What Stalin Knew (6 page)

November 1937 and shot in January 1938. Berzin was brought back from

Spain and briefly occupied the chief’s slot from June until August of that

year. He, too, was arrested in November 1937 and executed in July 1938.

The next two chiefs, Semen G. Gendin and Aleksandr G. Orlov, were both

acting heads. Proskurov’s appointment would test the degree to which

Stalin was really interested in an effective military intelligence service.

All intelligence reporting was sent to the Soviet leadership, meaning

Stalin. Whether Stalin accepted the reports as accurate is another matter.

In 1939, during the events leading up to the nonaggression pact and the

Polish invasion, Stalin apparently appreciated the intelligence provided by

Proskurov from the marvelous sources of the RU’s Warsaw residency.

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C H A P T E R

Proskurov Sets Stalin

Straight

To appreciate the value of the intelligence report-

ing from the Warsaw RU residency under Proskurov in 1939, it is neces-

sary to know something of the residency’s history and of the backgrounds

and capabilities of its agent sources. Warsaw was an important RU resi-

dency (the term describes an operational station of Soviet intelligence

abroad) because Poland had been considered a potential Soviet adversary

since the Soviet-Polish conflict in 1920. But the intelligence activity that

would impact most importantly on the period 1939–41 began with the

arrival of Rudolf Herrnstadt in Warsaw in 1933. The Moscow correspon-

dent of the German newspaper
Berliner Tageblatt,
Herrnstadt was forced

to leave, along with other German correspondents, in retaliation for the

new Nazi government’s expulsion of Soviet journalists from Berlin. While

working in Moscow, Herrnstadt had been recruited by the RU and, follow-

ing their instructions, moved to Warsaw to become his newspaper’s cor-

respondent there. As soon as he arrived, he plunged into the life of the

German community, where he was highly respected for his knowledge of

East European affairs. He developed a close relationship with German am-

bassador Hans-Adolf von Moltke, who frequently sought his advice and

through whom he was able to meet, assess, and recruit several individuals

who would produce outstanding intelligence reports.

Among them was the redoubtable Ilse Stöbe (code name Alta), a well-

known journalist in her own right as well as Herrnstadt’s mistress. She

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

15

later served as the communications link with some of Herrnstadt’s best

sources, who had been transferred to Berlin and Bucharest. She was ar-

rested by the Gestapo in August 1942 but she never betrayed a single

person. Among those she worked with was Gerhard Kegel (code name

KhVS), an employee of the Trade Section of the German embassy in War-

saw, who would later be assigned to the Moscow embassy. Another was

Rudolf von Scheliha (code name Ariets), first secretary in the German

embassy in Warsaw; after the German conquest of Poland, he was as-

signed to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin. A member of the German

foreign service for many years, he had excellent contacts in German politi-

cal and military circles. The third and fourth members of this Warsaw

group were Kurt and Margarita Völkisch (code names AVS and LTsL). Kurt

dealt with press matters in the Warsaw embassy and was later assigned to

the embassy in Bucharest. Margarita, his wife, worked there as a secretary.

Taken as a whole, this group provided the RU with some of its best intel-

ligence on German plans and activities.

On May 17, 1939, Proskurov sent a report to Stalin with a six-page

attachment entitled ‘‘The Future Plans of Aggression by Fascist Germany

in the Estimation of an Official of the German Foreign Ministry, Kleist.’’

The report was classified ‘ Top Secret’’ (
Sovershenno Sekretno
) and ‘‘Of Spe-

cial Interest’’ (
Osobo Interesno
). Provided by the Warsaw residency of So-

viet military intelligence, it was based on a briefing given by Dr. Peter

Kleist, head of the Eastern Department of Ribbentrop’s office, to senior

officers of the German embassy in Warsaw during Kleist’s visit there on

May 2, 1939.1 Coincidentally, May 2 was the day Stalin informed Mak-

sim M. Litvinov that he would be replaced by Molotov as commissar of

foreign affairs. Litvinov was Jewish and had favored an agreement with

England and France to curb Nazi aggression. Thus, Stalin’s action was a

signal to Hitler of the possibility of an agreement between their two coun-

tries. This was to be one of the first steps in a minuet that would be danced

by Moscow, Berlin, London, and Paris during the next few months over the

question of what to do about Poland.

Kleist’s comments on Hitler’s plans for Poland and his longer-range

intentions must have been read by Stalin with great interest. Kleist, after

all, was the one person in Ribbentrop’s immediate entourage who was

continuously involved in German actions in Eastern Europe. He began by

stating that ‘‘Germany at the present moment is in the first phase of its

military consolidation in the east, which, without regard to ideological

considerations, must be achieved by whatever means. After the merciless

16

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

cleansing of the east will come the western phase that must end in the

defeat of France and England either by military or by political means. Only

after this can one count on the feasibility of the destruction of the Soviet

Union. At the present time we are still in the phase of military consolida-

tion in the East. It is Poland’s turn next. . . . The preparations already taken

by Germany—the creation of the protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia,

the creation of a Slovakian state, the annexation of the Memel region—

were all directed against Poland.’’ Here Kleist was presumably referring to

the March 15, 1939, agreement forced on the Czech government that led to

the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the creation of Slovakia, and the

March 23 occupation of the Memel region.

