The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order (27 page)

If managed well, such a system would prove a boon to global security as a mediated market for force and forestall the effects of an unrestrained free market, as demonstrated during the era of the
condottieri
and today’s Somalia. It would augment understaffed UN missions with qualified peacekeepers, provide a surge capacity for emergency deployments to stop atrocities, permit public scrutiny of the private military industry, allow the United Nations (and the world) to benefit from PMCs’ service, and offer a modicum of oversight for this burgeoning industry that is not disappearing. If utilized correctly, PMCs would greatly enhance the United Nations’ capacity to ensure peace, security, and governance and, as the UN Charter mandates, “save the future generations.” It would also establish the norms that would inform an eventual convention on controlling private military force. To be effective, such a protocol must include the spectrum of neomedieval actors and not just states, since many of these actors now employ force and the state is losing its monopoly.

Some at the United Nations will balk at privatized peacekeeping, as Kofi Annan did during the Rwandan genocide, since it violates Westphalian ideals. But this may be gradually changing. As Sir Brian Urquhart, a retired UN under-secretary-general and considered the founding father of peacekeeping, explains: “It does seem to me that some of these private companies could play an extremely useful role … there are all sorts of special tasks which possibly these companies are better-trained to perform than a UN force put together at the last minute.”
²⁵
In fact, the United Nations has already begun moving in this direction and employs PMCs to protect its operations around the world. In 2012, it introduced guidance for PMCs operating on ships traveling through pirate waters, upending centuries of Admiralty Law that is Westphalian to its core. At present, the UN working group on the use of mercenaries is exploring how the organization should utilize PMCs, and the UN security office has drafted operational guidelines, a model contract, and statement of work for PMCs.
²⁶

A market approach blended with regulation makes sense, because laws alone are difficult to enforce, and draconian ones will simply drive PMCs offshore, beyond the reach of accountability. Only the United Nations has the potential market power and regulatory heft to shape the industry’s future. It is probably too late to ban the industry, for those desiring this, but we do have options: allow the market for force to unfold in a laissez-faire manner, or shape it to extract its benefits while curbing its risks. In other words, accept a free market or nurture a mediated one. The answer is imperative, given the relationship between armed force and sovereignty.

The reappearance of private armies is a harbinger of a wider trend in international relations: the emergence of neomedievalism. In the modern Westphalian world order, only states can make international law and enforce it through their monopoly of force. That is, only states can use violence “legitimately” to impose their will, leaving nonstate rivals at their mercy. States strictly outlaw mercenaries, because they threaten this monopoly and contest the system.

The erosion of the taboo against mercenarism heralds a shift in this world order, from the state-centric Westphalian system back to the status quo ante of the Middle Ages. The medieval system was not dominated by states but was polycentric in nature, with authority diluted and shared among state and non-state actors alike. States were just another actor on a crowded world stage, and no one had a monopoly of force to enforce their will. Instead, there was a free market of force, and actors—kings, popes, princes, city-states, rich families, and so on—commonly employed mercenaries to settle disputes in contract warfare.

Neomedievalism describes what a return to a polycentric world order might countenance. Neomedievalism is a non-state-centric and multipolar world order characterized by overlapping authorities and allegiances. It is a metaphor for a global phenomenon and is not intended to be Eurocentric. Nor does it imply worldwide atavism. States will not disappear but will matter less and increasingly compete with other global actors such as the United Nations, NGOs, multinational corporations, politicized ethnic and religious groups, terrorists and transnational criminal organizations, and others for political dominance in world affairs. This was not the situation a century ago, when the rule of states was preeminent. Nor does neomedievalism connote chaos and anarchy; the global system will persist in a durable disorder that contains rather than solves problems.

Already, parallels between the Middle Ages and today are apparent. In 1977, scholar Hedley Bull devised a test to detect the presence of neomedievalism in international relations based on five criteria: the technological unification of the
world, the regional integration of states, the rise of transnational organizations, the disintegration of states, and the restoration of private international violence. He found little evidence of neomedievalism in his day, but that was at the height of the Cold War, a very Westphalian period. However, a contemporary examination clearly shows that neomedievalism is on the ascent.

For some, the most disturbing feature of neomedievalism is the restoration of private international violence—mercenarism—and the implications for world peace of contract warfare. The modern equivalents of private military actors are PMCs: expeditionary conflict entrepreneurs structured as multinational corporations that deploy private armies as mercenaries or raise armies as military enterprisers.

Excessive concerns over mercenarism are a Westphalian bias. Those brought up to see war in purely ideological terms, namely, as an armed contest between two or more states, might assume that the commodification of conflict guarantees greater violence, but this overlooks the obvious: some of the bloodiest wars in history, such as World War I and World War II, were fought by states via national armies at the apex of the Westphalian order. And those who fear that mercenaries are more undisciplined and dangerous than national armies ignore the fact that many state militaries have abysmal records of human rights abuse and rapaciousness. Can we honestly say that the national armies of Sudan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Belarus, Chad, Zimbabwe, Kirgizstan, Yemen, Haiti, and many other states are more professional than PMCs? Public armies are not de facto superior to private ones.

