What Stalin Knew (17 page)

the code name Baron. This clandestine contact was maintained by Major

Shevtsov separately from the official liaison. According to Vladimir Lota,

Moravec’s recruitment meant that the RU had recruited not just a single

agent but the entire intelligence networks of the Czech service.14

The most carefully guarded secret in the residency was its penetration

of one or more of the British organizations with access to ULTRA, code

word for the code breaking of German ENIGMA traffic. Apart from infor-

mation on German order of battle and troop deployments, these sources

could have provided hard reporting from ULTRA on actions by the Ger-

man Luftwaffe in the fall of 1940 to dismantle communications stations

and other arrangements originally created to support a German invasion

of the British Isles. These facilities were not to be manned after Janu-

ary 10, 1941, indicating that the Germans had in reality given up their

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plans to invade England, regardless of what was said in their deception

operations. Did Stalin, who fervently believed Hitler would never attack

the USSR until he had conquered England, see such reporting? Did he

believe it? We do not know.15

The best picture of the activities of the RU’s London residency in the

1940–41 period comes from the VENONA intercepts of traffic between

London and Moscow.16 The officers of the residency were kept busy cover-

ing the effects of German air raids on British armaments production, rail

transport, seaports, as well as public morale. They submitted reports on

British antiaircraft measures, German bombing techniques, and British

army order of battle and organization of defenses against a possible Ger-

man invasion. Considerable attention was paid to the collection of infor-

mation on German tactics during the Battle of France from British service-

men who had been involved. In all of this, the residency relied not only on

recruited agents but also on help from members of the British Communist

Party, or the ‘‘friends.’’17

Paris and Vichy

The RU resident in Paris (later in Vichy, after the defeat of France and the

establishment of the Pétain government) was military attaché General

Ivan A. Susloparov; his assistant was Makar M. Volosiuk, assistant air

attaché (code name Rato). Reporting to them were two illegal residents,

Henri Robinson (code name Harry) and Leopold Trepper (code name

Otto). Robinson, who had been a Soviet agent in France since the 1930s, is

believed to have been the source of an April 3, 1941, report from Rato

describing the German occupation regime, the three zones existing under

it—forbidden, occupied, and unoccupied—their purpose, and the kinds of

activities under way in each. The report bears a close resemblance to one

prepared by Robinson on January 30. During 1940–41 Robinson submit-

ted a great deal of information on the movement of German troops to the

east and their defensive construction along the Atlantic coast. He also

reported on French factories working on production orders for the Ger-

man military, as well as on police controls and documentation in occupied

and unoccupied France. In a September 20, 1940, report, Harry doubted

that the Germans were serious about invading England because their

preparations were much too obvious. On April 4, 1941, Harry stated flatly

that the Germans were no longer considering an invasion of England al-

though they would continue their bombing.18

RESIDENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

69

As for Trepper, alias Jean Gilbert, he arrived in France in the summer of

1940 and began to develop new cover and acquire sources. He informed res-

ident Susloparov on June 21 that the ‘ Wehrmacht command has completed

the transfer of its troops to the Soviet frontier and tomorrow, June 22, will

suddenly attack the Soviet Union.’’ When Stalin read this report, he wrote in

the margin: ‘‘This information is an English provocation. Find out who the

author of this provocation is and punish him.’’19

Switzerland

The only other information we have on RU agent sources in Western Eu-

rope comes from Switzerland, where the illegal network under Alexander

Rado (code name Dora) was active. Although the best reporting from this

network came after the German invasion in 1941, some reports were filed

in the winter and spring of 1941. On February 21, 1941, for example, Dora

sent a report to RU Moscow based on information from the chief of intel-

ligence of the Swiss general staff. According to the source, ‘‘Germany has

150 divisions in the east. . . . the German offensive will begin at the end of

May.’’ In the margin of the report Golikov wrote, ‘‘This is likely . . . disinfor-

mation. We must point this out to Dora.’’ Golikov was writing at a time

when other sources were reporting on German intentions and the buildup

on the Soviet Union’s western frontier was continuing apace. One can

only conclude that Golikov was aware of Stalin’s conviction that Germany

would not attack the Soviet Union in 1941 and did not dare publish a

report that contradicted him.20

On April 6, 1941, Dora noted that all German motorized divisions were

in the east. The report of June 2nd is interesting: ‘‘All German motorized

divisions on the Soviet border are in constant readiness. . . . In contradis-

tinction to the April–May period, preparations along the Russian frontier

are being carried out less obviously but with greater intensity.’’ On April 22

subsource Poisson (unidentified) reported to Dora that, according to the

chief editor of the newspaper
Basler Nachrichten,
highly placed govern-

ment officials in Berlin expected the Ukrainian campaign to begin on

June 15. Little resistance was anticipated.21

Another Dora report, dated May 19, this time from Diane (unidenti-

fied), is attributed to the Swiss military attaché in Berlin. It sounds like the

sort of gossip one might pick up on the diplomatic circuits and seems filled

with standard German deception themes. After commenting that ‘‘the in-

formation on the proposed German campaign in Ukraine comes from the

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most reliable German sources and is valid,’’ Diane says that ‘‘these sources

add that the offensive will only occur when the English fleet cannot enter

the Black Sea and when the German army establishes itself in Asia Minor.

