What Stalin Knew (15 page)

and give it to people openly. We have newspapers and journals, don’t we?’’

Proskurov tried to explain that unless something was classified the big

chiefs wouldn’t read it. Stalin repeated his idea but Proskurov pointed out

that it required personnel. When Stalin said, ‘‘If it’s necessary we’ll increase

the number,’’ Proskurov replied: ‘‘I have reported five times to the Defense

Commissar on the need for expansion, but I’ve been cut, and now we have

an organization that is barely able to disseminate secret literature.’’ As he

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THE FINNS FIGHT

continued to push his idea of using foreign literature on an unclassified

basis, Stalin commented that the Red Army newspaper,
Krasnaia Zvezda

(Red Star), wasn’t worth a damn, which brought Mekhlis into a discussion

about problems with the editor. Proskurov tried to bring the discussion

back to intelligence by describing how commanders at various levels used

intelligence reports. He complained that some commanders kept them in

their safes unread for three or more months. In response to Stalin’s remark

that ‘‘one has to know how to present a dish, if you want it eaten,’’ Pros-

kurov said, ‘‘If the material comes to you, it should be read. It’s beautifully

printed, with illustrations, with pictures.’’ The two continued a detailed

exchange about what information should be published and how it should

be received by those to whom it was distributed.23

Stalin held up a book. ‘‘Does it show the locations of German troops

here?’’ Proskurov: ‘ Yes, exactly.’’ Stalin: ‘‘This shouldn’t have been printed

at all.’’ Proskurov: ‘‘Not even as classified material?’’ Stalin: ‘ We must not

describe such things; we must not print them at all. We should publish

military knowledge, techniques, tactics, strategies, the make-up of divi-

sions and battalions so that people can have some idea of a division, units,

artillery, techniques, what new units there are.’’ From this last dialogue, it

becomes apparent that Stalin did not understand the nature and purpose

of intelligence and that he didn’t know much about the military either. On

the one hand he berated Proskurov for inadequate intelligence during the

Finnish war and on the other hand he stated that printing reports on the

deployment of foreign troops was wrong. Or did these statements reflect

Stalin’s deep-seated fear of offending Hitler by reporting on the location of

his troops? We don’t know. But it is clear that he was out to get Proskurov

and absolve himself of any blame.24

Meretskov added his complaint that because the reports were secret he

couldn’t take them home and he was too busy to read them in the office.

Stalin asked, ‘‘Who thought this up?’’ Proskurov answered, ‘‘It was Order

No. 015 of the Defense Commissar.’’ When someone from the audience

called out, ‘‘The books should be in the headquarters,’’ Proskurov replied:

‘‘How can you explain, Comrade Voronov [Nikolai N. Voronov, chief of

artillery], that of 50 reports sent to the Artillery Directorate, only seven

were read by two persons? These articles were unclassified.’’ Proskurov

ended the discussion by noting that the headquarters of the First Red

Banner Army kept reports for three months without distributing them to

its units because it expected the Intelligence Directorate to do so directly.

‘‘Does this mean,’’ asked Proskurov, ‘‘that the Directorate should know the

THE FINNS FIGHT

59

location of every unit? This is absurd!’’ Everyone at the conference must

have winced because they all knew the mania for secrecy that permeated

the military and civilian leadership.25

Proskurov moved on to the question Meretskov raised earlier of who

was responsible for directing combat reconnaissance, saying that he had

received hundreds of letters on the subject. In the early days of combat, he

pointed out, the personnel of combat reconnaissance units were badly

trained, despite a June 1939 meeting of the Main Military Council with

Stalin. The council decided then to place responsibility for combat recon-

naissance in the Operations Directorate of the general staff and in the

staffs of districts, armies, and army groups, this to be accomplished by

August 1, 1939. Obviously, Proskurov went on, ‘‘this has not been done and

still nobody is involved in combat reconnaissance.’’ He added that ORBs

were not being trained as intelligence units. ‘‘What is an ORB?’’ Stalin

asked. Proskurov replied, ‘‘Separate Reconnaissance Battalion. Each divi-

sion is allotted one.’’ The ORBs weren’t being used properly, he went on,

nor were the reconnaissance companies assigned to each regiment. Dur-

ing the Finnish campaign, he noted, ‘‘The 7th Army took over the intel-

ligence department of the Leningrad Military District, the other armies

had none.’’ Stalin asked what Proskurov would propose. Proskurov sug-

gested following the pattern of foreign armies, placing all intelligence un-

der one staff element: ‘ We should establish a unit in our directorate to

handle combat reconnaissance or be left solely with agent intelligence.’’26

Proskurov dealt next with the problem of dissemination. The com-

manders of the Eighth and Ninth armies, Shtern and Chuikov, complained

that they were not receiving reports. It was discovered that Comrade

Smorodinov’s general staff people considered what was happening in the

Eighth Army’s sector no business of the Seventh Army and so never passed

on the reports. ‘‘This is idiotic,’’ thundered Proskurov. ‘‘An army com-

mander must know what’s happening in an adjacent sector. We must make

senior and junior commanders aware of intelligence. . . . We do not have

exact figures on how many thousands of lives we lost because of the ab-

sence of intelligence.’’

