What Stalin Knew (40 page)

Filosof,), a member of the NKVD Foreign Intelligence residency in Berlin

whom Kobulov, knowing no German, used as an interpreter. Berlinks had

been a correspondent of the Latvian newspaper
Brive Zeme
but, now that

the newspaper was no longer being subsidized by the German Foreign

Ministry, he needed financial assistance. According to Kobulov, Berlinks

was well disposed toward the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR and

was willing to share with Moscow information he obtained from the For-

eign Ministry. Ten days later, on August 15, Kobulov surprised Moscow

with the news that he had ‘‘recruited’’ Berlinks and given him the code

name Litseist. There followed some biographic data on Litseist. NKVD

Moscow instantly realized that this operation posed a problem because

Kobulov was able to send information from this new source directly to

Stalin and Beria, bypassing NKVD specialists. Their concern grew as they

began to receive the results of checks on Litseist’s background from NKVD

Latvia. It appeared that Litseist was anti-Soviet and had spread pro-Nazi

propaganda. The Berlin residency was cautioned to keep this in mind in its

dealings with him.

Amaiak ignored these warnings and continued to meet with Litseist.

The information he began receiving covered topics such as German plans

to invade England, Hitler’s concern that Germany not become involved in

a two-front war, the existence of a split within the Nazi hierarchy over the

question of Soviet-German relations (with the military urging war against

Russia and Hitler playing a restraining role), the German need for an

independent Ukraine whose grain could feed all of Europe and for Soviet

oil. His information also supported the contention that the presence of

German troops on the Soviet border was a defensive measure occasioned

by a Red Army buildup. Litseist’s reports, particularly on German reluc-

tance to become involved in a war in the east until England was defeated,

were all sent directly to Stalin by Beria and later by Merkulov when he

GERMAN DECEPTION

183

became head of NKGB. They were apparently very well received, reinforc-

ing as they did Stalin’s conviction that a conflict with Germany could be

delayed until at least 1942. One might wonder whether it was not a folder

of Litseist reports that Stalin showed Timoshenko and Zhukov on June 13,

1941, when he refuted their intelligence on German troop concentrations

by saying ‘‘I have other documents.’’31

Although it must have been apparent to officers in the German Depart-

ment of the NKGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate that these reports were

at odds with other information on German intentions and capabilities, not

until 1947 did Soviet Intelligence learn that the Litseist case was a care-

fully targeted part of a much broader German deception program. In that

year a former Gestapo officer who had been assigned to work with the

Ribbentrop Special Bureau as part of his regular work with foreigners

residing in Berlin was interrogated by Soviet Counterintelligence. He

stated that ‘‘the Latvian Berlinks, a German agent, was planted on Amaiak

Kobulov, a counselor of the German embassy whom the Gestapo knew was

conducting intelligence operations.’’ Berlinks was ‘‘recruited’’ by Kobulov,

he said, and ‘‘for a long time we supplied him with disinformation that he

passed to Kobulov.’’ Berlinks reported that he had gained the confidence of

Kobulov, who told him ‘‘that all his reports went directly to Stalin and

Molotov.’’32 Obviously, Hitler considered Kobulov a useful channel for the

passage of information to Moscow. It worked like this, said the Gestapo

officer: ‘‘Ribbentrop prepared the material, then passed it to Hitler. The

material would then be given to Berlinks for delivery to Kobulov with

Hitler’s sanction.’’ The archives of the Ribbentrop Special Bureau confirm

this information. A December 30, 1940, report sent to Hitler and Rib-

bentrop by Rudolf Likus of the Special Bureau reads: ‘‘Our informant in

the Soviet Russian embassy was called in by embassy counselor Kobulov

at 7:30 this evening and given four important tasks, one of which was an

order from Comrade Stalin to obtain the text of the speech given by the

Führer on December 18 before several thousand military school gradu-

ates. Kobulov said the speech was not publicized in the German press, but

portions available to the Kremlin allegedly displayed an anti-Soviet ten-

dency. Stalin is interested in this and wishes to be convinced that there

were no such tendencies. The agent, who works for the GPU, must obtain

the text.’’ Ribbentrop commented in the margin: ‘ We can brief the agent

any way we wish.’’ Walther Hewell, Ribbentrop’s liaison officer with Hit-

ler’s office, also commented: ‘‘The Führer wants you to collect such infor-

mation regularly from the Soviet embassy.’’33

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GERMAN DECEPTION

We now know that the German deception program confused many

well-placed RU and NKGB foreign intelligence sources whose access to

very good information was rendered suspect by disinformation spread

without their knowledge by individuals within their organizations. Stalin

probably never knew or suspected that through Amaiak Kobulov Hitler

was playing him for a fool.

Still, were all these deception operations enough? Enough, that is, to

persuade Stalin to cling stubbornly to his apparent conviction that Hitler

would not attack the Soviet Union until he had dealt with England? It

seemed evident, as the spring of 1941 unfolded, that more and more infor-

mation indicated that the German forces on the Soviet frontier were plan-

ning to invade. Senior Soviet military leaders were growing uneasy; even

members of Beria’s clique, such as Dekanozov, were predicting war. To

hold out as Stalin did, right up to the moment bombs began to rain down

on Soviet cities, he must have been convinced that there would be no

German invasion. To be this confident, he would have had to have special

information, a card that in his view trumped everything he was shown

predicting such an invasion. If Stalin did not have such assurances, possi-

bly from Hitler himself, then his behavior in May and June 1941 was

completely irrational. It is one thing to be deceived (and Hitler was a

master of deception) but quite another to adhere stubbornly to one’s per-

sonal interpretation of events, thereby threatening the existence of the

Soviet state and the lives of its citizens.

