The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (115 page)

29.
For British assumptions, see B. Porter,
Britain, Europe and the World, 1850–1982: Delusions of Grandeur
(London/Boston, 1983), ch. 1; B. J. Wendt, “Freihandel und Friedenssicherung: Zur Bedeutung des Cobden-Vertrags von 1860 zwischen England und Frankreich,”
Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozialund Wirtschafts-geschichte
, vol. 61 (1974), pp. 29ff. For the economic details, see Cain and Hopkins, “Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas,” passim; L. H. Jenks,
Migration of British Capital to 1875
(London, 1963 edn.); Crouzet,
Victorian Economy
, chs. 10—11 and passim; Mathias,
First Industrial Nation
, ch. 11; A. H. Imlah,
Economic Elements in the “Pax Britannica”
(Cambridge, Mass., 1958). The complementarity in the trading/payments relationships is nicely covered in S. B. Saul,
Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870–1914
(Liverpool, 1960); and J. Foreman-Peck,
A History of the World Economy: International Economic Relations since 1850
(Brighton, Sussex, 1983), espec. chs. 1–6.

30.
For this argument, see Kennedy,
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery
, ch. 7.

31.
F. Crouzet, “Towards an Export Economy,” p. 70.

32.
Porter,
Britain, Europe and the World
, chs. 1–2. For the strategical implications of Britain’s increasing reliance upon “service” industries, see P. Kennedy,
Strategy and Diplomacy, 1860–1945: Eight Essays
(London/Boston, 1983), ch. 3; French,
British Economic and Strategic Planning
, passim.

33.
Quoted in Higham,
Britain’s Imperial Century
, p. 49.

34.
See pp. 131–33 above.

35.
Kemp,
Industrialization in Nineteenth-century Europe
, chs. 2–3; Pollard,
Peaceful Conquest
, chs. 2–3; T. Hamerow,
Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany
(Princeton, N.J., 1958).

36.
J. Droz,
Europe Between Revolutions 1815–1848
(London, 1967), p. 18.

37.
D. Thomson,
Europe Since Napoleon
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1966 edn.), p. 111; and see also Best,
War and Society in Revolutionary Europe
, pt. 3; A. Sked, “Metternich’s Enemies or the Threat from Below,” in Sked (ed.),
Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848
(London, 1979), ch. 8.

38.
F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen,
The Great Powers and the European States System 1815–1914
(London, 1980), chs. 2–3; Craig,
Politics of the Prussian Army
, pp. 65ff.; R. Albrecht-Carrié,
A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna
(London, 1965 edn.), chs. 1 and 3–4. The best study of Prussian and German-state affairs in this period is now T. Nipperdey,
Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866
(Munich, 1983).

39.
D. Showalter,
Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of Germany
(Hamden, Conn., 1975), passim; Dupuy,
Genius for War
, chs. 4–6;
NCMH
, vol. 10,
The Zenith of European Power 1830–70
, chs. 12 and 19; L. H.
Addington,
The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century
(Bloomington, Ind., 1984), pp. 39ff.

40.
See again Mamatey,
Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1815
, passim; Kann,
A History of the Habsburg Empire
, chs. 3 and 5.

41.
A. Sked, “The Metternich System, 1815–48,” in Sked (ed.),
Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848
, ch. 5; Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European States System
, passim; Albrecht-Carrié,
Diplomatic History
, chs. 3–4; P. W. Schroeder, “World War I as a Galloping Gertie,”
Journal of Modern History
, vol. 44 (1972), pp. 319–45—which echoes some of the remarks in his
Austria, Britain and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1972).

42.
Quoted in C. McEvedy,
The Penguin Atlas of Recent History
(Harmondsworth, Mddsx., 1982), p. 8; see also Droz,
Europe Between Revolutions
, pp. 170ff.

43.
G. Rothenberg,
The Army of Francis Joseph
(West Lafayette, Ind., 1976), pp. xi, 61. See also A. Sked,
The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetzky, The Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848
(London, 1979), pt. 1.

44.
D. F. Good,
The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914
(Berkeley, Calif., 1984) is best here.

45.
Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, p. 9; and J. Niemeyer,
Das oesterreichische Militärwesen im Umbruch
(Osnabruck, 1979), pp. 43–45.

46.
See Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, pp. 10, 41, 46, 58, for financial allocations; and G. A. Craig, “Command and Staff Problems in the Austrian Army, 1740–1866,” in M. Howard (ed.),
The Theory and Practice of War
(London, 1965), pp. 43–67, for institutional difficulties.

47.
Rothenberg,
Army of Francis Joseph
, p. 19; Kann,
History of the Habsburg Empire
, ch. 6; A. Sked, “The Metternich System,” in
Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848
, passim.

48.
For a succinct survey, see R. Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48: The Problems of Defeat and Recovery,” in Sked (ed.),
Survival of the Habsburg Empire
, pp. 122–44. For economic histories, see again Clough,
France; A History of National Economics
, passim; F. Caron,
An Economic History of Modern France
(New York, 1979), pt. 1; T. Kemp,
Economic Forces in French History
(London, 1971), chs. 6–8, 10.

49.
Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48,” pp. 125–26.

50.
Ibid.

51.
McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, p. 213, fn. 57.

52.
As quoted in Milward and Saul,
Economic Development of Continental Europe 1780–1870
, pp. 307–9. See also Clough,
France
, pp. 41ff; Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers 1780–1914
, pp. 130ff; Kemp,
Economic Forces in French History
, pp. 106ff.