The next German goal will be the capture of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal

in order to drive the English fleet from the Mediterranean Sea.’’ If not

deception, the vision of the Germans capturing Gibraltar and driving the

British fleet from the Mediterranean was a pipe dream. Franco had re-

fused to allow them to attack Gibraltar through Spain, and the British fleet

had administered a severe drubbing to the Italian navy at Taranto.22

The last report available from Dora before the invasion was dated

June 22 and contained order of battle detail on the German army but

nothing on the invasion.23 This recital of the contributions of the Dora

networks confirms that their best work came later.

π

C H A P T E R

Soviet Military Intelligence

Residencies in

Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe one found the same mix of

agent sources as in Western Europe. There were those with good access to

knowledgeable sources who reported solid intelligence and provided first-

rate reports and, contrarily, those with purely social contacts who repeated

gossip or unsubstantiated information based on rumors. Information ob-

tained from the latter sources was, of course, likely to contain German

deception. Stalin, however, disregarded the accurate reporting as disinfor-

mation. His people paid an extraordinarily precious price for his actions.

Bucharest

The best producer of information in Eastern Europe was the RU residency

in Bucharest, headed by Colonel Grigory M. Yeremin (code name Ye-

shchenko), whose cover was that of third secretary in the Soviet embassy.

Yeremin had previously headed the Romanian/Balkan Section of the First

Department at RU Moscow Center. His deputy was Mikhail S. Sharov

(code name Korf). The aces among this residency’s sources were German

embassy press officer Kurt Völkisch and his wife, Margarita (code names

AVS and LTsL); other sources generally confirmed and supplemented

AVS’s reporting. Had Stalin and others in the Soviet political and military

leadership taken these Bucharest reports seriously, it is difficult to see

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how they could not have been aware of German preparations for an inva-

sion of the USSR.

Here is how RU Moscow described the importance of AVS: ‘ AVS has

the possibility of close contact with the work of the German embassy in

Bucharest. He is aware of all the activities being carried out by the Ger-

mans in Romania. He has been directed by German intelligence to main-

tain contact with Ukrainian anti-Soviet organizations in Romania and

knows of their plans and measures directed against the USSR. He has

many acquaintances among responsible officials in the German Foreign

Ministry and enjoys their confidence. AVS is well acquainted with Gersten-

berg, the German air attaché in Romania, who is carrying out special tasks

for his government.’’ In recognition of AVS’s importance, RU Moscow Cen-

ter assigned Mikhail Sharov to the residency primarily to maintain contact

with him. Sharov’s cover as a TASS correspondent gave him broad mobil-

ity in the community and a reason to be in occasional contact with AVS or

his wife, LTsL.1

In view of his access, Moscow Center gave AVS these tasks: ‘‘Report on

the activities of Germany in Romania, and also on the Anglo-French bloc

in Italy. Follow the activities of Ukrainian nationalists in Romania and

report on the efforts of Germany to use them . . . against the USSR.’’ His

reporting was sent to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, and others in

the top leadership. On March 1, 1941, AVS described a visit to Berlin where

‘‘many spoke of an impending German attack on the USSR. The Russian

department of the German high command is working intensively on this.’’

The report in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (see note 2)

gives the full text and repeats word for word the portion regarding an

‘‘impending German attack’’ but, before that, states that ‘‘a large scale mili-

tary operation against the British Isles . . . is considered unlikely because

this operation is too risky and would be associated with extensive losses.’’

The final section of the report ends, however, with the statement that ru-

mors of German plans for war against the USSR are being deliberately

planted to create uncertainty in Moscow and serve German military goals

in the future. The last sentence reads: ‘‘The possibility of an attack against

the USSR by German troops concentrated in Romania is decisively ex-

cluded in Berlin.’’ This report was sent to Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko,

Voroshilov, Dimitrov, Beria, and Zhukov. Each recipient could interpret it

as he chose. Stalin probably rejected the idea that Germany had aban-

doned plans to invade England, an idea that ran contrary to an important

element of his conviction, nourished by German deception, that Hitler

RESIDENCIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

73

would not attack the USSR until England had capitulated. He probably

discounted the section describing German preparations for attacking the

USSR and preferred the last sentence.2

On March 13, Kopets, another Bucharest RU residency source, re-

ported that he had asked an SS officer, ‘‘When do we go against England?’’

The officer replied that there were no longer plans for invading England.

‘‘The Führer does not now even think of this. We will continue to fight

England with our air force and submarines.’’ A second source, Korf, re-

ported that a German major occupying rooms in the residence of a sub-

source stated that ‘‘we have completely changed our plan. We will move

to the east, against the USSR. We will obtain grain, coal, and oil from

the USSR and that will enable us to continue the war against England

and America.’’ Both these reports confirm AVS on the German decision to

abandon plans for an invasion of England.3

On March 24, 1941, RU Bucharest forwarded an AVS report that the

German ambassador, Baron Manfred von Killinger, who was expected back

from Berlin on March 23, had come out the winner in a bureaucratic battle

with SS chief Heinrich Himmler over whether Germany should support

Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu or the ultranationalistic, anti-Semitic