Additionally, the Westphalian belief that war is exclusively the privilege of states does not match historical reality. Throughout most of history, military force was marketized, and waging war with for-profit actors was normal. Wealthy individuals and groups regularly employed private armies to pursue their objectives—political power, wealth, vendetta, glory, and so on—creating a free market for force in which military might was traded as a commodity, and the nationality of suppliers or purchasers meant little. In fact, the private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the nineteenth century.

As in the Middle Ages, there will be advantages and disadvantages to contract warfare. In terms of economic advantages, on-demand military services generally have greater utility or value than maintaining a full-time standing military, which was very expensive in the Middle Ages and now. Furthermore, private sector innovation can find more efficient and effective ways of achieving war aims, sometimes sparing blood and treasure. Those who worry that PMCs will lead to global Armageddon should not forget that the private military industry, like the
condottieri
of old, require some modicum of law and order to function,
such as a reliable banking system, contract enforcement mechanisms, a physical headquarters, a safe base of operations, and other accoutrements of stability. It is not in the industry’s interest to have a lawless world.

But the benefits should not disguise the darker side of private warfare, also demonstrated in the Middle Ages. Linking profit motive to killing is morally repugnant to many and may instigate needless death and destruction. Compounding this problem, on-demand military services lower the barriers to waging war, making violence more tempting than peaceful solutions. Once at war, private armies are incentivized to elongate and expand armed conflict for financial gain, a moral hazard inherent to for-profit warfare. Military supply can also generate demand by offering new tactics or technologies previously unavailable to neomedieval actors. They can also create “demand” through racketeering and extortion. A worrisome trend is the development of cheap and accessible military technologies such as robotics and cyber-weapons; the combination of PMCs operating armed drones and using cyber-attacks seems a likely future. As in the Middle Ages, mercenarism can lead to more war.

Privatizing war also changes warfare. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it changes why we fight and for what. Moneyed corporations, cartels, and individuals could become a new kind of superpower. Contract warfare also changes how we fight. For example, nonviolent strategies are possible, such as buying out the enemy’s mercenaries or retaining all available PMCs in a region so that one is militarily unopposed. A perennial difficulty is enforcing the contract’s terms when the client is unarmed and the contractor is armed. A PMC is also incentivized to exploit asymmetries of information between itself and the client for profit and possibly to the detriment of peace. These dilemmas are only the beginning of a brave new world that looks remarkably old.

Just as in the Middle Ages, taming a free market for force is dangerous. A market approach might succeed more than a regulatory one, since onerous laws will simply drive PMCs offshore. Instead, fostering a mediated market for force, perhaps in conjunction with appropriate regulation, will produce better outcomes. A consumer with market power or a consortium of consumers could shape industry behavior by rewarding military enterprisers and shunning mercenaries, thereby avoiding a free market for war. This could potentially harness the industry’s benefits and mitigate its threats, domesticating the proverbial dogs of war.

Some may find the “back to the future” aspect of neomedievalism disquieting, but it need not be. The world is not in decline but rather returning to normal, when no single type of political actor dominates the world stage, as states have done in recent centuries. Historically, sovereignty is generally fragmented among different actors, as it was in the Middle Ages, and the past four centuries
of Westphalian supremacy by states is anomalous. This also implies that no single actor can monopolize and control force, unleashing the possibility of mercenarism in the world once again. The ensuing free market for force has the potential to change warfare, the distribution of power in global affairs, and world peace. The implications of this are enormous, since it suggests that international relations in the twenty-first century will have more in common with the twelfth century than with the twentieth.

UNCLASSIFIED

Peacekeeping/Capacity Enhancement/Surveillance Efforts—African
Continent
S-LMAOM-03-C0034
Section B

SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

B.1
The Contractor shall perform any and all services required for Peacekeeping, Capacity Enhancement and Surveillance Efforts within the continent of Africa. The specific projects and scopes of work shall be tasked, via task order, in writing by the Contracting Officer and shall be in conformance with the contract clauses and special conditions contained herein.

The professional services to be provided will include, but are not limited to, logistics, transportation of personnel, training of host country personnel, supply and establishment of field operations/services, maintenance, communications, and any other related service necessary to meet the department’s needs, as well as administration and coordination of the various disciplines involved. See Section C for the Statement of Work.

B.2
This is an Indefinite Quantity/Indefinite Delivery contract containing fixed hourly rates. The term of
Contract S-LMAQM-03-C0034
is one base year, with four, 12-month option years to be renewed at the government’s discretion. The contract may be renewed by modification under the same terms and conditions as the base year, except as provided in section B.5 Prices/Costs. The actual amount of work to be performed, the time of such performance, the deliverables, and the location of the work will be determined by the Contracting
Officer, who will issue executed task orders to the Contractor. The only work authorized under this contract is that which is performed after receipt of such task orders and a written Notice to Proceed (NTP) from the Contracting Officer. A written NTP may be transmitted by facsimile or electronic mail (e-mail).