Kleist went on to say: ‘‘Hitler . . . has decided it is necessary to bring

Poland to her knees. To a small circle of persons around Hitler, it was

known that the last German proposal would be rejected by Poland. Hitler

and Ribbentrop were convinced that because of foreign and domestic pol-

icy considerations, the Polish government would not accept the German

demands. Only for this reason could Germany have been able to insert the

point in its proposal on guarantees of the inviolability of frontiers for 25

years. German calculations were correct. On the strength of Poland’s re-

fusal, we now have a free hand in dealing with her.’’ At this point in his

briefing, Kleist was probably referring to negotiations with Poland’s for-

eign minister, Josef Beck.

Kleist’s next words were harsher:

If Poland does not agree to German proposals and does not capitu-

late in the weeks ahead, one can scarcely doubt that in July, August

she will be the victim of a military attack. . . . Major strategic oppo-

sition by the Polish army will be overcome in 8–14 days. The attack

on Poland will be carried out simultaneously from Germany’s east-

ern border, from Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and East Prussia. The

offensive must be carried out in the fiercest way and, as the German

general staff conceives it, should lead to a stunning success. The

remaining centers of opposition that will, without doubt, exist in

the entire country will be suppressed in the most merciless fash-

ion. . . . German preparations against Poland have been postponed to

July–August. Military measures will be undertaken not long before

the offensive. They must be executed thoroughly and completely

camouflaged.

Kleist concentrated on the themes for a propaganda offensive against

Poland, listing the ploys and slogans that were to be emphasized in the

PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

17

campaign: ‘‘Under the slogan ‘Poland—State of Reaction and Decay,’ we

must reveal the poverty of the Polish peasants, the cultural backwardness

of the country, the feudal methods of running the economy and existence

of a starving Polish population. . . . The goal of this campaign is to affect

world public opinion and the Polish population; one must achieve a split

within the Polish nation and dissatisfaction with the Polish leadership on

the part of the Polish population, exploiting class differences. Preparations

for the propaganda attack against Poland will take about two months.’’

Kleist examined various situations that would provide Germany with

a pretext for initiating military action:

It would be ideal if the conflict with Poland was not seen as brought

about by Germany. At the present time, we in Berlin are discussing

the question of bringing the Ukraine into the affair. Voloshin [A. Volo-

shin, head of the autonomous government of Carpatho-Ukraine] and

Iu. Revai [a minister in that government] are agreed concerning . . .

the broad autonomy of the Carpatho-Ukraine within the framework

of the Hungarian states. With this we have again won the trust of the

Ukrainian masses in eastern Galicia and strengthened the frayed

military might of the Ukraine. No special propaganda is needed to

work up Ukrainian leading circles; they will remain faithful to Berlin.

We might later give the western Ukraine the signal to revolt. From

Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine we could send weapons and

arms as well as well-trained Ukrainian fighters. There is such close

contact between Lvov and Berlin that there can be no doubt about an

uprising in the Ukraine. Thus, creating the seeds of unrest in the

Ukraine will give Germany the opportunity to intervene militarily on

a large scale. This project, however, creates concern in Germany over

one danger—the possible reaction of the Soviet Union. If we think

otherwise, the Ukrainian factor will be put into play in the future.

Signing the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact precluded this scheme. It

demonstrates, however, the degree to which the Germans had made com-

mon cause with Ukrainian nationalists, a factor that would become active

in the spring and summer of 1941.

Kleist’s view of the future was oddly prophetic:

We adhere to the view that a conflict with Poland can be localized.

England and France, as in the past, are not ready to act on Poland’s

behalf. If we crush Poland’s main opposition in a short time, then En-

gland may demonstrate with her fleet in the Mediterranean. France

will rattle its guns behind the Maginot line—that will end the affair. If,

despite expectations, a European war begins in connection with a

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PROSKUROV SETS STALIN STRAIGHT

German attack on Poland, then we’ll know that a German strike

against Poland will serve as a pretext for a preventive war against Ger-

many by the Western powers—something agreed on in advance. . . . If

this happens, Hitler will be ready to engage in lengthy discussions. In

any case, we will not allow ourselves to be provoked at a time not of

our choosing. Choice of the moment for action we reserve to our-

selves. At present we have decided not to involve ourselves in a Euro-

pean war as a result of our inadequate readiness and, for us, the unre-

warding international situation; however, in three or four months we

can be completely ready. The German command is convinced it will

be victorious . . . because of our aviation. According to the calcula-

tions of our military specialists, all the ports of England can be de-

stroyed within six hours. The destructive action of German aviation

has up until now, been demonstrated only once, during the Spanish

civil war in the port of Guernica. The success was stupendous—the

city was flattened. In this light, the defeat of England and France will

not be a difficult affair. . . . America will not intervene in time and the

Soviet Union will stay neutral.

Kleist continued his prophesying:

In order to deliver a blow against Poland, at present Berlin has be-

gun to be intensively involved in the southeast. We must get closer to

Romania. Gafencu [the Romanian foreign minister] spread around

kind words in Berlin but then in London and Paris engaged in anti-

German politics. We will not achieve our goals this way. Direct pres-

sure on Bucharest is needed. . . . We will . . . make Hungary a German

protectorate and then move troops up to Romania’s borders. Ro-

mania will capitulate. We expect to achieve our goals in the Baltic

States in a different way. The neutrality of the Baltic States in the

event of war is just as important to us as is the neutrality of Belgium

or Holland. Some time later, when a favorable moment occurs for