What Stalin Knew (38 page)

the Western Special Military District: ‘‘German aircraft with loaded bomb

racks violated the frontier June 20.’’24 Never in the history of modern war-

fare had an aggressor been given a unique opportunity like this to photo-

graph its victim’s defenses.

On June 29, seven days after the invasion,
Pravda
announced that the

total number of German violations of Soviet airspace in the period leading

up to the war was 324. The existence of these overflights was never made

public before the German attack.25 The brave statements made by senior

Soviet commanders at the December 1940 conference were so much blus-

ter, however well meant at the time. All these men, from the defense com-

missar to the general staff to the commanders of the western military

districts and the armies under them, realized that to have permitted Ger-

man aerial reconnaissance up to the evening of the invasion was sheer

insanity.

∞π

C H A P T E R

German Deception

Why Did Stalin Believe It?

Without examining the full dimensions of Ger-

many’s artful program of deception, one cannot entirely understand the

tragedy of June 1941. As Barton Whaley’s seminal work first noted, it was

not random noise that prevented Moscow from divining Hitler’s true inten-

tions.1 Rather, it was the dissemination, through myriad channels, of bits

and pieces of information based on very specific deception themes, some

of which were designed by Hitler himself. The entire program was ex-

ecuted under Abwehr control, and it involved virtually all components of

the German government, although in each component only a few officials

were briefed on their roles in spreading deception. The program was pur-

sued with precision and bureaucratic thoroughness. Whaley’s study, im-

portant as it is, was written in 1973, before the release of much of the

archival and other material on the pre-1941 period that has become avail-

able since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. This information,

combined with German archival data, provides a much more detailed pic-

ture of German deception themes and how they confirmed Stalin in his

belief that Hitler would not attack the USSR in 1941.

A February 1941 directive of the high command of the German armed

forces (OKW) made clear that the invasion of England, or Operation Sea

Lion, was a major element of the deception program. This directive spoke

of strengthening ‘‘the already existing impression of an impending inva-

sion of England.’’2 The theme, present in diplomatic and intelligence re-

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GERMAN DECEPTION

ports as early as July 1940, continued through the rest of that year.3 Stalin

was greatly dismayed by the swift German victory over France and the

British expeditionary forces on the Continent, seeing his hopes dashed for

a drawn-out war with the consequent exhaustion of both of the bellig-

erents. Nevertheless, he still believed there would be no danger of a Ger-

man attack on the Soviet Union, as long as Germany was at war with

England. He remained wedded to the concept that Germany would never

risk having to fight on two fronts. He didn’t realize that this was not a

serious problem for Hitler because, after the evacuation of the British

forces from Dunkirk, there were no British troops left on the Continent

and the French army no longer constituted a threat of any kind. A German

invasion of England was the only hope Stalin had that Germany would

become so entangled in a major struggle with England that it would delay

for a year or more active military operations against the USSR.

Despite Hitler’s decision on September 17, 1940, to postpone the inva-

sion of England, throughout the spring of 1941 German deception pro-

grams continued to stress the ‘‘English invasion first’’ theme. On May 12,

when the OKW issued orders for the implementation of the second phase

of the deception program to coincide on May 22 with the concentrated

movement of Wehrmacht military rail traffic to the east, that theme still

predominated.4

One of the specific recommendations of the May 12 directive was to

spread the idea that the forthcoming airborne attack on Crete was to be a

‘‘general rehearsal’’ for the invasion of England. In his diary, Propaganda

Minister Joseph Goebbels gleefully described running in the official news-

paper, the
Völkischer Beobachter,
an article entitled ‘‘Crete as an Example’’

