What Stalin Knew (41 page)

This account differs substantially from that of Simonov in his report-

ing of the interviews in which Zhukov spoke of meeting Stalin in January

1941. Simonov also does not say that Stalin actually showed Zhukov both

his letter to Hitler and Hitler’s reply. Bezymensky claims that there are

no archival records of the Stalin-Hitler correspondence but notes that

they may have been destroyed. He quotes German archives to show that

at the end Hitler ordered his private correspondence with heads of state

destroyed.4

A 1997 novel on the immediate prewar period entitled
Groza
refers to

this correspondence in considerable detail. Its author, Igor Bunich, claims

that ‘‘from October 1940 to May 1941 Hitler sent Stalin six personal letters.

Only two have been found, one dated December 3, 1940, and the second

May 14, 1941.’’ None of Stalin’s replies have been found. In his December

1940 letter, Hitler advises Stalin that he intends ‘‘no later than the summer

188

SECRET LETTERS

of the coming year’’ to resolve the English question by ‘‘seizing and occupy-

ing the heart of the British Empire—the British Isles.’’ Referring to his

statements in an earlier letter that German troops were assembled in an

area of the Government General inaccessible to English aviation and intel-

ligence for reorganization and training, he acknowledges that this has

aroused in Stalin ‘‘understandable anxiety.’’ He goes on to say that ‘‘rumors

of a German invasion of the USSR are being deliberately circulated by the

appropriate German offices’’ as a way of ‘‘keeping Churchill and his circles

in ignorance of our precise plans.’’ Hitler closes by proposing a personal

meeting with Stalin ‘‘at the end of June–beginning of July 1941.’’5

Although the December letter contains references to the usual decep-

tion themes, nothing can match Hitler’s personal letter to Stalin of May 14,

1941. According to the author of a November 2003 article in
Krasnaia

Zvezda,
it was intended by the Nazis to ‘‘misinform the leadership of the

USSR concerning its true intentions. The German Führer himself was

involved in this action. It endeavored to exploit the Soviet leader’s long-

standing distrust of the ruling circles of Great Britain, his efforts to put off

the beginning of the war at any price, and his belief that the English leader-

ship planned to push Germany into attacking the USSR.’’6

In the excerpts in the article, Hitler again explained the presence of

German troops on the Soviet border as protection from British aircraft

even though they had given rise to rumors of a conflict ‘‘between us.’’ Hitler

assured Stalin ‘‘on my honor as a chief of state’’ that these rumors could be

completely ignored. They ‘‘are being spread by English sources,’’ he as-

serted, admitting, though, that with so many troops concentrated in the

area a conflict could break out ‘‘without our wishing it.’’ He feared, he said,

that ‘‘some of my generals might deliberately embark on such a conflict in

order to save England from its fate and spoil my plans.’’

Hitler then advised Stalin that ‘‘by approximately June 15–20 I plan to

begin a massive transfer of troops to the west from your borders.’’ He asked

Stalin ‘‘not to give in to any provocations that might emanate from those of

my generals who might have forgotten their duty. And, it goes without

saying, try not to give them any cause. If it becomes impossible to avoid

provocation by some of my generals, I ask you to show restraint, to not

respond but to advise me immediately of what has happened through the

channel known to you.’’

The phrase noted by Zhukov, ‘‘on my honor as a chief of state,’’ would

seem to authenticate the excerpts in the
Krasnaia Zvezda
article. The issue,

however, is more complicated. The excerpts also appear, word for word, in

SECRET LETTERS

189

Bunich’s novel, which purports to reproduce the entire text of the letter.

(English translations of both the December 1940 and the May 1941 letters

can be found in appendix 2.)7

Zhukov told Simonov that Hitler responded to a letter Stalin wrote at

the beginning of 1941 expressing concern over the presence of large num-

bers of German troops in Soviet border areas. Hitler’s December 31, 1940,

letter may have been that response. The phrase ‘‘on my honor as a chief of

state’’ appears not in that letter, however, but in the May 14, 1941, letter, the

last one from Hitler. This confusion is not surprising since Zhukov’s mem-

ory may have dimmed, but he may also have been repeating what Stalin

told him. Zhukov’s statements to Simonov do indeed reflect Hitler’s expla-

nations for the German troop presence in Soviet border areas, but no

mention is made of Hitler’s intentions toward Great Britain, which figure

prominently in both letters. Stalin may not have wished to reveal an aspect

of German military planning that Hitler expected him to keep confidential;

on the other hand, if Lev Bezymensky’s recollection of his 1966 meeting

with Zhukov is correct and Zhukov did read portions of the Hitler-Stalin

correspondence in June 1941, it is surprising that Zhukov said nothing to

either Simonov or Bezymensky of Hitler’s statements about attacking En-

gland. Zhukov would have immediately understood their significance.

The May 14 letter, then, might be seen as the final masterpiece in a

gallery of disinformation. By confiding in Stalin that some of his generals

might launch an unauthorized provocative attack and asking Stalin not to

respond in kind, Hitler virtually dictated the scenario Stalin followed in the

first hours after the invasion. By the same token, it was tragic for the

Soviets that Timoshenko, Zhukov, and those around them—knowing what

they knew of the extent of German preparations and aware, as military pro-

fessionals, that an offensive across thousands of kilometers could never

have been undertaken as a ‘‘provocation’’ by a few dissident German gen-

erals—could not change the views of their stubborn leader. At a minimum,

these Hitler letters, if genuine, demonstrate that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

was right when he wrote that Stalin, who trusted no one, did in fact ‘‘trust

Adolf Hitler.’’8

There is another aspect of the May 14 letter that demands attention.