Stalin did not respond. Probably he did not want to get involved in the

question of who was to blame for the horrendous death toll of the Winter

War. Instead he changed the subject and asked about an agent in London

who had sent reports on a planned British air raid on Baku, but he got no

further details. The same man had also reported that 12,000 colored troops

were being brought into Romania. Proskurov said the source wasn’t an

60

THE FINNS FIGHT

agent but the air attaché, Major General Ivan I. Cherny. Stalin responded

by saying, ‘ You argue that he’s an honest man. I say that he’s a honest man,

but a fool!’’ He went on, ‘‘I am afraid that if your agents continue to work

like that, nothing will come of their work.’’27

Meretskov interrupted to note that commanders were afraid to get

into intelligence because later it would be said of them that they served

abroad. Proskurov agreed, observing that ‘‘if it’s written in your personnel

file that you were abroad, it remains there throughout your life.’’ Stalin

countered, saying that ‘‘we have thousands of people abroad. This is a

service.’’ One can imagine the thoughts of those present, all of whom knew

that Meretskov and Proskurov were right about the suspicions that at-

tached to persons serving abroad.

Proskurov brought up the difficulties encountered by agents para-

chuted seventy kilometers behind the lines, including the fact that many

agents, like many commanders, were ‘‘infected with the idea that they

would be greeted with flowers, but it didn’t turn out that way.’’ This was a

scarcely veiled reference to the Finnish Democratic Republic, which was

supposed to enlist the support of the Finnish working class, Stalin’s idea.

The obvious reference in the presence of others to the failure of his plan

must have infuriated Stalin, who then accused Proskurov of sending into

Finland Russians with no knowledge of Finnish: ‘‘Give the Main Military

Council a list of who you’ve sent and where.’’ Proskurov responded, ‘‘I’m

glad that you are interested in these questions, because after this things

will be better.’’ He added that ‘‘it was one thing for a tourist to look at an

emplacement but to describe its construction, and its exact location, that’s

another matter. We had an amusing incident recently. Skorniakov [Niko-

lai D. Skorniakov, assistant air attaché in Berlin] sent a telegram. But Kulik

ordered Skorniakov to send sketches and construction details. But he

couldn’t provide those details as he wasn’t qualified. This problem can’t be

solved by sending in a tourist.’’ Stalin missed the point and argued that it

would be best to have Skorniakov recalled and fully debriefed. Kulik called

a recess.28

Thus ended Proskurov’s part in the conference. Proskurov made no

concessions to Stalin, who evinced little understanding of combat intel-

ligence or the manner in which intelligence was collected, analyzed, and

disseminated. Stalin obviously disliked the way Proskurov behaved to-

ward him, and time after time he sought to turn the discussion away from

serious subjects to frivolous matters. From the manner in which Stalin

and others reacted to Proskurov and intelligence issues, it was clear that

THE FINNS FIGHT

61

Proskurov and his Intelligence Directorate were to be made scapegoats for

the failures that led to the disastrous Finnish war. As for Proskurov, in his

negative references to various senior officers by name, he seemed ready to

take on anyone who in his view maligned the intelligence service. It was, of

course, one thing for Stalin and others to use the April conference to blame

intelligence for Finnish war errors; it was another to have official recogni-

tion of the accusation that the intelligence service was inadequate. The

vehicle chosen for this was the act of transfer of the Defense Commissariat

from Voroshilov to Timoshenko in May 1940; contained in the act were the

reports of the chiefs of central directorates, delivered in the presence

of Zhdanov, Georgy M. Malenkov, secretary of the Central Committee,

VKP(b), and Nikolai A. Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Com-

mittee. The paragraph on ‘‘The Condition of Intelligence Work’’ read as

follows:

The organization of intelligence is one of the weakest sectors in the

work of the Defense Commissariat. We do not have organized intel-

ligence and the systematic collection of information on foreign ar-

mies. The work of the Intelligence Directorate is not connected to

the work of the general staff. In the Intelligence Directorate the De-

fense Commissariat does not have an organ providing the Red Army

with information on the organization, condition, armaments, and

preparations for deployment of foreign armies. At the moment of

assumption, the Commissariat of Defense does not dispose of such

information. Theaters of military operations and their preparation

have not been studied.29

Proskurov’s days as Red Army intelligence chief were clearly num-

bered. But even as these attacks on Soviet military intelligence were taking

place, the war in the West suddenly erupted. In early April 1940 the Ger-

mans occupied Denmark and Norway, and on May 10 they invaded Hol-

land, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. On May 15 the Dutch would

capitulate and the Belgians would follow suit on May 27. By June 4 British

forces had evacuated France; Paris fell on the fourteenth, and on the seven-

teenth Marshal Pétain ordered French forces to lay down their arms. Sta-

lin’s hopes for a long, drawn-out war between Germany and the Allies

would be dashed—now he needed to know what Hitler would do next.

It seemed unlikely, under these circumstances, that Stalin would move

against his intelligence chief, Proskurov.30

∏

C H A P T E R

Soviet Military Intelligence

Residencies in

Western Europe

In June 1940 the Soviet Military Intelligence Ser-

vice, still headed by Proskurov, produced two intelligence reports on the

events transpiring in Europe. One reflected the German view of the Wehr-

macht’s successes in France. The other provided the first indication of

what Hitler would do after the defeat of France.

On June 4, 1940, Proskurov sent the first report to Stalin. It was based

on a visit to the German embassy by Colonel Gerhard Matske, German

military attaché in Tokyo. He had stopped off in Moscow on his way back

to Tokyo after a two-week stay in May with a German army unit during its

campaign in Belgium and northern France. He shared his experiences

there with Lieutenant Colonel Hegendorf, German assistant military at-

taché in Moscow, and other attachés. The source was probably Gerhard

Kegel (code name KhVS), an experienced RU agent formerly in Warsaw

and now a member of the Trade Section of the German embassy. Kegel

would have heard of Matske’s account from Hegendorf. The report was

sent to Stalin, but we do not know how he or his senior military advisers