that suggested that the attack on Crete was a prelude to the invasion of

England. Deliberately withdrawing the issue of the newspaper as soon as it

had been delivered to foreign embassies reinforced rumors of an impend-

ing assault on England.5

The airborne component of the battle for Crete was not an auspicious

success. The British learned of plans for this operation well in advance

through ULTRA. The volume of ULTRA messages must have been consid-

erable, and it is difficult to see how the RU London residency sources privy

to ULTRA could have been unaware that the German Seventh Airborne

Division had been badly beaten by the defenders. While the Germans fi-

nally gained control of Crete, the paratroop victory was not one that could

serve as an example of what would happen were an airborne assault on

England undertaken. The Seventh
Flieger
Division, the only one Hitler

GERMAN DECEPTION

175

possessed, had been virtually destroyed, and according to General Kurt

Student, the leader of Operation Mercury, Hitler was very unhappy, believ-

ing that ‘‘the days of paratroops were over.’’6

On May 24 and 25 Goebbels noted in his diary that ‘‘our distribution of

rumors concerning an invasion of England is working.’’ Back in Moscow,

meanwhile, Stalin’s new military intelligence chief, Filipp I. Golikov, kept

the English invasion myth very much alive. He included it in his periodic

intelligence summaries, while at the same time describing reports point-

ing to an imminent German attack on the USSR as ‘‘German or English

deception.’’7

How was it possible for Golikov to make such statements without

being questioned on their substance? As has already been noted, the Lon-

don RU residency was probably the most prolific of any RU component in

the 1940–41 period and during the war itself. Thanks to the VENONA re-

leases of ULTRA decrypts, we have obtained examples of their messages to

Moscow. Their reporting on British victories in the aerial warfare of 1940

and on the decision of the Luftwaffe in the late fall of 1940 and January

1941 to close down facilities in France and the Low Countries intended to

support Sea Lion demonstrated that the invasion of Britain had been aban-

doned. Other information on Germany’s real military plans, as reflected in

ENIGMA traffic, was very likely passed to RU headquarters. In the face of

this and other reporting from reliable sources, Golikov’s actions are diffi-

cult to understand except in the context of his toadyish behavior toward

Stalin and his deep fear of him. As for his subordinates, they were all aware

of the fate that awaited them were they to confront Golikov.8

Another important deception theme, ‘‘defense against a Red Army of-

fensive,’’ was plausible during the early stages of the German buildup

along the Soviet frontier, when Wehrmacht units, newly arrived from the

west, began construction of what were, in fact, purely defensive works

such as trenches, machine gun nests, barbed wire, and even artillery em-

placements. Linked to the defensive theme were statements by German

officials to the effect that the troops were returning to former garrison

areas, or were sent east to be beyond the range of British bombers. These

essentially benign explanations for the movement of German troops to the

Soviet border area began as early as July 9, 1940, when General I. V. Smo-

rodinov, Soviet deputy chief of the general Staff was told by German mili-

tary attaché General Ernst Köstring, that there would be large-scale troop

movements in Poland and East Prussia, ostensibly because the German

army would be demobilizing older units. Köstring said that units with

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GERMAN DECEPTION

younger groups would be brought in while other units returned to perma-

nent garrisons. None of these explanations seemed valid. As the German

concentrations grew, large amounts of river-crossing equipment appeared,

and modified locomotives arrived equipped with devices enabling them to

change track carriages to the Soviet gauge. German intentions then be-

came clear.9

From January to June 1941, a number of reports from RU and NKVD/

NKGB foreign intelligence reflected deception on the operational level.

These reports all pointed to the ‘‘Ukraine as the main axis and principal

goal of the German attack.’’ The purpose of the deception, obviously, was to

mask the decision under Barbarossa to launch the main blow north of the

Pripet Marshes, along the Brest-Minsk axis. This is where the major Ger-

man thrust actually came. The Red Army, though, had concentrated its

largest forces in the Ukrainian Special Military District after Stalin decided

in fall 1940 to change the strategic deployment plan worked out by the

general staff. This plan had correctly anticipated the main German attack

north of the marshes.10 Stalin objected because he felt the Germans’ main

objective would be the grain and manufacturing centers of the Ukraine,

which they would need in the event of a protracted war. Apparently, he did

not realize that Hitler had no intention of becoming bogged down in a

protracted war. He counted, unrealistically, on a ‘‘lightning war.’’ Neverthe-

less, the change was made as Stalin wished on October 5, 1940. Conse-

quently, the Germans wanted to ensure that the Soviet general staff did not

change its mind about where the main blow would fall.11 Hence their

inclusion in their deception program of the Ukraine as their primary objec-

tive.12 As in the Finnish war, Stalin refused to accept professional military

advice.

In a memoir published in 1989, Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov described

the fateful decision to deploy the Red Army’s largest formations south of

the mouth of the river San. He, too, noted Stalin’s reasoning (that Hitler

would need Ukrainian resources for a protracted war) but failed to observe

that Hitler really hoped for a blitzkrieg and had no plans for a drawn-out

conflict. According to Zakharov, it was probably the frequent changes in

general staff leadership that permitted this error in deployment to occur

without challenge. He concluded his defense of Stalin’s position by citing

an April 2, 1941, Starshina report that claimed that the Germans would

open the war with a ‘‘lightning blow against the Ukraine.’’ Whatever Sta-

lin’s reasons for the change, it was an incredible mistake.13

As the date for the invasion drew nearer, German deception took on

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177

new forms: ‘‘ultimatums, negotiations, and the concept that the Wehr-

macht presence on the Soviet borders was solely there to pressure the

USSR in accepting German demands.’’ An analysis of the agent reports

received by SS Oberfüher Rudolf Likus in Ribbentrop’s Special Bureau

demonstrates that as of May 15, 1941, foreign diplomatic and press offi-

cials in Berlin were convinced that negotiations were under way between

Germany and the USSR. They thought that Germany had placed specific

demands on the Soviet Union, such as transit rights for German armed

forces through the USSR, a German lease of the Ukraine, and transfer of

control of portions of the Baku oil fields to Germany. Belief in the existence

of serious negotiations, even a visit to Berlin by Stalin, was strengthened

by rumors that a Berlin flag company was busy sewing red flags for a

forthcoming visit by the Soviet leader.14 As for the ultimatum aspect, refer-

ences to it were found in portions of reports from Starshina, the NKGB

source in the Luftwaffe Intelligence Department. On May 9 Starshina de-

scribed conversations with officers about likely dates for the invasion;

some officers, he reported, believed Germany would first issue an ultima-

tum demanding increased agricultural and industrial deliveries and a stop

to communist propaganda (at the same time, Starshina noted that prepa-

rations for the invasion were going forward at an accelerated tempo).15

A month later, on June 9, Starshina and Korsikanets noted increasing

rumors of a German lease of the Ukraine and a visit by Stalin to Berlin.

They suggested that these rumors were being circulated by the Ministry of

Propaganda and the military command to mask preparations for the inva-

sion of the USSR and to ensure maximum surprise. On June 11 they re-

ported that ‘‘competent circles say the question of an invasion of the USSR