The penultimate paragraph reads: ‘‘I thank you for having agreed with me

on the question known to you and I ask you to forgive me for the method I

have chosen for delivering this letter to you as quickly as possible.’’9 Very

likely the ‘‘method . . . for delivering’’ the letter refers to the unscheduled

flight on May 15, 1941, of a Junkers transport to Moscow. In the Bunich

190

SECRET LETTERS

novel, it is depicted as a courier plane carrying the letter to Stalin.10 In any

case, a German JU-52 aircraft made its way through Soviet airspace, un-

detected and apparently unauthorized, and, against all regulations, landed

at the central airfield. Here it was not only allowed to land but also refueled

for its return trip and permitted to leave Soviet airspace. These actions

were obviously at Stalin’s behest. Kept in the closest secrecy, the official

permission extended to the plane was unknown to all but a very few. This

intrusion of Soviet airspace immediately became a sensation within the

defense establishment.11

According to a statement by the Defense Commissariat, because of

poor organization the early-warning posts of the Fourth Separate PVO

(National Air Defense) Brigade of the Western Special Military District

detected the JU-52 only after it had penetrated twenty-nine kilometers into

Soviet airspace. Mistaking the JU-52 for a commercial aircraft, a DC-3, on

a routine flight, they failed to notify anyone of the intrusion. Although the

Belostok airport had been informed of the JU-52 flight (we do not know by

whom), it did not pass the information on to PVO or to the Ninth Mixed Air

Division (responsible for interception) because its communications were

down. Similarly, senior officers of PVO Moscow did not learn of the flight

until May 17 even though a PVO Moscow duty officer had been advised by

a Civil Air Fleet dispatcher that the aircraft had passed over Belostok. In

addition, the Defense Commissariat report went on, the Red Army air

forces took no measures to halt it. Moreover, the chief of staff of the air

forces, Major General Pavel S. Volodin, and the chief of the First Depart-

ment of the staff, Major General Vladimir D. Grendal, knew that the air-

craft had crossed the frontier without authorization. They not only failed

to take measures to detain it but assisted its flight to Moscow by giving

orders to PVO to ensure its safe arrival and by permitting it to land at a

Moscow airfield. How could this have happened? Whatever the truth of the

matter, the incident was treated as a major failure of the air defense system

and the Red Army’s air forces.12

On June 7 Colonel General Grigory M. Shtern, the air defense chief,

was arrested. (Chief since March 19, he had assumed his new position only

to discover that air defenses were in abysmal shape.) On June 10, the

Defense Commissariat, in NKO Order No. 0035, reprimanded Volodin and

Grendal for having given the ‘‘JU-52 unauthorized permission for the flight

and for landing in Moscow without having checked its right for such a

flight.’’13 On June 27 Volodin was arrested, and on October 28 he was shot

without trial along with Shtern and others.14

SECRET LETTERS

191

It seems evident that for a transport aircraft the size of the JU-52 (note

that it had been mistaken for a Douglas DC-3) to have flown through Soviet

airspace unchallenged from the western border to Moscow would have

been a near miracle. For it to have landed safely in Moscow, been refueled,

and been allowed to leave soon after its arrival without a major PVO inves-

tigation seems incredible. It can be postulated, therefore, that Stalin, who

was awaiting a response from Hitler to one of his letters, gave the order to

allow the JU-52 to proceed to Moscow, land, and be refueled for its return

flight. He would not, of course, have said a word about a communication

from Hitler. When the story of the ‘‘unauthorized’’ JU-52 flight began to

leak out, causing an outcry in PVO and the air forces, Stalin acted imme-

diately to take advantage of the situation, moving first against Shtern,

whom he had long disliked, and then against Volodin. As air forces chief of

staff, Volodin may have known that Stalin was behind the safe arrival and

departure of the flight. By the time of Volodin’s arrest on June 27, five days

after the invasion, Stalin would have realized he had been cruelly deceived

by Hitler. The flight was testimony to that fact. It was imperative he get rid

of Volodin, who knew too much and could not be allowed to survive. Far-

fetched? Not if one considers Stalin’s passion for conspiracy and his ability

to wait patiently for the right moment and then act quickly to achieve his

ends. He would never have allowed it to become known that he had been

naïve enough to have fallen for Hitler’s disinformation.15

∞Ω

C H A P T E R

The Purges Revived

When Proskurov was relieved of his position as

chief of military intelligence back in July 1940 and an order came down

placing him at the disposition of the Defense Commissariat, he became a

man without a job.1 An order of this type was issued when Stalin or the top

military brass had not yet decided on an officer’s next assignment. For a

man with the energy and determination of Proskurov, this distance from

the action was hard to take. The fact that the air forces were undergoing a

reorganization favored by many senior officers made it that much harder.

He wanted to be part of the planning. A decree of the Council of People’s

Commissars dated July 25, 1940, ordained that the air division would be

the basic organizational structure of the Red Army’s air forces.

This changeover was to be fully completed by January 1, 1941, and

would involve an increase of over 60,000 personnel in the Red Army air

forces. Proskurov would surely have learned of the reorganization from

his friends in the air forces, particularly those with whom he had served in

Spain. Although he could not participate in the implementation of the new

decree, he must surely have followed the action closely, even from afar.

Still, he very much wanted a new assignment and he must have pushed

hard to get one. Therefore, it was no surprise when word came of a Sep-

tember 9, 1940, order appointing him deputy chief of aviation for the Far

Eastern Front. Nothing happened, however; written on the original of the

document were these words: ‘‘Hold until further notice.’’2 Instead, on Octo-

THE PURGES REVIVED

193

ber 23 Proskurov was appointed deputy to the chief of the Main Directo-