B.3
The Contractor shall, upon receipt of a duly executed task order, perform all services as required in this contract and such further requirements as may be contained in task orders for projects described therein. The Contractor shall complete all work and services under this contract within the period of time specified in task orders, except that no task order shall be issued hereunder after the expiration of this contract. Performance, the deliverables, and the location of the work will be task order specific.

B.4
The Government makes no guarantee as to the number of orders or actual amount of services which will be requested above the guaranteed minimum value of
$5,000,000.00
for the life of the contract (1 base year plus all four option years).

B.4.1
If two or more contracts are awarded under this solicitation, the Government reserves the right to compete or assign individual task orders to a particular contractor.

B.4.2
The maximum dollar value for the life of this contract (1 base year plus all four option years) is
$100,000,000.00.

B.4.3
The minimum value for the contract that is exercised is
$5,000,000.00
for the life of the contract (1 base year plus all four option years).

B.4.4
The minimum dollar value of any awarded task order is
$50,000.00
and the maximum amount of any awarded task order is
$5,000,000.00
(refer to Section I, Contract Clause 52.216-19, Ordering Limitation). These limits may be waived by bilateral agreement between the government and the awarded contractor.

B.4.5 Reserved

B.4.6
The Prime contractor shall not subcontract more than
50%
of the total value of this contract.

The Contractor shall provide professional services as directed by individual task orders executed by the Contracting Officer. In establishing the prices for individual task orders, the rates for the required services shall be in accordance with the fixed fully burdened hourly labor rates submitted by the Offeror (see B.5.1).

B.5.1
The Offeror shall submit a Cost Volume that contains unburdened direct hourly rates for each professional category, as well as fully burdened hourly rates for each labor category of each required discipline. The burdened rates shall include direct hourly rates, overhead, G&A, profit, and all employee fringe
benefits, such as retirement, withholding for FICA and taxes (NOTE: DBA Insurance is not to be included in the burdened rate), unemployment, workman’s compensation, etc. Submit these rates in the form of a chart, detailing each component of the burdened rate. Please include a rate for any category you feel which may be utilized during the performance of Task Orders under this contract. All rates shall be submitted for each of the basic years and each option year. The submission of the option year rates shall not bind the Government to exercising the option year, nor should it be construed by the Offeror as the Government’s intention to do so. Submit the same information for all proposed subcontractors, if possible.

B.5.2
Submit a legend depicting the individual labor category and its requirement (e.g., Project Manager—10 to 12 years relative experience, minimum of 4 year degree(s), X certification(s)).

B.5.3
Submit a copy of the most recent audit completed on your company by another Government agency. If a copy cannot be provided, please provide the cognizant agency’s name and a contact point.

B.5.4
For cost/price evaluation under this contract, see Section L, M and Appendix I. For evaluation purposes under this contract, the prices submitted in accordance with Appendix I will be analyzed. The rates used in Appendix I will be extracted from the Cost Volume submitted in accordance with B.5.1 and B.5.2 and same shall be affixed to Section B of the resulting contract.

NOTE:
Following the completion of negotiations and prior to the award of any Task Order, you will be required, where necessary, and if not waived by the Contracting Officer, to complete a Certificate of Current Cost and Pricing Data.

B.6 COST OF MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT

The cost of any materials or equipment required to be furnished and used in conjunction with the services rendered herein shall be included in the price of each task order unless otherwise noted in the task order.

B.7 TRAVEL

In determining the cost of travel, the terms and conditions of the Federal Travel Regulations/Joint Travel Regulation (FTR/JTR) shall apply to all travel and travel-related matters authorized under this contract; travel and travel-related expenses shall not exceed the maximum allowable under the FTR/JTR. In connection with authorized travel, the following items may be included in the price of the task order:

(i) The cost of domestic economy-class (coach) airfare; (ii) the cost of hotel or housing accommodations, meals, and other incidentals when travel is undertaken; and (iii) miscellaneous expenses incurred in connection with the travel. For international travel, see Section H.14 Reimbursable Expenses.

B.8 GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED PROPERTY

Government furnished property, if provided, will be identified in any issued or executed task order.

B.9 DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE COST

The requirements of the Defense Base Act apply to this contract and any subcontracts under this contract. The Contractor shall provide Defense Base Act (DBA) insurance coverage in accordance with FAR clause 52.228-03 Workers’ Compensation Insurance (Defense Base Act). Rates for DBA will be task order specific.

B.10 DEFINITIONS

In this contract, the terms Contractor or Prime Contractor are used interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise. Each shall mean the Contractor identified on the cover sheet of this contract.

Annex A
IDIQ Contract (S-LMAQM-03-00034)

Source
: US Department of State,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136426.pdf
(accessed 21 June 2011).