accords.
It constitutes a framework for terrorist organizations operating against Israel, in its territory or in the world at large, with the following purposes:
• To undermine the domestic stability in Israel and its security.
• To generate international pressure on Israel.
• To drag the confrontation states to war against Israel.
• To deter Arab countries and moderate Palestinian elements from negotiations with Israel on the basis of Camp David.
The third factor is one of growing concern to us and to the Western world, and might well develop as the main challenge of the 1980's. It has to do with the Soviet strategy of expansion in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet strategy is under no pressure of time, but its achievements since the middle of the 1950's are really impressive. . . . It is a strategy of expansion which, if not checked, could eventually enable the Soviet Union:
• To ensure a sea-control capability in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
• To establish the military infrastructure for direct or indirect operations.
• To expand and penetrate other key countries in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from the direction of Afghanistan, Iraq, South Yemen and Syria.
• To outflank NATO's eastern tier (Turkey) through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
• To outflank NATO's southern tier in the Mediterranean, through Libya, Syria and Algeria.
• To gain control over other key countries in Africa, from the direction of Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. . . .
Today, as in the past two decades, the Soviet strategy of expansion in the area continues to build on:
• Arab regimes which Soviet political and military support enables to survive, to carry out their own ambitions and to maintain military confrontations—including the confrontation with Israel.
• Radical elements and terrorist organizations, which Soviet political and military support enables to create upheavals threatening to shift the region towards Soviet political-strategic patronage.
The shadow of Soviet presence in the Middle East and Africa endangers the stability of the region and vital interests of the free world. I want to stress this point with all possible emphasis. The greatest danger to the free world in the 1980's would be to continue to indulge in the wishful thinking and the inaction which have characterized Western attitudes to Soviet gradual expansion during the last two decades. . . .
Obviously, in order to be able to protect our national security interests, we will have to ensure our ability to maintain a balance of forces and a qualitative and technological edge over any combination of Arab war coalition; in other words:
• To prevent war by maintaining a deterrent posture against the threats to the existence of Israel.
• Should deterrence break down and war erupt, to ensure a military capability to preserve the integrity of Israel's territory, in any war-opening situation including a sudden Arab attack, and to disrupt the war coalition by damaging the core of its offensive capability.
To achieve these goals, we will have to structure our military strength on new approaches, taking into account:
• The lack of territorial depth and therefore the necessity to establish a strong territorial defense system, based on populous and high quality settlement of key border areas in Judaea, Samaria, the Gaza district, the Golan Heights, the Galilee and the Negev.
• The need to provide maximum protection to human life.
• The need to develop and produce weapon systems and equipment which should enable us to maintain a permanent qualitative advantage over Arab confrontation states—including with regard to advanced and sophisticated equipment they might get from Eastern and Western sources.
As a rule, while striving to establish ties of strategic cooperation with the United States to enhance stability and security in the region as a whole, we will continue to ensure our own independent ability to cope with the Arab military threats to our existence and security.
In order to cope with the threat, Israel cannot build on a balance of power based on a simple quantitative ratio of military forces. We cannot hope to match Arab numbers. Therefore, Israel's defense policy will have to ensure our ability to maintain a military balance based, beyond the quantitative ratio, on a clear qualitative and technological superiority. Israel is confronted by the challenge of maintaining a balance in peace of countries which have practically no limitations in funds to finance their military effort and furthermore in the . . . military technology and sophisticated weaponry they receive from all three sources—the Soviet, the American and the Western European supply sources, which are all competing by the same means for influence and economic advantages. Among the three sources of supply the United States remains sensitive to the need of maintaining a balance in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. But there is no control on the influx of armament from Soviet and European sources. Therefore, Israel has to build on her independent capability to develop and produce systems which are vital to ensure our qualitative advantage and our security. This puts a tremendous burden on our defense budget and on Israel's national economy. . . . The second “safety valve,” if I can use that concept, in our defense policy, is our resolve and our ability to prevent the disruption of the territorial military status in neighboring countries. That includes our resolve.
BOOK: The Israel-Arab Reader
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