53.
Calculated from the figures produced in Table 10 of Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” p. 296. See also the figures offered in R. E. Cameron, “Economic Growth and Stagnation in France 1815–1914,”
Journal of Modem History
, vol. 30 (1958), pp. 1–13.

54.
For these arguments, see Caron,
Economic History of Modern France
, espec. ch. 1. The study by P. O’Brien and C. Keydor,
Economic Growth in Britain and France 1780–1914
(London, 1978), is also a useful corrective to the older literature; but since it is not concerned with what they describe as “the mercantilist jargon of ‘national power’ ” (p. 176), its implications are not so important for our analysis. For a critique of O’Brien and Keydor’s handling of comparative statistics, see V. Hentschel, “Produktion, Wachstum und Produktivität in England, Frankreich und Deutschland von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhundert bis zum
Ersten Weltkrieg,”
Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozialund Wirtschaftsgeschichte
, vol. 68 (1981), pp. 457–510.

55.
R. Cameron,
France and the Economic Development of Europe 1800–1914
(Princeton, N.J. 1961); Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers
, pp. 176ff; A. Rowley,
Evolution économique de la France de milieu du xix
^e
siècle à 1914
(Paris, 1982), pp. 413ff.

56.
McNeill,
Pursuit of Power
, pp. 226ff. French tactical and strategical (as well as technical) innovations are nicely compared in C. E. Hamilton, “The Royal Navy,
La Royale
, and the Militarization of Naval Warfare, 1840–1870,”
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol. 6 (1983), pp. 182–212.

57.
In Padfield’s definition: see
Tide of Empires
, vol. 1, foreword; and see again Bullen, “France and Europe,” passim. France’s colonial endeavors are briefly covered in Fieldhouse,
Colonial Empires
, ch. 13.

58.
This was Palmerston’s phrase of April 1848: see
NCMH
, vol. 10, p. 260. For general surveys of Russia’s international position after 1815, see Bridge and Bullen,
Great Powers and the European States System
, passim; Lobanov-Rostovsky,
Russia and Europe 1789–1825
, passim; R. W. Seton-Watson,
The Russian Empire 1801–1917
(Oxford, 1967), ch. 9.

59.
See the discussion in M. E. Falkus,
The Industrialization of Russia 1700–1914
(London, 1972), ch. 4; W. C. Blackwell,
The Beginnings of Russian Industralization, 1800–1860
(Princeton, N.J., 1968); and idem,
The Industrialization of Russia: An Historical Perspective
(New York, 1970), chs. 1–2.

60.
Bairoch, “Europe’s Gross National Product, 1800–1975,” Table 4, p. 281.

61.
Ibid., Table 6, p. 286.

62.
Kochan and Abraham,
Making of Modern Russia
, p. 164.

63.
Ibid., chs. 9–10; Trebilcock,
Industrialization of the Continental Powers
, ch. 4; Falkus,
Industrialization of Russia
, chs. 4–5; Dukes,
Emergence of the Super-Powers
, chs. 3–4.

64.
J. S. Curtiss,
The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825–1855
(Durham, N.C., 1965), passim; Best,
War and Society in Revolutionary Europe
, ch. 18; Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 289ff; J. Keep, “The Military Style of the Romanov Rulers,”
War and Society
, vol. 1, no. 2 (1983), pp. 61–84. For the Anglo-Russian rivalry, see D. Gillard,
The Struggle for Asia 1828–1961
(London, 1977); E. Ingram,
The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828–1834
(Oxford, 1979); Ingram (ed.), “The Great Game in Asia,”
International History Review
, vol. 2, no. 2 (April 1980), special issue.

65.
Curtiss,
Russian Army Under Nicholas I
, pp. 310–11.

66.
By far the best study is J. S. Curtiss,
Russia’s Crimean War
(Durham, N.C., 1979); but see also A. Seaton,
The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle
(London, 1977), passim; idem,
The Russian Army of the Crimea
(Reading, Berkshire, 1973).

67.
D. W. Mitchell,
A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power
(New York, 1974), ch. 8.

68.
For these details, see Curtiss,
Russia’s Crimean War
, passim; Seaton,
Crimean War
, passim; Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, pp. 319ff; Blackwell,
Beginnings of Industrialization in Russia
, pp. 183ff; and the very good summary in W. Baumgart,
The Peace of Paris, 1856
(Santa Barbara, Calif., 1981), pp. 68–80, from where the quotation comes.

69.
Baumgart,
Peace of Paris
, pp. 72–74; Seton-Watson,
Russian Empire
, p. 248; W. Pintner, “Inflation in Russia During the Crimean War Period,”
American Slavic and East European Review
, vol. 18 (1959), pp. 85–87.

70.
Baumgart,
Peace of Paris
, pp. 25–31.

71.
Ibid., pp. 31ff.; Barnett,
Britain and Her Army
, pp. 283–91; E. M. Spiers,
The
Army and Society 1815–1914
(London, 1980), ch. 4; J.A.S. Grenville,
Europe Reshaped 1848–1878
(London, 1976), ch. 10.

72.
O. Anderson,
A Liberal State at War
(London, 1967), passim.

73.
Figures taken from the “Correlates of War” print-out data, made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

74.
See again MacDonagh,
Liberal State at War
, and compare with Schroeder,
Austria, Britain and the Crimean War
, Baumgart,
The Peace of Paris
, and N. Rich,
Why the Crimean War?: A Cautionary Tale
(Hanover, N.H., 1985), pp. 157ff, which concentrate much more upon Palmerston’s belligerent
tone
.