∞∫

C H A P T E R

Secret Letters

In 1965–66 Konstantin M. Simonov, the renowned

Soviet war correspondent, writer, editor, and poet, conducted several inter-

views with retired Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov. At one point, Zhukov re-

called a meeting with Stalin at the beginning of January 1941 concerning

the large numbers of German forces in the Government General (German-

occupied Poland). Stalin told Zhukov he had ‘‘turned to Hitler in a personal

letter, advising him that this was known to us, that it surprised us, and that it

created the impression among us that Hitler intended to go to war with us.’’

In reply, Hitler sent Stalin a letter, also personal and, as he underlined in the

text, confidential. He wrote, said Zhukov, that ‘‘our information was cor-

rect, that there actually were large troop formations deployed in the Gov-

ernment General,’’ These, Hitler explained, ‘‘are not directed against the

Soviet Union. I intend to observe the [nonaggression] pact strictly and

swear on my honor as a chief of state that my troops are deployed in the

Government General for other purposes. The territories of western and

central Germany are subject to heavy English bombing and are easily

observed from the air by the English. Therefore, I found it necessary to

move large contingents of troops to the east, where they can secretly reorg-

anize and rearm.’’ Insofar as Zhukov was aware, Stalin believed this letter.1

This reference to correspondence between Hitler and Stalin was not

published until 1987. Apparently, the only archival reference to an ex-

change of letters between Hitler and Stalin is a May 9, 1941, report of a

186

SECRET LETTERS

meeting between Ambassador von Schulenburg of Germany and the So-

viet ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, then on leave in Moscow. Dekano-

zov had proposed that ‘‘a joint German-Soviet communiqué be prepared

refuting rumors of tension in German-Soviet relations and also refuting

the possibility of war between the two countries. Von Schulenburg feared

there was not enough time to negotiate a joint communiqué and urged

that Stalin write a letter to various chiefs of state in which he referred to

his new position as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and

stated that the USSR would pursue a policy of peace with all countries. In a

separate letter to Hitler, he would discuss the proposed communiqué, ad-

vising him of the contents. Von Schulenburg added that if Stalin sent such

a letter Hitler would send a special aircraft for the courier and the whole

affair would move forward very quickly.’’2

On May 12, 1941, Dekanozov received very specific written instruc-

tions from Stalin and Molotov for his response to von Schulenburg: ‘ I

spoke with Stalin and Molotov concerning von Schulenburg’s proposal for

an exchange of letters in connection with the necessity of quashing the

rumors of worsening relations between the USSR and Germany. Stalin

and Molotov have no objection in principle to such an exchange of letters

but consider that such an exchange should be carried out only between

Germany and the USSR.’’ Not, it would seem, with countries other than

Germany. (If the two leaders were actually in correspondence, Stalin had

no intention of revealing it.)3

Lev Bezymensky, a Russian historian and war veteran, describes a

meeting he himself had with Zhukov in 1966 in which the subject of Hitler-

Stalin letters arose. According to Bezymensky, Zhukov commented:

Sometime in early June I decided to try again to convince Stalin of

the accuracy of the intelligence reports on the approaching danger.

Until then Stalin had turned aside similar reports by the chief of

the general staff. . . . Defense Commissar Timoshenko and I brought

along staff maps with the locations of enemy troops entered on

them. I made the report. Stalin listened attentively but remained

silent. After the report he sent us away without giving us his opin-

ion. . . . A few days passed and Stalin called for me. . . . He opened a

case on his desk and took out several sheets of paper. ‘‘Read,’’ said

Stalin. . . . It was a letter from Stalin to Hitler in which he briefly

outlined his concern over the German deployments, about which I

had reported a few days earlier. . . . Stalin then said, ‘‘Here is the

answer. Read it.’’ I am afraid that after so many years I cannot exactly

reproduce Hitler’s words. But this I do remember precisely: . . . I read

SECRET LETTERS

187

the TASS communiqué in the June 14 issue of
Pravda
and in it, to my

amazement, I discovered the same words I had read in Hitler’s letter

to Stalin in Stalin’s office. That is, in this Soviet document, I found

printed Hitler’s very arguments.

Stalin’s evident purpose in releasing the June 14 TASS communiqué

was to prompt a response from Hitler. The communiqué opened by blam-

ing England for spreading rumors that Germany and the USSR were ‘‘close

to war.’’ According to these rumors, ‘‘Germany has made territorial and

economic demands on the USSR and negotiations are now under way

leading to closer relations between the two countries. Ostensibly the USSR

has rejected these demands, as a result of which Germany has deployed

troops along the Soviet borders with a view to attacking the USSR.’’ The

communiqué declared that ‘‘Germany has made no such demands on the

USSR and both sides are steadfastly observing the terms of the nonaggres-

sion pact. Rumors that Germany intends to break off relations with the

USSR have no basis in fact. The recent movement of German troops, freed

from operations in the Balkans, to eastern and northeastern Germany has

other motives having nothing to do with Soviet-German relations. Rumors

that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are untrue and provoca-

tive. Attempts to portray the summer maneuvers of the Red Army as hos-

tile to Germany are absurd.’’ That many of these themes, such as England’s

blame for rumors of war, were reflected in Hitler’s letters should come as

no surprise. What was unexpected about the TASS communiqué was the

unreal manner in which it portrayed the state of Soviet-German relations

just eight days before the Nazi onslaught.